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Abstract

The overwhelming majority of theorists addressing questions of the morality
of war do so from within the moral framework provided by Just War Theory
(JWT): a normative account of war that dates back over 1500 years in the
Western Tradition. However, today’s iterations of Just War Theory are
markedly different from those of its intellectual ancestors. Specifically, today’s
accounts tend not to consider matters of moral virtue, personal excellence,
moral psychology, or human flourishing – that is, aretaic matters – to be
worthy subjects of discussion. Instead, they prefer to focus overtly on
questions of law, justice, and human rights – deontological questions – as if
they were the entire purview of a comprehensive morality of war.

I explore some of the major theorists in the history of Western JWT, showing
that the ancestors of today’s just war theories did consider aretaic matters – in
particular the moral virtues – to be of central importance to the morality of
war. I also show how and why it came to be that deontological and aretaic
discussions became fragmented in contemporary JWT.

In order to demonstrate how this fragmentation is problematic, I consider
deontological ethics’ connection to aretaic ethics. I explain how contemporary
JWT tends to conceptualise rights, emphasising the central place of intention
in those theories. I show how aretaic ethics can enrich deontological appraisals
of ongoing debates in military ethics.
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Finally, I make a positive case for aretaic ethics by identifying new questions
that aretaic ethics reveals to JWT, those being: the complexity of the identity
of soldiers, how moral character and identity can help prevent moral
transgressions, and the moral and psychological trauma suffered by many
soldiers and veterans. I argue that aretaic modes of thinking help to explain
moral transgressions of soldiers and the psychological difficulties that
veterans can experience post-war.

Deontological and aretaic ethics also interact in the three professions most
relevant to waging war: soldiers, commanders, and political leaders. I show
how the virtues are necessary character traits in order to guarantee that
warfighters and their political leaders can be relied on to fulfil their
professional duties. Aretaic ethical analysis is also able to provide conceptual
understanding of supererogatory actions.

Contemporary just war theorists would be wise to re-integrate aretaic ethics
into their considerations of the morality of war. Aretaic ethics can be combined
seamlessly and productively with deontological ethics, yielding more robust
and intelligible responses to the most pressing controversies facing military
ethics today. Rights and deontology present crucial elements of the ethics war,
but they can be ably complemented by insights from aretaic ethics;
specifically, matters of character and the moral development of the agent.
Furthermore, incorporating aretaic ethics into JWT enables theorists to utilise
that framework to consider matters currently outside of its purview, but
which are of growing relevance to military practice.
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O valiant hearts who to your

Eternal Father, strong to save,

glory came

Whose arm hath bound the restless

Through dust of conflict and

wave,

through battle flame;

Who bidd'st the mighty ocean deep

Tranquil you lie, your knightly

Its own appointed limits keep;

virtue proved,

Oh, hear us when we cry to Thee,

Your memory hallowed in the

For those in peril on the sea!
-

land you loved.
-

Oh Valiant Hearts
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Chapter One

Introduction

As a work of moral philosophy,1 throughout this thesis I make use of
particular language, concepts, and theories drawn from that discipline. Some
of the concepts, like ‘virtue’ or ‘character’, are defined differently by different
theorists or fields of study. It will therefore be important to clarify what I mean
by particular terms, and how I utilise particular concepts. I begin by
introducing and contrasting deontological, consequentialist, and aretaic ethics
before moving to discussion of the general territory of military ethics;
specifically, the debate between realism, pacifism, and Just War Theory
(JWT).2 In some cases, my discussions will allude to matters about which there
are differing opinions and ongoing debates – at those times I acknowledge
those debates, but delving into them deeply will do little to serve my purposes
here. This opening chapter establishes two things: first, the operational
meaning of key concepts employed throughout this thesis, and secondly, the

There is debate regarding the correct usage of ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ in some spheres of
academic philosophy. Bernard Williams, for instance, saw ‘morality’ as best represented by
the work of Immanuel Kant, and closely connected to the concepts of obligation and blame.
Ethics, by contrast, was sympathetic to the Aristotelian project of describing the good life
broadly with respect to projects, emotions, virtues, and so on. See: Bernard Williams, Ethics
and the Limits of Philosophy, (Oxon: Routedge, 2006), especially Chapter 10, ‘Morality, the
Peculiar Institution’, 193-182. However, insofar as there is no consistent usage of the terms
‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ amongst the many theorists I discuss in this thesis, I do not take a
position on this debate. Instead, I treat the terms morality and ethics as equivalent, and use
them interchangeably throughout the work.
2 Hereafter, I use ‘JWT’ to describe Just War Theory as a general set of principles that unify a
large number of theorists. I use “just war theory” without capitals to describe the theory of a
particular theorist; e.g. “Beard’s just war theory.’
1
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conceptual position of the thesis within the discipline of philosophical applied
ethics (also known as moral philosophy).

Although at times I speculate about matters of significance to fields such as
history, international relations, political science, literature, and psychology, I
only do so when it has bearing upon the moral significance of the issue at hand.
Moral philosophy, or ethics, is a sub-discipline of philosophy concerned with
questions of right and wrong, the nature of happiness, and – most importantly
for this thesis – questions of good or evil dispositions and choices made by
people. It prompts us to ask questions such as: how should I live; how should I
act; how should other people be treated; which actions are morally good ones?

Most relevant to this thesis is the sub-discipline of moral philosophy known
as ‘applied ethics.’ This branch of ethics considers how our understanding of
right and wrong underpins specific walks of life, such as business, medicine,
sport, or the military. Thus the existence of applied fields like ‘business ethics’
and ‘military ethics.’ Sometimes actions which would be unjustifiable in
everyday life are subject to different considerations because of the role a
person is serving: thus, whilst almost everyone would agree that cheating in
an exam is wrong, many will see cheating in a sports match (diving in football,
for example) morally permissible (even if against the spirit of sportsmanship).
This is a more specific manifestation of the question how should I behave?
Specifically, it asks how should I behave in a particular practice/profession?

2

This thesis will focus largely on the specific applied field of military ethics, but
it will also address questions regarding how one ought to live. It will explore
what the good life consists of for those engaged in waging wars, and how the
process of waging war might make living a good life more difficult. In the
course of this exploration, some facts about war will become relevant, for
instance the growing rates of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder3 (PTSD) in
veterans. Large portions of this thesis will deal with the questions of how
individual warfighters and political leaders should and should not behave,
the reasons why certain acts should be performed and others not, and how to
encourage people to do the right thing, even when it is hard. However, these
questions will be undertaken in subsequent chapters. In this chapter, I focus
on the basic theories most relevant to this thesis: deontological ethics,
consequentialism, aretaic ethics, and military ethics.

1: Approaches to Moral Philosophy

1.1: Deontological and Consequentialist Ethics

Deontology, coming from the ancient Greek deon, meaning duty, is a moral
system premised on the claim that morality consists in adhering to certain
rules of behaviour. Most deontologists argue that “what makes a choice right

I use the term “disorder” in conformity with the most recent iteration of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders’ (DSM-5) description. I note, however, that this is
a contested point, as some within the military seek to re-categorise PTSD as ‘Post-Traumatic
Stress Injury’. My use of the term disorder here is not intended to weigh into that debate in
any way, although I consider it an important matter.
3
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is its conformity with a moral norm. Such norms are to be simply obeyed by
each moral agent.”4 Typically associated with the Enlightenment philosopher
Immanual Kant, deontology argues that moral agents (who are usually
defined as rational beings) have absolute moral duties regarding the way that
moral agents should be treated.

Kant’s duties include prescriptions against any action which treats a person as
a means (or instrument) to my own ends. These include (for example)
forbidding murder, lying, and stealing because they treat people only as tools
or obstacles on the way to achieving my own personal goals. Not only does
deontology require a person to act (or not act) in certain ways, but it holds that
people have a duty or obligation to act in those ways.5 Thus, what compels a
person to do what is right is the fact that he6 is obligated to do so. These duties,
furthermore, are a product of our reason: moral laws refer simply to acting as
a rational, morally autonomous agent would act if he were always acting as
such.

Although deontology is often associated with Kantian philosophy, it can also
refer simply to any approach to morality which understands good actions to

Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, ‘Deontological Ethics’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2012, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/>.
5 Brian Orend, ‘The Rules of War’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 21, iss. 4, 2007, 471-476
at 473.
6 Throughout this thesis I use the masculine pronoun in cases such as this. My reasons for
doing so are twofold: first, because repeatedly using “his or her” will prove clumsy and
logistically problematic due to word restrictions, and secondly because although things are
changing in the West, the overwhelming majority of military practitioners today still tend to
be men. However, I recognise that this is not a perfect solution to a problem that is much
contested within academic practice. I hope, however, that it will not be taken to be offensive
by any reader.
4

4

be those which adhere to an unwavering set of rules. Thus, the set of moral
requirements laid out by the Ten Commandments presents a set of
deontological requirements. This is why many ethicists describe deontology
as a “rule-based ethic.”7 Also important is that deontology is not usually
concerned with the consequences of an action; at least not enough for the
consequences to justify acting against one’s duty.8 It does not matter if killing
one person allows me to save one hundred people, to kill one person would
be to violate the duty (rule) against killing. It is therefore forbidden. An
exception to this rule is the theory known as “threshold deontology”: “A
threshold deontologist holds that deontological norms govern up to a point
despite adverse consequences; but when the consequences become so dire that
they cross the stipulated threshold, consequentialism takes over.”9 Threshold
deontology has found sympathy amongst many military ethicists, evidenced
by discussions of “supreme emergencies,” which will be explored throughout
this thesis. The centrality of rules in deontology has also found manifestation
in the military in a specific form: the form of codified laws that regulate how
states and individuals conduct themselves during war.

Threshold deontology is a manifestation of deontological ethics that makes
concessions to a different moral theory known as consequentialism.
Consequentialism argues that actions are judged as good or bad based solely

C.f. Maheran Zakaria & Norhaini Mat Lajis, ‘Moral Philosophies Underlying Ethical
Judgments’, International Journal of Marketing Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, 2012, 103-110 at 103; Peter
Olsthoorn & Rene Moelker, ‘Virtue Ethics and Military Ethics’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol.
6, no. 4, 2007, 257-258 at 257.
8 Alexander & Moore, op. cit.
9 Ibid.
7
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on the outcomes they yield.10 This mode of thinking, is described by one of its
early proponents, John-Stuart Mill, as:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals “utility” or the “greatest
happiness principle” [and which] holds that actions are right in proportion as
they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by
happiness, pain and the privation of pleasure […] what things it includes in the
ideas of pain and pleasure, and to what extent […] is left an open question. But
these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this
theory of morality is grounded.11

Consequentialism (also called utilitarianism)12 is commonly described by the
catch-cry ‘the greatest good for the greatest number.’ When evaluating what
one should do in a particular circumstance, a person ought to consider the
various possible consequences on all the people involved, and choose the
course of action that maximises the amount of happiness enjoyed. In the
context of military ethics, consequentialism may justify, for instance, an air
strike destroying a village housing both insurgents and large numbers of
civilians. In this case, the deaths of the civilians are weighed against the
benefits of killing the insurgents (including the civilians those insurgents are

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ‘Consequentialism’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/>.
11 John-Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in Steven M. Cahn & Peter Markie (eds.), Ethics: History,
Theory, and Contemporary Issues (3rd edition), (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 320.
12 I am aware that using this terminology interchangeably is a vexed matter and that the
differences are a matter of debate. However, insofar as (i) the outcome of that debate will
have no impact on this work, and (ii) many of the theorists I treat throughout this thesis use
the terms in different ways, I treat them as synonymous for the purposes of this discussion.
10
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likely to kill in the future): the fact that the latter outweighs the former justifies
the action.

Whilst consequentialism reveals that the outcomes of the deeds that we
undertake are of relevance to moral evaluations of those deeds, in many ways
JWT exists as a safeguard against unchecked consequentialism of the kind
described above. Michael Walzer, perhaps the most influential just war
theorist alive today, argued that:

[T]he limits of utility […] don’t explain the most critical of the judgements we
make of soldiers and their generals. If they did, moral life in wartime would be
a great deal easier than it is. […] soldiers [are invited] to calculate costs and
benefits only up to a point, and at that point it establishes a series of clearcut rules
– moral fortifications, so to speak, that can only be stormed at great moral cost.13

Walzer acknowledges simultaneously the moral importance of consequences
and the need to refrain from investing them with the sum total of moral value.
And indeed, as we will come to see, JWT also holds consequences to be
morally significant in both the political decision to go to war and in the waging
of war. However, despite the moral status of consequences in JWT, I do not
spend as much time discussing consequentialism as I do focussing on
deontological and aretaic ethics. The reasons for this are twofold. First, I
believe that politicians and warfighters who acted in accord with a coherent
account of the deontological and aretaic ethics of war will consider

13

Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th edition), (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 130.
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consequences

appropriately;

that

is,

JWT

can

adequately

satisfy

consequentialist concerns within aretaic and deontological frameworks.

Secondly, this thesis considers how JWT has fragmented over time and
addresses problematic consequences of that fragmentation, none of which
emanate directly from its interaction with consequentialist modes of thinking.
Rather, I hold that it is problematic appraisals of deontological and aretaic
matters that present as the most serious problems for contemporary just war
theorists. Even where consequentialism appears to be part of the problem (as
in, for instance, the growth of threshold deontology), it is a much smaller
problem than the fundamental flaws in our considerations of aretaic and
deontological concerns.

Military ethics has had a long and complex relationship with deontology that
continues today. This is in part because some of the first military ethicists, at
least in the Western tradition, were Christian moral theologians and
proponents of the moral theory known as natural law. Natural law theory
holds that all human beings inherently (and inevitably) tend toward certain
goods, and that morality consists in achieving those goods (such as life,
friendship, knowledge, leisure, and so on) in a manner that accords with
reason.14 The existence of these basic goods as the goal (or telos) of human
activity, and which are derived from and constitutive of human nature, form

C.f. Mark Murphy, ‘The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2011, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/>; Germain Grisez,
Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth & Ultimate Ends’, American
Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 32, 1987,99-151; Robert George, ‘Natural Law and Human
Nature’ in Robert George, (ed.), Natural Law Theory: Contemporary Essays, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1994.
14
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particular normative requirements regarding how one ought to behave (for
instance, because life is a basic good, one ought not to intentionally destroy
life). This is where the law component of natural law emerges.

This is important to explain because it is the concept of law that gives military
ethics the strong relationship with deontology that it has today. As we will see
in the following chapter, it was later natural law theorists who began the
project of developing a codified Law of War. These laws represented absolute
moral responsibilities for soldiers, political leaders, prisoners of war, priests,
noncombatants, and others. Good conduct consisted in obedience to the law,
whilst unethical conduct was understood as a breach in the law. In the modern
period, these laws have come to be based in rights. The laws of war, which are
now enshrined in positive international law, are designed to protect the rights
of both states and individuals from being unjustly harmed during war.

As such, deontological ethics serves to explain (i) what duties are incumbent
on those involved in war, and therefore what the laws of armed conflict should
be; (ii) where those duties come from (in the case of modern JWT, as we will
see in chapter three, duties are grounded in the moral rights of individuals);
and (iii) whether a particular action serves to violate a duty or not. We will see
in the third section of this chapter that in the most common formulation of
JWT deontological norms manifest in the form of a variety of different
principles of conduct: each of these principles is a moral duty that applies
universally to those involved in waging war.

9

1.2: Aretaic Ethics

The second moral philosophical theory that will be relevant to this thesis is
aretaic ethics. I use the term aretaic to refer to this area of moral philosophy
after the Ancient Greek word arete, meaning virtue, or “the goodness or
excellence of a thing.”15 The term ‘aretaic’ is here understood broadly to
include (to borrow from Martha Nussbaum) “concern for the role of motives
and passions in good choice, a concern for character, and a concern for the
whole course of an agent's life.”16 William Frankena describes aretaic
reasoning by distinguishing it from deontological reasoning:

In some of our moral judgments, we say that a certain action or kind of action is
morally right, wrong, obligatory, a duty, or ought or ought not to be done. In
others we talk, not about actions or kinds of action, but about persons, motives,
intentions, traits of character, and the like, and we say of them that they are
morally good, bad, virtuous, vicious, responsible, blameworthy, saintly,
despicable, and so on. In these two kinds of judgment, the things talked about
are different and what is said about them is different. […] I shall call the
former judgments of moral obligation or deontic judgments and the latter judgments
of moral value or aretaic judgments.17

Simon Blackburn, ‘Arete’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 22.
16 C.f. Martha Nussbaum, ‘Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?’, The Journal of Ethics, vol.
3, no. 3, 1999, 163-201 at 163.
17 William Frankena, Ethics (2nd edition), (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 9.
15
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David L. Perry describes aretaic judgements as focussing “on motives and
character traits rather than right or wrong actions.”18 However, it is more
accurate to describe aretaic judgments as being concerned with the interaction
of motives and character traits with right or wrong actions. Aretaic ethics
considers (i) how the motives, dispositions, feelings, and character of the
person can influence the type of actions that person will perform; and (ii) the
inverse: how actions serve to shape subsequent motives, dispositions, feelings,
and character. These two matters are evaluated insofar as they support or
undermine the project of living a morally good life.

For the ancient Greeks, in particular Aristotle, each thing in existence –
humans included – possesses a function (ergon) which it is intended to
perform. For instance, the function of an apple tree might be said to be the
production of apples. This function is its purpose, or end (telos). Arete, or
virtue, consists in those traits which assist in achieving one’s telos. However,
this means that arete differs with each different thing: virtue is not always the
same. To understand what virtues are for human beings, we must understand
what the telos of human beings is. This, Aristotle argues, is wellbeing: “activity
of the soul [reason] in conformity with excellence […] in a complete life.”19

David L. Perry, Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation,
(Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, 2009), 5.
19 Aristotle trans. Jonathan Barnes, Nicomachean Ethics, in Jonathan Barnes (ed.), The Complete
Works of Aristotle: Volume Two, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995), Bk. 7,
1098a16-19. All references to Aristotle’s works hereafter are from Barnes’ two-volume
translation. Aristotle in fact uses the word eudaimonia, but for reasons explained later in this
section, I use the ‘well-being’ instead.
18
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Wellbeing attempts to address the question that economists today call ‘quality
of life’ – that is, the overall standard of a person’s life, all things considered.
For Aristotle, quality of life was determined by assessing how consistent a life
had been with the activities that best typify human nature: activities in accord
with the virtues. However, this is not the only way to assess quality of life, and
wellbeing is, even amongst philosophers interested in aretaic ethics, a loaded
and controversial concept. Rosalind Hursthouse explains why:

[W]ellbeing is, avowedly, a moralized, or “value-laden” concept of happiness,
something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth
seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be
substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life
that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite
their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur.20

Because wellbeing, in this context, relies on a specific account of human nature
and the virtues that lead to human flourishing, it differs substantially from
modern accounts. A person who is, by Aristotle’s standards, mediocre or even
vicious21 may still be considered happy under modern conceptions, which
accept more subjective accounts of what constitutes happiness. Which account
is the correct one is a question not directly relevant to this thesis. Instead, I use
the concept of wellbeing to describe, literally, the process of living well. This
is helpful because unlike happiness or flourishing, wellbeing is free of

Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue Ethics’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#2>.
21 Today, the word vicious is commonly taken to mean mean-spirited or spiteful. In this
context, however, it is a description of acts that are characterised by a moral vice: i.e.
bullying is vicious, but so is over-eating gluttonously during meals.
20

12

normative weight: for example, a person’s psychological wellbeing is not
necessarily a reflection on their moral character whereas their flourishing, at
least by Aristotle’s standards, is. Similarly, wellbeing is not so vague or
fleeting a concept as happiness: a red light when running late or missing the
first five minutes of a favourite TV show might be enough to make someone
unhappy, but it is unlikely to threaten their wellbeing. Furthermore, wellbeing
is, unlike happiness, something that can be assessed according to criteria.
Whether or not a person feels happy is subjective; however, whether or not a
person can be described as having wellbeing (or ‘living well’) can be assessed
based on a number of criteria, some of which are subjective, but others that
are objective. Some of the criteria of wellbeing that will be explored
specifically in this thesis are: moral virtue, psychological stability, physical
health, a sense of acceptance amongst one’s peers and community, subjective
experience of satisfaction at one’s life, positive self-esteem, a certain level of
cognitive ability, and harmony between the various things a person commits
to in his life.

Aristotle argued that arete, or virtue, consists in those traits that enable a thing
to behave in a way harmonious with their nature, thus leading to a state of
wellbeing. Thus for the carpenter, whose purpose is to craft objects from
wood, arete consists in the ability to seamlessly connect different pieces of
wood, to have an artistic eye, a steady hand, and so on. The excellent human
life, however, consists of excellences of a variety of different kinds. Wellbeing
will consist in a person’s possessing all of the excellences relevant to a person’s
life: physical health, skill in their crafts, and, particularly importantly for
ethicists, virtue. The virtues, habits that direct a person toward excellence,
define a person’s character and make it easier for them to behave well.

13

Given that this is a thesis on military ethics, and is thus largely concerned with
action, why not simply focus on the moral virtues? Why be concerned with
aretaic judgements about wellbeing as opposed to simply discussing virtue
ethics? After all, are virtues like courage, justice, benevolence, self-discipline,
and loyalty not the most important aretaic factors when discussing the ethics
of war? In part, this is true: much of this thesis will focus on the moral virtues
and the virtuous character of military practitioners. However, to limit
discussion only to those areas is to overlook the various ways in which the
military life affects and shapes wellbeing. This is one way in which aretaic
ethics is broader than virtue ethics, as MacIntyre explains:

Plato in both the Gorgias and the Republic looked back to Socrates and asserted
that “it is better to suffer tortures on the rack than to have a soul burdened with
the guilt of doing evil.” Aristotle does not confront this position directly: he
merely emphasizes that it is better still both to be free from having done evil and
to be free from being tortured on the rack.22

Similarly, although it is better that military practitioners possess moral
virtues, it is better still that they possess all the necessary elements of
wellbeing, and that the military life contribute positively to the wellbeing of
military personnel. Thus, an aretaic approach to military ethics considers not
only the basic questions of right and wrong present in deontological ethical
theories, but the overall quality of a life, and what elements are necessary in
order to have a life worth living. These, as I have said, are likely to include a
certain level of physical health and fitness, psychological stability, a degree of

22

Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, (Oxon: Routledge, 2002), 58, emphasis added.
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intellectual prowess and curiosity, subjective feelings of happiness and
contentment (albeit not all the time), and the cultivation of a noble and
virtuous character.

It in is this final aspect – the cultivation of character – where aretaic ethics
relies most heavily on the ethical tradition known as virtue ethics. Unlike
deontological ethics, virtue ethics does not defer to external, universallybinding principles to determine how a person ought to act; rather, as Stephen
Coleman explains:

Virtue Ethics focuses on the character of the moral agent. For a virtue theorist the
intention of the moral agent will be important, but consequences, principles and
duties may also be important depending on the situation. According to virtue
ethics theories an action is right if, and only if, it is what a moral agent with a
virtuous character would do in the circumstances.23

Although this understanding of virtue ethics is correct, it can be misleading.
Virtue ethicists will ponder what the virtuous person would do in given
situations, but they will only do so after having contemplated the nature of
the virtues themselves. Thus, what is first required is a description of what
habits constitute the virtuous person. Aristotle held the virtues to be the mean
state between excesses:24 thus, if the extreme responses to fear are cowardice
and recklessness, then courage is the rational mid-point between these two

Stephen Coleman, Military Ethics: An Introduction with Case Studies, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 24.
24 Christopher Shields, Aristotle, (London: Routledge, 2007), 327.
23
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excesses. Importantly though, determining what the mean state between
excesses is must take into account the particularities of the individual and the
circumstances.25 This requires a person to exercise phronesis – practical reason
or prudence – to determine what behaviour, in the particular situation, is an
instantiation of virtue. This is why people who are experienced are more likely
to practise the virtues than those who are not; for this reason Aristotle thought
young men to be ill-suited to politics.26

Finally, not all morally good acts are necessarily virtuous. Some people will
do the right thing out of commitment to law, fear of punishment, or for
personal gain. This does not mean they have done wrong, nor does it mean
their action was virtuous; rather, as MacIntyre notes, the virtuous person
“does what is virtuous because it is virtuous.”27 Acting virtuously over time
forms dispositions of character such that acting virtuously becomes habitual.
This is what it means to call a person virtuous, “a man is virtuous if he would
behave in such and such a way if such and such a situation were to occur.”28
Thus,

[v]irtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in
particular ways. To act virtuously is not [...] to act against inclination; it is to act
from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues [through practice].29

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106a36-b7.
MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, op cit., 57.
27 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (3rd edition), (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
2007), 149.
28 MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, op cit., 58.
29 MacIntyre, After Virtue, op cit., 149.
25
26
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The cultivation of moral virtues helps to ensure that agents are the type of
people whose first inclination in a situation is to do what is right; they feel
compelled to act virtuously because that is the type of person they are. The
cultivation of this type of character, alongside a certain level of physical,
intellectual, and psychological excellence and subjective feelings of
satisfaction with one’s life are the constitutive elements of wellbeing with
which this thesis will be concerned.

2: Just War Theory

In this section I introduce JWT, the dominant framework through which war
is morally evaluated. Rather than being unified by a particular set of truth
claims (as many theories are), JWT is “a two-thousand year-old conversation
about the legitimacy of war that has over time crystallized around several core
principles and sub-traditions.”30 Part of what unifies these theories is the basic
claim that under certain conditions, war can be a morally justifiable practice
and that virtuous people can be justified in being engaged in war. They are
also, and perhaps more iconically unified by the division of the morality of
war into different conditions and categories. The major categories are: jus ad
bellum – when resorting to war is a morally legitimate option; jus in bello – the
morally correct way in which wars should be fought; and the more recent jus
post bellum – the morally appropriate way to end war and transition to peace.
Although jus post bellum is a question of growing importance (and

30

Alex Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 2.
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discussion),31 this thesis is concerned primarily with ad bellum and in bello
matters, and so my discussion of JWT is limited to these two categories.

2.1: Jus ad Bellum

Jus ad bellum is concerned with those matters that are necessary in order for
the decision to go to war to be a morally good or permissible one. For this
reason, it has typically been considered the domain of political leaders. 32 In
order for a war to be permissible, it must satisfy a series of different conditions.
Adherence to every condition is necessary for a war to be deemed just: failing
to satisfy just one is sufficient to render a war unjust. As Fotion explains, these
conditions “act as hurdles to be cleared before a nation can say that it has
justice on its side when it enters a war.”33 The six conditions that populate jus
ad bellum discussions are: just cause, right intention, legitimate authority,
proportionality, probability of success, and last resort.

C.f. Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum #1: Justice after War’ & ‘Jus Post Bellum #2: Coercive
Regime Change in The Morality of War, op cit. & ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Journal of Social Philosophy,
vol. 31, no. 1, 2002, 117-137; Gary J. Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol.
32, no. 4, 2004, 384-412; Larry May & Elizabeth Edenburg (eds.), Jus Post Bellum and
Transitional Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Larry May, After War
Ends: A Philosophical Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
32 In the modern era, this view has been challenged by a school of thought known as just war
revisionism, especially in: Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009);
David Rodin, War & Self-Defense, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
33 Fotion, op cit., 10.
31
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2.1.1: Just Cause

Discussions of jus ad bellum usually begin with the “just cause” criterion, to
which a great deal of attention is focussed; its usefulness lies in the granting
of a prima facie license for political groups to wage war in response to particular
wrongs and only in response to those wrongs.

In the modern climate, responding to “aggression” – a term that has both legal
and moral definitions, but which generally describes the violation of the rights
of one nation by another – is the almost-universally accepted standard of just
cause. The origins of this view lie in the “theory of aggression” presented by
Walzer, which restricts the legitimate use of war to responding to acts of
aggression.34

However, although responding to aggression is certainly a just cause, it may
not be the only just cause.35 What describes just cause is, in short, that a nation
declaring war has a reason that amounts to a justification. Many reasons can
be offered for war – national power, resources, racial superiority, religious
aspirations, but none are sufficient to justify the horrors of war. The just cause
condition emphasises that war’s devastation can only be justified by the
commission of very severe wrongs.

C.f. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 51-53.
Charles Guthrie & Michael Quinlan describe several different reasons that have, at
different times, constituted just cause. See: Guthrie & Quinlan, Just War, The Just War
Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), 17-18.
34
35
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2.1.2: Right Intention

The right intention criterion speaks directly to the state of mind of the agent
when he makes his decision. St. Thomas Aquinas, a just war theorist from the
13th century, argued that war is only just if it is fought with the right
intentions.36 The intention that political leaders require when resorting to war
is, as Michael Quinlan puts it, “to create a much better, more just, subsequent
peace than there would have been if we had not gone to war.”37 There are
several reasons for this: first, because wars fought from wrong intentions –
even if they happen to produce good outcomes – are morally bad actions and,
for this reason alone, ought to be avoided. Even if no civilians are killed, and
nobody tortured, every death occurring in a wrongly-intended war is the
product of the private – and wrongful – intentions of a certain group of people,
and is therefore needless. Second, wars that are fought from evil intentions
make evil actions such as torture and attacks on civilians more likely.38

Intention is the positive commitment of mind to bring about a particular state
of affairs. When a political leader decides to resort to war, he may do so
because analysts have determined that it would increase his likelihood of
being re-elected. However, it would be wrong to describe the political leader’s
intention as being to be re-elected: he was motivated by re-election, but the

Thomas Aquinas trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Summa Theologica,
1920, <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/index.html>. All references to the Summa
Theologica hereafter will be from this version and will be cited in the following form:
Aquinas, ST, Part #, Q. #, Art. #.
37 Michael Quinlan, ‘Justifying War’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58, iss. 1,
2004, 7-15 at 9.
38 Darrell Cole, ‘War and Intention’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 10, iss. 3, 2011, 174-191 at
174; Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 47-48.
36
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resort to war was still the direct object of his intention. Intention refers to
precisely what I aim to do; motive refers to why I aim to do it, including the
wishes, emotions, and interests that surround and explain my intention. This
is important because although political leaders are required to have right
intentions, they are not required to have good motivations: as Quinlan argues,
“it is entirely possible to do the right thing amid imperfect motivations.”39
Thus, although a political leader may only declare war with the intention of
bringing about a just state of peace, the reasons why he desires a just peace
may vary.

Note that the political leader who seeks a boost in his polling numbers by
authorising war is said to intend the war. This is because when we choose to
perform an action instrumentally – that is, as a means to access some other good
(for example, war being the means to achieve improved polling), we intend
both the means and the ends of the action. Thus, right intention – properly
understood – stipulates that political leaders authorise war in order to bring
about peace and justice, but must intend peace and justice to be brought about
through morally acceptable means.

2.1.3: Legitimate Authority

For a war to be just, it must be publicly declared by an authority that has legal
and moral authority to do so. Typically, the right to declare war has been
restricted to the political leaders of states, thus meaning that only states can
39

Quinlan, ‘Justifying War’, op cit., 12.
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fight just wars. However, this is a matter of some debate and contention: after
all, surely a revolution that overthrows an unjust regime through civil war can
be justified. Furthermore, for the last decade the United States has been
engaged in a ‘War on Al Qaeda’ - a non-state actor; this has given rise to a new
wave of examination surrounding legitimate authority and statehood: are
states the only groups who can wage war? Brian Orend suggests that all wars
are fought between “political communities,” defined as states or groups with
political interests or that aspire to be states.40 However, can non-state political
communities fight just wars? This question of legitimate authority remains
open, and is not one this thesis will address. However, what is noteworthy is
that the primary concern here is with regard to the declarant’s legitimacy rather
than their competency; in the fifth chapter of this thesis I explore the ways in
which the virtues can and should be seen as applicable to political leaders in
their decisions to go to war.

2.1.4: Proportionality

Proportionality is a condition of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. As an ad
bellum condition, it is concerned with ensuring that the international
community is left as a better place at the conclusion of war than it would be if
war was not fought. Note that this condition requires political leaders to
consider how their actions are likely to affect not only their own nation, but
the interests of the entire international community: as Quinlan notes, “the
better situation we seek to create should be one that is reckoned in terms of all

40

Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 2.
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those affected, not merely our own constituents.”41 Michael Walzer considers
one instantiation of the proportionality condition from the Korean War:

Consider those long months when the Korean negotiations were stalemated over
the issue of the forcible repatriation of prisoners. The American negotiations
insisted on the principle of free choice, lest the peace be as coercive as war itself,
and accepted the continuation of the fighting rather than yield on that point.
They were probably right, though it is difficult at this distance to weigh the
values involved – and here the doctrine of proportionality is surely relevant.42

Is the proliferation of free choice in the international community of great
enough benefit to justify the harms inflicted (in terms of human lives,
psychological damage, ongoing diplomatic tension, and possible economic
costs) by continued war? This is the question considered by proportionality.
However, it is important to note that insisting on proportionality as a
condition of jus ad bellum does not render JWT an instantiation of
consequentialism. This is because proportionality is not sufficient to justify
war, it is merely necessary: satisfaction of the other conditions is also
necessary in order to justify going to war. As was discussed above, one of the
characteristics of JWT has been to recognise the practical realities of war (and
thus recognise consequences as morally important), but never to concede to a
pure consequentialist mode of reasoning.

41
42

Quinlan, ‘Justifying War’, op cit., 12.
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 122-123.
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2.1.5: Probability of Success

Probability of success is an extension of the proportionality criterion: if there
is little to no probability of success, it is very unlikely that the war will be
proportionate. The lives of soldiers and civilians will be lost in pursuit of an
impossible cause. Victory need not be certain, but must be possible in order
for war to be justified. This, however, begs the question: ‘what is victory?’
Does it mean military success? Or should victory be defined in terms of the
proportionate benefits to the international community? Walzer, for instance,
argues that “[i]n just war doctrine [...] the triumph of aggression is a greater
evil [than appeasing a hostile nation].”43 He accepts that conceding to
aggression may seem like the lesser evil in the short-term, but in the long-term,
“appeasement would be, quite simply, a failure to resist evil in the world.”44
By contrast, Gerald Vann argued that appeasement should be preferred to war
in most situations.45 Answering this question requires a coherent sense of what
constitutes victory, which requires that the objectives of war be clearly
enunciated. The probability of success criterion then serves as a prudential
check against pursuing morally good goals that are entirely unachievable.
Thus, if a goal of war is to demonstrate that aggression will never be accepted
without resistance, then resistance which has no hope of military victory may
still satisfy this criterion.46

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 68.
Ibid. 69.
45 Gerald Vann, Morality and War, (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1939) in Michael
Walzer, 'World War II: Why Was This War Different?', Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 1,
1971, pp. 3-21 at 6-7.
46 For a more detailed discussion of the moral questions surrounding resistance in cases
where victory is impossible, see: Walzer, op cit.
43
44

24

2.1.6: Last Resort

The last resort condition is perhaps misleadingly worded. It does not require
that every possible option be exhausted (as a matter of fact) before war is
declared. “It would be unreasonable,” Guthrie and Quinlan note, “to demand
that every conceivable non-military instrument must have been exhaustively
tested irrespective of practical judgement about whether it is likely to work.”47
Similarly, Orend notes that “[n]o matter how fearful a situation, there is
always something else which can be tried.”48 Last resort, if it is to meaningfully
influence the conduct of political leaders, should be taken to mean “least to be
preferred.”49

Under this understanding, last resort is a criterion that is closely linked to right
intention: it does not require political leaders to tick off a checklist before war
is justifiable. Rather, it requires them to consider all possible non-military
options and, if they show some likelihood of being successful, prefer them to
military options. If political leaders take seriously the requirement of last
resort, they set a tone for the war – if it does occur – to be one that seeks to
minimise damage and avoid unnecessary death. Indeed, it does not require
that other options actually be tried: if, for instance, other options will prove
unsuccessful, then they ought not to be bothered with. They must, however,
be considered.

Guthrie & Quinlan, op. cit., 33.
Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 57.
49 Guthrie & Quinlan, op. cit., 33.
47
48
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2.2: Jus in Bello

Although political leaders may have some influence over jus in bello conduct,
the primary responsibility for the manner in which wars are fought falls to
military personnel. Most immediately, they apply to those military personnel
who are responsible for fighting and killing the enemy, as well as those who
command them to do so. Traditionally, two principles have been upheld as
the central tenets of jus in bello: discrimination and proportionality. Both of
these principles will guide action differently in the different arms of military
service (Army, Air Force, and Navy), but they do apply equally to each. For
example, it will be difficult for an individual midshipman aboard a warship
to discriminate between enemy soldiers and the cook on board an enemy
vessel, whilst for a special forces soldier, discriminating between individuals
is much easier. For reasons of scope, thesis will focus primarily on the
application of these principles to the Army, but the application of in bello
principles to Air Force and Navy conduct is equally important.

2.2.1: Discrimination

War challenges the basic moral intuition that intentionally killing another
human being is wrong by arguing that – as any number of philosophers have
sought to show – killing may be justified under certain conditions.50 What

Some prominent examples include Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, op cit.; David Rodin, War
and Self-Defense, op cit.; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit.; and Elizabeth
Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’ in G.E.M. Anscombe, in Richard A. Wasserstrom, War and
Morality, (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970).
50
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remains morally prohibited, however, is intentionally killing those who are
innocent, or at least are not guilty of an offense serious enough to justify their
being killed. This is enshrined in the principle of discrimination, sometimes
called the doctrine of non-combatant immunity. This principle requires that
soldiers only aim to kill those people who are legitimate targets of lethal force.
For most, the only people who are legitimate targets of killing are those who
are engaged in harming either me, my allies, or the innocent.

Importantly, the principle of discrimination prohibits the intentional killing of
illegitimate targets. It does not (and most likely could not) prohibit any killing
of noncombatants. One of the greatest tragedies of war is that even if it is
conducted carefully, it is likely to cause the deaths of innocent people.
However, where those deaths were inescapable side-effects of a military strike
on legitimate targets, and measures were taken to attempt to avoid or minimise
noncombatant fatalities, the principle of discrimination may not condemn
those deaths as immoral. This notion alludes to the ‘double-effect’ principle,
which states that foreseen but unintended side-effects (such as the deaths of
civilians during a military strike) may be morally permissible under certain
conditions. This idea will be explored closely in chapter three.

2.2.2: Proportionality

In bello proportionality requires that the force used by soldiers in achieving
their military objectives not be excessive. If an army wishes, for instance, to
use a particular town as a military base, keeping the base secure would justify
27

the use of regular armed patrols but not gathering all the residents into camps
and destroying every home in the area. Proportionality of this nature assesses
the manner in which military operations are conducted with reference to the
purpose for which they are conducted. Thus, proportionality serves to rule out
the unreasonable use of force. Fotion notes that the principle ought to
“distinguish between excessive and overwhelming force.”51 Overwhelming
force, he contends, can sometimes be the most reasonable option. If, for
example, the rapid deployment of a massive military force is likely to prompt
the enemy into a quick surrender, such a response is more reasonable than
deploying a smaller force that may end up being engaged in a drawn out,
bloody conflict. Thus, overwhelming force may, on occasion, present itself as
the most reasonable option.

Fotion notes that the proportionality principle suffers from a measurement
problem: “[g]iven the fog of war, there are difficulties in calculating the
benefits and costs […] in advance of the battle.”52 However, this is not a knockdown criticism because proportionality does not, unlike utilitarianism,
determine the moral goodness of an act solely on the basis of its outcome. Thus,
a commander who makes every effort to determine what a proportionate
response might be, but who fails to account for some unknown variable, is not
necessarily to be condemned for his actions. Rather, proportionality serves to
mediate the desire to prefer only the most efficient means of overcoming one’s
enemy.

51
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2.3: Alternatives to JWT

JWT sits alongside two rival philosophical approaches to the morality of war:
political realism and pacifism. There are, I believe, good reasons for rejecting
both political realism and pacifism as morally serious approaches to military
ethics – the main being that each in its own way ‘ducks the question’ of
military ethics rather than responding to it. However, I do not make these
objections in full here; they have been made elsewhere, and well.53 Introducing
them, and some of the major objections will, however, serve to situate JWT as
an approach that mediates the extremities of political realism and pacifism,
thus aiding in the understanding of the theory that sits at the centre of this
thesis. The question that each of these theories seeks to answer, the question
of military ethics, is how can the horror and death of war be morally justified?

Brian Orend contends that the belief that unifies all just war theories is that
“sometimes, it is at least morally permissible for a political community to go
to war.”54 Whether this is true is beside the point: it is certainly one belief that
all just war theorists hold. Another is its logical corollary: sometimes it is
impermissible for a political community to go to war. However, there are two
major alternative positions that reject one of these two fundamental beliefs:

For responses to political realism, see: Michael Walzer, ‘Against Realism’ in Michael
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 3-20; Brian Orend, ‘Evaluating the Realist Alternative’
in The Morality of War, (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2006), 223-243, and Nicholas Fotion, War
and Ethics: a new just war theory, (London: Continuum, 2007), 127-137. For responses to
pacifism, see: Brian Orend, ‘Evaluating the Pacifist Alternative’ in The Morality of War, op cit.,
244-266; Jan Narveson, ‘Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis,’ Ethics, vol. 75, 259-271; and
Nigel Biggar, ‘Against Christian Pacifism’ in In Defence of War, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2013), 16-60.
54 Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 31.
53
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political realism and pacifism. Each will be introduced here and alluded to
occasionally throughout the thesis. It is worth understanding these rival
accounts as they help contextualise the intellectual and political space in
which JWT is frequently discussed and invoked.

2.3.1: Political Realism

A realist argues that states should, or at least usually do, pursue activities
which will maximise their own self-interest.55 Orend distinguishes between
“descriptive realism” and “prudential realism”. The former describes the
international realm as a state of nature and claims that, as a matter of fact, this
is the way states do act; the latter, on the other hand, is normative, suggesting
that given the international state of nature, states ought to maximise their own
self-interest. Whether prudential or descriptive, the realist will deny the
relevance of ethical norms to the international sphere. As Machiavelli wrote
in The Prince: “[t]he fact is that a man who wants to act virtuously in every
way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous.
Therefore if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must learn how not to be
virtuous, and to make use of this or not according to need.”56

Although there are different forms of realism, all are unified in the claim that
“the character of foreign policy can be ascertained only through the

See: Brian Orend, ‘War’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosopy, 2005,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/>; Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 224-234.
56 Niccolo Macchiavelli trans. George Bull, The Prince, (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1986), 91.
55
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examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable
consequences of those acts,” measured through the lens of “interest defined in
terms of power.”57 Thus, the substantive claim of realist political theory is that
moral concepts like right and wrong are of no use or relevance in the
international domain. From a realist perspective, ethics ought only to be
championed, enforced, or adhered to by a political leader insofar as it serves
the interest of that leader’s nation.

Two objections to realism appear to me to be most telling. The first is that of
Walzer, who notes that moral language is as synonymous with war as is
strategic language. We may differ, Walzer notes, as to what constitutes a
retreat, but we all accept that such a thing as retreat exists in the military
lexicon.58 Similarly, terms like massacre, innocent, and cruel are terms that can
be rightly used to describe military actions, once we agree on the meaning of those
terms. However, if we are to explore, for instance, whether the atomic bombing
of Japanese cities was a cruel massacre or not, “our sharpest disagreements
are structured and organised by the underlying agreements that we share.”59
Most of us agree that certain actions in war are justifiable under certain
conditions, and others are not. Thus, the realist claim that the international
sphere and war as an extension of that sphere are exempt from moral
evaluations appears untrue.

Hans J. Morgenthau revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle
for Power and Peace, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 4-5.
58 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 4.
59 Ibid., 19
57
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A second objection is that even if the claim that moral laws are not inherent to
the international sphere is true, it does not follow that moral laws will never
be adhered to by states. As noted above, it may still be in the best interests of
nations to develop, obey, and enforce a set of universal laws regarding what
is and is not permissible regarding the use of force. Thus, the argument that
morality is not inherent to nations is not sufficient to avoid the question of
military ethics. If it could be shown that a set of universally applicable rules of
conflict advanced the interests of every state (individually and equally), then
the realist would be inclined to accept them. Thus prompting the question,
what ought those rules to be?

2.3.1: Pacifism

Pacifism is a school of thought that argues against war ever being morally
justifiable. Although there are domestic versions of pacifism (such as the nonviolent movement for African-American rights in America during the 1950’s
and 60’s), the international version refers to “the absolute refusal to participate
in, or support in any way, the waging of war.”60 The horrors of war, pacifism
argues, are too great to ever be morally permissible. Typically, pacifism comes
in two major forms: absolute pacifism, a moral opposition to violence or
killing of any kind; and contingent pacifism, which holds that although some
wars might be morally acceptable, the type of wars we fight today are not. 61
Ultimately, contingent pacifism reduces to a kind of JWT in which war is
acceptable if the correct conditions are met. As Biggar notes, “such a broad

Peter Mayer (ed.), The Pacifist Conscience, (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1966), 11.
Andrew Fiala, ‘Pacifism’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pacifism/#2.1>.
60
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definition embraces just war doctrine.”62 Thus, I focus here on absolute
pacifism: the summary rejection of war as a means of achieving any end.

The most pressing question that arises when examining pacifism is, simply,
what should be done in lieu of violence when we're under attack? Interestingly,
there doesn't seem to be a clear-cut response to this question, at least on a
global scale. Although Mohandas Ghandi and Martin Luther King Jr.
exercised non-violent protest effectively, this protest was on a domestic level.
It is difficult to see how the same non-violence could today be effective in
stopping another nation from militarily invading Australia, or how nonviolence could force them to leave once they arrived. A further question to
consider is whether, even if effective, such non-violence could be justified if it
meant letting innocent people suffer and die, or letting injustice go unresisted.
The comment of US President Barack Obama in his (perhaps premature)
Nobel Prize acceptance seem to ring true: “A non-violent movement could not
have halted Hitler's armies. Negotiations cannot convince [A]l Qaeda's leaders
to lay down their arms.”63 President Obama highlighted the problem of
pacifism as a national policy: even if small protest groups could achieve
success by non-violence, a nation cannot.

Nigel Biggar, In Defence of War, op cit., 16, n. 2.
Barack Obama, ‘A Just and Lasting Peace’, Nobel Lecture, Oslo, 2009,
<http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture_en.html>.
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3: Thesis Rationale, Content and Purpose

In his seminal book After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre tells the following story:

Imagine a world in which the natural sciences were to suffer the effects of a
catastrophe. A series of environmental disasters are blamed by the general public
on the scientists. Widespread riots occur, laboratories are burnt down, physicists
are lynched, books and instruments are destroyed. Finally, a Know-Nothing
political movement takes power and successfully abolishes science teaching in
schools and universities, imprisoning and executing the remaining scientists.
Later still there is a reaction against this destructing movement and enlightened
people seek to revive science, although they have largely forgotten what it was.
But all they possess are fragments [...] Nonetheless all these fragments are
reembodied in a set of practices which go under the revived names of physics,
chemistry and biology....

In such a culture men would use expressions such as 'neutrino', 'mass', 'specific
gravity', 'atomic weight' in systematic and often interrelated ways which would
resemble in lesser or greater degrees the ways in which such expressions had
been used in earlier times before scientific knowledge had been so largely lost.
But many of the beliefs presupposed by the use of these expressions would have
been lost and there would appear to be an element of arbitrariness and even of
choice in their application which would appear very surprising to us. What
would appear to be rival and competing premises for which no further argument
could be given would abound.64
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MacIntyre, After Virtue), op. cit., 1-2.
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MacIntyre tells this story to make a single, devastating claim against the
practical of moral philosophy.

The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which we
inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of grave disorder as the
language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described. What we
possess, if this view is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts
which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess
indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions.
But we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both
theoretical and practical, of morality.65

Inspired by MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the maladies of the state of moral
philosophy in his time, my thesis will make similar arguments with regard to
JWT: that thinking about military ethics has fragmented over time and is now
in need of restoration. The hypothesis I advance herein is a similar claim, albeit
not so wide-reaching as MacIntyre's broad criticism of the predominant moral
thinking of his time. My claim is that prevailing thought in the area of military
ethics is far removed from its ancestry, and bears little resemblance to the
thoughts of previous thinkers, and is conceptually divorced from conceptual
beliefs and understandings that justified and explained much of the morality
of war.
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Ibid., 2.
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More specifically, my view is that the majority of modern-day just war
theories find their foundation exclusively in deontological ethics, manifested
specifically in the concepts of positive law and human rights. However, the
prevalence of deontology within these theories is not a product of serious
intellectual reflection so much as it is a reflection of historical trends, the
personal intellectual projects of particular theorists, and the intellectual
flavour of the times. This is not to say that modern just war theories have
nothing to offer to those interested in moral governance of warfare. It is
however to say that they are in an important sense incomplete.

They are incomplete because traditionally, JWT was dually founded on both
deontological and aretaic ethics; that is, on both rights and virtues. These cooperating and complementary concepts provide - and historically have
provided - JWT with a robust and coherent understanding of deontological
concepts like duty, law and human rights. Furthermore, if JWT lacks any
aretaic foundation, it becomes difficult to make sense of the important place
afforded to virtue and character in traditional wartime imagery and narrative:
the importance of tales of sacrificial soldiers, noble politicians, shrewd,
tactical, and amicable commanders, and so on are best explained with
reference to aretaic ideas. There are two elements to my claim: first, that
existing concepts within JWT (such as rights, obligations, law) find their fullest
and most coherent explanation with reference to both deontological and
aretaic ethics; and secondly, that the close association between military
narratives and aretaic ideals – evidenced by, for instance, tombs dedicated to
‘Unknown Soldiers’ around the world are adorned with words like ‘courage’,
‘honour’, ‘loyalty’, or ‘patriotism’ – can be explained, enriched and made more
robust through the incorporation of aretaic ethics into JWT.
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I argue that virtue is fundamentally important for two main reasons. The first
argument is historical: as a matter of fact, JWT did begin by seeing a close
relationship between the morality of war and the moral character of soldiers
and political leaders. Thus, in a real sense, virtue serves alongside deontology
as a historical and philosophical foundation of just war theory. Secondly, the
central role provided to the intentions of actors in both deontological and
aretaic ethics provides a bridging point between the two different modes of
ethics. Not only does intention allow the two modes of ethics to be connected,
it requires them to be: deontological theory looks to intention in order to
determine the rectitude of those actions it seeks to evaluate. Furthermore, an
agent cannot form an intention in a vacuum; rather, intentions are formed by
the habits, desires, dispositions, and character of the agent. Thus, to
understand intentions, we must first understand aretaic ethics. Indeed, it will
be shown that an understanding of aretaic ethics provides new and useful
ways of answering questions that have been the subject of ongoing debate for
deontological just war theorists in recent times.

The re-integration of aretaic ethics into JWT is also important because aretaic
ethics alone cannot resolve all the challenges that war presents. Rights, law,
duty, and responsibility are all important concepts that have to be included in
any intelligent discussion of the ethics of war. Thus, the deontological focus of
JWT can enrich aretaic discussions in the same way that aretaic ethics can
enrich deontological insights. However, the single-minded focus on
deontological ethics by many modern just war theorists can blinker us,
preventing us from acknowledging or exploring fully crucial areas of military
ethics such as the personal virtue of soldiers, the complex identity of the
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warrior, and the psychological costs of fighting in war. This thesis will argue
that aretaic ethics thus offers Just War Theory two academic benefits: first, it
offers new ways to engage in ongoing debates within modern (deontological)
military ethics; and second, it presents new (aretaic) questions for military
ethicists to grapple with, and which can be best answered by reference to both
deontological and aretaic ethics – that is, an enriched JWT position. I also
argue that emphasis on the aretaic may be of practical benefit to those
involved in the realities of waging war. Insights from aretaic ethics assist us in
identifying: the best ways of assisting people in adhering to the deontological
responsibilities of their professions, how to best manage difficult re-settlement
issues for veterans returning from war, and ways of guarding against and
treating the moral and psychological trauma that can be generated by war.

I make these arguments in various ways. In chapter two, I explore some of the
major theorists in the history of the Western JWT tradition, showing that the
ancestors of today’s just war theories did consider aretaic matters – in
particular the moral virtues – to be of central importance to the morality of
war. I also show how and why it came to be that deontological and aretaic
discussions became fragmented in contemporary JWT. This discussion will
also serve as a literature review, introducing the thought of several of the most
prominent thinkers within Western JWT to be compared and contrasted with
one another.

Chapter three focuses on deontological ethics and the ways in which concepts
like rights and obligations are necessarily connected to aretaic ethics. I explain
how contemporary JWT tends to conceptualise rights – specifically the right
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not to be killed and the right to kill one’s enemies – and contrast that account
with the much older approach of double-effect theory. I also identify the
reasons why rights are an important and beneficial concept for JWT. Finally,
having established the necessary connection between deontological and aretaic
ethics, I show how the application of both modes of ethical reasoning in
tandem can enrich the ways in which JWT can respond to contemporary
deontological debates, those being torture and supreme emergencies.

In chapter four I focus on the new questions that aretaic ethics reveals to JWT,
those being: the complexity of the identity of soldiers, how moral character
and identity can help prevent moral transgressions, and the moral and
psychological trauma suffered by many soldiers and veterans. In this section
I combine insights from empirical psychological research with philosophical
insights in order to understand PTSD, moral fragmentation, and the psyche of
the modern soldier. Drawing on insights from Homer and Shakespeare, I
argue that aretaic modes of thinking about character, identity, virtue, and
wellbeing help to explain some of the supporting factors in the moral
transgressions of soldiers and in the psychological difficulties that veterans
can experience post-war.

In chapter five I show how deontological and aretaic ethics interact in the three
professions most relevant to waging war: soldiers, commanders, and political
leaders. I demonstrate how the virtues are necessary character traits in order
to guarantee that warfighters and their political leaders can be relied on to
fulfil their professional duties. Aretaic ethical analysis also provides
conceptual understanding of why and how professionals sometimes act
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“above and beyond the call of duty” – that is, perform deeds that exceed what
their professional duties require of them. By considering these supererogatory
actions, aretaic ethics is able to again enhance and broaden moral
philosophical discussion of the morality of war by JWT.

4: Conclusion

This chapter has sought to introduce the central theories within the framework
in which I present my thesis. The two central moral perspectives that will be
considered in this thesis are the deontological and aretaic viewpoints, but
consequentialist ethics will also be relevant and was therefore considered.
JWT theory was presented alongside the alternative views of pacifism and
political realism as the framework through with the ethics of war will be
examined in this thesis.

However, although I argue from within a JWT framework, I also critically
assess that framework. I contend that JWT as it is understood by most theorists
today is too far divorced from aretaic ethics to be an effective moral appraisal
of war. The prioritisation of deontological concepts at the expense of the
aretaic threatens both to undermine those deontological concepts, which rely
on aretaic ethics for their fullest explanation, and to diminish the breadth of
JWT by undermining its ability to explore questions of virtue, character,
psychology, and wellbeing.
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I contend that both aretaic and deontological approaches are central to
developing a sophisticated and complete morality of war. At varying point
these accounts will support, enhance, and enrich one another; at other times
they will appear to challenge each other. At all times, however, both moral
perspectives will be jointly required if we are serious about appreciating fully
the ethical nuances that manifest in military practice.
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Chapter 2

Just War Theory: From Virtues to Rights

Throughout the history of philosophy, a variety of different theorists have
engaged with the question of whether states might ever be justified in waging
war. Those theorists who have suggested that under certain considerations
war could be justified are known as just war theorists. However, although
loosely connected under the JWT umbrella because of their agreement about
the moral permissibility of war, these thinkers have not agreed on everything.
In fact, although it makes sense to talk about JWT as a school of thought, there
are a variety of differing – and sometimes contradictory – just war theories
available.1 Unlike the empirical sciences, the history of JWT has not been one
of constant improvement on past work; some of the earliest just war theorists
are as influential as their contemporary equivalents. Articles will often discuss
Thomas Aquinas’ 13th century views on just war alongside Michael Walzer’s
20th-21st century views.

Despite variance among individual just war theories, JWT has changed in
various ways over time. Perhaps the most obvious area of change is regarding

There are, as John Langan notes, a “wealth of resources” available to those interested in
JWT but this wealth is a double-edged sword. “This wealth can be a resource for reflection
or a cause of embarrassment, for it makes it very difficult to identify any particular
formulation as simply the just war theory and it means that any presentation of or appeal to
the just war tradition will have to be highly selective.” See: John Langan, 'The Elements of St.
Augustine's Just War Theory', Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 12, no. 1, 1984, 19-38 at 19.
1
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questions about the character of the actors who are involved in or affected by
war. For many theorists of the past, the virtuous character of individual
warriors and leaders was of central importance to the morality of war. In
recent times, theorists have been more inclined toward a human rights
oriented, rule-based approach to the topic.

By surveying the history of JWT this chapter reveals two things: first, that
modern instantiations of JWT are generally focussed specifically on
discussions of rights and related notions; and second, that historically, this
was not the case – some of JWT’s most influential theorists offered accounts
that included rights (or some equivalent) amongst a much broader host of
concerns. More specifically, in this chapter I advance the thesis that JWT
entails two separate areas of concern, each of which is historically and
philosophically foundational. The first is concerned with human rights and
the absolute moral rules of war that emerge in light of those rights; that is,
deontic notions of the morality of war. The second area is aretaic, referring to
the virtues, moral character and wellbeing. Each of these two different modes
of moral thinking is foundational to JWT, and both have, at various points in
history, contributed helpfully to moral evaluations of war. In this chapter I
argue that recent just war theories have emphasised the deontic at the expense
of discussing the aretaic, which provides important insights without which a
morality of war will be incomplete. Although human rights are an important
part of JWT, aretaic notions pertaining to the moral excellence of individual
agents are also worthy of attention.
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Throughout this chapter I consider two dimensions: wars’ beginnings (ad
bellum), and combat regulations (in bello) as they are discussed by each theorist.
In discussing these two dimensions as they manifest in different theories over
time, it will become clear that the history of JWT has been to shift away from
aretaic concerns in favour of more legalistic incarnations of the theory.

This historical survey will be divided into three sections: in the first section I
examine the origins of Western JWT in the works of St. Augustine of Hippo
(354-430) and St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Here, I note specifically the
interplay between deontological and aretaic influences in the writings of these
two theologians.

In the second section, I consider two theorists who are representative of the
shift away from aretaic ethics in JWT: Francisco di Vitoria (1483-1546) and
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). It is no coincidence that these two figures are often
associated with the foundations of international law: as we will see, their
desire to develop legal governance over war appears to have been at the heart
of the declining interest in aretaic ethics.

Finally, in the third section I explore the state of JWT today, focussing
especially on the work of Michael Walzer (1935-present), whose Just and
Unjust Wars is widely credited with having revived JWT in the modern day,
and was influential in determining the deontological framework within which
contemporary JWT discussions take place.
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1: The Origins of Western Just War Theory

1.1: St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430)

My story of the history of JWT begins with Augustine. Although Augustine
was not the first to speak about the morality of war (the writings of Aristotle,
Cicero, and Augustine’s spiritual mentor, St. Ambrose, all feature such
discussions), I begin with Augustine because he is by far the most influential
of the early just war theorists, and because many of the ideas of these earlier
theorists are captured in Augustine’s writing.

At the time when Augustine began to write about war, most Christians
practised pacifism: in Gethsemane, when Peter defended Jesus from arrest,
Jesus rebuked him: “for all who take the sword will perish by the sword.”2
Robert Holmes, speaking for early-Christian pacifism, notes that “[i]t is
difficult to read the New Testament with its emphasis upon loving one’s
enemies and turning the other cheek without suspecting that Jesus was
opposed to war.”3 Augustine, however, recognised that if Christianity were to
be seen as compatible with the political necessities of governance (and
therefore be adopted by political leaders and states), it would need to accept
war as a moral and practical reality. He thus set out to show how the

Matthew 26:52, The Holy Bible, (New Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition),
<http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matt+26:52&version=NRSVCE>.
3 Robert L. Holmes, War and Morality, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 116.
2
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imperative to love one’s neighbour could be consistent with occasionally
warring with that neighbour.

To prove that “Christians could have the full slate of civic responsibilities to
the state,”4 Augustine offered a reinterpretation of the Christian imperative
not to “resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to
him the other also.”5 Instead, Augustine argued that “what is here required
[in turning the other cheek] is not a bodily action, but an inward disposition.
The sacred seat of virtue is the heart.”6 For Augustine, nonviolence meant
finding no pleasure in violence rather than abstaining from it altogether. If
violence was ever necessary, Christians could be justified in going to war so
long as their intentions were just.

By focussing morality on intentions rather than actions, Augustine was able
to distinguish between killing and murder, noting that “not all homicide is
murder.”7 Exceptions came when killings were commanded by public
individuals (e.g. judges, political leaders).8 However, Augustine did not
believe that private citizens were permitted to kill one another, even in selfdefence.9 The only time killing might be permissible was when done by an
authority with power to do so; power which ultimately came from God.
Because Augustine believed that because God was the source of all goodness,

Ibid., 117.
Matthew 5: 39, op cit.
6 Augustine trans. Richard Stothert, Contra Faustum, 1887, 22.76,
<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/140622.htm>.
7 Augustine trans. Henry Bettenson, City of God, (Victoria: Penguin Books, 2003), 1.21
8 Ibid., 1.21.
9 See: Holmes, op cit., 120. Whether Augustine might have argued that self-defence that
accidentally results in killing was permissible (as Aquinas did, see below), is unclear.
4
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it would be impossible for any killing that he demanded to be evil. 10 Public
officials who had received their authority from God were therefore
empowered to sanction killings to uphold the divine will.11 Unlike political
theorists today, Augustine was not concerned with how to know whether a
public official had divine authority or not. If they did, God’s will was done, if
not, they would be punished in hell. Augustine’s eschatological beliefs meant
he was not concerned with enforcing morality – his project was simply to
describe it. For Augustine, eternal law (God’s law) was the ultimate and only
justification for any type of killing, especially the widespread killing involved
in war.

1.1.1: Ad Bellum

Augustine did not think that God’s law would justify wars motivated by
“worldly” desires. For the Neoplatonist Augustine, nothing temporary was of
moral value, including life itself, for “if it can be taken, it is worthless.”12
Augustine argued that the soul was the “seat of virtue”, and that the only evil
that a person can suffer is to sin. Thus, violence – including war – is not
described as evil because of the pain or death that it causes, because to fear
losing something that is “of the flesh” is to live in falsehood and sin.13 War and

In fact, Augustine believed evil was simply the absence of God. C.f. Augustine trans.
Albert H. Newman, On the Nature of Good, 1887,
<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1407.htm> especially Ch. XI.
11 Holmes, op cit., 130.
12 Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, 1. 5.12 as cited in Holmes, War and Morality, 125. All
references to De Libero Arbitrio hereafter are from Holmes’ work.
13 Richard B. Miller, ‘Just War, Civic Virtue and Democratic Social Criticism: Augustinian
Reflections’, The Journal of Religion, vol. 89, iss. 1, 2009, 1-30, at 9.
10
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violence are evil, rather, because of the damage that the violent person does to
his own soul, as Augustine explains:

What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that
others may live in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not
any religious feeling. The real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful
cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild resistance, and the lust of power, and
such like.14

For Augustine, when an emperor went to war in self-defence, he was able to
justify his actions to his citizens with reference to the wrongful aggression of
the enemy. In such a case, “the law permits the people that it governs to
commit less wrongs to prevent the commission of greater,”15 and thus the
killing of aggressors could be justified. But Augustine did not believe this law
was God’s law; rather, it was a human law protecting earthly goods that
ultimately ought not to be valued. Although self-defence was justifiable under
human law, it was still a sin against God. Thus, Augustine wrote, “I do not see
how these men, though blameless under the law, can be altogether
blameless.”16

We can understand this thought by distinguishing between ‘lower order’ and
‘higher order’ justifications. For Augustine, wars that are justified only by
human law possessed lower order justification, whilst those which are

Augustine, Contra Faustum, op cit., 22.74.
Augustine, Contra Faustum, op cit., 1. 5.11, 123.
16 Ibid., 1. 5.12, p. 124, emphasis added.
14
15
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sanctioned by the divine (moral) law were justified on the higher order. The
only wars that were entirely blameless were those of the higher order: those
moral laws which require humanity to live according to God’s will. However,
Augustine did not believe it to be sufficient that a person’s actions coincide
with God’s will; rather, his mind must be directed to God in his decision to act
in a particular way.17 As James Wetzel explains, “[t]o describe a virtue but not
refer it in the requisite way to God is to describe a vice.”18

Augustine explained similarly that:

[T]he virtues which the mind imagines it possesses, by means of which it rules
the body and the vicious elements, are themselves vices rather than virtues, if the
mind does not bring them into relation with God.19

This is especially true for political leaders, who ought to rule from love.
Ideally, he will rule from love of God, who is the Supreme Good, but pagan
rulers, Augustine notes, can still rule from love of their fellow human beings.20
Note especially that it is love of God and his law that makes a good leader:
leadership from fear or obedience of God’s law is a lesser form of leadership. As
Michael Northcott explains:

Augustine, City of God, op cit., 19.25.
James Wetzel, ‘Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank’s Augustine’,
The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 32, no. 2, 2004, 271-300 at 272.
19 Augustine, City of God, op cit., 19.25.
20 Michael Northcott, ‘The ‘War on Terror’, the Liberalism of Fear, and the Love of Peace in
St. Augustine’s City of God, New Blackfriars, vol. 88, iss. 1017, 2007, 522-538 at 536.
17
18
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Fear is politically weak because it does not direct those who love the right things
to love them any better. Nor does it educate the misdirected desires of those who
do not love the right things so that they love what is worthy of love.21

Here we come to see the interplay between deontic and aretaic ethics in
Augustine. God’s laws, which apply to all human beings whether they accept
them or not, served as moral duties and restrictions which it is wrongful to
violate. However, mere adherence to God’s law was less laudable than the
obedience that came from a genuine love for God. This is true not only because
Augustine believed God to be an object to whom worship was due, but acting
from love for moral goodness demonstrated an understanding of goodness that
is not present when one acts out of fear.22 It is the love that motivated adherence
to God’s laws that is virtuous. Without the virtuous understanding that is
entailed in the love of moral goodness, human deeds could never reach what
Augustine considered to be the perfection of human activity, justified on the
higher order discussed above.

So, for Augustine the just war was motivated by love of God and obedience to
the divine will; viz. virtue. It is on this basis that Augustine justified Moses,
who he also rebuked for killing an Egyptian,23 for leading of a war against the
Egyptian people.

Ibid., 537.
For a discussion of the difference and interaction between love and fear, see: Augustine,
City of God, op cit., 14.9.
23 Augustine, Contra Faustum, op cit., 22.70.
21
22
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[T]he account of the wars of Moses [should] not excite surprise or abhorrence,
for in wars carried on by divine command, he showed not ferocity but obedience;
and God in giving the command, acted not in cruelty, but in righteous
retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and warning those who needed
warning.24

However, in his commentary on Augustine, Robert L. Holmes argues that
given the very likely possibility that very few political leaders will always act
virtuously, “no state possesses true justice; force, violence, and suffering are
inevitable […] and, strictly, no one can know for certain who are the good and
who are the wicked.25 Holmes argues that we ought to abandon second order
justifications and concern ourselves only with justifications in human law:
“[i]f we cannot conform fully to God’s law given our sinful nature, at least we
can discern the traces of justice in our social life and […] act accordingly.”26 At
this point, Holmes focuses only on developing a just war theory according to
the laws of societies, suggesting that “there may be just wars from a temporal
or human perspective.”27

When a state has wronged another […] one then has a just cause to punish that
state, providing the decision emanates from a legitimate authority. This does not
require that the ruler be a good man, for that cannot be known. Nor does it
require that a state be truly just, for none is. The state need not even be nominally

Ibid., 22.74.
Holmes, op cit., 131.
26 Ibid., 131.
27 Ibid., 132.
24
25
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Christian; according to Augustine, the conditions of just cause and legitimate
authority sometimes characterized the wars of pre-Christian Rome.28

At this point, the theory Holmes presents is no longer Augustinian, although
it is an accurate representation of Augustine’s views about lower order
justifications for war. Although, as I have said, the failure to refer one’s
activities to God is always vicious, wars that seek to “avenge injuries, when
the nation or city against which warlike action is to be directed or to restore
what has been unjustly taken by it”29 are at least consistent with God’s law and
are therefore preferable to wars fought from selfish desires, hatred, or a desire
for glory. However, lower order justifications do not amount to moral
justifications: for Augustine, only actions performed from love of God and his
divine law possess true (higher order) justification. In Augustine’s mind, it
was not possible to remove virtue from the equation – all just wars had to be
in conformity with, and motivated by, the moral law which emanates from
God.

1.1.2: In Bello

Given that Augustine held that all lower order wars contravene the divine law
and are therefore sinful, it is worth asking whether he held the soldiers that
fight in lower order (or worse, entirely unjust) wars blameworthy for their
participation. Although above I quoted Augustine describing those soldiers as

28
29

Augustine, Seven Questions Concerning the Heptateuch, 6.10 in Holmes, op cit., 132
Ibid., 6.10.
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“not entirely blameless,” his writings indicate that soldiers who followed the
commands of their leaders should not have been punished for doing so. The
state – and by extension its leaders – are argued to be “the justest and most
reasonable source of power”30 in the world. The leader of a state should act as
a servant of God, in obedience to his law.31 Thus, the sovereign possessed
divine authority to lead God’s people on Earth. If citizens obeyed their
sovereign out of pious respect for his divinely-sanctioned authority, they were
free from punishment when obeying an unjust law or command. This is
particularly true of soldiers, because Augustine held that “one who owes a
duty of obedience to the giver of the command does not himself 'kill' - he is an
instrument, a sword in its user's hand.”32 As Langan notes, the soldier’s role
“makes obedience a duty.”33

In the previous section I noted that Augustine looked favourably on Moses’
war with the Egyptians because Moses had declared war out of obedience to
God’s commands. However, Moses was not justified in waging that war
barbarously (Augustine notes that he took no pleasure in it). If he had acted
with barbarity he would have shown love of revenge or violence, not God.
The moral law required that Moses fight only for righteous retribution (giving
what is deserved). The motivation of the soldier should similarly demonstrate
only adherence to God’s law – anything else would be to place value in earthly
goods. Only matters of the soul were morally significant for Augustine. This
is why Augustine argued that the evil of war is in the vices. Wars must be
fought with a sober disposition: a just inward disposition, with virtue, and

Augustine, The City of God, op cit., 1.21.
Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Langan, op cit., 23.
30
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motivated by love of God,34 which is why Augustine described sin as the only
true evil in war.

It is significant that JWT’s historical and philosophical foundations rest in the
dual premises of the justice of a particular cause determined by absolute moral
laws (in this case, eternal law vis-à-vis God's will) and consideration of the
internal dispositions required to justify soldiers’ and political leaders’
conduct. Although wars fought to restore some property or injury may be
justified on the lower order, if they are fought without commitment to virtue,
they will not be morally justified. Thus, the injustice of war comes from the
corruption of men’s souls through vicious actions common to war.
Augustine’s just war theory demonstrates a clear interaction between deontic
and aretaic concepts. It is not sufficient that a war be justified by human law
or the indiscretion of the enemy, it is equally (if not more) important that the
leaders declaring wars and the soldiers fighting on their behalf be virtuous,
and their souls be kept free from sin.

1.2: St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

In the thirteenth century another theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas, revived St.
Augustine’s just war thinking. When Aquinas discussed war, he situated the
discussion within a broader discussion of the virtues, arguing it to be a vice
against charity.35 However, he held that where war aims to restore a peace that
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is already broken, it may be just; on the other hand, where war acts against
peace, it is unjust.36 Aquinas suggested that some wars are actually peaceful
because they were manifestations of the virtue of charity, the virtue of love
between persons which is based in love of God.37 However, charity is not just
one of many virtues, but is what Thomas calls a “special virtue”38 – it is a virtue
that relates directly to a particular 'species' of love (Divine love), and therefore
no true virtue is possible without charity.39 This led Aquinas to call charity ‘the
form of the virtues’ because it directs men and women to their ultimate end,
God.40 Peace is one of the 'special attitudes' of charity; Aquinas called it one of
the effects of charity,41 and it entails two separate things: first, concord, the
wills of various hearts agreeing together in consenting to the same thing; and
second, what might be called inner peace, a harmony among one’s own
feelings, desires, and moral judgements.42

1.2.1: Ad Bellum

Unjust wars are acts against both concord and inner peace and are therefore
vicious.43 However, Aquinas was careful to make clear that some wars are not

Ibid.
Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 23, Art. 1.
38 Ibid., II-II, Q. 23, Art. 4.
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vicious,44 which is why Aquinas is correctly labelled as a just war theorist. Just
wars defend and promote peace as necessary traits of a person or community’s
wellbeing.45 Here, peace is used as an umbrella term referring to both concord
and inner peace, as Aquinas considered unjust wars to be an attack on both.
The evil of war is not merely the physical damage it causes to individuals and
communities, but the moral and psychological damage done to inner peace;
that is, to a person’s wellbeing. Aquinas described three necessary elements of
just wars that have become known throughout the JWT tradition as the
conditions of legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention.

First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged
[...] Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should
be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault [...] Thirdly, it
is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that
they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.46

Aquinas’ moral reflections on the just declaration of war combine interests in
the aretaic and deontic. The motivation for war is in defence of peace, which
is ultimately connected to the virtue of charity. Communities go to war to

modern analysis of the question, see: Eli S. McCarthy, 'The Virtue Ethic Difference in the Just
War Discourse of James Turner Johnson and Catholic Social Teaching', Political Theology, vol.
2, iss. 2, 2011, 275-304. I find Gorman's argument, which sides with James T. Johnson's, the
more compelling and consistent with Thomas' writings. The argument that Aquinas held a
presumption against war is inconsistent with Aquinas’ view that the practice of war could
be compatible with virtue and flourishing. Aquinas did not seek to condemn war, but to
outline the limited, but sometimes necessary place that it held in the moral life.
44 Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 40, Art. 1.
45 At this point, justice and charity become intertwined. For a discussion of the interaction of
these two concepts in Aquinas, see: Jean Porter, 'De Ordine Caritatis. Charity, Friendship and
Justice in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica', The Thomist, vol. 53, 1989, 197-214 199.
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defend the common good from both physical and moral harm. On Aquinas’
account, wars that defend and pursue the common good are acts of love
wherein members of a community see the common good as connected to their
own personal wellbeing.47 Indeed, many wars involve sacrificing one’s own
personal good for the common good, which is why Aquinas believed that
charity “requires an active commitment to serving others and a willingness to
sacrifice for the sake of the common good.”48 However, the desire for peace is
not sufficient; Aquinas also required that war is prompted by some grave
wrongdoing, and that war be declared by the leader of a community. In this
way, Aquinas addressed deontological concerns by introducing absolute
moral rules as checks and balances on the use of war as an instrument for
spreading peace.

1.2.2: In Bello

Aquinas' theory of moral conduct in war was informed by his view of murder
and intentional killing. Aquinas argued that intentional killing is absolutely
forbidden under all circumstances.49 However, by distinguishing between
intended outcomes and side-effects, Aquinas believed that if my acts of selfdefence cause the death of my assailant, I may not be guilty of wrongdoing.
Thus, not all killing is intentional killing. This idea has become known in
military ethics as “the doctrine of double-effect” (DDE).50 Aquinas argued that
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“[n]othing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which
is intended, while the other is beside the intention.”51 Morality is concerned
with what a person intends to do, not in what happens as a side-effect or
accident. For example, if I notice a spider on my friend’s head and slap it away
and in doing so injure my friend, I may not be morally responsible for causing
the injury, even if I knew that injuring my friend was a possibility. Similarly,
in attempting to prevent being killed by an aggressor, I may defend myself even lethally - so long as my intention is to protect my life. I may not be
culpable for any side-effects that I did not intend, even if those side-effects
were foreseeable. Murder, like any intentional harm, is evil and always
forbidden. However, if evil happens co-incidentally in the pursuit of good, the
user of force may not be morally responsible under certain conditions.
Aquinas argued that culpability for unintended outcomes is alleviated if the
following conditions are met:

1. The act itself is not inherently evil;52
2. The evil effect is not intended;53
3. The evil effect is not the means to the production of the good effect;54
4. The good achieved by the action must outweigh the evil consequence.55

DDE also marks a synthesis of aretaic and deontological ideals. Whilst
Aquinas condemned actions of a certain type (e.g. intentional killing) as
absolutely forbidden, he understood that what defined an action was not

Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q.64, Art. 7.
Ibid., II-II, Q.64, Art. 2.
53 Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7.
54 This condition comes from Aquinas' writing on lying, see: Ibid., II-II, Q. 110, Art. 3.
55 Ibid., II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7.
51
52

58

merely its outcome, but the goal the action aimed to achieve and the desires
or feelings that motivated it. For this reason, he was sensitive to the fact that
virtuous people are more likely to perform morally good actions. He therefore
examined the type of virtues which will be most beneficial to those who fight
just wars. This explicit focus on specific virtues demonstrates that, as Gregory
Reichberg notes, “[Aquinas’] aim was to […] situate lethal force in relation to
the virtues that render it an acceptable practice in human life, and inversely,
to indicate what vices are especially to be avoided.”56 By bringing the practice
of war under the realm of the virtues, Aquinas subjected those who fight in
wars not only to deontological norms, but to beliefs and dispositions internal
to the character of the individual; that is, questions of virtue and vice. Whilst
virtuous commanders and soldiers will require a complete set of the virtues
working co-operatively, Aquinas saw these practices as being specially
disposed to particular virtues which Reichberg describes as “two dispositions
assuring right conduct in bello.”57 The virtues that Aquinas believed were most
directly applicable to military personnel were prudence and courage.

Prudence, Aquinas argued, is the special virtue of the cognitive faculty which
allows man to decide between various paths of action.58 Aquinas goes on to
suggest that prudence does not apply only to the individual, but has political
relevance too.59 This includes a specific type of prudence directed to military
judgements, which differs from political prudence in that each reflects a
different part of nature. The ordering of the state corresponds to reason's
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governance over a thing, and the military defence of the state to the
withstanding of external assailants, which is also natural:

[I]n those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not
only “political” prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as
belong to the common good, but also a “military” prudence, whereby hostile
attacks are repelled.60

Aquinas’ introduction of prudence into moral reasoning about war
represented a new development in JWT. Aquinas noted that prudential
reasoning is not only inherent in the practice of warfare, but that participating
in warfare can be—as a response to virtue—a constitutive aspect of the moral
life generally; not just insofar as one fights for justice, but also insofar as one
is good at fighting. Aquinas did not, however, suggest that prudence is the
virtue which governs all military conduct; ordinary soldiers do not need
military prudence to function well in their role. Aquinas explained the
distinction between the soldier and the commander as one of virtue: issuing a
command and bringing that command to fruition are very different things:
“[t]he execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction,
especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs
to prudence.’61
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So, although the prudent man is best equipped for military command, it is the
fortitudinous man who is best suited for soldiering. Fortitude (or courage) is
the virtue which allows men and women to pursue what they know to be good
despite the difficulties involved.62 In the context of the military life, fortitude
usually comes in the form of doing what is right despite the prospect of dying
in the process and, because death is perhaps the greatest physical evil one can
suffer, courage in the face of death ranks as one of the purest instantiations of
the virtue.

[F]ortitude

of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to

the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against
great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not
conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard
something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does
away all bodily goods.63

Warfighters face, almost uniquely, the opportunity to practise fortitude in
their endeavours, because although “the dangers of death arising out of
sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come
on a man through his pursuing some good [...] the dangers of death which
occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit,
he is defending the common good by a just fight.”64
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Aquinas' just war theory represents a much more systematic approach to the
topic than Augustine's. The former unites the deontic and aretaic together in
the moral determinations of war by arguing that war is an act of charity aimed
at enhancing the wellbeing of the community, and that the just war pursues
peace in adherence to checks and balances which serve as absolute moral
rules. By situating his discussion of war within his discussion of the virtues,
Aquinas suggested a proper function for war in the pursuit of both individual
and community wellbeing, and a close relationship between the rules of war
and the virtues as dispositions that help individuals to adhere to those rules.

2: Just War Theory and the Birth of International Law

2.1: Francisco di Vitoria (1483-1546)

Almost three centuries after Aquinas, Francisco di Vitoria, sometimes credited
(along with Hugo Grotius) as the ‘father of international law,’ returned to the
question of the moral justifications for war. Vitoria's considerations of just war
were prompted by Spanish expansion into the Americas, and he proposed a
set of laws informed by those events and the debates surrounding them. The
focus on the development of law marks a new chapter in the development of
JWT, and the point at which deontological ethics began to dominate
discussions on the subject. Vitoria’s laws relied on his concept of the “law of
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nations,” a set of laws that are just for all people at all times, irrespective of
community or belief.65

2.1.1: Ad Bellum

Unlike Aquinas, Vitoria believed that prototypically immoral acts (e.g. theft
or murder) could be made permissible in wartime. If one needed to kill or steal
to successfully prosecute a just cause, then those things were morally
permissible. For Vitoria, the moral laws of war were predicated on the justice
of one’s cause: if one’s cause was just, whatever was necessary to see it succeed
was permitted. Separating himself from Augustine and Aquinas, for whom
the morality of war derived from their broader ethical beliefs, Vitoria argued
that:

A prince may do everything in a just war which is necessary to secure peace and
security from attack [...] The proof of this is that, as I have said above, the purpose
of war is peace, and therefore those who wage just war may do everything
necessary for security and peace.66

This extract suggests that when a cause is just, whatever is necessary to uphold
that cause is permissible. Vitoria justified this morality of necessity by
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suggesting that the alternative, refusing to violate certain norms and therefore
suffering defeat, would reward the immoral behaviour of one’s enemy. He
argued that “it would be the worst of all possible worlds […] if tyrants and
thieves and robbers were able to injure and oppress the good and the innocent
without punishment, whereas the innocent were not allowed to teach the
guilty a lesson in return.”67 The consequence of this view is the reimposition
of a form of consequentialism in the pursuit of a good end: so long as the ‘good
side’ is triumphant, whatever was necessary to triumph must have been
morally justified.

In an important sense this approach sets itself at odds with JWT, which aims
to show how war is consistent with morality, not how it alters morality. Seeing
the particular circumstances of war as altering the very nature of the morality
that governs it (for instance, Vitoria’s other moral writing is based in the
natural law, but his writing on war is more akin to utilitarian thinking)
indicates a form of relativism (a school of thought which holds (amongst other
things) that what is morally right or wrong is developed by culture or society
and may vary between them)68 in Vitoria’s thinking. War – Vitoria appears to
argue – is so different in every respect to the rest of human life that even
morality is changed.

Here it is worth noting the distance between this view and the theories of
Augustine and Aquinas. For them, war was something that could be – if
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practised virtuously – consistent with one’s overall wellbeing. Here, the
systematic account of the virtues presented by Augustine and Aquinas,
whereby the virtues all co-operated in directing the person toward the
ultimate good, is replaced with an entirely different account through which
the virtues are determined by the environment in which they are practised.
Under this new account, the virtues can no longer be perfective of human
nature; rather, they are perfective only of the particular practice from which
they derive. This is problematic if, for instance, the perfection of the soldier is
seen as a proficient and brutal killer who does ‘whatever it takes’ to achieve
victory. Unlike Augustine and Aquinas, for whom war was subject to morality,
not constitutive of it, Vitoria’s account of war sees the virtues as relative to the
goals and purposes of the practice from which they derive. This is a
particularly pressing point for those interesting in the influence of war on
wellbeing. If war is a separate and independent moral domain, those involved
in war will hardly be able to practise virtue with any consistency as they shift
between different domains of morality. As we will see in chapter four, this
inconsistency can undermine the moral and psychological wellbeing of
soldiers.

However, this position is also of concern from within the deontological mode
of thinking as well. Vitoria famously argued that there might be justice on both
sides of a war. Because occasionally leaders may be mistaken about whether
a cause is just, each side may possess a certain type of justification. The side
that is mistaken possesses the justice of their conviction – that is, that they are
acting in pursuit of what they genuinely believe to be right, whilst the side
who is not mistaken is objectively justified in going to war. However, in either
case, the belief that a cause is just in combination with the belief that whatever
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is necessary may be done in pursuit of a just cause is a recipe for widespread
violations of even the most basic standards of decency. Given that
deontological just war theories hold that there are absolute moral laws that
prohibit these types of behaviour, the relativist-consequentialist argument of
Vitoria arises as a challenge to both fundamental tenets of JWT.

In fairness, Vitoria was not entirely ignorant of the dangers inherent in his
belief that both sides of a war might possess different types of justification. He
did not believe, for instance, that “it is enough for the just war that the prince
should believe that his cause is just.”69 Rather, again emphasising that there is
an important difference between what is actually right, and what a leader or
nation believes to be right,70 Vitoria required (citing Aristotle) that the decision
to go to war “be an opinion formed according to the judgement of a wise
man.”71 Because of the moral seriousness of war – particularly Vitoria’s brand
of war – it becomes imperative “to examine the justice and causes of war with
great care, and also to listen to the arguments of the opponents, if they are
prepared to negotiate genuinely and fairly.”72
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2.1.2: In Bello

Further, because soldiers risk committing grave injustices by going to war at
the behest of a fallible ruler, Vitoria instructed “that if their conscience tells
subjects that the war is unjust, they must not go to war even if their conscience is
wrong”.73 Because it is difficult to be certain that the prince's judgement of
justice be correct, if a soldier disagrees, he should not fight. This is justified by
two arguments. First, because it is possible that the soldier’s interpretation of
justice, and not the prince’s, is the correct one. Secondly, because for the
soldier to go to war in a case where his conscience opposed it, he would be
doing something that was believed to be wrong,74 meaning that he would
necessarily be acting with bad intentions. It is worth noting, however, that
although Vitoria allowed for conscientious objection where a soldier is
convinced of the injustice of a war, he held no expectation that all soldiers
should actually engage in reflection about just cause.75 In chapter five I return
to the question of the obedience of soldiers, and explore what duties they have
to examine the justice of the causes for which they fight.

Vitoria presented a scattered, unique, and at times problematic just war
theory. His claim that when a state has just cause, necessity dictates what its
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soldiers may permissibly do in war contrasts with the approaches of
Augustine and Aquinas. Vitoria’s thesis that the moral climate of war is
independent of everyday morality is a question that theorists still grapple with
today. However, the consequences of positing entirely different moral laws
for different circumstances may well have deleterious consequences on the
virtue and wellbeing of soldiers and the civilians who are often innocent
victims of war. However, it is important again to remember that Vitoria’s
primary concern was the formulation of law; thus, it is possible to interpret
some of his claims as being about lower order permissions – that is, legal
justifications – rather than higher order moral ones. This is the idea that
Vitoria’s

successor,

Hugo

Grotius,

would

develop

further

in

his

comprehensive treatment of the law and morality of war.

2.2: Hugo Grotius (1583-1645)

Hugo Grotius offered perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the ethics
and law of war in the history of JWT. Like Vitoria, his project was in part
aimed at developing a codified law of war that can be applied and enforced
across nations. Indeed, he described his own project as being the development
of a “jurisprudence” of war.76 Consequently, Grotius’ chief concerns, like
Vitoria’s, were with deontological principles. However, Grotius did offer a
systematic treatment of the virtues as well, but expressed his view that
virtuous conduct in war is beyond the purview of the law. Acting in
conformance to the law is all agents need to do to avoid being punished, even
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if we would hope for more. The view of virtue as being supererogatory or
superlative to law is one that continues today, and will be a subject of ongoing
debate throughout this thesis. As JWT has grown increasingly deontological
in focus, moral virtues have come to be increasingly presented as being
beyond the purview of JWT, which I challenge in this thesis. The origins of the
contemporary absence of aretaic ethics in JWT lies, perhaps unintentionally,
in Grotius’ work.

2.2.1: Ad Bellum

Grotius’ discussion of war began by noting that people generally approve of
the use of force under certain circumstances. Societies do not reject all wars as
immoral, “but only that use of force which is repugnant to society, that is,
which infringes upon another's right.”77 Following Augustine and Vitoria, he
claimed that “[n]o other just cause for undertaking war can there be except
injury received.”78 He suggested that given all just wars are in response to an
injury received, there are four types of just wars: “defence, recovery of
property, and punishment [and] obtaining of what is owed to us.”79

Note that Grotius, interested in developing a Law of War that could be used
to govern nations, included punishment amongst the just causes for war. Not
only do sovereign rulers have authority over their own citizens, but insofar as
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all nations are governed by the same laws, it falls to rules to enforce those
laws.

The fact must also be recognized that kings, and those who possess rights on a
par with kings [supreme power], have the right of demanding punishments not
only on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but
also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but grossly violate
the law of nature or nations.80

Here Grotius indicated his belief that there are certain responsibilities that
political leaders inherit that extend beyond national self-interest or protection
of their own citizens. Rather, political leaders are duty-bound to uphold,
protect, and regulate the adherence of other states to the law of nations. The
question of whether, and to what extent political leaders are required to
intervene in response to the violation of international law by other states is a
matter of ongoing debate, but here – at the founding point of international law
– Grotius staked his position. The law applies equally to all political leaders,
but also relies equally on all political leaders to enforce it. Thus, it behoves
political leaders to uphold and enforce international law, if necessary, with
military force.

The final point regarding Grotius’s views on ad bellum is the degree to which
leaders and soldiers are morally responsible for the justice of their cause.
Grotius argued that “we must distinguish between those who were
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responsible for a war and those who followed the leadership of others.”81 Insofar
as political leaders have the responsibility to declare war, they are also
culpable for the justice of the cause. Soldiers, on the other hand, are dutybound to obey commands of their leaders, and are therefore inculpable (at
least with regard to cause).82 Notably, however, Grotius also argued that any
soldier who freely enters a war (e.g. mercenaries, allies) also bear culpability
for the justice of that war. Thus, not all soldiers are free – as Vitoria argued –
from scrupulously evaluating the morality of their cause. Those who
volunteer for the war must be confident of the justice of that war, or they will
be tainted with the injustice of the cause.

2.2.2: In Bello

When Grotius examined the various moral obligations that soldiers face in
war, he developed a novel dualism between legality and morality. Grotius
distinguished between “what can be done without blame”, and “what the
honourable man would do.” There are, Grotius contended, two meanings of
“permitted” each pertaining to in bello discussions. The first definition
concerns the moral rightness of the action, and the second concerns actions
that are free from punishment.
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[S]ometimes that is said to be permissible which is right from every point of view
and is free from reproach, even if there is something else which might more
honourably be done [...] In another sense, however, something is said to be
permissible, not because it can be done without prejudice to piety and rules of
duty, but because among men it is not liable to punishment.83

Beginning by considering the legally permissible (viz. that which is not liable
to punishment), Grotius argued that that in war it is permitted to intentionally
harm or kill one's enemies: “often killing is called the right of war.”84 This
deviates from Aquinas’ view that intentional killing in war cannot be justified
per se, though some killing may be justified in acts of self-defence. Instead,
Grotius followed Vitoria in holding that war is a separate moral sphere, and
that everyday moral requirements are not applicable in war.85 Perhaps the
most significant factor in justifying the intentional killing of others was, for
Grotius, the moral good of the end being aimed at by the war. Those killings
which are necessary to bring about victory in the war can be morally justified
whilse those which are unnecessary cannot. The same goes for other forms of
harm that might occur in war, for instance, Grotius was forthcoming in his
criticism of those who license rape as an acceptable practice in war.

Those who sanction rape have taken into account only the injury done to the
person of another, and have judged that it is not inconsistent with the law of war
[…] A better conclusion has been reached by others, who have taken into
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consideration not only the injury but the unrestrained lust of the act; also, the fact
that such acts do not contribute to safety or punishment.86

Those who defended rape in the time of Grotius usually accepted that it
harmed the victim. However, they also observed that war permits harm in a
number of different forms (for example, killing, conquest, destruction of
property). From this it followed, according to these proponents, that if other
types of harm were morally tolerable, so too was rape.

Grotius rejected this view because the only types of killing, conquest and
property destruction that are permissible are those necessary for victory. Rape
does not further the just cause being pursued and therefore cannot be justified.
However, Grotius believed this rebuttal failed to represent the entirety of what
is evil about rape. Rape not only harms the victim, but because the rapist
himself allows the vice of lust to control his actions, rape is demonstrative of
vice. In this way, Grotius appears to echo Augustine, who argued that
viciousness was the true evil in war.87 What is unclear, however, is how
Grotius would have responded in a case where rape was argued to be
necessary to pursuing the ends of an otherwise just war. Grotius claimed that
the right to injure one's enemies derives ultimately from just cause. If a certain
deed, then, was necessary to pursue a just cause, that deed must be
permissible under Grotius’ proposed system. So, having established that rape
is a prima facie moral evil, Grotius appears to have committed himself to saying
either (i) that moral evil is sometimes necessary, (ii) that what justifies the
harms committed in war is something other than the justice of the cause, or
finally (iii) that the ‘necessary rapist’ would not be liable to legal punishment
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(because his action was necessary), even though he had committed a grave
moral evil.

There is some evidence that Grotius’ response would be along the lines of (iii),
above, as he believed strongly in a distinction between what is legally
permissible in war, and what morality would sanction as virtuous conduct.
Thus, in Grotius we see clearly how deontological norms and aretaic virtues
are separated: the law is the domain of moral duty, and the military is right to
punish violations of moral duty, whilst virtue is optional – we praise soldiers
who act virtuously, but there can be no obligation for them to do so.

I must retrace my steps, and must deprive those who wage war of nearly all that
I may have seemed to grant, yet did not grant to them. For when I first set out to
explain this part of the law of nations I bore witness that many things are said to
be 'lawful' or 'permissible' for the reason that they are done with impunity [...]
things which, nevertheless, either deviate from the rule of right [...] or at any rate
may be omitted on higher grounds and with greater praise among good men.88

Some of what the law allows could still violate deeper laws of morality,
according to Grotius. He explained his view with reference to Seneca's Trojan
Women, where Pyrhus claims that no law protects captives from injury, to
which Agamemnon responds “[w]hat law permits, [a] sense of shame
forbids.”89 This “sense of shame” is what Grotius described as “internal
justice” – the moral laws that govern warfare, and forbid some of what the law
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of nations permits.90 The claims made by Grotius in this discussion show him
utilising a different mode of moral reasoning to that employed in his treatment
of law. This new approach – which is much closer to that of Augustine and
Aquinas – is one in which the morality of war is described in terms of what
the virtuous soldier or commander might do. For example, an “honourable”
warrior would wage war out of a genuine desire to do good, show mercy
where it is possible and prudent, show restraint where noncombatants are at
risk, and not promote hateful vitriol and unnecessary violence against one's
enemies.91

This indicates that although Grotius separated deontology from aretaic ethics,
he did not turn his back on aretaic ethics altogether. However, as we will see
in the following section, the growing interest in law seems to have meant that
only the legalistic aspects of Grotius’ work have had continued influence
today. Although the possession of moral virtues and good intentions is still
desirable, the primary concern for just war theorists has been on deontological
norms and violations of them. For this reason, Grotius (and Vitoria before him)
can be credited with – perhaps unwittingly – beginning the modern uninterest
in aretaic ethics within JWT.

Violations of absolute moral rules are much easier to discover and prosecute
than are vicious actions. As such, deontology was more immediately relevant
to Grotius, whose primary motivation was the writing of laws. Because Vitoria
and Grotius sought the development of an international law of war, they
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naturally emphasised deontology as the element of morality that is most like
in form to the law. However, despite a sharp distinction between arete and
moral obligation in Grotius, there remains a sense in which a just war theory
without a discussion of the virtues would remain incomplete. Thus, Grotius
notes that morality forces him to “deprive those who wage war of nearly all
that I may have seemed to grant,” because to do otherwise would be to present
an incomplete moral description of war. For Grotius, even if deontic and
aretaic ethics were separate questions for military ethics, his writings retain a
sense that unless one is able to address both elements, one’s understanding of
the morality of war will remain incomplete.

3: Michael Walzer and Just War Theory’s Modern Revival

Although in the 20th century several philosophers and theologians offered
insights into JWT,92 the most substantial contribution to JWT was to be offered
by Michael Walzer (1935-today). His treatment of the morality of war was not
only responsible for a revival in just war thinking, but also provided a radically
new way of discussing the topic. In fact, most of the major debates in JWT
today are in response to the ideas found in Walzer’s work. For this reason, this
section moves between exegesis of Walzer’s own views and those opposing
him on a number of controversial subjects.
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Walzer’s vital contribution was to invite just war theorists to discuss their
ideas in terms of human rights.93 In moving the discussion toward human
rights,94 Walzer aligned his work with the growing body of international law
that was emerging at the time when his seminal work Just and Unjust Wars
was published in 1977. Like international legal scholars, Walzer sought to
develop a theory that could apply across different communities and cultures.
Aware that many norms are culturally sensitive and unlikely to change,
Walzer recognised that an effective, universal morality of war would have to
be formulated in terms to which almost all communities would assent.95 The
distinction between culturally sensitive norms and universal ones is described
in terms of “thin” and “thick” moralities. If, Walzer contended, moral norms
of war would be universally applicable, they would need to be based in
“nothing more (nor less) than that core set of values we find reiterated in every
substantive moral and political code.”96 That is to say that JWT ought to be a
“thin” moral system.

The requirements of Walzer’s thin morality are “rudimentary and largely
negative,”97 and can generally be understood as being protective of basic
human rights like life and liberty.98 “Thin morality, in short, consists of those
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basic moral rules everyone believes in.”99 These basic moral rules, Walzer
contends, are best expressed in terms of human rights.

Walzer is also described as a “conventionalist”: emphasising that morality lies
in understanding what it is we already believe and do, Walzer situates
morality within historical, cultural and political traditions. “Moral and
political life is always experienced in particular places and times, through the
medium of different concrete actions, institutions and languages.”100 Being a
conventionalist, Walzer assumes the status quo of international relations and
focuses on JWT as being concerned with relationships between states: states
being those institutions that protect the rights of individuals and the common
life of communities.101 However, on this point he has been subject to some
criticism, as Orend notes, non-state violence is growing in incidence.
Consequently, Orend understands war as a relationship between “political
communities” rather than states.102 (Although, in Walzer’s defence, even
Orend's definition of political communities is state-centric: “those entities
which either are states or intend to become states.”)103 The rights of states are
twofold for Walzer: “territorial integrity and political sovereignty,” deriving
“ultimately from the rights of individuals, and from them they take their
force.”104 Walzer's largest contribution has been the suggestion that JWT
should be understood primarily through the lens of these two rights.
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The combination of Walzer’s moral conventionalism and his support for a thin
morality of war explains the further diminution of aretaic ethics within JWT
today. Because Walzer aims to develop a universally applicable and accepted
morality of war, his theory consists only in forbidding or prescribing practices
which reflect existing standards of communities around the world.
Contending that all communities enshrine basic human rights as morally
valuable, Walzer uses rights as the basis for his theory. However, in
discovering the foundational moral beliefs on which all communal moral
systems are based, Walzer’s theory is – as we will see – only able to describe
JWT in negative terms: that is, the deontological norms which ought not to be
violated. His theory echoes the legalistic elements of Grotius’ account but,
unlike Grotius, Walzer does not specify a separate aspect of JWT dedicated to
aretaic questions. Instead, Walzer’s pursuit of universal agreement comes at
the expense of aretaic reasoning with JWT.

It is important to note that Walzer does not explicitly exclude aretaic ethics
from discussion, and indeed at times discusses heroic sacrifice, courage,
prudence, and other virtues. However, they are only discussed as
supererogatory or unnecessary. Virtue becomes, in Walzer’s work, a matter of
the private morality of soldiers, commanders, and political leaders, not a
matter of concern for discussions of universal morality. The exclusion of
aretaic ethics from JWT in Walzer’s work, and subsequently in the work of his
contemporaries will become apparent through a more detailed exposition of
his thought.
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3.1: Ad Bellum

Walzer describes his theory of jus ad bellum in a section of Just and Unjust Wars
entitled “The Theory of Aggression”, which provides a clear idea of the focal
point of his theory. Walzer opens with the claim that “[a]ggression is the name
we give to the crime of war.”105 War is a crime when it is imposed on people
undeservingly, and demands that they defend what should not need to be
defended, their rights.106 The crime itself is defined as “[e]very violation of the
territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent state;”107 that is,
any violation of the rights of another state. For Walzer, what makes aggression
a crime is that “[a]ll aggressive acts have one thing in common: they justify
forceful resistance.”108 This leads to Orend's suggestion that “[f]or Walzer, the
only just cause for resorting to war is to resist aggression.”109 This includes
aggression against my own nation, or aggression committed against a thirdparty nation.

An alternative to Walzer’s limited view of just cause is provided by Nicholas
Fotion, who suggests that there might be “multiple reasons” which all
contribute to just cause, rather than requiring only one – admittedly powerful
– reason (like aggression). “[I]t can be argued that several small reasons can,
in theory, rise to the level of a single overriding reason. The whole might not
be greater than the sum of the parts, but the parts may add up to a single
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overriding reason.”110 If it is the case that only aggression can be met with war,
one's enemies can perform a multitude of antagonistic acts short of aggression
from a position of relative safety (one thinks, for example, of North Korea's
ongoing missile testing).111 Although one might forgive one, or even a few
such actions, at a certain point the aggregate harm begins to appear
overwhelming. Walzer’s claim that all aggressive acts justify forceful
resistance challenges the “probability of success” criterion of jus ad bellum.
However, as was said in chapter one, it is unclear what constitutes success.
For Walzer, the resistance of unjust aggression can sometimes be justified even
if there is no chance of success, as the alternative is simply “a failure to resist
evil in the world.”112 Note however, that Walzer also concedes that it might
not be necessary to resist every evil one encounters in the world:

It can't be said, however, that I am bound by my commitment to attack the
murderer myself if I cannot do so effectively or if the likely outcome is my own
destruction or the death of other people for whom I am responsible.113

Here we see Walzer attempt to establish the deontological limits of the
apparent duty to resist aggression: is the resistance of aggression ever a duty,
or is it merely morally permissible? In this discussion Walzer once again
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demonstrates his interest in discovering the relevant rights and duties of states
and individuals as they apply to war, seeing them hard moral limits on action.

One instance in which Walzer demonstrates his understanding of morally
permissible and impermissible acts in terms of rights and duties emerges in
his discussion of an incident in 1943 where mercenaries fighting for the French
in WWII were permitted to rape Italian women. He dismisses any argument
that might justify the rape, instead arguing that rape is always outside the
deontological limitations determined by universal morality.

Rape is a crime, in war as in peace, because it violates the rights of the woman
who is attacked. To offer her as bait to a mercenary soldier is to treat her as if she
were not a person at all but a mere object, a prize or trophy of war. It is the
recognition of her personality that shapes our judgement.114

We can contrast Walzer’s criticism of military rape to that of Grotius. Walzer
notes the immorality of rape lies in the harm inflicted on an innocent victim,
and the failure of the act to respect the humanity of the victim. However, this
is precisely the account that Grotius believed did not go far enough in its
condemnation. Forbidding rape solely on the basis of “the injury done to the
person of another” was insufficient for Grotius; a large part of rape’s illegality
stemmed, for Grotius, from “not only the injury but the unrestrained lust of
the act.”115
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However, because Walzer is concerned only with those moral beliefs that have
universal traction, he formulates the immorality of rape in terms of human
rights (it is an open question whether or not “unrestrained lust” might not be
similarly viewed by cultures around the world). But, in describing rape’s
wrongfulness only in terms of the harm it does to others, one remains open to
the possibility that lustful soldiers might be suitable figures to wage war, so
long as they do not act on their lust. This view is anathema to that of Augustine
and Aquinas, who held that the morally good soldier must also be a virtuous
man. For Walzer, the morally good soldier is simply one who does not harm
those who do not warrant being harmed.

Further demonstration of the diminished importance of internal dispositions
and personal moral excellence can be found in Walzer’s views on the right
intention criterion of jus ad bellum. Walzer, again concerned with the ethical
minimums that states and individuals ought to be expected to reach, does not
require that political leaders declare war solely out of concern for the justice
of their cause. Instead, he argues that “[t]here is no such thing as a pure will
in political life.”116 This concession to realism leads to Walzer’s allowance of
“mixed motives,” whereby “right intention is present amongst the ordinary
mix of motives which animates states behaviour.”117 Here, again, Walzer’s
interest in deontological formulations of JWT is indicative: if it is the case that
morality only needs to answer questions about right and wrong, then all
Walzer needs to determine is whether a just war declared from mix motives
constitutes a violation of deontological norms or not. By limiting war to the
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deontological domain – a product of his belief that the morality of war should
derive from universally held moral principles – Walzer’s JWT is considerably
narrower in focus than those of his predecessors. The trouble with this
narrowness is identified by Orend:

Walzer refers quite breezily, almost off-handedly, to the content of minimal
morality, presumably owing to his view that we all know more or less what he
is referring to. But do we really? Is the ‘more or less’ enough to provide firm
guidance in difficult situations, such as wartime?118

It is unclear whether Walzer’s reliance on thin (in Orend’s terms, minimal)
morality actually lends sufficient content to intelligently discuss the ethics of
war, or whether they “leave considerable space for different interpretations of
the same phenomena.”119 For instance, what counts as torture is frequently
debated (and will be addressed in detail in chapter three): can we say that a
thin morality that prohibits torture is sufficient if we lack consensus on the
correct definition of torture?

Aquinas argued that a large part of the

description of an action emanated from aretaic factors like intention and
motivation. If he was correct, achieving consensus about the description of
morally contentious terms will be highly problematic for defenders of a thin
moral system.
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3.2: In Bello

Like his predecessors, Walzer argue that if one fails to “fight well”, that is, fails
to respect the laws of jus in bello, then a war that was previously just (adhering
to the rules of jus ad bellum) is rendered unjust.120 Walzer's doctrine of jus in
bello consists of three rules which have emerged from the standard, ongoing
practice of war as articulated by laws, norms, and cultural practices – what
Walzer calls “the war convention.”121 These rules generally correlate to the two
principles described in chapter one: proportionality and discrimination, but
Walzer adds a third one – “armies are not to employ methods which are
intrinsically heinous; they may not commit actions which 'shock the moral
conscience of mankind.'“122 This third addition makes sense given that Walzer
views his work to be an interpretation of the existing moral beliefs of human
societies (although, as I mentioned, the narrowness of Walzer’s framework
may make it difficult to define these intrinsically heinous deeds in advance).
No society would approve of a deed heinous enough to shock the moral
conscience of all of humanity. However, it is also true that many, if not all
societies would prefer to have a heinous deed done than see their entire
society destroyed. How these two moral preferences interact in Walzer’s
thought will be explored later in this section.

Walzer’s view of the principle of discrimination focusses on who can be
attacked, rather than who cannot (although he still holds noncombatant
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immunity to be of central importance).123 Walzer argues that those engaged
directly in committing harms are legitimate targets in war.124 This view leads
to Walzer’s argument that soldiers forfeit their individual rights against being
killed when they go to war.125 “Soldiers,” Walzer observes, quoting Napoleon,
“are made to be killed.”126 However, although Walzer accepts this, he does not
think that all soldiers can be killed all the time; only that it can (and mostly
will) be permissible to kill enemy soldiers.127 On the basis that all soldiers have
forfeited their right to life and are legitimate targets, Walzer upholds a
doctrine that has come to be called “the moral equality of soldiers.”128
Therefore, whether a soldier fights for a just or unjust war, he has equal rights
to kill or be killed. Here Walzer finds an unusual ally in Augustine, who
argued that soldiers were merely “a sword in the hand.”

In response to this view, Jeff McMahan, argues “against the view that unjust
combatants act permissibly when they fight within the constraints of jus in
bello.”129 Rather, McMahan suggests, “it is morally wrong to fight in a war that
is unjust because it lacks a just cause.”130 McMahan’s position is that for a
solider to warrant being killed, he must have done something to make himself
liable to be killed, but soldiers who defend a just cause have done nothing to
make themselves so liable; they are in this respect “innocent”. Therefore to kill
soldiers simply for fighting for a just cause is impermissible.131 Even if,
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McMahan argues, the soldier has good reasons for why he believes the war to
be just, if he is mistaken, there is a clear difference in the moral status of a just
combatant and the moral status of an unjust combatant.

The disharmony between McMahan and Walzer on this point appears to stem
from two places: first, a view of soldiers as duty-bound (by either coercion or
through freely volunteering) to obey commands. Were soldiers not to obey,
military institutions would be unable to effectively co-ordinate the fighting of
Just wars. This argument, which McMahan calls “The Duty to Sustain the
Efficient Functioning of Just Institutions,”132 is predicated on the fact that
“[m]ilitary institutions have to be able to react quickly and efficiently in
moments of crisis,” and therefore “individuals within the military must fulfil
their assigned roles in a consistent and predictable manner.”133 McMahan
rejects this alleged duty for two reasons: first, because in conflicts between
institutional duties and other duties “there can be no a priori guarantee that
institutional duties will be overriding;”134 and second, because “that
[institutional] duty is generated only within military institutions that are
just.”135 Obedience only becomes a duty if (a) the institution is just, and (b)
even if the institution is just, there is no reason to believe that this duty takes
priority over other duties (such as not to act unjustly). This is a real problem
with Walzer's approach, and it is not clear on what basis Walzer justifies this
claim save to say that it is part of the war convention.
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The second source of disagreement between McMahan and Walzer comes
from the general manner in which they both view soldiers. Walzer famously
describes soldiers as “human instruments” who are “not comrades-in-arms in
the old style, members of the fellowship of warriors; [but] ‘poor sods, just like
me.’”136 Understandably for someone writing in the wake of the Vietnam War
and the controversies surround conscription policies in the US at the time,
Walzer develops a view of soldiers as the victims of the will of political leaders.
The condition of soldiers is one of shared victimhood: they may not fight for
the same side, but they are allied in their shared experience of being pawns in
a greater game. Because of this shared experience, soldiers are able to
recognise that their enemies, though legitimate targets to kill, are “men who
are not criminals,”137 but are – like me – worthy of pity. It is this mutual
understanding of the plight of soldiers that restrains them from going beyond
the rules of war.

McMahan, by contrast, sees soldiers as prima facie morally autonomous agents
whose decisions to go to war are ultimately their own. “Political leaders,” he
argues, “are utterly powerless to kill large numbers of people without the
acquiescence and complicity of all those who rationalize, pay for, and
perpetrate those killings.”138 McMahan believes that although soldiers and
commanders, as rational decision-makers, have a duty “to do whatever they
have been ordered to do,” unless there is evidence that obedience is absolutely
required (and McMahan contends there is not) they nevertheless “have a
moral choice to make when they receive an order.”139 Having made their own,
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individual decisions, soldiers “cannot plausibly deny their responsibility”140 if
they decide badly.

The question of soldiers’ responsibility for the justice of their cause is one of
the most hotly contested debates in the modern literature (and one that I
address at length in chapter five). In fact, the question has given rise to a school
of thought known as ‘Just War Revisionism.’141 The fulcrum of debate regards
whether the categories of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are, in Walzer’s words,
“logically independent,”142 or whether they are related. McMahan explains the
significance of this: “The most important implication of the idea that jus in
bello is independent of jus ad bellum is that it makes no difference to the
permissibility of an unjust combatant’s conduct in war that he fights without
a just cause. Unjust combatants do not do wrong merely by participating in an
unjust war.”143

McMahan’s view is not without criticism either though: Nancy Sherman
suggests that it “seems too harsh and to miss too much about the practice of
soldiering.”144 Sherman notes that the soldier lifestyle “is not the optimal time
for the deepest reflection and analysis of war's causes and rationales.”145
However, Sherman is no ally to Walzer, rather claiming that we do blame
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soldiers for the wars they fight if we perceive them to be unjust, and that the
soldiers themselves are concerned with this as well.146 There is a sense that the
side on which a soldier fights says something about the moral character of that
soldier. Thus, Sherman suggests that Walzer's claim that the separation of jus
ad bellum and jus in bello is part of the war convention is false; rather, the way
that people ordinarily understand war is to attribute some blame to soldiers
who fight in an unjust war. Orend, for instance, suggests they are “like minor
accomplices to a major crime.”147

Is it not only soldiers who forfeit their rights to life in wartime, but certain
civilians as well. How do we distinguish between civilians who enjoy the right
to life in wartime, and those who do not? Again, the question is whether the
civilians are engaged in harming or not, although this determination is
difficult.

It is harder to understand the extension of combatant status beyond the class of
soldiers, though in modern war this has been common enough. The development
of military technology, it might be said, has dictated it, for war today is as much
an economic as a military activity. Vast numbers of workers must be mobilized
before an army can even appear in the field; and so on. It is a great temptation
then, to attack the enemy army behind its own lines, especially if the battle itself
is not going well. But to attack behind the lines is to make war against people
who are at least nominally citizens. How can this be justified?148
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It is worth noting here that until this point, such actions had usually not been
justified. Paul Ramsey, Elizabeth Anscombe, and John Ford – all of whom
dealt with this issue – argued that if noncombatants were killed, it was only
justifiable as a side-effect to pursuing some militarily significant and morally
justifiable target; that is, it was justified with recourse to DDE. Ford, writing
during WWII, was especially suspicious of whether the decision-makers
involved with “obliteration bombing” genuinely do not intend the deaths of
innocent civilians, particularly given the rhetoric of leaders included a desire
to “break the morale of the people”149 and discussions of revenge.150

Following the war, Elizabeth Anscombe wrote a public response to a decision
to award Harry Truman – the President who ordered the dropping of the
atomic bombs – an honorary degree from Oxford University. Elizabeth
Anscombe revisited double-effect and its relation to obliteration bombing
(now on a nuclear scale).

For killing the innocent, even if you know as a matter of statistical certainty that
the things you do involve it, is not necessarily murder. I mean that if you attack
a lot of military targets, such as munitions factories and naval dockyards, as
carefully as you can, you will be certain to kill a number of innocent people; but
that is not murder. On the other hand, unscrupulousness in considering the
possibilities turns it into murder.151
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Anscombe argued that Truman's bombings did not scrupulously consider the
various options to minimize harm, seriously consider the moral status of
civilians, or consider the possibility of a conditional surrender. Such
imprudence in the face of the massive harm inflicted cannot be anything but
evil.152 By emphasising the role of prudence among the moral factors involved
in DDE, Anscombe illuminated its relevance to both deontological and aretaic
ethics. Deontology explains the basic principles which may not ever be
intentionally violated, and the moral framework for determining when a sideeffect may be foreseeably caused, but aretaic ethics is required to understand
the nature of the prudent person who would be able to make such decisions
wisely, discerning when side-effects were proportional and necessary. As
Ford notes:

The principle of the double effect, though basic in scientific Catholic morality, is
not, however, a mathematical formula, nor an analytical principle. It is a practical
formula which synthesizes an immense amount of moral experience, and serves
as an efficient guide in countless perplexing cases. [...] It is a truism among
moralists that, though the principle is clear in itself, its application requires
“sound moral judgement.”153

In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer expressed scepticism at the seemingly
inflexible approach of DDE,154 which he suggested could be used to justify
clearly immoral behaviour. Walzer's analysis of DDE begins with the story of

It helps to remember that Anscombe was at the forefront of a revival of virtue ethics in
moral philosophy, so the virtuous conduct of the person and psychological factors such as
intention, remorse and care were significant considerations. See, for example: Ancombe,
'Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 124, 1958, 1-19 at 1.
153 Ford, op cit., 27.
154 Ford, however, suggests that DDE must be flexible if it is to be successful. See: Ford, op
cit., 27
152
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Frank Richards, a soldier in WWI. Richards was assigned to clearing out a
village, which involved entering each house and ensuring no German soldiers
were present. Protocol for clearing the cellars was to throw a grenade down
and enter after it had exploded. Richards, being a genuinely concerned man,
would yell two warnings into the cellar before throwing the grenade, to give
civilians time to escape. If any civilians might have died, Richards suggests he
would have become a (paradoxically) “innocent murderer.” 155 Walzer asks
whether the warnings (which Richards believes made him innocent) were
morally necessary, given that they might give German troops a chance to
escape and attack. He suggests that Richards was required to issue warnings,156
but that DDE would not require him to, and it is therefore a bad principle. 157

However, this claim fails to strike at the heart of DDE as it was developed by
Anscombe, because Walzer's conception of DDE does not allude to the aretaic
concerns that Anscombe and Ford were cognisant of. The deontological effects
must be guided and governed by a prudent person of “sound moral
judgement.” This is to say that to interpret DDE through a purely deontic lens,
assuming that it establishes absolutely binding principles for action, is a
mistake. DDE can, and does, provide firm moral guidance in difficult
situations, but it is also subject to the situational factors at hand, and therefore
cannot amount to a deontological principle, which is the manner in which
Walzer expects it to operate. Just because DDE can justify an action vis-à-vis
proportionality and intention does not make it justifiable; it must also be an
action that can be justifiably imposed on the person who is likely to suffer. For
this reason, in Richards’ case, throwing the bombs without warning would be

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 152.
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impermissible. Walzer argues for the addition of a new condition to DDE:
“that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible.”158 However, a closer
analysis of DDE would reveal that this requirement is already entailed in what
it requires. The failure to correctly interpret DDE stems from Walzer’s attempt
to interpret it through a deontological lens. DDE is not a deontological
principle, it is a method of decision-making that utilises the moral and
psychological dispositions of the actor as a means to determining the moral
character of the act itself. Thus, it cannot be applied indiscriminately in the
way Walzer describes.

Let us turn now to acts that do intentionally risk, or worse, target civilians.
These are a species of actions that “shock the moral conscience of mankind.”159
Nevertheless, Walzer suggests that these acts may be done in cases of
“supreme emergency.” “A supreme emergency exists when our deepest
values and our collective survival are in imminent danger”160 However,
Walzer’s argument here is an instance of threshold deontology, as described
in chapter one. In cases where the stakes are morally severe, deontology loses
its binding force and “a certain kind of utilitarianism reimposes itself.”161
However, it is not pure utilitarianism, which holds that one ought to do
whatever leads to the best outcomes; rather, it is an ethic of necessity. One
does what is required despite the fact that what is required is morally wrong.
Paradoxically, in supreme emergencies, the morally necessary action is one
that is morally forbidden.162
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[T]here are moments when the rules can be and perhaps have to be overridden.
They have to be overridden precisely because [as opposed to, for example, habeas
corpus] they have not been suspended. And overriding the rules leaves guilt
behind, as a recognition of the enormity of what we have done and a
commitment not to make our actions into an easy precedent for the future.163

What situations can be called supreme emergencies? Here, Walzer's claim
betrays his conventionalist (state-centric) view of international relations,
defining the ultimate emergency as the threat of the destruction of an entire
community.164 According to Walzer, in situations like these the absolutist who
cries “justice though the heavens fall!” demonstrates “a refusal to think about
what it means for the heavens to fall.”165

Walzer is not explicit about the type of actions supreme emergency permits
but which are prohibited at other times, save noting that even those that shock
the moral conscience of mankind will be permitted. In 'Emergency Ethics' he
calls these things “forbidden things, taboos, proscriptions...”166 It seems that
there is nothing which might not fall onto this list were the need great enough.
Thus, supreme emergency does not rule out, for example, the knowing and
indiscriminate bombing of one's own civilians. “How can we, the opponents
of murder, fail to resist the practice of mass murder - even if resistance requires
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us, as the phrase goes, to get our hands dirty?”167 How can we fail to stop the
massacre of our own civilians, even if the stopping requires us to do a little
massacring of them ourselves? I cannot see a possible response to this charge
from Walzer, so the remaining question is whether the permissibility of
friendly civilian-killing undermines the entire project of the supreme
emergency.

Walzer dedicates no time to discussing the effect that destroying so many lives
might have on an individual’s moral and psychological wellbeing. To perform
such morally heinous deeds even under knowledge of necessity is, unless one
is altogether lacking in empathy, to subject oneself to crippling guilt, suffering,
and feelings of turpitude. In the HBO documentary Wartorn, executive
producer James Gandolfini asks two military psychiatrists about the
psychological toll of conflict on soldiers.

James Gandolfini: Is there anyone who you can honestly say, who was in a great
deal of intense combat situations and comes back completely fine?
Col. Charles C. Engel: I’d say those folks are pretty rare.
Col. John Bradley: There’s the pathology of the warrior that says that the only
thing you should feel when you shoot an insurgent is recoil […] but I would say
that no-one is really unscathed. Unless you have really no compassion for human
life. If you have a total disregard, maybe the only thing you feel is recoil.
Everybody else carries something with them.168
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If there is a psychological cost absorbed by soldiers when they kill the enemy,
imagine how much greater the cost when one kills innocent civilians on a large
scale. Can one perform an action like this and still remain a good person?
Before answering this question one first has to address the antiheroic notion
that the virtuous man is the one that will do these things. For instance, in his
defence of US President Truman’s authorisation of the dropping of atomic
bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Wilson D. Miscamble opines that:

As future anniversaries of the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki occur, one might hope for less moralizing condemnation of Truman’s
decision until the critics specify at least a less immoral and yet still feasible course
of action to end the terrible war. Perhaps there might even be some empathy for
the man who felt required to make the decision and who carried the burden of
it. Harry Truman […] was hardly some moral monster who now needs to be
placed retrospectively on trial for war crimes. Those who from the safe distance
of sixty-five years criticize his decision would do well to place themselves in their
shoes and ask what they might have done in the circumstances […] [P]erhaps
they might pray, if they be so inclined, that leaders in our own time and in the
future are never forced by horrible circumstances to make such decisions.169

Miscamble’s moralistic defense of Truman’s strength of character in doing
what was “necessary” indicates again, and perhaps especially, the extent to
which modern thinking about the morality of war has become removed from
aretaic ethics. Whether the moral cost to one’s own character in performing
heinous deeds might be enough to outlaw them altogether is paid no mind by

Wilson D. Miscamble, The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the
Defeat of Japan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 124
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Miscamble, or Walzer in his case of supreme emergencies. This is indicative of
the extent to which modern JWT is concerned exclusively with evaluating the
morality of actions independently of the actual people performing those
deeds. Whether or not these factors affect our moral evaluation of the moral
legitimacy of the action, these are important questions to be considered; if for
no other reason than because the harm an action does ought to be weighed as
a factor for the purposes of proportionality.

There has, however, been some discussion of the moral-psychological
consequences of performing highly morally dubious or impermissible acts
from outside JWT. For instance, Nancy Sherman and Laurie Calhoun have
both argued that the effects of war on those that operate in morally ambiguous
realms have detrimental effects on the character of those who perform them.
In The Untold War, Sherman looks at the moral space occupied by an
interrogator, William Quinn.

In Quinn's case, deception and betrayal, manipulation and exploitation, tools
morally questionable in ordinary transactions, had become standard tools of his
specialised trade. And this did not sit perfectly well [...] To interrogate is to
occupy a complex moral space. True, all soldiers occupy a moral space that is
hard to reconcile at times with civilian life; this is a recurrent theme in the stories
soldiers tell. But the space the interrogator inhabits has its own special moral
demands. And with it comes a distinct set of moral and psychological
vulnerabilities.170
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Similarly, Laurie Calhoun considers the “pilots” of unmanned air vehicles
(UAVs), who operate lethal machinery from thousands of kilometres away.

Indeed, there is a very real sense in which soldiers who kill virtually have entered
into the surreal and frightening realm of assassins who do not register the
suffering of their victims—because it is not real at all from the killers’ own
perspective. The people who agree to be a part of this enterprise may have no
qualms about destroying their fellow human beings, but even if they do initially,
those who continue on surely become inured to what they do, as a matter of
psychological self-defence.171

However, this psychological inurement cannot last forever; at some stage, the
chickens will come home to roost. As Dave Grossman notes in his pre-eminent
study on the psychology of killing in the military, “conditioning is
astoundingly effective, but there is a psychological price to pay.”172 Precisely
what the costs are will be explored closely in chapter four. For now, however,
it is important to emphasise that these kind of discussions are taking place in
literature outside that of JWT. In the modern day, the initial co-operation of
deontological and aretaic ethics utilised by Augustine and Aquinas has been
completely separated to the point where aretaic concerns no longer appear as
questions that serious just war theorists need to consider. JWT has become, for
the most part, exactly as Walzer foresaw it: a thin description of the minimum
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moral standards that must be reached in order for a war to be described as
just. No longer as it once was: a comprehensive analysis of the ethics of war,
but instead is a deontological analysis of how the moral limitations prescribed
by human rights can be morally navigated in times of war.

4: Conclusion

The contribution of Walzer marks the point at which consideration of the
aretaic has disappeared from JWT. Instead, JWT takes deontology – in the
form of international law and Walzer's thin conception of justice – as its
foundation. My thesis at the beginning of this chapter was that for the greater
part of the history of JWT, the theory was founded in the broader moral system
of aretaic ethics, and that there were good philosophical reasons for this. In
fact, the move toward deontic conceptions of JWT is a relatively new one, and
it is testament to Walzer's influence that it has become so widespread.
However, it is, I believe to the detriment of JWT; no longer are concepts like
rights and duties informed by deeper conceptions of virtue, wellbeing, and
character. JWT requires - to quote Anscombe - “an adequate philosophy of
psychology, in which [it is] conspicuously lacking.”173

When Augustine began to discuss the morality of war, he addressed two
separate elements: the absolute moral law, and the virtues of the individuals
who are forced to fight in war. Thus, JWT began by acknowledging both
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aretaic and deontic concerns. Adherence to absolute moral law (divine law)
ought to be motivated by love of God and not be fear of his wrath. The love of
moral goodness was preferred to mere obedience because the former
demonstrates understanding of the moral laws to which one commits. Thus,
for Augustine, the perfection of morally good action lay in the virtues. Later,
Aquinas developed a just war theory which assigned absolute moral law to a
natural law ethic distinct from the divine law of Aquinas in the sense that
believers and non-believers alike could be expected to know and understand
it. Furthermore, he suggested that war could be participated in with virtue
and in a manner consistent with living a morally good life. Prudence and
courage in particular are virtues inherent to the practices of commanding and
soldiering respectively.

Following Aquinas, Francisco di Vitoria argued that war is a separate moral
domain, independent of everyday morality. In this way, he paved the way for
the separation of the deontic and aretaic; in war, soldiers could be permitted
to perform even atrocities so long as their cause was just. Later, Hugo Grotius
strongly advocated deontology by arguing that virtue is supererogatory.

Finally, Michael Walzer developed a just war theory explicitly focussed on
human rights. In so doing, Walzer chooses deontology as the sole method of
moral reasoning about war. As was seen in a discussion of supreme
emergencies, failing to consider the aretaic means failing to consider the
various ways in which the deeds performed by soldiers can affect their moral
character and ongoing flourishing as these concerns are no longer considered
to be within the remit of JWT. Only an approach that considers both aretaic
101

and deontological concerns will lead to a full appreciation of the various
constitutive elements of the morality of war.
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Chapter Three

Rights, Deon and Arete

In the previous chapter, I argued that the growing role of international law
and human rights in contemporary discussions reflects the overwhelmingly
deontological focus of JWT today. This, I suggested, has coincided with a
dwindling interest in aretaic ethics, which was, at other stages in JWTs history,
recognised to capture important elements of the morality of war. In this
chapter I argue that one reason aretaic moral reasoning is important is because
it enriches purely deontological approaches. Although these can be logically
coherent, they can at times fail to treat the morality of war in its full breadth.
Incorporating aretaic ethics into the discussion enables JWT to deal more
satisfactorily with the moral challenges that arise in war.

It will be important to discern what kind of rights are of interest to just war
theorists. In section one I suggest that most implicitly follow Joel Feinberg’s
view of rights as “valid claims”1 that form side-constraints on the actions of
others. Although I have a good deal of sympathy for this view, rights as side
constraints do little to explain the content of rights-respecting acts. Modern
rights-based theories tend to understand rights-respecting actions as “not

Joel Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ in Steven M. Cahn & Peter Markie (eds.),
Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (3rd edition), (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006).
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wrongs.” That is, right action refers to any action that does not violate any
deontologically-prescribed duty. I argue that this description is sufficient to
describe actions that are not prima facie wrongs, but does not present a theory
of morally laudable or virtuous action. The shortcoming of this approach is
that it fails to recognise sufficiently the moral importance of intentions in the
moral evaluation of actions. To demonstrate the importance of intention, I
contrast the rights-based justification for the types of killings soldiers perform
during war with an account based in the doctrine of double-effect (DDE).

The exploration of rights and intentions in section one will set the intellectual
context and debate which I address in the following sections. In section two I
outline what I consider to be strong arguments in favour of incorporating
rights into the morality of war. This section constitutes a defence for the place
of rights within JWT, and explain why I do not endorse a purely aretaic
approach. In summary, my reason are because few (if any) moral concepts
provide the same sort of defence for the absolute moral value of individuals
as do human rights (and we are right to hold individuals to be of absolute
moral value). Second, because the virtue of the various people who participate
in war is not assured. Third, because the deontological nature of rights is wellsuited to form a framework under which a universal law of war can be (and
has been) developed.

Having developed an understanding of (i) how contemporary just war
theorists tend to conceptualise rights and (ii) why rights are an important
concept in JWT, I consider some of the shortcomings of developing a just war
theory exclusively from a rights framework. In section three I outline two areas
104

in which an exclusively deontological approach unnecessarily limits moral
understanding of particular phenomenon to a simple transaction of rights. As
I indicated in the last chapter, both aretaic and deontological frameworks
cover important aspects of the morality of war. Just war theories based solely
on human rights will be shown to be inadequate because at times they diverge
from war’s ultimate aim, being peace, and because they tend to defy popular
common-sense notions about war.2 The two illustrations seek to demonstrate
this with regard to matters of both ad bellum and in bello, the examples being
(i) torture as an example of circumstances in which rights can be upheld in a
manner that is vicious and immoral, and (ii) the “lesser evil” problem invoked
famously in Walzer’s supreme emergency. In response to these challenges, I
show how a just war theory that incorporates both deontological and aretaic
ideas provides a more all-encompassing explanation in these two cases.

I do not take common-sense moral intuitions to be entirely authoritative, but when a
philosophical theory presents conclusions that contradict ordinary moral intuitions, I believe
the onus is on the theory to explain what is wrong with those intuitions. The usefulness of
common beliefs is noted by Aristotle in what has become known as the “doctrine of the
wisdom of the multitude.” “For each individual among the many has a share of excellence
and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a manner one
man, who has many feet, and hands, and sense, so too with regard to their character and
thought.” See: Aristotle trans. Jonathan Barnes, Politics, Bk. III, Ch. 11, 1281b3-6 in Barnes,
Jonathan, (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: Volume Two, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995) . Aristotle is likewise aware that common-sense intuitions are insightful, but not
necessarily authoritative (Ch. 11, 1281b15-16). For an analysis of Aristotle on this subject,
see: Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter
11 of Aristotle’s Politics’, Political Theory, vol. 23, no. 4, 1995, 563-584.
2
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1: Rights

1.1: Which Rights?

Modern theorists (from around the time of the Walzerian revival onward)
have made a substantial place for rights within their theories, and they have
had good reason for doing so. However, before presenting what I believe to
be the compelling reasons for finding a place for rights within JWT, it will be
worth outlining what is meant by the term ‘rights’ in this context.

Most theorists divide rights into a number of different types: legal philosopher
Rex Martin speaks of “claims, valid claims, entitlements [and] established
ways of acting,”3 whilst another jurist, W.N. Hohfeld, divided rights into
claims, duties, privileges [liberties] and “no rights.”4 To which type of rights
(if any) do modern just war theorists subscribe? In the following discussion I
distinguish between ‘basic rights’, those being valid claims to those things
necessary as foundations of human survival and wellbeing,5 and other rights.
Whilst basic rights are usually conceived of as claims, some war rights – rights

Rex Martin, A System of Rights, Oxford Scholarship Online, 1997, 1.
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broad, that are not the product of explicitly conventional design but antecedent to it, and
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that are particular to the environment of war, such as a soldier’s right to kill –
are best understood as liberties.

Although discussion of the logical structure of rights is helpful, I argue that
JWT is a moral theory concerned primarily with morally just and unjust actions.
It is a normative theory, not a meta-ethical one. Thus, the pertinent questions
relate to particular human actions: is an invasion an act of aggression or not?
Did a bombing run violate the principle of proportionality or not? It is
therefore important to shift toward a consideration of the intentions of human
actors with regard to the rights their actions affect. Whether a person intended
to respect, undermine, deny, or violate rights can and should bear on our
moral evaluation of the action. In this section I argue that determining whether
an act is just or not provides insufficient evidence on which to condemn or
laud either the act or the agent performing it. If just war theorists want a theory
that is able to praise or condemn, reward or punish, they needs to consider the
moral traits, intentions, and dispositions of the agents involved in making just
war decisions. At present, deontological just war theories do consider intention
to be a morally significant concept, and rightly so. However, they have not as
yet recognised the connection between intention and aretaic ethics more
broadly. If such a connection were made and aretaic considerations we
brought to bear on the deontic, a more sophisticated account of military ethics
would be possible.
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1.1.1: JWT and the Right to Kill in War

Much of the moral distaste for war stems from the fact that during wars,
innocent people often have basic rights (such as life, shelter, and liberty)
destroyed. Ironically, however, much of the work of moral philosophy has
been to show how the violation of basic rights can sometimes be justifiable.
This is most obvious in discussions of what justifies soldiers in killing their
enemies. In this section, I explore how some of the major rights-based just war
theorists alive today – Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and David Rodin –
justify the right to kill in war. Although these thinkers are usually considered
to offer differing accounts of what justifies killing during war, I argue that they
share a basic underlying belief that is symptomatic of the modern prevalence
of deontology in military ethics. Namely, the belief that the right to kill is
derivative of the moral status of either the victim, the killer, or both: a status
which is determined independently of the intention of the individual soldier.

For Rodin, the right to kill in wartime derives from the right to self-defence.6
How does this right, which involves depriving another person of his life (to
which he has a claim), fit into the Hohfeldian schema? Rodin explains that
self-defence is a kind of “exculpation,” whereby an agent can be excused of an
action for which he should seemingly be punished.7 Specifically, self-defence
is a justification for homicide. Justifications do not hold only that an agent
should not be punished for what he has done, but that agent has in fact done
nothing wrong.8 Finally, Rodin concludes, the logical structure of justifications

David Rodin, War & Self-Defense, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 1-2.
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leads us to conclude that they are liberty-rights.9 The specific structure of the
liberty-right to self-defence is as follows:

1. Person A performs an action that intends to harm Person B.
2. A is not justified in harming B, and is culpable for his attack.
3. B has a claim-right to life, and A a duty not to violate that claim.
4. Therefore, B would be wronged if A was to kill him.
5. However, if B were to kill A in order to prevent his being killed, A would not
have been wronged.
6. Therefore, A must have had no claim (a “no-right”) against B’s acting in selfdefence.
7. Therefore, B was at liberty to act in self-defence.

Rodin sees self-defensive killing as one example of a species of actions he
describes as “morally and legally justified defensive actions.”10 Defensive
actions are justified when the defender, D, possesses either a right to or a duty
of care toward a particular good, G, and when an assailant, A, presents a threat
to G.11 However, D is not entitled to do just anything to A in defence of G;
rather, A is limited by three moral conditions: necessity, imminence, and
proportionality.12 In short, defensive actions must do no more harm than is
required to protect G, must only be undertaken when we are certain that G is
under threat from A, and that the harm to A is proportionate to the moral value
of defending G. Note that in this case, the defensive right is predicated on (i)
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the moral value of G; (ii) D’s moral status as either entitled to or custodian of
G; and (iii) A’s status as a threat to G.

What though, Rodin asks, of A’s rights? Although the moral relationship
between D and G appears to justify D acting in defence of G, can it justify D
doing harm to A – “a person whom we can assume has interests and rights of
his or her own”?13 It can if and only if (i) A’s threat to G is unjustified and (ii)
that A is morally responsible for the threat he poses to G. There must be “a
sufficiently substantive normative connection between the unjustified threat
and the person against who one uses defensive force.”14 From this we can
understand fully Rodin’s description of self-defensive killing as follows:

Figure 1 – Rodin’s Model of Self-defence

When G is the right to life of B, the value of G stems from “the legitimate
interest a person has in their own continued survival and bodily integrity.”15
This value is great enough to make self-defensive killing proportionate.
Furthermore, A’s intentional effort to destroy G – a good to which B has a
moral relationship – makes A responsible in a manner that justifies using
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defensive force against him. In short, it is the fact that A is intentionally
engaged in harming G in an unjustified manner that renders A vulnerable to
defensive action. In times of war, G may vary between innocent civilians,
national territory, the life of a soldier or his squad, or some other good. In all
cases, what makes defensive action justifiable is that the assailant both is
unjustified and responsible in attacking G and that D has some right to G or,
more relevantly, a duty to defend G. In this account, the morally relevant
factors are (i) G’s status as morally valuable; (ii) D’s morally privileged
relationship to G; (iii) A’s injurious relationship to G; and (iv) the lack of
justification for A’s relationship to G. Thus, the right to defensive action is
predicated on the status of two parties relative to a particular good which is
held to have objective moral value.

Similarly, McMahan believes that intentional killing is justified in war because
certain people’s rights not to be killed are lost – as if they had been waived.16
When a right is waived, the right-holder has no-right where he once had a
claim. As McMahan notes, “[a] right is waived when the possessor of the right
consents to allow another person or persons to do what he has a right that they
not do.”17 In cases of war, however, soldiers do not necessarily consent to
being killed, but their right is lost nevertheless. For McMahan, this loss is
explained because the soldiers’ actions cause their right to be forfeited (in his
terms, they are “liable”).18 However, it is only unjust behaviour that leads to a
right being forfeited. Those soldiers whose attacks are unjustified (because of
the injustice of cause, the innocence of their victim, or some other factor) forfeit
their right against being killed. Similarly, for Rodin, the soldier who is
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defending G is of a higher moral status than the soldier who attacks G. Only
the defensive soldier has the right to use force against the other. Thus, only
soldiers whose war is justified possess defensive rights.

McMahan’s argument is that only “just combatants” have a right to kill
because their attacks are justified and they are therefore not culpable for them.
By contrast, unjust combatants (those being combatants fighting for an unjust
cause) are not permitted to attack because no moral fact justifies their actions.
Even killing in self-defence becomes morally difficult in the case of the unjust
combatant because, to borrow from Rodin, no person has the right to prevent
someone from defending themselves against unjust attack. Thus, McMahan
argues, self-defence is no more justified for unjust combatants than it would
be if a bank robber (who is like in form to the unjust combatant vis-à-vis war)
killed a policeman (like in form to the just combatant) in self-defence. The
logical structure is as follows:

Figure 2 – McMahan’s Model of Unjust Combatants

Figure 3 – McMahan’s Model of Just Combatants
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Rodin and McMahan’s accounts can be contrasted with that of Walzer, who
argues that all soldiers, regardless of which side they fight on, have the right
to kill other soldiers. This thesis, “the moral equality of combatants,” was
discussed in the previous chapter. He begins by arguing that all soldiers are
victims – “poor sods” – and that shared victimhood makes soldiers moral
equals who “choose each other as enemies.”19 Walzer argues that the equality
of combatants is precisely with regard to their right to kill each other: “[t]hey
can try to kill me, and I can try to kill them…”20 In addition, when soldiers are
not poor sods it is because they have volunteered for war and thus consent to
being targets of attack. This is to say that either soldiers are – under Rodin’s
account – not morally responsible in the relevant sense for their status as
aggressor, or that they have chosen to participate in the war freely and have
thus consented to being attacked by enemy soldiers.

Walzer does not emphasise the consensual justification, preferring to
conceptualise soldiers through the lens of shared victimhood. This is to the
benefit of Walzer’s argument, as the consensual justification appears to
conflate ‘consent’ and ‘acceptance’: soldiers might accept that their profession
entails the possibility of being attacked by their enemies, but it seems unlikely
that they would consent to that attack any more than the policeman in
McMahan’s example has consented to being attacked by the bank robber.
Thus, one could make a convincing case that soldiers do not, in fact, consent
to being attacked by their enemies at all. However, this possible objection
aside, Walzer’s underlying contention is that soldiers who fight for an unjust

19
20

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 36-37.
Ibid., 36.
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cause are equally entitled to kill their enemies as are soldiers fighting for a just
cause.

Walzer believes war to be (at least in part) a contractual relationship; a product
of “formal and informal bargaining between belligerent powers.”21 In his
view, soldiers are permitted to kill each other because the states they serve
have collectively accepted that killing each other’s soldiers is an acceptable
practice within the “social creation”22 of war. War rights emerge, according to
Walzer, from these agreed-upon conventions (the “war convention”),23 not
directly from moral principles.24 Therefore, because states accept soldiers to be
victims (often of the states’ own making), they are afforded the right to kill
one another. Although Walzer sees states as “permitting” their soldiers to kill
each other, they would have been justified in doing so even without that
permission because of Walzer’s insistence that those “engaged in harming”
can be justifiably killed. Either a war in which soldiers fight is a just one and
therefore not a crime, or it is not their crime.25

Here we see Walzer echoing the Vitorian spirit in which war exists as a world
apart from common morality: although prima facie, self-defence may operate
in the way Rodin describes, killing in war is something altogether different. In
times of war, killing is ‘business as usual’ whilst in ordinary society it is an
exceptional circumstance. What justifies killing in times of war is the status of

Ibid., 43.
Ibid.
23 Ibid., 44.
24 Ibid., 43.
25 Ibid., 37.
21
22
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the person who is killed: if he is a soldier or is engaged in harming (and
therefore a participant in the war), he can be killed. If not, the person is not a
legitimate target.

This view insists on a strict separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
Because soldiers have little influence or insight into the factors considered
when their political leaders decide to go to war, they ought not to be held
morally responsible for those decisions. Although this is, in itself, a reasonable
position with a long history in JWT, Walzer’s use of rights as the means for
freeing soldiers from moral responsibility appears more problematic. For one
thing, Walzer’s bases for the rights of soldiers are contradictory: either soldiers
are free and consenting, or they are not; either way, they have the right to kill
other soldiers. However, this can only be true in cases where both sides are
free or both sides are fighting under duress. As Walzer notes, “[i]n both cases,
military conduct is governed by rules […] in the first the rules rest on
mutuality and consent, in the second on a shared servitude.”26 But soldiers
who freely choose to fight and kill soldiers who are fighting under duress
cannot be justified by mutual consent or shared servitude. How then can we
think about their moral responsibility or status?27

Part of the difficulty inherent in Walzer’s approach is the view that the only
(or at least, the best) way to exculpate the soldier from the injustice of cause is

Ibid., 37.
One alternative is not to consider the intentional threat of combatants, but their likelihood
to cause collateral damage to civilians. For this argument, see: Uwe Steinhoff, ‘Rights,
Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants’, The Journal of Ethics, vol. 16, no. 4, 2012,
339-366.
26
27
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to provide every soldier with the right to kill other soldiers. Thus, unjust
combatants do no wrong in killing just combatants because no combatant, just
or unjust, has the right not to be killed. Here, morality is seen as existing in a
straight-line relationship between the deed of the perpetrator and the
person(s) his actions affect: inculpability and morality become synonymous.
Walzer’s concern appears to be that if soldiers’ moral status is predicated on
the justice of the war that they fight in, then it follows that any action a soldier
performs in defence of an unjust cause will be wrong. This, it is worth noting,
is only true if moral status is the only determinant of moral responsibility.

In reality, this is not the case. As we saw in Rodin’s discussion, a crucial
element in allocating responsibility is that a person intentionally commits to act
in a particular way. If a person accidentally or inculpably acts in a way that
causes harm to another, it appears that the victim is wronged, but that the
actor was not the person who wronged him. Those who wrong another
without acting wrongfully are described by Jeff McMahan as “innocent
attackers,” “whose threatening action is morally unjustified but nevertheless
excused or nonculpable.”28 His action is, according to McMahan, unjustified
because the victim has done nothing to make himself liable to being harmed,
yet is harmed nevertheless. Despite this, the attacker is morally innocent and
free of responsibility because moral status and intention can both play a role
in allocating moral responsibility under the status-based framework.

Jeff McMahan, ‘Self-Defense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker’, Ethics, vol. 104, no.
2, 1994, 252-290 at 263.
28
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In fact, moral status is largely irrelevant in the allocation of moral
responsibility. Rather, intention is overwhelmingly the most important
consideration in determining the guilt or innocence of an individual soldier.
The reason for this is because, pace McMahan, a person who is killed by an
innocent attacker is not wronged unless some human failing contributed to
the killing: to be wronged entails that there be a wrongdoer, who, in the case of
innocent attackers, is notably absent. Because the innocent attacker is – in the
manner in which he “attacks” – not operating as a moral agent, he cannot be
said to have done anything wrong.

Rodin contrasts a falling boulder that threatens to land on me with a falling
fat man. Although the fat man is a moral subject, “qua falling object he is just
like the stone, neither the subject of a liberty to fall on you, nor of a duty not
to fall.”29 However, cases vary: were the fat man to have chosen to jump at a
time where he was likely to land on me, had he been acting foolishly near a
ledge knowing that he risked falling and landing on someone, or had he fallen
as a product of faulty engineering whilst standing on a platform, any injury I
suffered would be wrongful because it would be the product of a human
failing. The wrong comes not because of the man’s physical act of falling, but
because of some other antecedent during which a moral agent was acting
intentionally: for instance, the negligence of either the fat man or engineer.
Soldiers may not be innocent to the same extent as the falling fat man, but they
are certainly not culpable to the same extent as the political leader who, in
possession of all the relevant facts and knowledge, makes a decision to go to
war. Soldiers are responsible to the extent that they are human agents in

29

Rodin, War and Self-Defense, op cit., 86.

117

control of their own actions; that is, amongst other things, when they are
acting intentionally.

The primacy of intention gives cause to question the status-centred framework
for justifying soldiers’ killing of enemy soldiers during war. However, there
are other reasons for looking for another model for justifying at least some of
the deaths caused by soldiers in war. For this thesis, which aims to reintroduce aretaic ethics into discussions of JWT, the moral relevance of the
psychological states that precede and co-incide with the actions a person
undertakes are worthy of serious discussion.

The current infatuation with deontological ethics in JWT has reduced the
ethics of killing almost entirely to a discussion of who may be killed and when;
that is, to questions of moral status. However, an equally – if not more –
important question regards not whether a victim is wronged when he is killed
in a particular circumstance, but whether the person who caused the victim to
die acted morally well in causing him to die. In the following section I focus
on how a particular interpretation of the doctrine of double-effect (DDE) –
namely that associated with John Finnis, Germain Grisez and others –
formulates acts of self-defensive killing and killing in war. This approach, like
all interpretations of double-effect, is concerned with the intentions of the
agent who performs the deed rather than the harms suffered by the victim or
the comparative status of the killer and killed persons. This interpretation of
DDE is also an approach worthy of consideration from within deontological
ethics because it explains how killing in war is possible without ever violating
the right of another person not to be killed. Regardless of whether a person’s
118

status is that of a just or unjust combatant, they can engage justifiably in
warfare without violating any other person’s right against being intentionally
killed. Thus, this approach may serve to resolve the conflict between the moral
equality of combatants doctrine and the position of just war revisionists like
Rodin and McMahan.

1.1.2: The Doctrine of Double-Effect

DDE has fallen out of favour in contemporary military ethics, at least as a
moral framework through which to justify the types of killing required of
soldiers in war. In modern reckonings, DDE tends to be restricted to justifying
military actions which are likely to cause the deaths of noncombatants. 30
However, this need not be so: for many Catholic moral theorists, including
Aquinas, John Ford, and Elizabeth Anscombe, DDE was a framework that was
equally helpful in discussing interpersonal killing or killing in large-scale
military operations. What made DDE specifically helpful was that it explained
how one could justifiably cause the death of another person without
intentionally killing them, and thereby preserve the absolute inviolability of
another person’s right not to be intentionally killed whilst simultaneously
defending JWT.

See, for example: James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1999), 140-141; Fotion, op cit., 92; and Orend, The Morality of War, op cit.,
115-116.
30
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DDE, having its basis in Catholic moral theology, has been closely associated
with the view that any and all intentional killing is morally wrong. Whilst the
prima facie implausibility of this claim’s applicability to warfare may be why it
has fallen out of favour with contemporary military ethicists, there are still
those that see no contradiction between defending JWT and maintaining an
absolute prohibition on intentional killing.31 For these theorists – most notably
John Finnis, German Grisez, and others - there is no right, or license, to
intentionally kill (I will call this interpretation of DDE “the absolutist
interpretation”). Many other theorists, by contrast, tend to limit wrongful
killing to the intentional killing of noncombatants. Surely, the modern theorist
might argue, we cannot both hold JWT to be true and that intentionally killing
is always wrong – what are soldiers for if not to kill? After all, for those who
defend a status-based approach to justifiable killing (such as the theorists
discussed above), the right not to be killed is one that can be forfeited,
overridden, or both.32 In so doing, this approach exonerates those who kill
legitimate targets as having done nothing wrong because either (i) they did
not violate any rights; or (ii) the person(s) who they killed was of a lower moral
status than the person(s) or goods who were saved.

However, the status-based approach leaves military ethics and individual
soldiers alike bogged down in morally serious questions regarding which
military killings are justified and which are not that may not be readily
answerable. If the moral status of one’s target is what legitimates his being
killed, then it seems that one must possess knowledge of the target’s moral

31

C.f. John Finnis, ‘The Power of the Sword’ in Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 275-293.
32 See especially McMahan, Killing in War, op cit., 9; and Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit.,
145.
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status. Given the confusion and complexity of war, the question of the moral
status of a particular target may be at many times epistemically unresolvable:
we simply cannot know whether a target is legitimate or not. If what
legitimates a target is either (i) the injustice of his cause and the threat it poses
to a good that I am duty-bound to defend, or (ii) his engagement in unjust
harming, then soldiers require a host of oftentimes unavailable knowledge in
order to ensure the legitimacy of their killings. For this reason, DDE, an
approach prioritises what actions one performs and how they are performed
over who an act is performed on, becomes preferable because it liberates
soldiers of much of the epistemic burden that threatens to cripple them under
the status-based approach.

Part of the motivation for this view may be (although I will not defend this
view closely, and very little turns on its being true) that talking about
intentional killings in terms of legitimate and illegitimate targets makes
training soldiers to act within the Laws of Armed Conflict a considerably
easier project, as it provides a simple binary: either the person I am able to kill
is a legitimate target, or not. However, the language of legitimacy used here
demonstrates how far removed today’s military ethical framework is from
that of JWT’s founders. For those founders – in particular, Aquinas – the right
not to be intentionally killed is absolute because (i) life is intrinsically good
and valuable to each human being, and therefore (ii) any human who
intentionally and deliberately attacks life acts immorally. Here, what renders
an action immoral is not the status of the victim but the intention of the agent.
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Under this approach, the moral status of killings33 is derived from the conduct
of the one who causes the death, not the status of the person who dies.

DDE offers an alternative framework for evaluating morally justifiable killing
in war. It extrapolates a doctrine of legitimate killing in war from the idea of
morally justifiable self-defence and more broadly from the notion of morally
acceptable side-effects. By contrast, Walzer extrapolates his approach from the
conventional notion that when soldiers are killing each other in a fair fight,
they do not act wrongly, whilst revisionists like Rodin and McMahan develop
their view of intentional killing from the moral status of the assailant. For these
theorists, soldiers are afforded the right to kill members of the opposing
military because, consecutively, they are either “engaged in harming” 34 in the
broad sense of being directly involved in a harmful war, or because their
enemy is directly engaged in wrongful harming (of civilians, for instance). In
either case, a person who previously possessed a right not to be intentionally
attacked is now a legitimate target of attack due to some particular behaviour
he has undertaken.

By contrast, the absolutist interpretation holds that no person can ever be a
legitimate target of intentional lethal attack, with the key notion being that of
intention. As we saw in chapter two, DDE originated in the thought of
Aquinas, who argued that “[n]othing hinders one act from having two effects,

In the context of DDE, the word ‘killing’ is used to imply strictly causal responsibility for
the death of another absent of any intention or disposition to do so. In this sense, if a person
is electrocuted to death having been struck by lightning, it is intelligible to say that they were
“killed” by the lightning, despite the obvious absence of any intention on the part of the
lightning.
34 Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 110.
33
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only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention […]
moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according
to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental.”35 Thus, if in doing
something good, something bad happens as a consequence (in the
paradigmatic case, killing someone as a side-effect of defending oneself), one
may not be responsible for those side-effects.36 However, it is a matter of
debate whether Aquinas in fact intended to develop a moral principle at all:
Charles Forster and his co-authors argue that “Aquinas [was] concerned with
the nature of intention as a way to know God better; he [was] not primarily
interested in developing mechanisms of moral assessment that might derive
from a fuller understanding of intention.”37 Similarly, Eric Rovie notes that “it
has been argued both by theologians and historians that [Aquinas’] view was
far less nuanced than the standard view is understood to be,”38 and Gregory
Reichberg rejects the notion that Aquinas would have endorsed the DDE
framework at all.39 As such, my discussion will focus on modern
commentaries

and

developments

on

Aquinas’

original

discussion;

specifically, that which responds to the status-based approach to rights by
advancing an absolute rejection of intentional killing: the absolutist
interpretation.

Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7.
The caveat “may not” stems from the fact that side-effects must not only be unintended,
but proportionate to the good being done; as Aquinas stipulates that “though proceeding
from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the
end.” C.f. Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 64, Art. 7.
37 Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham, et. al., ‘The Double Effect Effect’,
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, vol. 20, iss. 1, 2011, 56-72 at 57.
38 Eric Rovie, ‘Reevaluating the Historical Evolution of Double Effect: Anscombe, Aquinas,
and the Principle of Side-Effects’, Studies in the History of Ethics, vol. 2, 2006, 1-34 at 2.
39 Gregory Reichberg, ‘Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double-Effect?’, The Thomist,
vol. 69, 2005, 341-370.
35
36

123

The “standard view” that Rovie refers to is one that has emerged from more
recent discussions in philosophy and moral theology. Today, DDE is usually
considered to consist of four conditions that emerge from Thomistic thinking
on intentions and side effects, as Joseph Mangan explains:

A person may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good and
bad effect provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time:

1) That the action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent;
2) That the good effect and not the evil effect be intended;
3) That the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect;
4) That there be a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect.40

An example will help to demonstrate this point. Brian Orend uses a nation’s
resort to war as a case study for DDE, and I will use the same here.41 When a
nation decides to use force against another nation, it can be justified according
to DDE only if: (i) the act of going to war (or, more generally, war itself) is not
intrinsically wrongful; (ii) the peaceful state that war promises to bring about
is intended and the harms that war tends to cause are not; (iii) the harms
caused by war are not necessary means by which to bring about peace; and
(iv) the precipitating factors for the resort to war are sufficiently grave as to
justify the war’s prospective harms. Here, there are two points that may
render war difficult to justify under a DDE framework. First, it is unclear how

Joseph T. Mangan, ‘An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double-Effect’, Theological
Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 1949, 41-61 at 43.
41 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 260.
40
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(iii) could ever truly be fulfilled so that “the good effect [is] produced directly
by the action, not by the bad effect.”42 Secondly, and to my mind more
importantly, war is not an action: it is a huge collection of different acts by
different actors all of whom are working together toward a common goal. An
action, in the sense DDE is concerned, is far more limited in length of time,
complexity of psychological processes, and breadth; specifically, for the
interests of DDE, an action is performed by a single agent.

This is why self-defence is the paradigmatic example of DDE thinking: the
decision to act in self-defence is a decision to perform a single action. The basic
cognitive process could be described as follows:

1. I am under attack;
2. My being under attack is bad;
3. Therefore, it would be good to return to a state in which I was no longer being

attacked;
4. Person Y is attacking me;
5. Using force against Person Y will stop his attack;
6. Therefore, I will use force against Person Y.

Actions, in the sense described by DDE, are basic: they begin with a motive
(stop being attacked), proceed to an intention (protect myself by using force

F. J. Connell, ‘Principle of Double-Effect’ in New Catholic Encyclopedia (Volume 4), (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 1020–1022 at 1021 in Alison MacIntyre, ‘Doctrine of DoubleEffect’ in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/doubleeffect/>.
42
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against Y), and culminate in an action (self-defence). DDE stipulates that one’s
intention plays an important role in determining whether or not a person is
responsible for the harms they performed. Unintended harms are, all things
being equal, beyond the responsibility of the agent. Here it is important to note
that deontologically-aligned concepts like moral status and rights are largely
inapplicable. This is because DDE insists on any wrongful occurrences of an
action being unintended. Were a person to think “I am justified in killing this
person because this person’s actions have lowered his moral status relative to
mine,” he would instantly be morally culpable for violating an absolute moral
prohibition against intentionally killing another person. Thus, in a way that is
not possible for the status-based approach above, DDE is able to preserve the
absolute deontological limitations of human rights whilst simultaneously
awarding intention the conceptual significance it deserves.

Furthermore, this approach to self-defence does not rely on knowledge of
one’s assailant’s moral status as, for instance, just, unjust, liable, or innocent.
Consider Rodin’s falling fat man from a DDE perspective. If my intention were
to protect either myself or another from harm, I would be justified in taking
potentially harmful action against the fat man even though is not engaged in
wrongful behaviour by falling on me or another. This is true so long as my
intention is to protect either myself or another from harm, and is permissible
just as it would be permitted to take action against a falling boulder in similar
circumstances. It is not the falling man’s liability to attack that makes
defensive action justified but my good intention to protect innocent lives.
Consider a real-world example provided in an article by Paul Berghaus and
Nathan Cartagena concerning the actions of two soldiers: Sergeant Taylor and
Corporal Sanchez:
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Sanchez was providing security for the traffic control point by manning the
machine gun from the turret of his vehicle. His squad leader, Sergeant Taylor,
was in charge of the checkpoint and made sure that all the proper control
measures were in place so that motorists stopped their vehicles at a designated
point for an identification card check.

During the first hour of their mission, a car approached the traffic control point.
It was moving at a normal pace, but the driver was not heeding the warning signs
that Taylor’s squad posted, and continued to approach the checkpoint. When the
car passed the warning signs, Taylor gave verbal commands in Arabic as well as
hand and arm signals to tell the driver to stop. The car kept moving closer to the
checkpoint. As the car passed the traffic cones, Taylor fired a warning shot with
his rifle. The car still continued to move. Even after driving over the spike strips
that the squad placed as a final control measure, the car stayed on course. It
seemed to Taylor that the driver may have been intent on getting close enough
to the checkpoint where the blast radius of a car bomb could inflict the most
damage. Taylor ordered Sanchez to fire his machine gun at the car. Sanchez did
so and hit the car. The car quickly came to a stop. The driver exited the car, and
fell to the ground. After searching the driver and the vehicle, Sanchez’s squad
found no weapons or explosive devices on the vehicle. Yet the passenger, who
was the driver’s fourteen year old son, was dead from multiple gunshot
wounds.43

How might we describe the actions of Taylor and Sanchez? Under a statusbased approach, we would seem obligated to say that, at best, we were

Paul T. Bergaus & Nathan L. Cartagena, ‘Developing Good Soldiers: the Problem of
Fragmentation within the Army’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 12, iss. 4, 2013, 287-303 at 290291
43
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uncertain of the victims’ moral status. Taylor and Sanchez may have had
reason to suspect that they were under threat, but they lacked sufficient
evidence to be certain. How, for instance, could they be sure that these actions
were not a product of the driver’s fear or distrust of U.S. soldiers? The
information that a status-based approach to killing requires appears
unavailable in this case, meaning that either it would not be justified, or
perhaps that the soldiers would be excused on the basis of having good
intentions (again revealing intention as the morally central concept). Yet I
suspect few would be ready to describe Sanchez or Taylor as lacking moral
justification, and indeed they were cleared of any wrongdoing in a review of
the incident.44 DDE provides a clear explanation of why soldiers involved in
these types of incidents (which are likely not uncommon). Sanchez and
Taylor’s actions intended to prevent the possible destruction of the roadblock
(which would have entailed their own deaths) by firing on the vehicle posing
the threat. Despite being aware of the possible risk to the driver and the
possibility that the driver was a civilian, Sanchez and Taylor were justified in
their action because their intention was good, the side-effects were
unintended, and the action was not intrinsically evil.

Above I have outlined a basic cognitive process for self-defence, demonstrated
by the case of Taylor and Sanchez. However, what if the driver had been
identified as a known insurgent who was actively planning hostile action
against US military personnel? In that case instead of firing on the car, might
Taylor have ordered Sanchez to fire on the driver? Although status-based
approaches would justify the killing in that case, the absolutist interpretation
of DDE would not. The reason for this is not, as some explain, that killing
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becomes the means by which one has defended oneself, and thus it failed the
“no means” condition,45 as this could be said equally of injuring another
person in a case of nonlethal defence. Rather, this interpretation, having its
basis within Catholic moral theology, stipulates that all intentional killing is
wrong. Thus, the immorality is not in the makeup of the act vis-à-vis meansends relationships, proportionality, or desired side-effects, the immorality is
in the thought “I will kill Person Y;” that is, with the intention itself. Thus,
even if the moral status of the driver was knowable, intentionally killing him
would be prohibited. This is why DDE is a suitable framework for intentional
killing only for those who hold that rights are absolute and inviolable: it will
not be a suitable framework for those who, like the threshold deontologists
above, see rights only as one morally serious consideration. Given that, as I
argue later, there are other very good reasons for adopting an absolutist
account of human rights, coupled with DDE’s freedom from epistemic
burdens, it is worth exploring this absolutist interpretation of DDE.

Some perceive an uneasiness between proponents of DDE arguing that
intentional killing in self-defence is immoral whilst simultaneously
maintaining that “to strike in self-defence against an aggressor is permissible,
even if one foresees that the blow by which one defends oneself will be fatal.”46
Here, the difference lies in whether the side-effect (even death) is intended or
not. If a person, X, is being attacked by an aggressor, Y, then X is entitled to
use whatever force is necessary to repel the attack, even lethal force, so long
as his sole intention is to repel the attack, and the other conditions listed above

C.f. Susan Uniacke, ‘The Doctrine of Double-Effect’, The Thomist, vol. 48, 1984, 188-218 at
210-211; Germain Grisez, ‘Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of Killing’, American
Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 16, 1970, 64-96 at 79.
46 MacIntyre, ‘Doctrine of Double-Effect,’ op cit.
45
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(such as proportionality) are met. In this instance, the fact that Y is killed by
X’s self-defensive action is a side-effect of X’s legitimate practice of selfdefence. By contrast, if X recognises Y’s aggression and takes actions intended
to kill Y, his defensive killing is unjustified (assuming that intentional killing
is morally wrong). The relevant difference between these cases concerns what
John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, and Germain Grisez call “senses of ‘doing’.”47
“There are,” they claim, “at least three ways in which one’s actions have […]
moral significance:”48 (i) when one acts for the intrinsic value of the thing acted
for (i.e. acting out of friendship simply because friendship is good); (ii) when
one chooses something as a means to some further goal (i.e. working to obtain
money); and (iii) when one voluntarily accepts the side-effects of an action.49
When one voluntarily accepts side-effects, they are not of the agent’s choosing,
they are accepted corollaries of what the agent has chosen to do.

If, for example, a commander ordered the bombing of an enemy munitions
factory, a side-effect would be that some factory workers may be killed, and
all workers will lose their employment. However, it would be false to describe
these side-effects as being chosen by the commanders; were it possible to
destroy the munitions factory without destroying lives or jobs, they would
(hopefully) do so. In this sense, voluntary acceptance of side-effects is not
entirely voluntary – it is coercive to the extent that it is an unavoidable and
undesirable outcome of a morally good action. By contrast, if the commanders

John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, & Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality & Realism,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 289.
48 Ibid.
49 Finnis, Boyle & Grisez, op cit., Note that unpredicted side-effects are not included here –
presumably either unpredicted side effects do not have moral significance vis-à-vis the
choices an agent makes to act in a particular way, or they do hold moral significance, but
only insofar as one voluntarily accepts as a side-effect that some unpredicted side-effect may
emerge from an action.
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bombed the munitions factory with the intention not only of destroying the
factory, but robbing the enemy of skilled workers able to work in other
factories and denting the enemy economy by destroying jobs, then the
commanders would have chosen to bring these consequences about, and
become morally responsible for them.

The same principle governs individual acts of killing and, indeed, any action
in which undesirable side-effects occur. (The case of self-defence is a morally
serious example, but not modally different from other voluntarily accepted
side-effects.) If, in defending himself, X recognises that only a lethal blow will
stop Y’s assault on X’s life, then X accepts Y’s death as a side-effect of his
legitimate self-defence. X does not desire or intend Y’s death, but neither does
he see any other means of defending himself. As Rovie explains:

[T]he act of defending oneself from an assailant (call that act A) can lead to the
consequence B (killing one’s assailant) and/or consequence C (successfully
defending oneself from the assailant). Obviously, if one can achieve only C as a
result of act A, this would be the best scenario: the assailant flees or is
incapacitated, or apologizes, or something of the sort. However, if one can ONLY
achieve C because B and C come together as a package deal (the assailant will
only stop if killed), C can still be permitted with B as an unfortunate side-effect.50

Here it is worth correcting a common confusion about DDE and self-defensive
killing: the difference between a side-effect and an accident. DDE does not
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claim that deaths which occur as side-effects are accidental – a view Elizabeth
Anscombe ridiculed in her essay ‘War and Murder.’51 Rather, it claims that the
fact that a particular action causes undesirable and/or harmful side-effects is a
product of circumstance, not choice. The ‘so happening’ that I referred to
above is precisely of this kind – circumstances being as they are, it so happens
that the only way X can successfully defend himself against Y is with the use
of lethal force. X will not be surprised that his defensive action kills Y because
he foresaw and accepted the side-effect. This is starkly different from an
accident like, for example, the widely publicised death of Brandon Lee, when
a blank cartridge used on a movie set was poorly prepared, leaving a bullet in
the chamber which hit Lee in the chest, killing him. This outcome is not one
which could have been foreseen by any reasonable person (although those
responsible for preparing the guns may be culpable for negligence). Lee’s
death was genuinely an accident. It has been to the detriment of DDE’s place
in moral philosophy that few theorists have taken the time to outline in detail
the decision-making processes that underpin DDE. The process begins when
one realises that in doing something good, it appears that evil will also occur.

This framework explains how soldiers can be justified in fighting in wars
whilst simultaneously refraining from any act of intentional killing. However,
it remains to be seen whether this framework is sensitive to the realities of war
where, it seems, soldiers’ express purpose is to kill the enemy. We must
consider whether an ethically and practically salient way to apply the moral
prohibition on intentional killing to war exists. Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez argue
that there is, suggesting that the structure of military use of lethal force “can

Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’ in G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, in
Richard A. Wasserstrom, War and Morality, (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970).
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be the same as that of individuals’ acts of self-defence.”52 They note that
“military action must be directed toward stopping the enemy’s unjust use of
force, not toward killing those who are bringing that force to bear.”53A
possible model of this approach is described by Christian Brugger, a student
of Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez:

Adapting Aquinas’ paradigm of self-defence as a model for violence in war, we
can say that in the deliberation and choosing of suitable means for realizing
particular limited purposes in war, measures of violence must be selected that
are proportionate to (i.e., not in excess of what is necessary for) realizing the
limited military objectives, such as destroying munitions factories and proposals
arising from deliberation must not include at any level the deaths per se of the
enemy […] Chosen proposals may include measures which one foresees are
likely or even certain to cause death, but such deaths are not what the measures
are designed to bring about, whether to satisfy feelings or to achieve military
objectives. They will be the unintended results of otherwise intended acts of
collective defense. In other words, if success could be achieved without causing
deaths, all the better.54

Brugger’s approach, which mirrors that proposed by his absolutist
predecessors, invokes DDE as the central justifying principle of killing in war.
It is, however, more restrictive than the status-based approach to intentional
killing. In specifying “that the death of an enemy soldier be brought about

Finnis, Boyle, & Grisez, op cit., 313.
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52
53

133

only as a side-effect of a military act having a different object,”55 DDE requires
all military action to be dedicated toward a morally good end such as justice,
peace, or charity. The destruction of the enemy’s military force is not a
sufficiently good intention. Thus, “military action must be directed [only]
toward stopping those who are bringing [unjust] force to bear.”56

Here an important question arises that warrants a more focussed discussion:
is DDE too demanding of soldiers’ decision-making processes to be
practicable in an actual firefight? Making the kind of judgements DDE
requires in the heat of battle demand a high level of moral sensitivity even
amongst entry-level soldiers. Further, insofar as these judgements are
cognitively demanding (and therefore take time), they may cause soldiers to
refrain from firing at times when an immediate response is strategically – or
morally – necessary. As Euripides’ Heraclidæ observes, “bitterly doth Ares
loathe loiterers.”57 Whether or not the hesitant soldier is hated by the gods is
unclear, but he is certainly more likely to meet his gods than the soldier who
shoots without question. Thus, at first sight it seems that the absolutist
interpretation presents a serious challenge to the efficacy of operations and the
physical safety of frontline soldiers. Given this, is the absolutist interpretation
a suitable framework for military personnel?

The answer is a qualified “yes.” Applying an absolutist interpretation of DDE
as a moral decision-making framework can be made consistent with the

Ibid., Emphasis added.
Ibid.
57 Euripides trans. E.P Coleridge, Heraclidæ, line 722,
<http://classics.mit.edu/Euripides/heracleidae.html>.
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military requirement to train soldiers to pre-judge situations to ensure they
act effectively, expediently, and minimise risk in incredibly dangerous
environments. In fact, pre-judgement is exactly what happens in the more
common application of DDE: strategic airstrikes that risk civilian casualties. In
those cases, pilots are (or ought to be) briefed in advance about (a) the various
steps that have been taken to protect noncombatants from harm, and (b) the
foreseeable possibility that, despite these steps, some noncombatants may be
killed in the attack. In the event that something unforeseen occurs (for
example, a school bus full of children unexpectedly appears in the strike
vicinity), the pilot should still be permitted to abort the mission, but should
not (and will not) be required to fly past each building to ensure they are
empty, or that the amount of civilians within them is proportionate; he relies
on previously collected intelligence for that.

It is possible to introduce analogous measures for ground troops conducting
missions. Their briefing should consist in informing them of how many noncombatants are anticipated to be in an area, the anticipated level of risk, and
the advised manner of response. If soldiers are entering ‘hot’ zones, populated
by enemies, with little to no anticipated noncombatant presence, then it is
reasonable that they be able to pre-judge (using a DDE framework) how they
will respond to perceived threats during the mission. These pre-judgements
would be unlikely to amount to a decision to ‘shoot to kill’ or ‘fire on anything
that moves’, but they may, for example, lead a soldier to presume any nonfriendly personnel in an area to be hostile. In such a case, soldiers aware of the
foreseeable possibility that an anomalous civilian may be mistaken for a
hostile soldier and be fired upon may still be justified in acting forcefully
against all people in the area so long as their intentions were defensive and
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aimed toward enemy combatants. Thus, if pre-judgement processes that help
soldiers to determine in advance the appropriate way to respond to any
potential threats they come across are implemented, then successful military
practice is not at odds with the absolutist approach to the morality of killing.

It is important to note that although DDE is a useful moral principle, it does
not represent the sum total of moral reasoning required in situations where
harmful side-effects might be caused. Just because an action fulfils the
conditions of DDE does not necessarily make it a morally good action; there
may be some other factor which makes the agent culpable. For example, a
soldier who attempted to break up rioting civilians by firing blank cartridges
from his weapon, but, through negligence had left a live round in the barrel
after switching his magazine to blanks, would be responsible for the death he
caused despite his intended action being justifiable under DDE.
In this section I have shown the internal consistency of arguments that seek to
advance an absolutist interpretation of DDE, including its relevance to
individual self-defence and individual killing in war. Furthermore, I have
shown how DDE decision-making manifests itself on a cognitive level
including the ability for one to pre-judge a situation whilst utilising the DDE
framework. This fact makes a case for the re-introduction of DDE-based
reasoning – even the controversial absolutist interpretation – into military
ethics as a potential justification of killing in war. More compelling is the
possibility within DDE to protect soldiers from being on one hand unfairly
burdened with moral responsibility for epistemic uncertainties, and on the
other impractically prohibited from acting in cases where such uncertainty is
rife. This was demonstrated with the example of Taylor and Sanchez, and will
be explored in more detail in the following section.
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Furthermore, it is particularly appealing because the DDE framework is not
unique to war; it applies to every aspect of morality. As such, teaching soldiers
to employ it in times of war may be less jarring than trying to re-train soldiers
against the fundamental moral belief that killing another human being is
wrong, a point I return to in the next chapter. DDE reveals clearly the moral
significance of a person’s intentions when determining whether there is moral
justification for their action.

Finally, if DDE is the framework through which deaths caused by soldiers can
be morally justified, the debate regarding the moral statuses of just and unjust
combatants is largely dissolved. Whether or not a soldier is defending a just
cause, the immediate intention of his action must be to do some good; usually,
to protect human life. If an unjust combatant unintentionally causes the death
of a just combatant, his conduct can be explained as morally justified by
reference to the good intentions of his actions. Of course, there is still a broader
question of whether his actions can ever be proportionately justified if he is
fighting for an unjust cause, but understanding the moral role of intention
reveals how soldiers can and often do act morally well regardless of which
side of a conflict they fight for.

1.1.3: Intention: Bridging Deon and Arete

In the previous sections I presented two competing accounts that attempt to
explain the morality of intentional killing; namely, status- and intention-based
justifications. However, I have simultaneously been presenting two different
137

descriptions of a morally just action. These two approaches describe just
actions as either (A) one that does not violate the claim or liberty –rights of an
individual, with exceptions emerging when either (i) an individual does
something that alters his status and eliminates his right (for example, attacking
me), or (ii) in cases of extreme moral gravity on a wide scale; or (B) an action
in which no person’s right is intentionally violated. The central difference
between the two is that whilst (B) understands unjust actions not only as
objective states of affairs, but as including subjective factors concerning an
agent’s intentions, (A) sees unjust actions as objective: either a person was a
legitimate target of killing, having forfeited their right to life, or they were not.
According to (A), just actions could actually be performed with the most
corrupt of intentions (so long as they were directed toward those who had
forfeited their rights). Rodin expresses a similar concern, arguing that “having
a right to do X and being in the right in doing X are not logical equivalents.”58

Viewing these questions through an aretaic lens – that is, through a framework
that considers the moral character, virtue, and psychology of individual
agents as being worthy of moral consideration – means we can add to Rodin’s
observation that doing the right thing and doing something rightly are not
logical equivalents. An overt focus on deontology means emphasising what is
done and to whom it is done at the expense of the manner in which and by whom
it is done. However, as the above sections have demonstrated with regard to
killing in war, the primary moral questions appear to be centred on the
intentions of those whose actions cause the deaths of other people. The victims
who are killed, their moral status and rights, are only peripheral concerns.
However, I do not wish to present DDE and intention as ‘the aretaic approach’
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to killing to be contrasted with ‘the deontic approach’ focussed on rights and
status. Rather, I want to show how the conceptual importance of intention
suggests that deontic and aretaic ethics are inescapably linked, and are best
understood when used co-operatively to describe the morality of killing in
war.

Let us begin by considering whether it is possible to perform a just action
viciously, or an unjust action virtuously. In 2011, WikiLeaks released footage
of a 2007 Apache helicopter strike by U.S. military personnel in Baghdad. 59
The video, provocatively60 entitled “Collateral Murder” depicts an air strike
on a group of men who appear to be carrying weapons. It was later revealed
that although there were several armed insurgents present, two of the men
were Reuters reporters, and what had appeared to be rocket-propelled
grenade launchers were in fact film cameras. Under the status-based
justification, it would appear as though the Reuters journalists had been
wrongfully killed, although the US personnel would likely be excused from
any wrongdoing because of the reasonable assumption that unidentified
people carrying weapons-like equipment were hostile. Thus, all those killed
were either legitimate targets or were assumed to be such, and the US forces
could be argued either to have been justified in opening fire, or at best to have
been acting from inculpable ignorance. The killings then, were either not

The footage is available at: WikiLeaks, ‘Collateral Murder,’ 2010,
<http://www.collateralmurder.com/>.
60 On an interview with Stephen Colbert, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange admitted that
the title was designed to “try and get the maximum possible political impact for the
material.” See: The Colbert Report, Comedy Central, 12/4/2010,
<http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/270712/april-12-2010/julianassange>.
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unjust at all, or the injustice was not one for which the Apache personnel were
responsible.

Whether the status-based interpretation is correct or not is an open question.
However, for my purposes the outcome is not particularly relevant. Let us
assume, for the sake of a more important discussion, that the killings were
morally justifiable. In the recording of the attack, the helicopter crew can be
overheard laughing, berating the targets, relishing in the destruction they
cause, and conducting themselves in a manner that might generously be
described as distasteful. Particularly troubling moments include their hoping
for a wounded man to reach for a weapon so that they can open fire on him
again, impatiently awaiting permission to fire on a van which arrives to help
the wounded man, and revelling in seeing the “dead bastards” after the
attack.61 The callous and brutish manner in which the attack was conducted
(perhaps best demonstrated by their reaction to learning that a child had been
severely wounded in the attack – “well it's their fault for bringing their kids
into a battle”62) suggests that the soldiers’ intentions were not merely to
incapacitate the targets qua military threats (even if it results in the death of
those targets as a side-effect); rather, they appear to be enjoying the fact that
they are intentionally killing other human beings.

Recalling the double-effect requirement that any bad side-effects be
unintended (and thus, undesired), taking pleasure in those side-effects will

Bumiller, Elisabeth, ‘Video Shows U.S. Killing of Reuters Employees’, New York Times,
5/4/2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/06/world/middleeast/06baghdad.html?_r=0>.
62 WikiLeaks, ‘Collateral Murder - Transcript,’ 2010,
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render any deed vicious. For instance, although the soldiers may withhold
from shooting an unarmed man until he reaches for a weapon and thus not
violate the no-right requirement, in willing the injured man to reach for a gun
so that they can kill him, they demonstrate a genuine assent to the side-effects
of their actions. In short, even if licensed under a status-based account, when
one considers the character with which the action is performed, one sees that
status-based justification is insufficient to determine the genuine moral nature
of the event. Indeed, as Rosalind Hursthouse argues, “in exercising a moral
right (for example, the right to kill) I can do something cruel, or callous, or
selfish, light-minded, self-righteous, stupid, inconsiderate, disloyal, dishonest
– that is, act viciously.”63 It seems then that those who wish to defend statusbased justifications must either accept that a just action may involve a person
wilfully – even gleefully – murdering another, or concede that one’s intentions
when performing an action bear significantly on the moral acceptability of that
action.

It is likely that the defender of a status-based approach will opt for the latter
route, perhaps suggesting that although good intentions may be helpful in
ensuring a person’s actions are just, because intentions do not in themselves
affect other people in the way that failing to respect the moral status of another
person does, intentions are only instrumentally significant. If a deed respects
the rights of those whose rights ought to be respected then, good or bad
intentions aside, the act can be described as a just act. Acts ought to be
measured, so the argument would go, on whether a person’s moral status has
been respected or not: if a person’s moral status means he ought not to be

Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Virtue Theory and Abortion’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 20,
no. 3, 1991, 223-246 at 235. Parentheses added.
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attacked and he is attacked, that is sufficient to classify an action as unjust
(although not, as we saw above, necessarily to allocate blame to the
wrongdoer). This claim is worth testing with a case study.

On December 21, 2012, United Nations helicopter flight 544 was mistakenly
shot down by members of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
The SPLA claim to have believed the helicopter to be supplying the insurgent
Yau Yau rebel group, and to have checked with UNMISS (United Nations
Mission in the Republic of South Sudan), and received confirmation of no
scheduled flights that day.64 All those aboard UN 544 were killed. These
civilians had done nothing which could be said to forfeit their claim not to be
attacked, and thus ought not to have been attacked. In this sense, even if their
claims are true, the SPLA unintentionally failed the no-right justification.
However, if the intention of the shooters was to destroy a legitimate target,
and this was genuinely a tragic case of mistaken identity,65 could this act truly
be described as unjust? As in the previously discussed case of Sergeant Taylor
and Corporal Sanchez, I believe not, as the shooters are free from any moral
responsibility. Such acts are tragedies, and oftentimes the actors cannot be
held morally responsible.66

Reuters, ‘South Sudan admits it downed U.N. helicopter, killing four’, Reuters, 22nd
December, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/22/us-southsudan-unidUSBRE8BK0V720121222U>.
65 UN Secretary Ban Ki Moon disputed this claim, alleging that the vessel was “clearly
marked.” AAP, ‘Punish those who shot the UN chopper: Russia’, The Australian, 23rd
December, 2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/punish-those-whoshot-un-chopper-russia/story-fn3dxix6-1226542488032>.
66 I say oftentimes, because an agent may be mistaken, but be morally culpable for their
mistake (for instance, if a soldier neglects to properly service his weapon, and this leads to
the killing of his comrade, he is culpable for the consequences of his neglect).
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The question of moral responsibility – attributing praise or blame for a just or
unjust action to a particular individual – requires us to examine the moral state
of the agent in performing a particular action. As Nancy Sherman notes,
“determining responsibility depends upon a more rather than less complete
rendering of the circumstances of action”.67 Sherman notes that judgements of
responsibility must consider first the intentions of the actor, and second “the
pattern of actions of an agent;”68 that is, the virtue of the actor.

Consider the intentions of the SPLA on December 21, 2012: not knowing that
the UN were sending aircraft into Sudanese airspace, and operating in a state
of war, they fired on the vessel. The intention of the soldiers was, it seems, to
destroy a legitimate target in what they believed to be a just war. Thus, their
intentions were in conformance with both the Laws of Armed Conflict and
with generally accepted principles of combat. Therefore, if the events occurred
as the SPLA claim that they did, it seems that although those on board UN 544
were wronged in the sense that they were undeservingly deprived of their
lives, those who performed the action were blameless and the civilian deaths
a tragedy. The status-based advocate rightly identifies that the moral status of
these civilians meant that they did not deserve to die, but it does not follow
that their death was an injustice. Although all people are obliged not to
intentionally kill them, there can be no obligation against accidentally killing
another person; one cannot have a duty to do (or not do) something over
which one has no control (although, obviously one ought to take all reasonable
steps to ascertain whether one’s target is legitimate or not; if such precautions
are not taken, one is culpable to at least some extent). No person has a right

Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), 19.
68 Ibid., 19-20.
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not to die simpliciter, for there could be no possible obligation to correspond to
such a right.

Here we introduce a new concept alongside intention, motive. The two
concepts are, although related, distinct in important ways that bear on our
understanding of the connection between virtuous character and moral
responsibility.69 As Anscombe notes, “’motive for action’ has a rather wider
and more diverse application than ‘intention with which the action was
done’.”70 Intentions are simply “meant to inform us of the goal at which an
action is aimed;”71 by contrast, Burleigh Wilkins posits three different senses
of motive: “(1) to mark the presence of a reason for acting, (2) to mark the
presence of a reason for acting and to indicate that this is in fact an agent’s
reason for acting, and (3) to mark the presence of a disposition in an agent for
acting in a certain way under certain kinds of circumstances.”72 In short,
motives explain why an agent forms his intention. The SPLA soldiers seem to
have intended merely to shoot down the helicopter. However, such a
description is obviously insufficient for morally evaluating their actions. What
is required is a further description of why the helicopter was shot down.

We can see all three of Wilkins’ senses of motive in operation through the
SPLA example. In the sense that the SPLA were fighting a war over territory,

C.f. chapter one, 21-22 where intention and motive are discussed in relation to right
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and thus had an interest in maintaining coercive authority over movements
within territory they controlled, they had motive in shooting down the
helicopter which was, to their knowledge, undermining that authority.
Furthermore, soldiers have an understandable desire not to see their enemies
well-supplied: suspecting the helicopter of being a supply craft, this desire
could easily have motivated the attack. Thus, in the sense of (1), the SPLA “had
motive” to shoot down the helicopter. Describing the host of possible reasons
for action is less important than understanding the actual motive held by SPLA
soldiers – in this case, sense (2) described above. Were the soldiers motivated
by, say, a genuine desire not to see the enemy re-supplied and a belief that
UN544 was an enemy helicopter? Or were they motivated by a more basic
desire to kill, brought on in part by boredom or undue aggression? Was the
motivation to deny aid a motivation to end the war more quickly, or to see
Yau Yau rebels suffer through a denial of humanitarian aid?

Answering which possible motive served as the actual motivator in this
circumstance is vital in allocating moral responsibility. However, although
good motives are morally significant, especially in cases of ignorance, they are
not an infallible excuse. For instance, if the SPLA were acting from good
motives (such as denying munitions aid to more quickly end the war) but,
because in a state of panic, failed to take appropriate measures to identify the
helicopter, they would be culpable for their panic as explained by Wilkins’
third sense of motive above: dispositions for acting in certain ways in certain
circumstances. If an agent forms dispositions so that, for instance, in high
pressure situations he becomes panicky and responds rashly, he can be
described as being motivated by that panic; similarly, an agent who responds
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to tense situations in anger and aggression becomes motivated by his anger as
much as by any rational condition.

This third sense demonstrates the importance of considerations of character in
the determination of responsibility. As Sherman notes, Aristotle suggests that
to fully understand the extent of someone’s responsibility for an action, his
character must be considered. Aristotle did not believe that an agent’s actions
began with intentions, but with character. Any situation a person finds himself
in must be interpreted73 – the first stage of practical wisdom is “perception:”
considering whether there is any moral requirement to act.74 However,
differences between agents lead to different interpretations of events: a
person’s character shapes his perception. Perception, Sherman notes, “is
informed by ethical considerations expressive of the agent’s virtue.”75 All this
is to say that a person’s intentions do not appear ex nihilo, they are reflections
of the person’s character. Insofar as (i) intentions are born of motives; (ii) a
person’s motives are a means by which his actions are evaluated; and (iii) his
motives are, at least in one sense, born of character, any theory for which
intentions and motives are to play a central moral role will need to consider
aretaic concepts such as character and virtue. The Greek term prohairesis refers
directly to the choices born of one’s character – that is, motives of Wilkins’
third sense – and, as Sherman rightly observes, “prohairesis assesses particular
actions relative to some arrangement of overall ends (goals). But these ends
can be good or bad, and the character whose ends they are, a good or bad
character.”76 Thus, attributing moral responsibility via motive requires some
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consideration of aretaic concerns insofar as prohairetic responsibility is born of
character traits and dispositions.

I argue that status-based justifications, derived from a purely rights-based
concern for acts independent of their actors, is an ineffective framework from
which to determine just or unjust acts. Better, I suggest, is to focus primarily
on intentions and on the traits and dispositions of those who commit
particular actions. Focussing on the conceptual centrality of intention helps to
bridge the gap between the deontic and aretaic. Fully understanding intention
requires not merely that a person’s motives be identified, but that one
understands the character from which prohairetic intentions emerge.

Intention is the concept that gives an act much of its normative content. When
we describe an act as being immoral, we do not only mean that it has caused
harm to someone who did not deserve to be harmed (if we did, then we could
sensibly describe cancer as immoral); rather, what we mean is that some
human agent acted wrongly be doing what he did. However, insofar as a
crucial defining aspect of any action is the intention from which it was done,
describing an action as moral or immoral requires an appraisal of the state of
mind of the person before he acted. The framework through which these
psychological considerations is best understood is an aretaic one, which
reveals the intimate connection between specific intentions and the more
general motives, dispositions, and character of the person. To determine
whether an act was right or wrong, we need to determine what was intended
by that action, and what is intended is born in part from the character of the
individual. Thus, a full description of the morality of an action moves from a
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person’s character and dispositions to his intentions before ever describing the
actual content or consequences of his action.

For these reasons, I have argued that the DDE framework is a more robust
account of the morality of killing in war than the status-based conception
advanced by many modern just war theorists. This account fails to consider
appropriately the moral significance of intentions by contrast to the moral
status of different parties to an action. In reality, a proper understanding of
intentions reveals the limited relevance of moral status in determining the
morality of particular actions. Furthermore, DDE is a framework for wartime
killing that preserves the absolute protection of human rights argued for by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

However, despite the fact that a sufficient understanding of intention limits
the influence of deontological appraisals of rights in JWT, it does not eradicate
them. Rights still serve as a crucial way to identify the deontological limits of
actions, restricting what may be done in pursuit of good motives and
intentions. In the following section, I explore several reasons why we ought to
preserve a place for rights within JWT.

2: Why Rights?

The previous section demonstrated how many contemporary just war
theorists conceptualise rights within their theories, and secondly why the type
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of conceptualisation those theorists undertake needs to consider aretaic ethics
more so than it currently does. However, what has not yet been made fully
clear is what reasons there might be for the overwhelmingly rights-oriented
flavour of JWT today. In this section, I explore several advantageous elements
of rights discourse, and argue that those advantages are best utilised within
an absolutist rights framework.

Brian Orend argues that the impetus for the shift toward rights in JWT
occurred in response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945). At
that moment, “theorists saw that the new moral basis for the age was destined
to be human rights.”77 However, what is left unexplained is why theorists
decided the Universal Declaration would form the moral basis for the postwar age. Its legal force aside, there must have been something that appealed
to theorists. Here I suggest three factors which might have led to the
recharacterisation of JWT in terms of human rights. I should note that these
are my reasons for arguing that rights be preserved in some form within JWT.
They may not necessarily be the reasons that motivated other theorists’ use of
rights. Nevertheless, I believe that these reasons make a strong case for
preserving some account of rights within JWT.

2.1: Individualism

Why have modern just war theorists taken such an interest in rights? In part,
I believe Orend’s thesis is right: modern theorists began to take as their
77

Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 23.
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inspiration the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the
Declaration itself is representative of a perceived need for absolute protections
against certain types of treatment. After all, the world was living in a century
which saw some of the gravest human rights violations in history; the majority
occurring during war. “A century that has witnessed the Holocaust and the
Gulag is not one which can aptly be characterized as paying too much heed to
basic rights,”78 writes Loren E. Lomasky. Orend, whose just war theory is
based on rights, argues similarly:

Human

rights,

perhaps

alone

amongst

political

concepts,

genuinely

acknowledges the worth of each individual human life and the importance of
that life’s value being protected against all the other people, forces and
institutions who might otherwise plot to use that life as a mere prop in their own
projects.79

Furthermore, rights discourse gives JWT a strong response to the challenges it
faces from political realists.80 Insisting on the centrality of rights to the ethics
of war rebuffs the pure consequentialist thinking at the heart of political
realism. As Walzer notes, “[c]onsiderations of utility play into the structure
[of JWT] at many points, but they cannot account for it as a whole.”81 The
challenge that rights poses to political realism, and its in-war equivalent
(military realism) is in refusing to accept outcome-based assessments of
morality. What one can do in war is limited by the fact that many of those

Lomasky, op cit., 14.
Brian Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 52-53.
80 For political realism, see chapter one, 32-34.
81 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., xxiv. Brackets added.
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people affected have infinite moral value, and as such their value cannot
intelligibly be weighed against other interests. Even if one does not hold rights
to be infinitely valuable, but only extraordinarily so, rights still place a check
on expediency-oriented reasoning in war by emphasising the immense value
of human rights-holders.82

Note, though, that the ability of rights to uphold the moral value of every
individual human being and thereby respond to consequentialist modes of
thinking is undermined if rights are seen as a moral threshold that is not
inviolable, but only of serious moral consideration. Above, Orend describes
how rights protect individuals from being used as “mere props,” but the
threshold deontologist will be forced to say that if the stakes are high enough,
an individual may indeed by reduced to prop-like status. The moral force of
human rights discourse comes from unapologetically stating the absolute
value of each individual human person. However, in subjecting the value of
human persons to the value of, in Walzer’s supreme emergencies for instance,
the community, individualism is eroded in favour of communitarianism.

However, some may respond that it is the moral value of individuals that in
fact justifies threshold deontology. For, if each individual is absolutely
valuable as a moral agent, then the death or suffering of a huge number of
those individuals must be more morally serious than the death or suffering of
one individual. It is the sheer mass of valuable human beings that justifies the
violation of the rights of one or some in dire cases. This is a compelling

Exactly who counts as a rights-holder (and on what basis) is a matter of some debate: this
will be addressed in the next section.
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argument, but it must be noted that the argument relies on the ability to
quantify the moral value of each individual.
Furthermore, if each individual is infinitely valuable, then adding to the
infinite cannot make it larger. Thus, the threshold deontologist cannot hold
individual human beings as being of absolute moral value, but only of great
value. Then, the question arises why it is only in dire cases that utilitarianism
reimposes itself. Why, if forced to choose between the lives of three people
and five people, can one not kill three to save five? If the only recourse is the
quantifiable moral value of individuals, there appears to be no reason to
enforce rights in any situation where the majority seek to render individuals
to be “mere props” and therefore provide the same protection to individuals
as absolute rights.

2.2: Moral Security and Legislative Strength

It is a matter of some debate whether rights would exist in a world of perfect
virtue,83 however the outcome of this debate has little bearing on my
discussion here. The world that we inhabit is not a world of perfect virtue.
Most people will make moral exceptions for themselves on occasion: “I am a
good soldier, but this particular civilian is getting under my skin. Just this once,
I’m going to butt him with my rifle.” Here, the vicious behaviour can be
dismissed as “not me,” because it is inconsistent with the way I usually act;
viz. my character. If we cannot be assured of virtuous behaviour, then we
ought not to rely on it exclusively as a means of governing action.
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The language of rights (and the corresponding language of wrongs) provides
a powerful impetus against wrongdoing. When I strike a civilian with the butt
of my rifle it is not just a case of me not furthering my own project of moral
self-improvement (as a pure virtue ethicist may argue), it is also the case that
I wrong another human being by violating his intellectual property rights, rights
to compensation for work, and so on. Rights-talk forces the moral agent to
think about his actions in terms of other people. Even if I have a duty to be
virtuous, it seems (as Augustine contended) that if I fail to do so, the person
who suffers most for it is me. This frees the agent from a certain amount of
guilt, because he has harmed nobody but himself.84 Rights make that
psychological process more difficult: if my wrongdoing is a violation of the
claim of another person, it is not me that is harmed, but the other.

Rights therefore provide psychological incentives against wrongdoing. There
are two potentially negative outcomes of this position. First, if rights-talk is
used exclusively, it becomes difficult to see actions that do not directly harm
another or violate their rights as wrongful. Second, it is important to
acknowledge that when I act wrongly, I do some harm to myself as well as to
the other. This is why recognition of both virtue and deontology is important
for a complete moral theory of war.

Psychological support for this suggestion can be found in Rajenda A. Morey & Jessica D.
Nasser, ‘Neural systems for guilt from actions affecting self versus others’, Neurolmage, vol.
60, iss. 1, 2012, 683-692. One possible explanation is that intrapersonal (self) harm causes
regret, whist interpersonal (other) harm causes guilt. See: Marcel Zelenberg & Seger M.
Breugelmans, ‘The role of interpersonal harm in distinguishing regret from guilt’, Emotion,
vol. 8, no. 5, 2008, 589-596.
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Rights-talk is also practically appealing in that it allows for the easy
implementation of legal enforcement mechanisms that protect against rightsviolations. It is comparably easier to prosecute war crimes if they are
understood as (for example) violating a person’s right to life, rather than if
they are understood as acting with vengeance, cruelty, hatred, or power
mongering. The former are much more easily demonstrable than the latter.

In the previous chapter I suggested that the codification project embarked on
by Vitoria and Grotius led to a diminishing emphasis on virtue within their
respective theories.85 Part of the reason for the de-emphasis is the simple fact
that viciousness by itself is hard to prove in a court of law. By contrast, Aquinas
believed the law of the New Testament, “love one another as I have loved you”
to be an internal law written in the hearts of men, rather than a “written law”
that might carry legislative force.86 The written law should not be concerned
with what goes on in people’s minds until such a time as some harmful (or
potentially harmful) action is taken. This is where rights, focussing on actions
and outcomes rather than intentions and dispositions, show their value. Given
the limited number of human rights, it becomes relatively easy to determine
whether an action has violated one of those rights or not. For example, murder
will always violate the right to life, theft the right to property, and so on. This
makes determining wrongdoing, and subsequently punishing the wrongdoer
and making restoration to the victim a substantially easier project than
proving the presence of vice.87

C.f. chapter two, 68-69 & 75-76.
Aquinas, ST, I-II, Q. 106, Art. 1.
87 It is worth noting that this will only be true for just legal systems with fair and reasonable
standards of evidence.
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The comparative ease of evidencing rights-violations rather than vicious
behaviour can be made clear by returning to the 2007 Apache helicopter attack
in Baghdad. Assuming again that the laws of war were not violated here, the
soldiers nevertheless appear excited by their roles as killers and eager to
obtain permission to (re-)engage. The cavalier approach to violence and killing
suggests a love of violence here that is clearly contrary to what Augustine
would expect of the virtuous soldier who is sober and reluctant in his
approach to violence.88 In such a case, demonstrating the viciousness of an
action is relatively easy (particularly when, following Wikileaks’ release of the
video, veterans of the incident issued an apology to the Iraqi people).89
However, there is often much less evidence of viciousness: transcripts are not
always readily available, missions are not always recorded and soldiers do not
always verbalise their thoughts.

Although determining whether a war crime has been committed still requires
proof of intention and motive (in the legal sense of mens rea), the framework
provided by rights at least provides some objective standard of evidence for a
trial to seek. Either the people on the ground were noncombatants and
therefore their rights were violated, or they were combatants and therefore
legitimate targets. If virtue were the only measure of legally punishable action
and viciousness were provable, every soldier who had furiously and
vengefully shot out at the enemy soldier who shot his comrade would be liable
to prosecution. Rights provides an objective measure by which to prosecute.

Cf. chapter two, 55-56.
Josh Stieber & Ethan McCord, ‘An Open Letter of Reconciliation & Responsibility to the
Iraqi People’, April 17th 2010 <http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mike-friendsblog/open-letter-reconciliation-and-responsibility-iraqi-people>.
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To simply act viciously, where the vice does not contribute to the harm
inflicted on another person, is not a crime. However, it is important to note
that although rights theory makes prosecution easier, it by no means makes it
easy; even in the example used here the soldiers involved in the Apache
helicopter attack were found innocent of any wrongdoing.90

Note again that the legal force of rights theory presumes that rights are
absolute deontological limits which may never be permissibly violated. If,
instead of absolute prohibitions of behaviour rights were only strong moral
barriers which only extreme situations could overcome, legal enforcement
would become equally if not more difficult than if one were to prosecute on
intentions alone. The reason is because in order to punish a rights violation a
court would have to be convinced that the violation was not performed in
order to prevent a substantively graver violation which may have occurred.
This introduces another level of speculation, and therefore ambiguity, to the
process. Furthermore, determining whether or not the action did – as a matter
of fact – prevent a greater catastrophe is not sufficient because even if there
was no supreme emergency, the court would have to consider whether the
defendant could reasonably have known that the situation did not constitute
a dire enough emergency to justify rights violations. Again, we see that the
benefits provided by rights theory are best provided when the rights in
question are considered absolute and inviolable.

Author classified, ‘Legal Review, AR 15-6 Investigation, Finding and Recommendations of
the Conditions Surrounding the Possible Death of Two Reuters Reporters during an
Engagement on 12 July 2007 by Crazyhorse 18 and 19, 1 st Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment,
in the New Baghdad District of Baghdad, Iraq (Zone 30)’, 20 th July 2007,
<https://www2.centcom.mil/sites/foia/rr/CENTCOM%20Regulation%20CCR%2025210/Deat
h%20of%20Reuters%20Journalists/5--1st%20Air%20Cavalry%20Brigade%20AR%20156%20Investigation.pdf>.
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2.3: Universality

Following from the legislative appeal of rights discourse is its third
characteristic, universal application. By explaining JWT through the lens of
human rights, theorists are able to validate the claim that the laws of war apply
equally to every nation and every person (insofar as every person shares in
the same human rights). Under this approach, the moral laws of war are not
limited to particular societies, nor are they grounded in politically or
culturally variable norms; rather, they are founded in the nature of humanity
itself. As H.L.A. Hart says, they are rights “which all men have […] qua men
and not only if they are members of some society or stand in some special
relation to one another [they are] not created or conferred by men’s voluntary
action.”91

The universality of human rights such as the rights to life and bodily integrity
is appealing for just war theorists because it justifies universal applicability.
The values that rights-based just war theories uphold are ones that
communities all around the world should affirm. Some have suggested that
the best attempt at outlining and enumerating a set of human rights – the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights – is anglocentric and does not actually
represent values held universally.92 However, even if this criticism holds true,
the rights theorist’s claim that some set of universal values could be upheld via
human rights is not necessarily defeated. The legal appeal of human rights is

H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, The Philosophical Review, vol. 64, no. 2, 1955,
175-191 at 175.
92 American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement on Human Rights’, American
Anthropologist, vol. 49, no. 4, 1947, 539-543.
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not only that they are applied to communities around the world, but also that
they can govern and prescribe moral conduct across the borders of different
communities and cultures. It matters not if the offender is American,
Rwandan, Bosnian, or German, the laws of war, such as the principle of
discrimination, will apply equally. The International Criminal Court (ICC), for
example, claims jurisdiction over “serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole;”93 specifically, it deals with war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide – wherever they occur. So, although
the international society “is pluralist in that different moral values are enacted
within each political community,”94 there are some basic moral values, human
rights, which apply universally – to the global community.

I concede that the universal application of rights theory is in no way affected
by whether those rights are formulated as absolute or not. Despite this, the
fact that two of the three major reasons why rights are appealing to military
ethicists are undermined by threshold deontological approaches to rights
should be of concern to contemporary just war theorists who formulate their
views of rights in that manner.

However, even with the benefits that rights theory offers, there are
shortcomings to limiting one’s discussion to rights alone. For instance, as we
saw in the discussion of the 2007 Apache attack, rights theory’s ability to
criticise or condemn vicious (but not unjust) behaviour is limited. Thus, a

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, Article 5.1,
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm>.
94 Jamie Gaskarth, ‘The Virtues in International Society’, European Journal of International
Relations, vol. 18, no. 3, 2011, 431-453 at 443.
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more all-encompassing morality of war must look beyond rights for a fuller
discussion of morality.

3: Beyond Rights: Just War Theory and Virtue

Having established what modern just war theories mean by rights, and why
it is that rights discourse is beneficial for JWT, I now suggest two areas in
which rights theory can be helpfully enriched through integrating aretaic
ethics into the discussion. The two cases speak to two different areas of
military ethics: the first concerns operatives “on the ground” (in bello), and the
second regards political decisions and military strategy (ad bellum). I suggest
that whilst rights-based just war theories can provide a coherent account in
each case, important questions as to the motivations of the actors, the
development of virtues, the wellbeing of the moral actors, and the common
good can be more comprehensively and satisfactorily addressed with the
inclusion of insights from aretaic ethics.

This is not to say that there is nothing to be gained from deontological
interpretations of the morality of war; rather, it is to say that those accounts
will be more complete representations of war in all its moral complexity if they
have incorporated aretaic concepts into them. I should also note that I do not
consider the two areas to be explored – torture and so-called “lesser evil”
scenarios – to be the only areas in which aretaic notions can enrich
deontological ones. I do, however, consider them to be representative of the
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complementarity of the two moral frameworks, and to be pressing moral
questions in contemporary debate among just war theorists.

3.1: Intentions and Vices: The case of torture

A crucial way in which aretaic notions can enrich deontological just war
theories is by explaining how agents can adhere to deontological rules in a
way that detracts from their good moral character. One example of this is
advanced interrogation employed in times of war; that is, treatments that
either are, or border on, torture.95 In this section I argue that just war theories
that fail to adequately condemn (or worse condone) acts that degrade, mock,
traumatise, or objectify other human beings (as torture does) as outside of the
body of morally acceptable actions are problematic from within an aretaic
framework. The problem arises primarily from the fact that such actions
facilitate soldiers becoming the kind of people who do not make good citizens
when they return home from war. One of the difficulties facing those who
have denied the legitimacy of torture is that they have usually attempted to
do so from within a rights-based framework. However, as many
commentators have argued, this is not easy to do. A critique of torture may be
enhanced by drawing on aretaic notions concerning the degradation of the
moral character of the torturer.

Michael Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail in an Age
of Asymmetric Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 123.
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The United Nations ‘Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment’96 defines torture as:

[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.97

This is a helpful starting point, but it is not without its shortcomings. For
example, as Michael Davis observes, “an illegal organization, such as the
mafia, is, without official ‘consent or acquiescence’ as capable of torture as any
government.”98 Even though Mafiosi or gang thugs will never be brought
before the International Criminal Court for their actions, they are still capable
of torture. The crime of torture is not determined by who performs the action,
but qualities inherent to the action itself. Thus, we must enquire as to which
qualities of the action will constitute torture.

The convention is in fact only effective as a convention against torture because other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatments” occur only in the title of the document, and are never
defined.
97 United Nations, ‘Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment’, No. 24841, 1987, Article 1. 1,
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201465/volume-1465-I-24841English.pdf>.
98 Michael Davis, ‘Justifying Torture as an Act of War’, 189 in Larry May (ed.), War: Essays in
Political Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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The UN definition suggests that what constitutes torture is the severity of the
pain or suffering that is inflicted in combination with the reasons for which
the pain is inflicted; reasons which may include intelligence gathering,
punishment, intimidation and coercion, or “any reason based on
discrimination.” However, not all pain or suffering for these purposes can
constitute torture. After all, criminals suffer loss of their freedom when they
are imprisoned as punishment for their crimes, but criminal imprisonment
should not be considered torture. The amount, or intensity of the pain and
suffering must meet a certain threshold before the label of torture can be
applied.

So emerges a deeper difficulty with the UN definition: the fact that by
identifying torture as the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, one
implicitly condones inflictions of less than severe pain or suffering. Here we
enter a realm stifled by ambiguity. For example, how serious is the suffering
inflicted on a prisoner who is forced to sleep naked on the cold floor? The
treatment, although inhumane and painful, may not fit the legal definition of
torture and therefore may not violate an individual’s ‘right not to be tortured.’

How should “severe pain and suffering” be understood? Two possibilities
emerge: either (i) the degree of suffering inflicted, or (ii) the quantity of pain one
endures. If (i), certain types of suffering will always constitute torture;
regardless of how long and short they go on for. This approach will see torture
as a line in the sand which delineates a set of actions that are so severe in the
level pain and suffering they inflict as to constitute torture. (ii) is more flexible
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as to the manner in which pain and suffering are meted out, but is more
interested in quantifying how much a person has suffered over time. For
instance, waterboarding may be considered a type of suffering severe enough
to constitute torture, but a particular detainee might prefer fifteen minutes of
waterboarding to a fortnight of sleep deprivation (were they given the choice).
Under the first conception, sleep deprivation may be a sufficiently moderate
form of suffering to fall below the torture threshold; under the latter, even
tickling a person for an indefinite period of time may constitute torture – the
longer it goes on, the more torturous it becomes.

Michael Gross argues that it is important to distinguish between “moderate
physical pressure or “torture light” [sic.] and cruel or vicious torture.”99 Gross
rejects torture on the grounds that it is ineffective, but also holds that “there is
no overwhelming evidence that the costs of torture in a democracy are
intolerable.”100 By torture, Gross means “moderate physical pressures” such
as extreme temperature exposure, sleep deprivation, minor assault (slapping,
pushing), and waterboarding.101 These are distinguished from more brutal
measures (i.e. rape) because the extremity of the suffering is lower, and its
duration shorter than other measures.102 The short duration and comparably
diminished amount of pain suggest that these kinds of pressures do qualify as
torture (or perhaps “torture-light”), but are not “cruel or vicious torture.”
However, as I suggested above, moderate pressures do not remain moderate
forever. An analogy here can be drawn from the sufferers of medical
symptoms: pins and needles that last for 5-10 minutes can be irritating, or even

Gross, op cit., 123.
Ibid., 146.
101 Ibid., 127-128.
102 Ibid., 128.
99
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amusing to some, but if those symptoms did not subside for years, the
suffering inflicted would be severe indeed. In fact, one of the most famous
methods of torture, Chinese Water Torture, rests on this exact premise. It takes
something minorly irritating, a drip on the forehead, and repeats it over an
indefinite period of time, where the person has no ability to stop it. The success
of the torture in this case relies on the denial of freedom, the powerlessness to
stop the discomfort, and the uncertainty as to when, or if, it might end.

A better definition of torture is offered by Patrick Lee, who focusses not on the
acts or outcomes of torture, but on the intention behind it. Lee defines torture
as “acts of mutilation or acts that attempt to reduce the detainee to a
subhuman, dis-integrated state, for the ulterior purpose either of
interrogation, deterrence, revenge, punishment, or sadistic pleasure.”103 This
definition identifies the “type of choice and execution of choice”104 that is
involved in torture; specifically, the reduction of a human detainee to
something less than human. Thus, placing soiled female underwear on the
faces on detainees with strict sexual sensitivities, as occurred at Abu Ghraib
prison, is likely to constitute torture. It also explains why the UN Convention’s
distinction between torture, cruel treatment and degrading treatment is
mistaken: any kind of treatment which aims to disintegrate a person’s psyche
is torturous. Under this framework, torture is better understood as an
adjective; particular kinds of treatment are torturous when it has the aim of
undermining integrated personhood. For Lee, torture is not an act, but an
intention. This explains how, in the above cases, tickling, pins and needles, or
water dripping on one’s forehead can constitute torture, as much as can sleep

Patrick Lee, ‘Interrogational Torture’, The American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 51, 2006,
131-148 at 132.
104 Ibid., 132.
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deprivation, waterboarding, or de-nailing. Torture does not require the
experience of extreme pain or suffering by victims, merely that such an
experience be intended.

Lee’s account also helps us to make the important distinction between torture
and interrogation. Torture, as Lee explains, is defined by (a) the objective,
which can be punishment, intelligence, or even sadistic gratification; and (b)
the means of bringing about the objective, that being the dis-integration of a
human being, resulting in his becoming sub-human. Interrogation, by
contrast, is always aimed at obtaining intelligence (and is thus more narrowly
aimed than torture), but more importantly, is distinguished in the means
employed to obtain information. Interrogation uses a host of different
methods, many of which are unpleasant: exploitation of close relationships,
manipulation of facts, or more coercive measures such as blackmail. However,
these methods all aim at having the detainee choose to offer the information he
possesses. By contrast, torture forces the information out by destroying a
person’s ability to resist. The distinction lies in the interrogator/torturer’s
attitude to his victim, and whether he is willing to accept the possibility that
his victim will not volunteer information. Interrogators will accept that
possibility, torturers will not.

Thus far, we have seen theorists try to distinguish torture from interrogation,
torture-lite (a softer version), and cruel or vicious torture (a more extreme
form). We can also distinguish between different types of torture based on the
purpose of the torture – interrogational torture should be distinguished from
punitive or sadistic torture, at least for the sake of discussion. Indeed, it is
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interrogational torture that is most relevant to those within the military and
intelligence communities, and which therefore deserves (and receives) most
of the focus. Following Lee, we can define interrogational torture as
interrogation whose methods for soliciting the truth from an individual by
aiming to dis-integrate the victim, or reduce him to a sub-human state. This is
what Hollywood scriptwriters have in mind when they describe torture as
attempts to “break people.” They envision a point at which a person’s psychic
and bodily integrity are so diminished that any willpower they had to retain
information disappears, and the truth flows from them like a stream. The
question, many argue, is what could justify “breaking” a person in such a way,
if anything? And are there certain types of treatment which break a person
beyond repair, and should therefore never be performed? Put another way,
when and to what extent can degrading a person to sub-human levels be
justified?

Amongst a host of various answers is the pragmatist who responds “never,”
not because of anything intrinsic to the act of torture itself, but because it is, as
a matter of consequence, ineffective. Former F.B.I. interrogator Ali Soufan has
been a public opponent of torture on the grounds that it is ineffective,
although conceding the possibility that if it was effective, he might accept it as
legitimate practice.105 But, he has argued in several op-eds, the reality is that it
does not provide accurate information.106 Empirical debates regarding the

Duncan Gardham, ‘Torture is not wrong, it just doesn’t work, says former interrogator’,
The Telegraph, Oct. 28, 2011, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/8833108/Torture-is-notwrong-it-just-doesnt-work-says-former-interrogator.html>.
106 C.f. Ali Soufan, ‘Torture, Lies, and Hollywood’, The New York Times, Feb. 22, 2013,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/opinion/sunday/torture-lies-and-hollywood.html>;
‘My Tortured Decision’, The New York Times, April 22, 2009,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/opinion/23soufan.html?_r=0>; ‘What Torture Never
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efficacy of torture are ongoing,107 but to rest the outcomes of the debate on
empirical findings regarding torture’s efficacy would be unimaginative. The
torture question is much broader than mere effectiveness: even if these
questions were resolved and torture were shown to be ineffective, we would
still face debate as to whether “torture-lite” was morally acceptable. To this
debate, Michael Davis responds that:

[t]o debate whether a certain way of treating a person “amounts to torture” is to
admit the treatment in question is well within the domain of the inhumane and
therefore prima facie among the most serious of moral wrongs.108

Discussions of whether various forms of coercive interrogation can be justified
dwell in a moral shadowland: simply being there may be enough to be lost in
the dark. In what follows, I argue that when it comes to the effects of coercive
interrogation on the character of the interrogator, the distinction between
torture and torture-lite is unimportant: the moral costs in either case are
devastating.

In what follows I show how aretaic concepts broaden the torture debate
beyond definitional debates regarding how to distinguish torture from
torture-lite. An interest in arete and wellbeing prompts the question: is the
Told Us’, The New York Times, Sept. 5, 2009,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/opinion/06soufan.html>.
107 Jean Maria Arrigo offers a summary of much of the empirical debate, arguing that the
outcomes of torture interrogations make it unjustifiable. See: Jean Maria Arrigo, ‘A
Utilitarian Argument Against Torture Interrogation of Terrorists’, Science and Engineering
Ethics, Vol. 10, 543-572.
108 Davis, op cit., 197.
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character of the interrogator who performs “torture-lite” affected any
differently than the more brutal torturer? This question has been touched on
by Jessica Wolfendale, who notes that “[t]he distinction between the methods
referred to as torture lite and so-called real torture serves a further aim: it is
sometimes used to distinguish not only between types of torture methods but
also between the moral character of torturers and their motivations.”109

To borrow from Lee’s approach, the difference between torture and torturelite is claimed to be (at least in part) that the latter does not intend to
disintegrate personhood in the same way as the former. This is obviously a
contentious claim, as for Lee, torture is concerned with the intention, not the
act itself, and it seems that torture and torture-lite differ only in the quality of
suffering they aim to inflict, but both intend to inflict suffering. Whilst nonanaesthetised surgery to save a life might perform the same kind of acts as
certain forms of brutal torture without being torturous, there seems to be less
distinction between waterboarding and de-nailing.

Wolfendale begins an aretaic mode of thinking by questioning whether
torture-lite actions demonstrate a corrupt moral character (in the way that
torture does), but it is worth continuing that line of questioning and
considering whether they can create one. This, I believe, is a more important
line of questioning given that most interrogators will not take any pleasure in
what they are required to do, even where what they do does not amount to
the legal definition of torture. However, we would do well to ask whether,

Jessica Wolfendale, ‘The Myth of “Torture-Lite”, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 23, iss.
1, 2009, 47-61 at 49.
109

168

over time, those same people may either come to enjoy what they do, whether
their interrogation methods are likely to escalate, or if the actions they are
required to can be detrimental to the character of interrogators in other ways.
I begin with the following case from Brian Orend in his discussion of torture
in The Morality of War.

[At Abu Ghraib] the world saw some shocking photos of American troop
conduct […] Some of it – like deliberate, prolonged sleep deprivation, and using
dogs to attack or threaten already prone and naked people – clearly violated the
Geneva Conventions. Others might have been visually disturbing but do not
obviously count as human rights violations, such as forcing the prisoners to wear
dog collars, or having American women ridicule their private parts, or putting
female panties on their faces temporarily.110

Orend disapproves of both clear violations (torture) and less obvious cases
(torture-lite) as “a violation of both the letter and the spirit of the principle of
benevolent quarantine.”111 However, he is not willing to completely condemn
torture-lite: “I suppose we might condone efforts at psychological pressure
[…] when the goal is getting information which might save innocent lives.”112
Orend’s approval is unusual given that he simultaneously holds that
“[t]orture hardens the heart and corrupts the character of the torturer.”113 This
aretaic sentiment is an important one, but Orend may be overreaching: the
torturer who interrogates reluctantly, and out of a genuine belief that this is
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necessary to achieve the goals of war, or to save a vast number of lives, may
not find his heart hardened or his character corrupted.

However, routine torture of the kind that might emerge if torture became
institutionalised as a matter of official military policy is likely to harden the
heart. But it is not clear that Orend’s concerns are exclusive to the torturer; the
interrogator (or “torturer-lite”), if willing to mock, insult, lie and threaten
surely cannot expect to leave with a pristine character – cannot this alone serve
as a basis to condemn the behaviour? Nancy Sherman’s aretaic work on the
moral psychology of warriors is informative here:

The nearly exclusive focus on torture has silenced a more general debate about
the moral shadowland in which the interrogator dwells, even when he does not
practice torture […] [T]he space the interrogator inhabits has its own special
moral demands. And with it comes a distinct set of moral and psychological
vulnerabilities.114

Sherman suggests that even “interrogation-short-of-torture” (Sherman uses
the term “exploitation”)115 entails aretaic difficulties for the interrogator. The
detainee’s vulnerability, loyalty and trust is exploited by the interrogator for
specific ends, and the skills requisite to do so are not compatible with the
overall flourishing of a life. In cases such as torture, then, employing
deontological reasoning to determine whether a person’s right not to be

Sherman, The Untold War: Inside the Hearts and Minds of Our Soldiers, (New York: W.W.
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tortured has been violated or not is insufficient to appreciate the full moral
scope of the situation; a more robust account of the morality of torture will
explore the effects that performing such deeds will have on the protagonist’s
character. For example, occasionally soldiers will kill one of their own in
training mishaps, technological malfunctions or simple human error, most of
the time being free from moral or legal fault for their actions. 116 In such
situations those who are responsible are usually only causally so; often no
moral or legal culpability can be attributed, such as in the SPLA case discussed
earlier. But aretaic concepts can help demonstrate the moral difficulties a
soldier who accidentally kills a comrade may face down the track. Although
guilt, shame, regret and so forth are psychological conditions, each has longreaching and profound moral consequences for the wellbeing of veterans, as I
show in chapter four. JWT – if it is to be a complete morality of war – must
accommodate the aretaic into such situations, appreciating that the deeds
soldiers perform in war infiltrate their character and shape their flourishing
by way of memories, trauma, changed character traits, or psychological scars.

The same is true of the interrogator: it is not sufficient to determine the justice
or injustice of his deeds; JWT must take the further step of explaining how his
actions can be reconciled with his life as a moral agent and with his overall
wellbeing. Indeed, if it were ever possible to show that a terrorist really did
forfeit his right not to be tortured (as the no-right justification discussed earlier
might hold), it may nevertheless be wrong for any individual to commit
torture if doing so would foster character traits that are contrary to his ability

Sherman tells the story of one man, responsible for providing security for a position in
Iraq who authorised a replacement battery for a Bradley gun. The replacement battery, as it
turned out, had different amperage, and the gun fired, killing a US Private. See: Ibid., 96-97.
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to be a good citizen, or live a fulfilling life. Pope Paul VI demonstrated an
understanding of this in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes.

[W]hatever is opposed to life itself, such as any type of murder, genocide,
abortion, euthanasia or wilful self-destruction, whatever violates the integrity of
the human person, such as mutilation, torments inflicted on body or mind,
attempts to coerce the will itself; whatever insults human dignity, such as
subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery,
prostitution, the selling of women and children; as well as disgraceful working
conditions, where men are treated as mere tools for profit, rather than as free and
responsible persons; all these things and others of their like are infamies indeed.
They poison human society, but they do more harm to those who practice them
than those who suffer from the injury.117

Throughout this chapter I have suggested that to discuss just and unjust
actions solely through the lens of deontology is too narrow. Also required is
an appreciation of aretaic ideas. An account that includes such discussion will
be able to represent the various moral categories explained earlier more richly.
Torture provides a good case analysis of this. Even if deontological theories
were unable to demonstrate if and how rights theory leads to an absolute
prohibition on torture, aretaic notions can provide insights that suggest why
no person ought ever to commit an act of torture. For example, because of the
trauma inflicted or the disharmony it may generate when the person returns
home from war. Furthermore, awareness of aretaic concepts helps to inform
us of the moral difficulties that may be faced by those interrogators who,

Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes, 1965,
<http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html>.
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although only performing just actions, are still developing particular character
traits (such as the manipulation of relationships and desensitisation from
forming close personal bonds), which may be difficult to reconcile with civil
society.

3.2: Lesser Evils

In his discussion of torture, Fritz Allhoff notes that “there can be cases
involving rights conflicts where one right has to be violated in order to prevent
further rights from being violated.”118 Allhoff, focussing on the torturing of
those who we reasonably believe to be terrorists with valuable (and pressing)
information divides torture into three kinds: “physical, psychological, and
other-directed”, and whilst arguing against other-directed torture, believes
that “both physical and psychological torture, in all their forms, should be
allowed [although] only the minimum necessary to extract the information is
allowed.119 Torture in such circumstances is justified by the moral status
argument: the terrorist has done something which lowers his moral status
relative to others who are innocent. Even if he has not forfeited his right, the
terrorist’s rights are diminished by comparison to the rights of innocent
people (if, say, he has hidden a bomb and refuses to disclose the location).

However, there are also cases in which preventing the violation of a great
many innocent people’s rights may require violating an innocent person or

Fritz Allhoff, ‘Terrorism and Torture’, International Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 17,
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persons’ rights. Such cases are usually referred to as “lesser evil” scenarios:
those in which the only way to prevent a morally catastrophic outcome is by
doing something evil. In such cases it is held that the proportional costs of not
acting are so extreme that to hold (as an absolutist does) that one must never
intentionally violate another’s rights is to succumb to a kind of “rights
fetishism.”120 As Walzer argues, the absolutist catch-cry “do justice though the
heavens fall!” involves “a refusal to think about what it means for the heavens
to fall.”121

In one sense, lesser evil scenarios are remarkably similar to the case of torture
already discussed. However, it is worth exploring them in detail for several
reasons: first, because unlike torture and torture-lite, there is no claim that the
victims here are liable to attack or injury; even defenders of the so-called “dirty
hands problem”122 acknowledge that it requires one to do what appears to be
evil. Secondly, these cases apply more directly to political leaders, who must
give the orders for such things, than they do to military operators such as
interrogators or soldiers. Thus, these cases allow the exploration that
previously took place regarding in bello to be applied to ad bellum
responsibilities.

Allhoff, op cit., 113.
Walzer, Arguing About War, op cit., 37.
122 C.f. C.J. Coady, ‘Dirty Hands, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dirty-hands/>.
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3.2.1: Just Cause and Morally Justifiable Cause

Jeff McMahan contends that there can be morally justifiable wars fought by
nations who do not have just cause. He describes the following scenario:

Suppose that country A is about to be unjustly invaded by a ruthless and more
powerful country, B, A’s only hope of successful defense is to station forces in
the territory of a smaller, weaker, neighboring country, C, in order to be able to
attack B’s forces from prepared positions as they approach A along the border
between B and C, A’s government requests permission from the government of
C to deploy its forces on C’s territory for this purpose, but C’s government,
foreseeing that allowing A to use its territory in this way would result in
considerable destruction, denies the request. Suppose that C is within its rights
to deny A the use of its territory but that, all things considered, it is nonetheless
justifiable for A to avoid an otherwise inevitable defeat at the hands of B by going
to war against C in order to be able to deploy troops there […] Given that C is
not morally required to sacrifice its territory for the sake of A, it seems that C
does nothing to make itself liable to attack by A. On the account I have offered,
therefore, A does not have a just cause for war against C. Yet if A is nevertheless
morally justified in going to war against C, it must be possible for there to be
wars that are morally justified yet unjust.123

A deontic reading of McMahan’s contention that there might be morally
justifiable yet unjust wars would require that the rights of states against

Jeff McMahan, ‘Just Cause for War’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 19, Iss. 3, 2006, 1-21
at 15
123

175

unjustified invasion not be absolute. As a threshold deontologist, McMahan
makes it clear that the circumstances that would justify this event would be
unlikely, because “for the war to be proportionate […] its good effects would
have to be weighed against the intentional killing of just combatants in
[nation] C, who are innocent in the generic sense.”124 The difficulty here is that
a host of different rights have come into conflict: state A’s right to self-defence,
state C’s right to territorial integrity, A’s citizens’ rights not to be subjected to
unjust war, and C’s citizens’ rights not to be subjected to unjust war. An
absolutist reading would state simply that the right to self-defence does not
afford a nation the liberty to violate the territorial integrity of others, but
McMahan does not follow this line of argument. Instead he argues that the
only way to determine between them is with recourse to “the greater good.”125
The rule would be this: where two fundamental rights come into conflict with
one another, the one which best contributes to the greater good will be upheld.

Recalling that deontological ethics is concerned primarily with developing
moral principles that serve as rules to guide action in particular cases, we can
see how this principle would be an appropriate formulation with regard to
resolving the problem of lesser evils within a deontological framework.
However, McMahan does not believe the principle to be a sufficient
explanation of the morality of lesser evil cases (and nor do I). In cases where
rights can be permissibly violated, the justification emerges not only from
proportionate calculations, but from intention.126
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If an act would cause harm to the innocent as a foreseeable side effect, it may
nevertheless be permissible if it is intended to achieve good effects that exceed
the bad by a certain margin. It may not, however, be permissible to cause the
same amount of harm to the innocent as an intended means of achieving the
same good effects. Yet if causing that amount of harm to the innocent could be
the means of achieving much greater good effects, it might be permissible to cause
it – though only if the agent acts with an acceptable intention, such as the
intention to achieve the greater good.127

However, despite invoking insights typical of DDE (such as side-effect based
reasoning), McMahan’s specified intention – “achieve the greater good” –
represents a very different account of intention to those we have seen earlier.
The desire to achieve the greater good is much closer to a motive than an
intention: when one intends to achieve the greater good, he must intend to do
it in specific ways. These ways are, as a matter of fact, the things the person
intends, not “achieve the greater good.” DDE and other absolutist modes of
reasoning hold that in intending a specific end, such as the greater good, one
also intends the means to achieve that end; in this case, violating rights. So,
one cannot merely avoid the lesser evil problem by invoking good intentions,
especially when conceived so broadly. Indeed, unless restricted by a specific
understanding of what the greater good is constituted by, it would be hard to
find any historical instance of someone not acting to achieve the greater good.

What needs to be shown, rather, is either that it is sometimes permissible to
violate absolute moral proscriptions or that the right to territorial integrity is
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not absolute, and can therefore be violated in some cases. Although I believe
the latter argument to be the more salient, I will not make that case here.
Rather, I wish to point out how in either case, deontological ethics will be
noticeably enhanced through incorporating aretaic ethics. In two important
ways, aretaic ethics can lend further depth of insight to the lesser evil
calculations that McMahan is here concerned with.

First, aretaic ethics – focussed on human wellbeing, including the internal
moral excellences of the individual (virtues), intentions and motives of actors,
character, and moral psychology as each contributes to wellbeing – can
explain what traits will be necessary in order for individuals to be able to
determine when a situation is a “lesser evil” case, and when it is a case n which
basic deontological principles ought to be applied. One major shortcoming in
McMahan’s discussion is that is presumes that individuals will know when
they are faced with a moral dilemma that requires them to choose the lesser
evil. However, it is not immediately clear that any and every individual will
be readily able to identify the morally salient features of a particular situation.
So, if we take a threshold deontological approach, how do individual actors
determine when the threshold has been reached?128 Furthermore, if the right
to territorial integrity is not absolute, how do we determine when it can be
proportionate to violate a nation’s right? In this instance, a virtue such as
prudence would help to identify the morally relevant features of a situation
and determine between different possibilities.

This question can also be posed against Michael Walzer’s cases of supreme emergencies.
See: Berry Tholen, ‘Dirty Hands or Political Virtue? Walzer’s and MacIntyre’s Answers to
Machiavelli’s Challenge’, Public Integrity, vol. 15, no. 2, 2013, 187-202 at 190-191.
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Daniel Jacobson, for instance, argues that possession of moral virtues allows a
person to identify the right thing to do in a situation, even without an ability
to voice the moral principles demanding that particular action: “the virtuous
person has a reliable ability to do the right thing in the situations confronting
her, even if she may be unable to articulate how, or even what, it is that she
knows.”129 This is particularly poignant because McMahan argues that the
relevant intention in lesser evil cases is merely to serve the common good. In
such a broad case, it may be almost impossible to identify a particular
principle that oversees each particular case.

The process of prudent decision-making is described by Charles Henry as
follows:

To reach a solution [...] one needs to inspect all the known variables, even
apparently nonessential ones, covering the [...] social, spiritual, ethical,
psychological, legal, and familial aspects, respecting the context and the
individuals involved, and any circumstance that would at all be of influence in
arriving at the final decision.130

Henry, speaking in a medical context, lists variables that might not be
especially relevant in the military. For instance, we might substitute “familial”
for “international politics” and add factors like “strategy,” but the general
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process is still the same. Prudential reasoning of this kind is particularly
helpful in cases where there are “simply too many variable to consider.”131 A
central element of the virtue of prudence is concerned with the ability to
discern the right way of acting when there are a wide range of variables; in
particular, variables whose outcomes are uncertain. In cases such as these, it
appears highly unlikely that the application of a rule to various cases will
resolve the apparent tension: what is required are individuals who possess
particular decision-making skills and who can readily determine the morally
salient factors on the basis of the particular case in question.

Note that Henry insists that even nonessential factors be considered in a
prudential judgement. The reason for this is because some factors that appear
nonessential can, in fact, be critical in making a morally good decision. This
leads to the second way in which aretaic ethics can usefully enhance the
deontological conception offered by McMahan: by offering new moral factors
to add into measures of proportionality. Aretaic ethics concerns itself with the
way in which particular actions can shape a person’s character, and
subsequently affect his wellbeing. In cases where one violates rights, even in
a case of necessity, the fact that he violates rights is morally relevant not
merely to the victim, but to the perpetrator as well. Even if such actions are
justifiable under some moral framework, the fact that they influence and
shape character in particular ways ought to be treated as a serious moral
concern in making judgements of proportionality.132
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3.2.2: Supreme Emergencies

In the previous chapter I introduced Michael Walzer’s concept of supreme
emergencies. This species of the lesser evil cases described above is a more
specific formulation worthy of dedicated discussion because of its popularity
in the literature. Whilst McMahan sees his lesser evil example as a case of
“morally permissible injustice” (meaning that an innocent party is wronged,
but the transgression is free of moral culpability), Walzer holds that supreme
emergencies are paradoxical examples of unjust behaviour in which “the
immorality […] is simultaneously, morally defensible.”133 That is, an agent is
morally required to do evil and is held morally responsible for doing it. Typically,
supreme emergency is understood to justify (in this paradoxical sense) the
intentional targeting of civilians – bearers of the right not to be killed – in war,
however it need not be limited to requiring violations of noncombatant
immunity. Walzer explains that “[w]hen our deepest values are at risk, the
constraints [of absolute morality] lose their grip, and a certain kind of
utilitarianism reimposes itself again.”134 Thus, so long as the conditions of
supreme emergency are met, literally anything is justifiable in the interests of
preserving the community. Here the main question is whether communities
are of sufficient moral value to justify the use of immorality in its defence.

In my earlier discussion on Walzer and supreme emergencies in chapter two,
I speculated as to whether a supreme emergency might justify a state targeting
its own civilians as well as those of the enemy. I concluded that there was
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nothing in the logic of supreme emergencies to forbid such action should the
circumstances require it. Ultimately, supreme emergencies are justified by the
central role of the political community in people’s lives: “its replacement
would require either the elimination of the people or the coercive
transformation of their way of life.”135 Neither of these is morally acceptable
for Walzer. These outcomes are also morally unacceptable in a way that
individual deaths are not in light of the immense value of the political
community.

[The supreme emergency] argument doesn’t work unless we add to it an
argument about the value of the community. It isn’t only individuals who are
represented, but also the collective entity – religious, political or cultural – that
the individuals compose and from which they derive some portion of their
character, practices and beliefs.136

Because of the immense value invested in the political community by all or
most individuals within it, Walzer believes that defending it through immoral
actions (to use Walzer’s own term) is required despite the fact that individuals
may not defend themselves through such means. If all individuals breached
the laws of morality, the law would cease to function. Thus, “when we tell an
individual soldier that he can’t [act immorally for self-preservation] we are
telling him that he must risk death and even die within the moral limits so that
his children […] can hope to live within them.”137 By contrast, a supreme
emergency threatens the very ongoingness of the moral limits: the principles
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and practices the soldier values will cease to be. In such cases, there is no
motivation for adhering to principles. If “sticking to my guns” meant that I
would no longer have any guns, then my sticking to them would be
completely unreasonable.

However, Walzer’s argument relies on the claim that a community’s values
and principles die when the community does: that is, that the community is
the source of our moral values.138 He argues that “[m]oral and political life is
always experienced in particular places and times, through the medium of
different concrete actions, institutions and languages.”139 If, however, we reject
Walzer’s metaethical position about the origin of morality,140 then his
argument about the immense value-difference between individuals and
communities loses some of its lustre. If the origins of morality are based in,
say, reason or human nature, one has less to fear from the destruction of a
political community.

Consider, for example, a moral framework that identifies the source of
morality with human reason, and a life lived in harmony with that reason – a
virtuous or flourishing life. Virtues, as habitual dispositions are excellences 141
derived from the idea of the flourishing or ideal person. As such, the

Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice, op cit., 17.
Ibid., 14.
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elimination of a community places these moral values under no threat. If
killing innocent civilians is barbaric, then one ought not to do things which
are barbaric. No amount of destruction could be so devastating as to remove
the ability to evaluate and condemn barbarism. Even barbarism to prevent the
destruction of reason itself (although impossible) would not be justifiable
because reason reveals barbarism, or any act of intentional wrongdoing to be
inherently unjust. This is because virtues stem from reason and have to do
with the way that persons relate to themselves. Therefore such a moral
framework could not require a person to act immorally; virtue-based duties
are, at least in part, duties to oneself. And this is precisely how supreme
emergencies are described, as being a moral duty to “get one’s hands dirty”142
on behalf of the community. Of course, part of the duty might be a sacrifice of
one’s own good moral standing for the benefit of all.

Defending supreme emergencies means defending a controversial principle:
“if the very perpetuity of the community is at threat, one must do whatever is
necessary in its defence.” Thus, what is justified by supreme emergency is
unspecified. Although Walzer tends to focus on the targeting of enemy
civilians, C.J. Coady points out that torture would also seem immediately
justifiable (and remember, we have already eliminated the possibility of the
practice of torture being virtuous). Would, for instance, the targeting of one’s
own civilians, the use of chemical or biological weaponry or – as was practised
in the Roman Empire – the appointment of a political dictatorship be
justifiable if the circumstances were dire? None of these appear to be
consistent with the overall goal of war: peace. Particularly unreasonable is the
argument that in order to defend my community, justice might require me to
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kill a large number of innocent members within it. As Aquinas says in his
discussion of murder and justice, “the life of righteous men preserves and
forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community.
Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.”143

In one sense, supreme emergencies are situations that require political leaders
to sacrifice their own moral goodness for the good of the community.
Paradoxically, they are duty-bound to do what is wrong. In this sense,
supreme emergencies ask leaders to be ‘martyrs’ who condemn themselves to
hell. Rather than becoming this kind of ‘damned martyr,’ one could elect to
become an ordinary martyr, who would rather die than sacrifice what he
knows to be good.

This relies initially on the claim that one’s own moral character is, at least from
one’s own subjective perspective, the most important moral value such that
its destruction for the pursuit of other goods will be unreasonable. 144 Secondly,
it requires a kind of Augustinian Stoicism whereby we recognise death in itself
to be no threat to our moral goodness or human flourishing. Such a
commitment is especially important because it may be that political leaders,
in refusing to sacrifice their souls, sacrifice their communities instead. Were
the unlikely event of a supreme emergency to come to fruition, it seems that
both deontic and aretaic values would require this kind of communal
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martyrdom. It is only the type of utilitarianism imposed by threshold
deontology that can defend supreme emergencies or lesser evil cases more
broadly. Furthermore, it is a specific kind of utilitarianism that is biased
toward the interests of my political community over the interests of innocent
noncombatants from other communities; this is especially true in Walzer’s
paradigmatic case, the obliteration bombing campaign that England
undertook against Germany in WWII. There is nothing within either deontic
or aretaic frameworks that can justify supreme emergencies. 145 However, in
this case, aretaic concepts can enrich a deontological rejection of supreme
emergencies by explaining that if political leaders and their communities were
ever faced with such a situation, it would – at least – provide an opportunity
for the perfection of charity through martyrdom; not the type of “damned
martyrdom” that supreme emergency requires, but the genuine martyrdom
that comes from being willing to die rather than violate absolute moral laws.

4: Conclusion

Deontologically-focused, rights-based just war theories can be enriched by
including considerations of aretaic notions. I began by identifying what rightsbased theories understand war rights to be. They consist largely in basic rights
(viz valid claims to those things necessary as foundations of human survival
and wellbeing) and in liberty-rights to defend basic rights. Importantly, they
also include obligations not to violate those rights when they are held by

For a sophisticated and comprehensive rejection of Walzer’s concept of supreme
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others. I compared three of the major rights-based just war theorists alive
today: Rodin, McMahan, and Walzer as they approach the topic of the ‘right’
of soldiers to kill their enemies during wartime. I argued that, despite
differences between their approaches, each was unified in considering moral
status to be the most important moral concept. By contrast, I argued that
intention is far more significant in the moral discussion of killing than moral
status. Indeed, a sophisticated and coherent understanding of intention
dissolves many of the disagreements between these status-based approaches.

For this reason, I defended an intention-based approach based in DDE. That
view contends that one may never intentionally violate the rights of another,
but if another person loses something integral to their flourishing (say, life) as
a side-effect of my just action (practicing my liberty-right to self-defence), such
an action may be just. After determining precisely what rights-based theorists
understood war rights to be, I identified three reasons for the appeal of rights
to JWT: (i) they offer a powerful defence of the absolute value of individuals;
(ii) they are an effective means from which to develop an enforceable law of
war; and, (iii) they are easily applied universally.

The subsequent section focused on two cases (torture, and lesser evil cases)
within military ethics where a strictly deontic approach, although not
incoherent, presents a very narrow reading of those phenomena. The section
advanced the thesis that incorporating aretaic notions allows JWT to recognise
a much broader range of morally significant factors in those cases, including
considerations of psychological wellbeing, the virtue of the agent, how his
character can be changed by his deeds, and supererogatory actions. Arete can
187

exist helpfully alongside a deontological moral framework, and in fact, must
be considered because of the importance of intention to deontology, and the
subsequent importance of virtue, character and moral psychology to intention.

Arete captures ideas which go beyond the purview of rights-based concerns
and can help to explain the functions of character, motive, intention, and
supererogation within military ethics. Furthermore, insofar as these notions
explain the connection between moral judgements and identity (which will be
addressed in more detail in the following chapter), they can prove useful role
models for people to aspire to when contemplating their futures in their
chosen professions.
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Chapter Four

War and Excellence

In the previous chapter I established some ways in which aretaic notions could
enrich and expand deontological responses to particular issues in military
ethics. The general focus was on how sensitivity to moral virtue and character
could enhance deontological, rights-based explanations of torture and “lesser
evil” scenarios. I further argued that arete and deon are most useful when
discussed as complementary, bridged by the concept of intention. Whereas
the last chapter concerned virtue and character, in this chapter I explore war’s
relation to moral and psychological wellbeing, concepts that – rather than
enhancing existing discussions in military ethics – actually extend the breadth
of the subject to include areas that are not traditional avenues of inquiry. Not
only are these areas relatively untouched by deontological just war theories,
but they are areas in which reaching an adequate moral understanding
enhances the good that military ethics is able to do for all its stakeholders:
political leaders, warriors, military families, and noncombatants alike.

In this chapter I focus on two new and beneficial insights into the morality of
war provided by discussion of wellbeing. The first will deal with how virtues
of character can help reduce the temptation for soldiers to commit atrocities
in war such as the killing of noncombatants or the inhumane treatment of
enemy combatants. Not only is preventing atrocities a matter of justice, but
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insofar as perpetrators tend to suffer psychologically for their crimes, it is a
matter of aretaic importance that such crimes are prevented. In the second
section I explore the various challenges the psychological trauma inflicted by
war pose to wellbeing, especially as they have manifested in military
personnel from Australia and the United States. This includes not only
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), but also feelings of guilt, regret, shame,
displacement, fragmentation, and so on – what some theorists call “moral
injuries.”1 Although I focus on wellbeing in soldiers, this is not to suggest that
these issues apply to soldiers exclusively. There is necessary work to be done
exploring how the flourishing of civilians, political leaders, and military
commanders can be affected by war. However, this is beyond the scope of this
chapter.

1: Honour and Warrior Identity

In the first section of this chapter I explore the question of preventing moral
transgressions, here understood as violations of deontological limitations of
the ethics of war outlined by rights-discourse. At the same time I critically
explore two of the major figures in aretaic military ethics today. This new and
growing field is largely interested in how best to assist soldiers in reconciling
their professional roles with the idea of living a morally good life. That is, how
to assist soldiers in shielding their humanity whilst traversing the moral (and
sometimes literal) minefield of war. Christopher Toner calls this the “shield

Nancy Sherman & Philip Adams, ‘The untold costs of moral injury in war’, ABC Late Night
Live, 24th April, 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/latenightlive/anzacday/4648634>.
1
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approach,”2 to be contrasted with the “sword approach.” Whilst the sword
approach is concerned with how soldiers can justifiably kill in times of war
(thus serving as an offensive application of military ethics, of which the
deontological theories discussed in the last chapter are instances), the shield
approach aims to protect soldiers’ characters from the killings that they are
required to perform and prevent those killings from escalating to the level of
atrocity.

Two prominent examples of this approach are those of Nancy Sherman and
Shannon E. French. Sherman argues that the inculcation of empathy within
soldiers – empathy for the plight and humanity of noncombatants, enemy
soldiers, and colleagues – is the best way for soldiers to guard themselves
against committing atrocities. However, empathy will only be helpful in
contexts in which the potential atrocity victim is the type of person with whom
it is possible to empathise, meaning it will not always be an appropriate means
of guarding against atrocity.

French, on the other hand, argues that appealing to an internally developed
and regulated “warrior code” of honour provides soldiers with an internalised
set of beliefs about the type of things that soldiers should and should not do.
I believe that both arguments capture different elements of how an aretaic
approach can help prevent atrocities. I argue, pace French, that a code of

Christopher Toner, ‘Military Service as a Practice: Integrating the Sword and Shield
Approaches to Military Ethics’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 5, no. 3, 2006, 183-200. Toner in
turn borrows the term from Shannon E. French, who firsts uses the term “shield” to describe
her approach to military ethics. C.f. Shannon E. French, The Code of the Warrior, (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 242.
2
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honour internal to a warrior culture3 can be problematic, and can sometimes
facilitate the committing of atrocities.

A better approach is one that encourages warriors to act in ways informed by
the same virtues (including Sherman’s “empathy”) that inform them when
they are at home. Thus, a soldier could conceivably restrain himself from
intentionally killing noncombatants by seeing those actions as contributing to
his character in a way that would be detrimental not only to being an excellent
warrior4 (as French argues is the case), but also to being an excellent father,
son, teacher, friend, and so on. In developing this approach I draw on
examples from the history of warfare and fictional literature. I do not pretend
that my approach will necessarily be easy to implement, or that every soldier
will implement it. I do, however, argue that this approach, which synthesises
French’s and Sherman’s views, would be more effective at reducing the
commission of atrocities.

1.1: Nancy Sherman’s Neo-Stoicism

When Nancy Sherman began teaching future midshipmen at the United States
Naval Academy, Annapolis, she found that of all the philosophical systems

French does not define the term “warrior culture.” I take her to mean the set of collective
values, history, and identity which the military community develop amongst themselves.
4 In this discussion I use the terms ‘soldier’ and ‘warrior.’ I will use warrior when referring
to either (i) warfighters in an age before the existence of professional militaries, or (ii) the
archetypal image of a warfighter as imagined by French’s warrior code. I will use the term
‘soldier’ to describe members of a professional military force. When the term ‘warrior’ is
used, it should be taken to include within it the notion of the professional soldier.
3
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presented to the students in her ethics classes, including Kant, Mill, and
Aristotle, it was the Stoicism of Epictetus that most resonated with military
men and women.5 “[W]hatever is good,” the Stoics held, “must benefit its
possessor under all circumstances.”6 Goodness cannot be subject to luck of
circumstance, or be external to the agent. Therefore, the Stoics held, only
“characteristic excellences or virtues of human beings”7 qualify as genuine
goods. From this flows the Stoic claim that emotional responses – joy, sorrow,
fear, anger, jealousy, pride – to external things (for instance, the behaviour of
others, random acts of nature, or unforeseen consequences) are merely false
judgements about good and evil. If I feel anger because my enemy acts
unjustly, then I have falsely believed that his actions somehow affect me in
some morally significant way. In reality, the Stoics claim, only my own choices
– be they virtuous or vicious – can be of moral significance to me. The person
who recognises this and frees himself from emotional attachment attains a
sage-like “indifference” to external factors.8

The Stoic claim that the sage should free himself of moral and emotional
attachment to those things over which he has no control provides warriors
with the assurance that, though the fog of war is often thick, their moral
commitments extend only as far as their autonomy, as Sherman explains in
the following passage:

Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors: The Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Mind, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.
6 Dirk Baltzly‘Stoicism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/#Eth>.
7 Ibid.
8 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, op cit., 3.
5
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A Marine may be killed in friendly fire that he had no way of avoiding; a sailor
may be deserving of decoration and promotion, though she is overlooked
because of gender prejudice that she alone can’t change; an adoring parent or
wife may receive a knock on a door from uniformed Marines, who begin, “We
regret to inform you…” The circumstances may be beyond our control, but
ultimately what affects us for good or ill are only our own judgements about
them.9

Stoicism, as the passage above suggests, provides soldiers with psychological
armour from the potential cruelties of fate and chance by helping them see
that luck and circumstance contribute nothing to the soldier’s own moral
wellbeing. Although Sherman understands the appeal of Stoicism to her
students, and sees a great deal of benefit in much of its teaching, she herself
recommends a modified form of Stoicism, one that avoids the pitfall of
“minimiz[ing] human vulnerability.”10 Sherman suggests that the military
requires a Stoicism that validates people’s emotional reactions to morally
serious events. For instance, Sherman argues that experiencing grief is a
legitimate expression of the fact that I have lost someone I love despite the loss
being outside of my control. (Indeed, as Sherman notes, not to grieve in such
situations may indicate something deficient in one’s moral character.)11 Her
point is that feelings of love, camaraderie, loyalty, and friendship are not
merely pathological attachments, but morally good and virtuous experiences.
For instance, it is right that soldiers feel a certain kind of righteous anger in

Ibid.
Ibid., 2.
11 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, op cit., 133.
9

10
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response to injustice, grief in response to the loss of a comrade, and so forth. 12
Sherman opines that:

[W]e can learn from Stoicism without embracing its strict letter. We can learn
that in the midst of our grieving, we still have a home in the world, connected to
others whose fellowship and empathy supports us, that we have inner resources
that allow us to stand again after we have fallen. This is the human side of
Stoicism that can toughen us without robbing us of our humanity.13

Although Sherman deviates from Stoicism at many points, it is in her
approach to empathy that Sherman draws most upon the classical theory. The
Stoics emphasised the importance of showing respect for fellow human beings
because each possesses the faculty of reason, which echoes the divine reason
(logos).14 The only way to foster that respect, according to both the Stoics and
Sherman, is by generating genuine empathy for other human beings “through
exercises in imagination: to heighten empathy by becoming others for a
moment, to trade places and become the victim.”15 Not only does empathy
serve to develop the respect that is owed to all people, it serves to temper other
emotions like anger and vengeance by fostering respect for those at whom one
is angry.16 Furthermore, kinship, camaraderie and loyalty are central concepts
in the military ethos, and all of them require concern for more than one’s own
soul; that is, an empathetic connection with others. For Sherman, empathy is

See: Ibid., 71-73 on anger; on grief, see 136-149.
Nancy Sherman, ‘Educating the Stoic Warrior, Whitehall Papers, vol. 61, iss. 1, 2004, 105-126
at 109-110.
14 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, op cit., 169; C.f. Marcus Aurelius trans. Maxwell Staniforth,
Meditations, (Victoria: Penguin Books, 2004), Book V, Para. 27.
15 Ibid., 177; C.f. ‘Educating the Stoic Warrior’, op cit., 111-112.
16 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, op cit., 171.
12
13
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the key to “loosening the Stoic armour.”17 Empathy and respect allow us to
gauge whether our outwardly-directed emotions are accurate representations
of events or false beliefs; whether our grief is legitimate, our anger righteous,
or our loyalty justified.

Empathy also informs Sherman’s approach to military ethics education. Given
that empathy (i) allows soldiers to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate emotions; (ii) underpins the respect owed to others; and, (iii)
checks against the irrational employment of base human desires (for example,
wrath against those who have killed a comrade), the fostering of empathy is a
priority for military educators. This is noted in Sherman’s appraisal of the
atrocities committed in 2004 at Abu Ghraib prison, Iraq. A case in which US
soldiers, who subjected detainees to cruel and degrading treatment such as
forced nudity, sexual assault, and sleep deprivation, demonstrated a clear
failure to be empathetic.

Military leaders, bound by the humanitarian laws of the Geneva Conventions,
have a moral mandate to try to make [the Conventions] serviceable. Indeed, all
soldiers, in swearing to uphold the Geneva Conventions, have indirect moral
duties to cultivate the imaginative skills that underlie a capacity for the empathy
necessary for dignitary respect [the respect generated through empathy].18

C.f. Nancy Sherman, The Untold War: Inside the Hearts, Minds, and Souls of Our Soldiers,
W.W. Norton, New York, 2010, 171-193.
18 Ibid., 177.
17
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Sherman’s focus on empathy as a means of generating respect is compelling
as a means of preventing atrocities committed against noncombatants.
Empathy – imagining what it would be like to be another person - reveals to
us the fundamental humanity of other people. Sherman argues that “we must
imagine what it is like to be another with her distinctive temperaments and
talents, in her situation and circumstances, living her life with her life
choices.”19 One can see how this would be an effective means of preventing
atrocities from being committed against the innocent, but what happens when
our imaginative experiment reveals a thoroughly corrupt, abusive character
who has committed serious crimes against us? That is, will empathy serve as
an effective deterrent from wrath and violence against one’s genuine enemies? In
Homer’s epic, the Iliad, Achilles’ wrath against Hector is such that empathy
seems impossible to him. Against Hector’s (reasonable) request that the victor
of their combat return the slain body to his people, Achilles reveals his
inability to empathise with the man who has done the “unforgiveable” in
killing his dear friend, Patroclus.

Hector, stop!
You unforgiveable, you… don’t talk to me of pacts.
There are no binding oaths between men and lions –
Wolves and lambs can enjoy no meeting of the minds –
They are bent on hating each other to the death.20

Sherman, ‘Educating the Stoic Warrior’, op cit., 112-113.
Homer, trans. Robert Fagles, The Iliad, Penguin Books, Victoria, 1998, Book 22, lines 308312.
19
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After successfully killing Hector, Achilles allows the Greek army to stab at his
body before lacing his corpse to a chariot and dragging it around the city of
Troy as Hector’s family look on. Not only does Achilles reject Hector’s request,
but he does the exact opposite.

Perhaps Achilles is a good example of what might happen when we fail to
encourage soldiers to empathise with their enemies prior to going to war. If
Achilles’ training had been directed toward empathy and respect, perhaps he
would have returned Hector’s body to Priam. After all, “to whom we show
[…] respect is a matter of cultivated habit as well as calculated decision.”21
Thus, it might be argued that the development of empathy serves as a check
against the wrathful fury seen in Achilles.

Here we are reminded of the continuing interaction between aretaic and
deontological concepts within the morality of war. Although there existed
strong deontological prohibitions on dishonourable conduct such as the
desecration of corpses, the existence of these laws does not prove sufficient to
restrain Achilles when his emotions run hot. In these moments, Sherman
contends, what may serve to stay Achilles’ hand is something intrinsic to
Achilles himself. That is, a disposition of character which might retain its
relevance even when external norms and rules are disregarded. Thus, the
morally upstanding soldier will require a set of particular traits of character
that will inspire morally upstanding conduct even when it is difficult or
unlikely. Exactly what traits those are will be discussed in chapter five, but it
is important to note here that adhering to morally binding norms in

21

Sherman, Stoic Warriors, op cit., 177.
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extraneous circumstances will require virtuous character traits such as, for
Sherman, empathy.

Despite the arguments in favour of empathy, Sherman’s desire to allow
soldiers to express emotions and vulnerability whilst simultaneously
retaining self-control and empathy is not without difficulties. Aristotle argued
that virtue was always the mean between two vices22 – in the case of anger,
‘righteous anger’ might be described as the mean state between rage (or wrath,
the emotion Homer attributes to Achilles at the beginning of the Iliad), and
apathy. For Aristotle, anger can be a virtuous state, and indeed, it is this
moderated approach that Sherman advocates,23 suggesting that soldiers might
rightly feel angry at the death of a comrade. Achilles, this line of argument
would suggest, exceeds the mean, allowing his anger to turn to rage, wrath
and vengefulness. Thus, he subjects his character to vice. Soldiers are expected
(perhaps encouraged) to feel “righteous anger” toward injustices, and at the
same time empathy toward those who committed the injustices; to feel angry,
but not too angry; empathetic enough to recognise the seriousness of their
killing, but not so empathetic as to make such killing impossible. However, to
have anger and empathy co-exist harmoniously in the psyche is
psychologically demanding. In the context of a limited period of military
training before soldiers are deployed, forming characters capable of such
emotional complexity may not be practically possible.

22
23

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 6, 1106b8-23.
Sherman, Stoic Warriors, op. cit., 71-73.
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Furthermore, not all enemies are as honourable as Hector. Some soldiers, such
as Amon Goeth, commandant of the Krakow-Plaszow concentration camp –
who enjoyed shooting camp detainees for sport (as depicted by Ralph Fiennes
in Schindler’s List) – or Sergeant Bob Barnes from Platoon (1986) – who kills a
fellow Sergeant with whom he disagrees, orders the killing of Vietnamese
civilians, and tortures subordinates who question his authority – appear
increasingly barbaric the more deeply one understands their character.
Empathetic imagination of a corrupt character may not reveal a human whose
rights should never be violated, but rather a defective character who, in the
eyes of the viewer, deserves to be destroyed. Sherman is correct in arguing
that empathy is a powerful shield against committing atrocities against
noncombatants, but it may struggle to be as effective in preventing their
commission against enemy combatants, particularly those who one knows or
has judged to be genuinely dishonourable and vicious, and therefore
undeserving of empathy.

Sherman’s Stoic account argues that empathy develops the type of respect that
should be afforded unconditionally. However, if empathy reveals a person
who appears to deserve death, rather than one who demands respect, it seems
unlikely to guarantee the same assurances against moral transgression as it
does against noncombatants (who are, presumably, unlikely to appear so
morally bankrupt as to deserve to be killed). Thus, we need to look further for
effective shields against the commission of atrocities to supplement empathy
in times when it becomes elusive.
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1.2: Shannon E. French’s Warrior Code of Honour

The other major contribution to the shield approach can be found in Shannon
E. French’s book The Code of the Warrior. French, also writing whilst training
future midshipmen at Annapolis, argues that warrior cultures, scattered
historically and geographically, have developed “codes of honour” or
“warrior codes:” commonly held standards of what the ideal warrior does and
does not do that bears normatively on each warrior within the culture.24 These
normative bearings go well beyond the deontic requirements of the Law of
Armed Conflict; rather, they entail what it is to be a warrior. Warrior codes,
French contends, ensure that morally upstanding and honourable conduct is
intertwined with the warrior’s identity.

In HBO’s feudalistic fantasy series Game of Thrones, Jaime Lannister, one of the
finest swordsmen in the land, describes memories of when he first watched
his mentor, Barristan Selmy, the greatest warrior in the kingdom, fight in
battle: “He was a painter. A painter who only used red. I couldn't imagine
being able to fight like that. Not back then.”25

Jaime awards Sir Barristan esteem on the basis of his being a graceful and
efficient killer. However, Barristan is also an anointed knight and the
Commander of the Kingsguard. He is a man who is seen as honourable and

French, The Code of the Warrior, op cit., 3.
HBO, Game of Thrones, ‘A Man Without Honour’, Season 2, Episode 7, Directed by David
Nutter, written by George R.R. Martin, D.B. Weiss & David Benioff.
24
25
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upstanding throughout the fictional kingdom of Westeros; at one point he is
told before the King’s full court that “no man here could ever question your
honour.”26 That Jaime awards him esteem only on the basis of his
swordsmanship speaks volumes about what Jaime honours in a warrior, and
subsequently of Jaime’s own character as a person and honour as a knight.
Barristan’s nobility lies not only in his skill as a killer, but in his virtue.

Modern-day warriors (soldiers) are also expected to be more than just
proficient killers, they are expected to be morally upstanding, virtuous people.
Such figures represent the ideal to which every budding soldier should aspire.
Jaime Lannister, by contrast, is seen as a man bereft of honour. Also a member
of the Kingsguard, he killed the King he was sworn to defend during a
revolution, and for this he is shunned. Knights – especially Kingsguard –
simply do not breach their vows. In killing the King, Jaime betrays his own
identity as a knight, and, in undermining the code of chivalry itself, betrays
all his fellow knights as well. It is no matter that Jaime’s motivation for killing
the King was to save the population of a city he threatened to burn down; even
if the King needed to die, the chivalric code stipulates that it should not have
been Jaime that killed him. Knights, the chivalric code suggests, swear oaths
of fealty, and good knights follow such oaths to the death.

At one point, Jaime laments the number of vows he is forced to take, and the
fact that they occasionally contradict each other: “So many vows. They make
you swear and swear. Defend the King, obey the King, obey your father,

HBO, Game of Thrones, ‘You Win or You Die’, Season 1, Episode 7, Directed by Daniel
Winahan, written by D.B. Weiss & David Benioff.
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protect the innocent, defend the weak. But what if your father despises the
King? What if the King massacres the innocent?”27 What Jaime forgets is that
the vows a knight makes are not only to specific ways on conducting oneself,
but are reflective of more deeply-seated virtues: courage, loyalty, benevolence,
justice, empathy and so on. The moral commitments of a knight extend far
beyond the specific deontic regulations he vows to adhere to, the
commitments extend to being a particular type of person. In a word, chivalrous.
French contends that the modern day soldier is also governed by a code to
which all warriors, professional or not, are expected to hold faithful to. In The
Code of the Warrior, she refers to an incident in which a Marine refrains from
killing a noncombatant after receiving the simple rebuke, “Marines don’t do
that.”

“Marines don’t do that” is not merely shorthand for “Marines don’t shoot
unarmed civilians; Marines don’t rape women; Marines don’t leave Marines
behind; Marines don’t despoil corpses,” even though those firm injunctions and
many others are part of what we might call the Marines’ Code. What Marines
internalize when they are indoctrinated into the culture of the Corps is an
amalgam of specific regulations, general concepts (e.g. honour, courage,
commitment, discipline, loyalty, teamwork), history and tradition that adds up
to a coherent sense of what it is to be a Marine.28

The warrior code ensures that honourable, chivalrous, and virtuous conduct
is an intrinsic aspect of what it means to be a warrior. French opens her book

HBO, ‘A Man Without Honour’, op cit.
French, The Code of the Warrior, op cit., 15. French’s story comes from Mark Osiel, Obeying
Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers,
1999), 25. Original emphasis.
27
28
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by tracing her students’ distinctions between warriors, murderers, killers,
fighters, victors and conquerors. What divides them, her students contend, is
the explicitly moral focus of the warrior.29 This distinction is a central one for
anybody interested in military ethics. If “war is hell,” and it so often is, soldiers
are asked to walk through hell without becoming demons. This requires
warriors to be able to distinguish themselves from murderers, killers, and
other pejorative labels that threaten to undermine the moral justifications for
their deeds. To remain so distinguished, French contends that warriors “must
learn to take only certain lives in certain ways, at certain times, and for certain
reasons. Otherwise, they become murderers and will find themselves
condemned by the very societies they were created to serve.”30 A central part
of the warrior code – perhaps the primary purpose of that code – is to prevent
warriors from becoming mere murderers. French observes the fall from
soldier to murderer in the Iliad, when Achilles surrenders to his rage in
desecrating the body of Hector and, in another instance, kills prisoners when
previously he would have accepted ransom in exchange for their lives. 31
Achilles is now a shell of a man, bent on revenge; in dragging Hector’s dead
body around Troy he offends not only Trojans but the gods. Once Greece’s
greatest warrior Achilles becomes little more than an animal, as Apollo
explains to the other gods.

That man without a shred of decency in his heart…
his temper can never bend and change – like some lion

French, The Code of the Warrior, op cit., 1-2.
Ibid., 3.
31 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Ruin of Character, (New York:
Scribner, 1994), 29-30.
29
30
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going his own barbaric way, giving in to his power,
his brute force and wild pride, as down he swoops
on the flocks of men to size his savage feast.
Achilles has lost all pity! No shame in the man.32

French’s interest in the warrior code is focused largely on the prevention of
atrocities; not only because they entail horrific abuses of the innocent, but also
because in committing them, soldiers begin to erode their own humanity. “A
warrior’s humanity is most obviously at risk when he participates in an
atrocity. Vile actions such as rape, the intentional slaughter of civilians, or the
torture of prisoners of war dehumanize the victims and degrade the
perpetrators.”33 Here, again, the potential interaction of deontological and
aretaic ethics is revealed. The commission of moral transgressions is
undesirable for two reasons. First, because of the intrinsic wrongness of the
act vis-à-vis the harm it does to the victim, and secondly, because of the
detrimental effects on the perpetrator’s moral and psychological wellbeing.

Understanding how the warrior code serves to restrain soldiers against
morally transgressing requires understanding a key point of French’s
conception of the warrior code: that the code itself is determined by warriors
from within the warrior culture, and therefore atrocities are prevented by fear
of being shamed before one’s fellow warriors. She argues that “[t]he code is

Homer, The Iliad, op cit., Book 24, 47-52. For French’s analysis, see: French, The Code of the
Warrior, op cit., 48-52; and ‘Sergeant Davis’ Stern Charge: The Obligation of Officers to
Preserve the Humanity of Their Troops’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 8, iss. 2, 2009, 116-126
at 119.
33 French, The Code of the Warrior, op cit., 121-122.
32
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not imposed from the outside. The warriors themselves police strict adherence
to these standards, with violators being shamed, ostracized, or even killed by
their peers.”34 The reason for warrior codes (there are many different codes, as
French’s work shows) being developed by the warriors themselves is because
an internally developed code assented to by peers has a more powerful
binding force than externally imposed rules. Thus, the warrior code echoes the
sentiments of Bernard Williams’ essay, ‘Internal and External Reasons.’

[N]o external reason statement could by itself offer an explanation of anyone’s
action […] The whole point of external reason statements is that they can be true
independently of the agent’s motivations. But nothing can explain an agent’s
(intentional) actions except something that motivates him so to act. Something
else is needed besides the truth of the external reason statement to explain action,
some psychological link.35

The warrior code provides a framework through which soldiers internalise
the norms that govern their conduct. Military education should seek to help
soldiers “internalize an appropriate warriors’ code that will inspire [them] to
recognize and reject a criminal direction from [their] officer,”36 such as an
order to commit an atrocity, violate Laws of Armed Conflict, or betray their
identity as soldiers.

Ibid., 3.
Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’ in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 19731980, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 107.
36 French, The Code of the Warrior, op cit., 14.
34
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In A Few Good Men (1992), two US Marines are commanded to carry out a
“code red:” an extrajudicial punishment of a fellow Marine, who is killed in
the process. Although they are found innocent because they were ordered to
do so, they are still dishonourably discharged for “conduct unbecoming a
United States Marine.”37 However, one could reasonably expect a more
coherent sense of “what it means to be a Marine,” one which incorporated
virtues like Sherman’s empathy, to have empowered these soldiers to reject
the code red order to begin with.

The warrior code French is concerned with is centrally focussed on the
motivating power of honour. Honour, Whitley Kaufman notes, is concerned
with two things: esteem by one’s peers, and the traits which warrant that
esteem.

[T]he term “honour” has long been recognized as having two distinct senses, one
external and one internal. In the “external” sense, honour refers to the esteem,
approval, or rewards bestowed by society on an individual. But a prior and
arguably more fundamental meaning of honour is the “internal” standards of
behaviour that merit such approval or esteem.38

This is to say that soldiers who are genuinely concerned with honour are not
merely pursuing popularity via the appearance of excellence from their peers;

Castle Rock Entertainment, A Few Good Men, 1992, Directed by Rob Reiner, Written by
Aaron Sorkin.
38 Whitley Kaufman, ‘Understanding Honour: Beyond the Guilt/Shame Dichotomy’, Social
Theory and Practice, vol. 37, no. 4, 2011, 557-573 at 559.
37
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rather, they are concerned with becoming the type of person who their peers
consider to be morally praiseworthy and laudable. Similarly, Daniel Putnam
explains the Aristotelian view that “[s]omeone who tried to look good without
genuine achievement in action was not virtuous,” adding that “[t]his is
equally true today.”39 Thus, the focus on honour is a focus on encouraging
soldiers to become – and to desire to become – characters of a particular sort.
The project of honour is for a community to instil and propagate as desirable
a particular way of living, being, and acting in the world which is morally
laudable.

However, French’s approach places a huge burden on the capacities of those
within a warrior culture to be morally reflective and intuitive. Internal
development, regulation and enforcement of a warrior code risks the
development of a breed of soldier whose only concern is becoming the type of
person who his peers will esteem. Although this may be effective when those
peers are aware and possessive of genuine moral virtues which they impose
on fellow soldiers, a different peer group may have values that differ from
those “imposed […] by some external source (such as a fearful civilian
population).”40 In a conflict between the warrior code and externally imposed
laws, which should trump the other?

In the final chapter of The Code of the Warrior, French asks whether modernday terrorists are warriors. Noting a swathe of possible justifications (or
rationalisations) of which these terror organisations might avail themselves,

Daniel Putnam, ‘In Defense of Aristotelian Honour’, Philosophy, vol. 70, no. 272, 1995, 286288 at 288.
40 French, The Code of the Warrior, op cit., 13.
39

208

French suggests, despite these, that “[h]owever they may justify their actions
to themselves, if they refuse to accept any rules of war, they forfeit the right to
be regarded as warriors by the rest of the world.”41 This suggests that the laws
of war should trump internally developed honour codes, but it is important
to ask why, if the warrior code is concerned with how one’s peers will evaluate
an action, it should matter whether the rest of the world considers me an
honourable warrior? It can only matter if the determination of what it means
to be a warrior is made with input not merely from the warrior class, but from
the community at large – including those with no experience of or familiarity
with military matters, but whom the military do claim to serve and represent.

Recall that Achilles, our archetypal perpetrator of atrocity, is described by
Apollo as having “no shame.” Jonathan Shay describes Achilles as
experiencing a “shrinking of the social moral and horizon,” which Shay argues
was also a contributing factor in the serious moral transgressions during the
Vietnam War.42 Achilles’ horizon shrinks so drastically that nobody is able to
shame him out of killing prisoners or desecrating Hector’s body. Achilles
enters what Shay calls the “berserk state in which abuse after abuse is
committed.”43 In the berserk state, soldiers feel a god-like sense of invincibility
coinciding with bestial desires for revenge and violence. 44 Importantly, the
berserker is “cut off from all human community.”45 In such a scenario, warrior
shame seems ineffective as a preventive measure. Notably, the causes of the
berserk state are varied: Shay lists “betrayal, insult, or humiliation by a leader;
death of a friend-in-arms; being wounded; being overrun, surrounded, or

Ibid., 238.
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trapped; seeing dead comrades who have been mutilated by the enemy; and
unexpected deliverance from certain death.”46 Given the broad spectrum of
potential catalysts of the berserk state, it seems likely that many soldiers will
be at risk of ‘berserking’ at some stage in their time at war. Significantly, there
appears to be nothing that warrior peers can do to restrain or prevent the
berserk state. Shay observes five instances of the berserk state in the Iliad, none
of which are checked by interventions from fellow warriors. Three are checked
by self-preservation (Agamemnon, Hector, and Patroclus), whilst another two
(Diomedes and Achilles) are checked by interventions by non-warriors, and it
is to these latter two examples that I now turn.

Shay suggests that the soldier in the berserk state experiences a profound
shrinking of the moral and social horizon. However, he does not seem cut off
from all human community; deep-seated relationships appear to remain,
particularly those which connect soldiers to their families and homes.
Diomedes, one of the Greeks’ greatest heroes, is snapped out of his berserk
state when he meets Glaucus, a Trojan warrior who challenges him to combat.
Glaucus tells Diomedes of his ancestry, at which point Diomedes realises that
his grandfather and Glaucus’ grandfather were friends, and thus declares
them “sworn friends from our fathers’ days till now.”47 Achilles too is snapped
from his berserk states by thoughts of home. When Priam visits him to beg for
the body of Hector to be returned, he implores Achilles, “remember your own
father! I deserve more pity… I have endured what no one on earth has ever
done before – I put to my lips the hands of the man who killed my son.”48 This
pitiful act and imploration “stir[s] within Achilles a deep desire to grieve for
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his own father”,49 and he weeps. Not for Patroclus, not for his soul or for
Hector, but for the shame of having chosen the warrior life, and thus giving
“no care” to his father in his old age.50 These scenarios present a compelling
argument for consistent reminders of home during war: they appear to be an
effective preventive from the commission of atrocities and the breaking of the
berserk state within which so many atrocities are committed.

1.3: Remembering the Home Front
By profession, I am a soldier and take pride in that fact.
But I am prouder, infinitely prouder, to be a father.51

If there is a problem in French’s approach to warrior codes, it is only a
potential problem, not an a priori one. French, teaching at Annapolis when she
wrote The Code of the Warrior, had good reason to expect that the warrior code
(or codes, as, for instance, the air force will have a different code to the navy
or army) of US soldiers had been developed and maintained by soldiers (or,
at least, officers) with a high level of ethical training and awareness. In such
an environment, there is a good chance that the warrior code in question will
reflect deeper moral truths. However, it is prudent to ask whether the warrior
class is always a morally competent cohort from which to think that a morally
acceptable warrior code might emerge. That is, whether a priori we would be
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wise to trust warrior communities to develop internally their own codes of
honour.

For example, in discussing the Samurai code known as Bushido, French
touches on the controversial self-disembowelment practice known as seppuku.
The Bushido code allows Samurai to perform the ritualistic suicide in order to
restore honour in the face of some disgrace (which may be, as French notes,
“anything from an overt act of cowardice in combat to a trivial […] breach of
etiquette at a formal dinner.”)52 She concedes that “there is at least a pragmatic
flaw in a system that could lead a warrior culture’s most courageous and
committed members to make the ultimate sacrifice to save, not land or lives,
but face.”53

The flaw deepens when it is realised that samurai would often be pressured
to perform the rite to atone for dishonour. One famous example comes at the
end of the Japanese epic Forty-Seven Ronin, when the “villain,” Kira, refuses to
perform the rite and is thus labelled a coward.54 In the shaming of those who
do not “opt in” to the commission of seppuku, we see that seppuku’s availability
as an honourable practice renders it the expected course of action. What is
honourable becomes normatively prescriptive. One need not (although I
believe there are good reasons for doing so) condemn the practice of seppuku
to question a culture in which people can be pressured into performing the
rite. Note that, unlike previous examples used in this thesis, Samurai is a
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decidedly non-Western warrior culture. Indeed, it is precisely the Asian
context of the Samurai code that explains why suicide as a form of atonement,
although extreme from a Western perspective, is justifiable and laudable.55
However, the tension between what a warrior culture expects as a matter of
honour and what morality demands a soldier to do is a problem which
transcends cultural barriers.

The example of seppuku can be used to emphasise a point which I believe to be
pivotal to explorations of honour in the military. When warriors (soldiers
included) are concerned only with achieving the type of esteem valued by
their peers, the ability of the broader society to influence military practice is
undermined. For instance, when Okudaira Tadamasa (a 17th century samurai)
died, one of his vassals followed him in junshi – an extension of seppuku
whereby vassals of a samurai would follow him into death by committing
seppuku out of fealty – which was outlawed at the time. In response, the
vassal’s children were executed and his remaining family exiled.56 This vassal
clearly felt that his commitments to the military and the warrior code greatly
outweighed his commitments to his family (whom, we must assume, he knew
would be punished). It seems as though some warrior codes can become
insensitive to morally significant factors outside of the warrior culture.
Although the Samurai culture was concerned with the preservation of “face”,
or reputation, it appears that warrior codes, including the Samurai, tend only
to be interested in face vis-à-vis their warrior peers, not to society as a whole.
As Paul Robinson notes:The four virtues of prowess, courage, loyalty, and
truthfulness form the unchanging core of military honour [...] Many societies create
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formal codes of behaviour which prescribe how to display the approved virtues.
Unfortunately, in yet another complication, this means that honour can derive from
rigid obedience of the code even when it is unhelpful or even clearly wrong.57

This, to my mind, is the flaw of internally developed warrior codes; in reality,
one’s status, commitments, and normative demands as a soldier do not
outweigh one’s moral obligations as a father, husband, mother, or wife. For
example, a father may go to war and serve as a soldier with all the duties and
moral responsibilities this entails whilst seeing his soldiering as simply being
an extension of fathering: defending his children from harm. This concept is
captured by the remark attributed to General Douglas MacArthur at the
beginning of this section. Thus, warrior codes would be well-served by
expanding their standards to incorporate what would be considered shameful
in other walks of life, not only in a military context.

Indeed, in an article surveying a number of different examples of military
honour, Ted Westhusing finds only one to be a true representation of honour.
The rest, he argues, are “false philosophy.” The model of honour that
Westhusing sees as the truest representation of genuine military honour is that
of General Lee at Gettysburg. What motivated Lee at Gettysburg was not only
his warrior pride and peers, but his identity as a Virginian and his relationship
with the land on which he fought.58 It was as much Lee’s closeness with his
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home, his family, and his heritage that motivated his conduct and sense of
honour as any military tradition.

Because the beliefs that animated his sense of honour were congruent with those
of his fellow Virginians, his military honour was Virginian honour. When such
congruency obtains between the beliefs animating the common life to be
defended by the warrior and the beliefs that inform the warrior’s own conception
of honour, ‘warrior honour’ appears to achieve its truest and most powerful
form.59

A similar, but perhaps more powerful demonstration of the power of nonmilitary sources of honour, esteem, and virtue can be found in Shakespeare’s
play, Coriolanus. In the play, Caius Marcius, a great Roman general is awarded
the title ‘Coriolanus’ for his military exploits against Rome’s enemies, the
Volsci, in taking the city of Corioles. His mother, Volumnia, with whom
Coriolanus is very close, encourages him to stand for election as consul.
Although initially successful, eventually Coriolanus’ disdain for the mob and
scepticism about the merits of democracy loses him the support of the people
and he is exiled from Rome. He joins with his mortal enemy Aufidius, the
Volscian general, and swears revenge against Rome. Together, Coriolanus and
Aufidius lay siege to Rome, which looks certain to fall. Coriolanus ignores the
pleas of Roman senators to lift the siege, seeking only vengeance, saying:

Wife, mother, child, I know not. My affairs
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Are servanted to others. Though I owe
My revent properly, my remission lies
In Volscian breasts.60

The pleas of the Senate having fallen on deaf ears, Coriolanus is visited by
those he “knows not,” his wife, mother, and son. His mother implores him to
consider what effect “making the mother, wife, and child […] see the son, the
husband and the father tearing his country’s bowels out”61 might have on
them. Coriolanus’ destruction of Rome would mean the death of his honour
as a Roman citizen, and his legacy “would be dogged with […] curses.”62
When such implorations are unsuccessful, Volumnia appeals beyond
Corolianus’ sense of warrior pride, which demands vengeance. She shows
how bartering a peace agreement between Rome and the Volsci will not only
uphold his honour as a soldier, but as a Roman, a son, a husband, and a father.
Finally, mother, wife and son all kneel before Coriolanus, and “shame him
with their knees.”63 Volumnia offers one final barb before turning to leave,
suggesting that the warrior Coriolanus has forgotten the commitments he held
to his mother as Caius Marcius.

Come, let us go.
This fellow had a Volscian to his mother.

William Shakespeare, Coriolanus, Act 5, Scene 2, 82-85 in John Jowett, William
Montgomery, Gary Taylor & Stanley Wells (eds.), The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works
(2nd edition), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
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His wife is in Corioles, and this child [his son]
Like him by chance.64

Here, Coriolanus, like Achilles before Priam, breaks into tears, noting that “it
is no little thing to make mine eyes to sweat compassion.”65 He concedes,
agreeing to broker a peace between Rome and the Volsci, but not before
ensuring that doing so will be accepted by his fellow warriors. He turns to
Aufidius and asks “were you in my stead would you have heard a mother
less, or granted less?”66

Although Coriolanus is swayed from vengeance by his mother, he also seeks
the validation of his martial peers. What he seeks is a route through which he
can fulfil what it means to be a good soldier alongside what it means to be a
good son, husband, father, and Roman. Being one at the cost of the other is –
as his mother shows him – insufficient. It is also worth remembering that
Volumnia is not ignorant of the pressing claims of the warrior code; indeed, it
was she who first sent Caius to war, “considering how honour would become
such a person.”67 Despite this, she recognises that what it means to be an
honourable man involves obligations to one’s family which cannot be
betrayed.
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What Coriolanus senses, and his mother confirms, is that, as Sir John Hackett
argued, “[w]hat the bad man cannot be is a good sailor, or soldier, or
airman.”68 When Coriolanus first lays eyes on his wife when he returns to
Rome at the head of the Volsci army, he informs her that “these eyes are not
the same I wore in Rome.”69 The loving eyes of Caius Marcius have been
replaced by the vengeful gaze of Coriolanus. But Coriolanus and Caius are the
same man. Whilst he tries to forget who he was before his vengeance, his
identity is bound up as much in his family as it is in the warrior code. The
Marine who abstained from killing a noncombatant on the basis that “Marines
don’t do that” was sharply reminded of what it is to be a Marine, however, he
may equally have been persuaded by the rebuke “what would your children
think?” Warrior often take their wars home with them, but they also take their
homes to war. Civilian identities can do as much to remind a warrior of what
is honourable as can any warrior code.

The above goes to show how a warrior’s non-warring (civilian) identity can
play a role in regulating his conduct by affecting his personal motivation for
performing, or not performing, a particular type of action. A warrior’s
motivation may not stem from a belief about what it means to be a soldier, but
what it means to be (for example) a parent. Thus, it becomes vitally important
that soldiers be encouraged to remember what they’ve left behind whilst at
war, that they not give themselves completely to the warrior identity.

Sir John Hackett, ‘The Military in Service of the State’ in M. Wakin (ed.), War, Morality, and
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Kwame Anthony Appiah argues that those concerned with honour dwell
within an “honour world,” and seek only the respect of those who live in the
same world.70 Thus, soldiers are only concerned with the opinions of other
soldiers. Perhaps this would be true if they lived only in one world. However,
most warriors seek the respect, honour and love of at least some people away
from the battlefield. They live in more than one honour world, and wish to be
respected in all of them. Paris, whose love for Helen sets in action the events
of the Iliad, flees the battlefield and hides in his room. His brother Hector
returns to berate him, but finds Paris already preparing to return to the fight,
persuaded not by a code of honour, but by Helen, whose “winning words urge
him back to battle.”71

The code of the warrior is a code of honour, and the desire for honour, as the
Iliad shows clearly, is not so far from pride and hubris. 72 In some situations, it
may be that honour is the cause for soldiers to commit atrocities, not a guard
against it. This, Sherman suggests, is what occurred when 24 civilians were
murdered by US troops in Haditha, Iraq, 2005, in response to one US soldier
being killed and two injured by a roadside improvised explosive device (IED).
Sherman argues that we should “see the events of Haditha through the lens of
traditional revenge and honour. The Haditha rampage took the form of a
reprisal raid, inspired by the US brigade experiencing the killing of one of their
own.”73 Honour can restrain, but it can also tempt. Thus, recalling that my
identity is larger than my role as a warrior – that I am my parents’ son, my
Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Honour Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen, (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2010), 20. A similar approach is offered by Christopher Toner, who interprets
the world inhabited by the soldier as a MacIntyrean practice. See: Christopher Toner, ‘The
Sword and Shield Approaches’, op cit.
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siblings’ brother, and so on – honour can also help moderate the passions
evoked by war. If I want to ensure my children are not raised by a murderer,
then I ought to avoid committing murder even in cases where my fellow
soldiers might forgive me for it.

To help prevent shame- or honour-inspired killings, two possibilities arise.
The first is to suggest that warrior codes become less segregated from the
community at large, and that they accept input from the rest of society on what
it means to be a virtuous soldier. In this sense, warrior codes would become
more transparent and avail themselves of evaluation by external groups who
would help determine whether or what benefit they offer society. If a code
facilitates character traits that are incompatible with that society, or is so
dominating on a person’s identity that soldiers are no longer able to serve
other social roles when not at war, external groups should be able to pressure
the military to stop condoning that code. Opening the military culture to
external scrutiny is appealing because of its transparency and responsiveness
to community demands, but it is problematic in that the military is not a
unitary organism that can quickly and univocally jettison a cultural identity
like the warrior code.

A second option is preferable because it maintains the internal development
of warrior codes, whilst also making such development sensitive to broader
social values. Warrior codes could introduce as archetypal role models not
only excellent warriors, but also morally upstanding citizens from various
walks of life. Further, those responsible for the education and training of
soldiers could begin to emphasise to students not only their warring identities,
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but their broader identities as citizens, friends, and family members. Such an
approach would valourise those virtues held in esteem by society more
broadly (even if not clearly relevant to military efficacy, such as Sherman’s
empathy, Aquinas’ charity, mercy, prudence, and so on), encouraging and
instilling those virtues in soldiers. In years to come it might be that such an
approach leads to a closer convergence between the person society deems
excellent and the person the military deems excellent. In later sections I will
show how this model of aretaic ethics helps to overcome some of the more
pressing moral-psychological challenges of the modern day military. This
exploration also shows how other aretaic models such as Sherman’s empathy
and French’s honour contribute to much-improved outcomes for those
involved in military practice.

The Iliad and Coriolanus are set in times when the soldier’s family was much
more closely connected to the honour world of the warrior than is common
today. Recall Coriolanus’ mother Volumnia, who sent him off to war once she
recognised the honour he might win there. Today, at least in the West, the
distance between soldiers and their families is much greater; wars are fought
a long way from home, and civilians live in relative safety. By contrast, the
soldier's life is one of danger and discipline. His mindset is not one the civilian
immediately understands any more. This is particularly difficult with certain
military values, and certain types of soldiers, for whom excellence and honour
qua soldier requires developing traits that are frowned upon in the context of
their other honour worlds. Sherman explores this difficulty with reference to
an interrogator, William Quinn, whose role requires him to acquire traits such
as deceit and exploitation of close relationships; traits that can undermine
wellbeing in civilian contexts.
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“Border passing” – that is, moving between civilian roles and the roles required
in uniform and in war – is neither morally nor psychologically simple. The
passage can subject both psychologically strong and morally good persons to
feelings of shame and remorse, as well as to traumatic symptoms. In Quinn’s
case, deception and betrayal, manipulation and exploitation, tools morally
questionable in ordinary transactions, had become standard tools of his
specialized trade. And this did not sit perfectly well.74

Not all struggles to adjust are so basic, but all represent the gaping difference
in civilian and military mindsets. Shay, for instance, describes the difficulties
soldiers have in participating in the democratic process at all, since it relies on
the idea of a passionate, safe struggle, “conducted within rules of safety and
fairness [which] simply doesn’t make sense to them or seems a hollow
charade.”75

One solution, which Sherman advocates, is that civilians become better
informed of the warrior ethos and psyche.76 However, another side of that
solution might be to encourage soldiers to remember, as best possible, the
person that they were before they went to war. It might also mean modifying
warrior codes to include civilian values and identities, or at least be consistent
with them. For example, recent sexual assault scandals amongst the military
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in the United States77 and Australia78 have led to a renewed interest in civilian
involvement in military culture. It might be that the increasing documentation
of re-entry difficulties soldiers face when returning to civilian life and the
increasing attention being paid to PTSD and suicide rates amongst veterans
warrants a similar interest, and it is to this topic that I now turn.

2: The Mind of the Warrior: Psychological Scars of Battle

Much has been made in both the United States and Australia of late regarding
the overwhelming damage done to soldiers by PTSD. For instance, in 2010 the
US Department of Veterans Affairs named June “PTSD Awareness Month,”
and the US Congress allocated June 27th as “PTSD Awareness Day;”79 in 2009
the Australian Department of Veterans’ Affairs commissioned an independent
study into suicide and mental healthcare in the military;80 and, in 2011 the
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Australian Centre for Military & Veterans’ Health completed its first research
report on PTSD.81

Many ethicists have argued that, as a matter of justice, governments should be
doing more to help veterans suffering from the ongoing damage caused by
the psychological scarring left by war. Joelle M. Abi-Rached, for example,
argues that reparation for psychological harms should be included in the postwar duties described in jus post bellum discussions.82 Further, a recent study
indicates that the children of Australian Vietnam War veterans face highly
elevated risk of committing suicide,83 and other studies indicate elevated risks
of suicide by veterans themselves, although the evidence is not yet
conclusive.84 Although this discussion, which aims at using empirical data to
demonstrate to governments why they are duty-bound to lend financial and
political assistance to suffering veterans and their families is helpful, it misses
what I believe to be a more pressing concern surround PTSD and combat
trauma. Specifically, understanding the moral significance of the trauma
inflicted in terms of moral wellbeing and the overall flourishing lives of
veterans, and how such harms can be prevented. That is, not to focus on the
psychological or empirical fallout that results as a consequence of the scarring
caused by war, but to more closely explore and understand the suffering itself.
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Specifically, this section aims to answer the question of how and why war can
shape and alter the character of soldiers in ways that have long-term
consequences for their wellbeing.
At first sight, this might seem like a task for psychologists, not ethicists.
However, examination of the 2013 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Health Disorders’ (DSM-5) explanation of PTSD reveals elements of the
condition which appear to be moral rather than psychological. Specifically,
Criterion D – “negative alterations in cognitions and mood” – lists as
symptoms of PTSD: “[p]ersistent distorted blame of self or others for causing
the traumatic event or for resulting consequences;” “[p]ersistent negative
trauma-related emotions (e.g., fear, horror, anger, guilt or shame);” and
“[f]eeling alienated from others (e.g., detachment or estrangement).”85

These symptoms are not necessarily limited to psychological causes, nor are
their treatments necessarily psychological. For example, misattributed guilt
can be a product of a misunderstanding of the difference between causal and
moral responsibility equally as much as it can be a product of atypical
cognitive or behavioural processing. Guilt and shame can be genuinely
accurate emotional evaluations of what one has done, and alienation may not
only be felt, but be genuine – soldiers are often alienated from their
communities after returning home.86 These are not false judgements or
inappropriate emotions, but real and accurate experiences of a difficult
phenomenon; that is to say that these experiences can be the normal responses
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, (5th
ed.), Washington D.C., 2013,
<http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/pages/dsm5_criteria_ptsd.asp>.
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of psychologically typical people. Treating such ailments may require a
combination of psychological and moral therapy, especially where the
causative factors include moral judgements. Furthermore, there is an aretaic
interest in describing this trauma as a setback to wellbeing. As Jonathan Shay
explains, “[a] person “broken” by combat has lost the capacity for […]
happiness.”87

The moral dimension of combat trauma is being increasingly recognised
within psychological and philosophical literature. Indeed, there is a growing
movement to distinguish between PTSD and “moral injury.” By moral injury,
these theorists refer to what Shay describes as “the soul wound inflicted by
doing something that violates one’s own ethics, ideals, or attachments.”88 This
type of injury is not, according to Shay, captured by the diagnosis of PTSD.
The growing interest in moral injury opens the door for philosophers to
explore and explain how moral concepts can contribute to understanding,
treatment and prevention of combat trauma-related psychological injuries. In
this section I endeavour to do so and argue that, for the most part, the relevant
philosophical concepts are aretaic in nature.

2.1: Moral Injury and PTSD: Diagnostic Differences

It will be helpful to begin by distinguishing PTSD from moral injury. This
section is informed by diagnostic differences between these two proposed
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forms of combat trauma. I use the word ‘proposed’ to reflect the fact that the
existence of moral injury as a diagnosis is not widely accepted; in fact, the
DSM-5 rejected the notion of including the term “injury” altogether in its
definition of PTSD).89 Whether or not PTSD and moral injury differ in terms
of diagnosis (and I believe they do), I explore how they differ
phenomenologically: they differ vis-à-vis the experience of the person
suffering from them. But first, it is worth exploring the diagnostic differences.

The DSM-5 lists eight separate criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, divided into
the following categories.90

A. Stressor (one required): Direct exposure to, directly witnessing, indirectly
learning of a loved one’s suffering of, or repeated/extreme exposure to the
aversive details of: death, threatened death, actual or threatened serious
injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence; directly witnessing
B. Intrusion Symptoms (two required): Event is persistently re-experienced
through: recurrent, involuntary, intrusive memories; traumatic nightmares;
dissociative reactions (flashbacks); intense or prolonged distress after
exposure to trauma-related reminders; or physiological reaction to traumarelated stimuli.
C. Avoidance (one required): Persistent avoidance of trauma-related reminders
or stimuli.
D. Negative alterations in cognitions and moods (two required): Inability to
recall features of event; persistent negative beliefs about the self or the world;

C.f. American Psychological Association, ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder’, American
Psychiatric Publishing, 2013,
<http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/PTSD%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>.
90 Adapted from U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, ‘DSM-5 Criteria for PTSD’, 2013,
<http://www.ptsd.va.gov/PTSD/professional/PTSD-overview/dsm5_criteria_ptsd.asp>.
89
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persistent distortion of blame on self or others for the event; persistent
negative trauma-related emotions; diminished interest in significant
activities; feelings of alienation; or inability to experience positive emotions
E. Alternations in arousal and reactivity (two required): Irritable and
aggressive behaviour; self-destructive or reckless behaviour; hypervigilance;
exaggerated startle response; concentration problems; or sleep disturbance.
F. Duration: Symptoms A-E persist for more than one month.
G. Functional Significance: Symptoms cause functional impairment
H. Attribution: Symptoms are not a product of substance abuse, medication or
some other illness.

There are important reasons for listing these in detail. First, to distinguish
them from the symptoms experienced by those who suffer moral injury; and
second, to provide a language through which to discuss the various
experiences of these conditions. PTSD essentially involves a traumatic event
which triggers judgements by the victim about one’s continuing safety. As
Shay notes, “no place is familiar enough to completely shed combat
vigilance.”91 Following the stressor, one is reasonably “on guard” for a period,
thus leading to a temporary state of hyperarousal. However, if a person is
unable to reconcile his experience with his other judgements and experiences,
this dissonance can lead to intrusions. Coincidentally, a continued state of
hyperarousal can generate judgements that the world is no longer a safe place,
and that one is continually at threat. This, in turn, leads to avoidance
strategies, feelings of helplessness, fear and alienation, and persistent
hyperarousal. At this point, one’s judgements about the safety of one’s
surroundings are disordered. The basic process is as follows:
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Figure 4 – Causal framework of PTSD

There are a number of similarities between PTSD and moral injury, such as
initial stressors, changed evaluations, and dissonance. What is different is the
way in which these manifest. It begins with a difference in the stressor: whilst
PTSD begins with experience or threatened experience of a violation of the
safety of myself or someone I love, moral injury begins with what Shay
describes as “betrayal of what’s right.”92 According to Brett T. Litz and his coauthors, who recently conducted a quantitative study into moral injury, moral
injury is created through “[p]erpetrating, bearing witness to, or learning about
acts that transgress deeply held moral beliefs and expectations.”93 Similarly,
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Brett T. Litz, Nathan Stein, Eilenn Delaney et. al., ‘Moral injury and moral repair in war
veterans: A preliminary model and intervention strategy’, Clinical Psychology Review, vol. 29,
2009, 695-706 at 700.
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Shay suggests that morally injurious events are ones that entail “(1) Betrayal
of what’s right; (2) by someone who holds legitimate authority […] (3) in a
high stakes situation.”94 These accounts, which notably do not require the
individual himself to be the perpetrator, echo the kind of experience Nancy
Sherman describes in an interview with Reservist Dereck Vines, during which
he talks about soldiers feeling “suckered.”

What Dereck Vines means by being suckered is that he feels duped, deceived,
toyed with by those in charge, to whom he has sworn fidelity and for whom he
has put his life on the line […] what fractures is the sense of betrayal, the feeling
of being abandoned, misled, unsupported, manipulated by those who have put
you in danger’s way.95

Shay suggests that a similar kind of betrayal occurs when certain groups of
soldiers are forced to take on more risk than others. He retells a story of a
Commanding Officer who “played favourites” when it came to the allotment
of dangerous missions.

Many aspects of the themis [concept of rightness] of the American soldiers cluster
around fairness. When they perceived that distributions of risk was unjust, they
became filled with indignant rage, just as Achilles was filled with menis,
indignant rage [at Agamemnon’s unjust taking of Briseis, a woman granted to
Achilles as a prize for having fought courageously in battle].96

Shay, ‘Moral Injury’, op cit., 59.
Sherman, The Untold War, op cit., 54-55.
96 Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, op cit., 12.
94
95

230

The description of moral injury is – we see – closely connected to a person’s
response to a transgression of a morally serious deontological norm. However,
what is noteworthy is not the fact of a moral transgression having occurred,
but that such a transgression may yield consequences on the character and
future wellbeing of transgressors and witnesses alike. That is, explaining what
constitutes immoral conduct – an enterprise deontological ethical theories are
very good at – is not enough to capture the important aretaic consequences of
that transgression. It is of moral importance vis-à-vis human wellbeing how
people are able to respond to their experiences committing, witnessing, or
being victim to moral transgression.

Whilst accepting Shay’s account of morally injurious events, I think it is also
necessary to add, (as the DSM-5 does) a criterion stipulating a certain
proximity to the event. I can witness betrayals of what is right by authorities
regarding matters I consider to be “high stakes” by reading them in the news,
watching them on the internet, or hearing about them in conversation. None
of these is likely to trigger the type of moral injury being described here unless
I have a particular interest or stake in what has occurred. This interest may
take the form of a personal relationship with a person involved, financial or
political stakes which may be affected by the decision, strong religious or
philosophical beliefs that are challenged by the betrayal, or some degree of
complicity in the betrayal itself. Without these factors (or something like
them), I am unlikely to suffer any psychological or moral damage from the
betrayal.
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So, moral injuries begin with a person’s direct experience of a betrayal of
“what’s right” by a legitimate authority. The betrayal “severely and abruptly
contradicts an individual’s personal or shared expectation about the rules,” a
contradiction of which the individual is aware, and thus causes the individual
inner conflict.97 From here, the individual begins to make attributions about
the nature of the world at large. If they are personally responsible for the
transgression, they may experience guilt and shame which alter their selfperceptions, causing “[m]aladaptive interpretations about stability (“this
event will forever define me) [...] and severe self-condemnation (“I am evil,”
“I am worthless,” “I can never forgive myself”).”98 These lead to ongoing
feelings of guilt and shame, feelings which the person seeks to escape by
avoiding reminders of the guilty or shameful event.99 Guilt and shame are
compounded by a lack of self-forgiveness (which is in part brought on by
withdrawal from opportunities to discuss the event with peers, therapists,
priests, etc.), eventually leading to intrusions (dreams, memories) and selfharm/self-punishment. Litz, Stein, Delaney et. al. provide the following causal
framework for moral injury:
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Figure 5 – Causal Framework for moral injury100

Note that Category E criteria (hyperarousal and reactivity), which featured in
Figure 4, are not symptomatic of moral injury.101 This reflects the fact that
whilst what is lost in PTSD victims is their sense of safety, “moral injury
destroy[s] the capacity for trust.”102 The type of judgement made here concerns
the moral nature of the world around me, and my own character. Whilst PTSD
victims see the world as unsafe, moral injury victims see it as untrustworthy,
capricious, amoral, or evil. Even worse, they can come to see themselves as
somehow bad, corrupt, or evil as a consequence of what they have done. This
kind of attribution error is radically different from that of PTSD, and therefore
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moral injury theorists present a compelling case as to why it should be treated
differently in a diagnostic sense.

2.2: Moral Injury and PTSD: Phenomenological Differences

What is it like to have PTSD, or moral injury? The primary difference lies with
the victim understands himself. In this section I explore the difference between
the PTSD “self as victim” experience, and the moral injury “self as judge”
experience.

Recall that PTSD is primarily a concern about one’s safety. It is a
misjudgement that assumes one’s environment is always a threatening place.
For soldiers, the war zone never ends, the enemy could be just around the
corner, and they must be ready to defend themselves. The experience of PTSD,
therefore, is an experience of perpetual victimhood (or potential victimhood).
It is a state of ongoing vulnerability to unseen others. This is why Shay argues
that PTSD tends to be typified by emotions like fear, horror and
helplessness,103 with fear being primary among them. The soldier is now
unable to lay down arms – he is continually prepared for combat to
spontaneously erupt. This explains why veterans will involuntarily drop to
the floor upon hearing a loud noise,104 refuse to drive the speed limit for fear
of being easy targets,105 and refuse to plan ahead for fear of becoming
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predictable.106 In Olivier Morel’s documentary On the Bridge, one veteran tells
the story of being stuck on a bridge in what he describes as “a perfect ambush
position.” Suddenly, he is back in a convoy in Iraq and is desperate to escape
the situation lest insurgents take advantage of his vulnerability.107 These
feelings of constant danger make it difficult for veterans to sleep for fear of
night attacks and it also makes surprising them a terribly unwise thing to do:
“co-workers of Vietnam combat veterans have learned that it is most unsafe
to approach these men unannounced from behind.”108

However, at the same time, veterans know that what they are experiencing is
atypical. Most non-veterans do not live in constant fear, and spontaneous
battle never breaks out. Thus, on top of this ongoing fear come feelings of
displacement and alienation. These feelings undermine belief in one’s own
sanity, until finally the victim either breaks down, or (hopefully) seeks help –
often unable to describe what he is going through in any more detail than “I
ain’t right.”109 Feelings of dissonance continue. Because the soldier’s
experiences confirm that the world as he knows it is unsafe, he must be
vigilant, but hypervigilance will also destroy his relationships, and eventually
his sanity. Over time, what began as judgements about the world begin to shift
into judgements about one’s own suitability to live in the world. It is no
surprise then that many veterans’ thoughts turn to suicide, not only as a
release, but as a “bottom line of human freedom”110 over which one retains
some control.
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By contrast, the victim of moral injury sees himself as judge: judge of his
world, of his actions, and of his character. This form of judgement usually (but
not always) surrounds feeling morally responsible for a betrayal of “what’s
right.” On other occasions, where it is genuinely a case of one having simply
witnessed, without any involvement, such a betrayal (for instance, one objects
to an order to kill a noncombatant, but it is carried out by somebody else), one
may be morally injured in coming to see the world as untrustworthy. Whilst
all forms of moral injury can be devastating to a person’s wellbeing, this latter
form involves a loss of trust in other people which can hopefully be overcome
through the victim directly experiencing instances during which people act
kindly, reliably, and honestly in their interactions with him (this may be
another of the “protective factors” identified in Figure 5).

More serious, to my mind, are those injuries that “deteriorate […] character
[and by which] ideals, ambitions, and attachments begin to change and
shrink.”111 These seem to occur primarily in cases where one passes judgement
on oneself. It should also be noted that the judgements that soldiers make in
these cases are false. They commit misattribution error by taking one immoral
event (admittedly, a very serious one) as defining permanently the moral
character of oneself and the world, as though forgiveness or redemption were
wholly impossible. Thus, witnessing transgression, and therefore not having
perpetrated any moral offense, is less morally perilous than when one has
violated a deontological norm; again suggesting a close interaction between
what a person does and how his character and identity can transform as a
result.
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One way in which the soldier’s identity can be dramatically altered is when
those to whom he is morally attached seem to betray his trust. Shay describes
the relationship between fellow soldiers as an instance of philia – an ancient
Greek word signifying “the very strongest affective relationships that human
beings form.”112 When these strongly affective commitments are betrayed, the
betrayed party is at risk of severe character injury by way of what Shay
describes as a “wrecked thumos.”113 Thumos – “spiritedness” or “honourable
character” – is often seen as a dated notion concerned with archaic models of
honour. However, Shay argues that thumos is actually constituted by three
things: (i) ideals, ambitions, and attachments, (ii) the intensity with which
these are energised, and (iii) the emotions aroused by seeing those ideals
manifest in the real world.114 Understood in this way, thumos is intimately
connected with the aretaic notion of character: it concerns what one values,
morally speaking, the vigour with which one’s values motivate one’s actions,
and how one feels when a project that one values is successful. 115 If
transgressions of deontological principles can indeed wreck thumos then we
ought to understand how it is wrecked, and whether it might be reconstructed.

Shay describes the symptoms of a damaged thumos as including cognitive and
emotional states like “self-loathing, a sense of unworthiness” and “loss of selfrespect and initiative,”116 two symptoms that correlate clearly with the global
misattribution that occurs when an agent judges the whole world to be unjust
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based on the evidence of a single event. Interestingly, however, damaged
thumos can also result in “grandiosity and entitlement,” “coercive demands
for respect, honour, [and] acknowledgement,” and “claims to having been [a]
player in the single most important event in human history.”117 Thumos, when
damaged, can either be inflated or deflated in response to damage. One’s
character, being so altered by the shift in thumos, perceives morality
differently. What may have previously been understood as a once-off – but
still morally serious – deontological violation becomes either justified because
of the moral importance of the actor, or, in the reverse, comes to define the
perpetrators character from that point onward.

What purpose can inflated or deflated thumos serve? Deflated thumos, it seems,
is a way of integrating what one has done with his broader experiences.
Someone who mistakenly kills a civilian can integrate that killing into his
identity by persisting in his identity as evil. This way, perhaps, the dissonance
will stop. In this sense, deflated thumos appears to be a defensive mechanism
through which one seeks to avoid fully processing what has happened.
Similarly, an inflated thumos – often mistakenly dismissed as narcissism by
mental health professionals118 – seeks to justify what one has done by the
significance of those events. Inflated thumos aims to deny the judgemental
element of moral injury by putting oneself above moral judgement. Both
inflation and deflation of thumos ultimately seek the same thing: avoidance of
the difficulties associated with integrating one’s status as perpetrator (or
perceived perpetrator) with one’s lived experiences by denying those
experiences. Adding to the complexity, thumos can fluctuate between states of
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inflation and deflation within the one individual, “giving the appearance,
descriptively, of bipolar disorder.”119 Subconsciously, the character attempts
to protect itself from the painful process of self-forgiveness.

Compounding the problems associated with subconscious avoidance of selfforgiveness is the fact that other forms of forgiveness are not readily available.
This is largely due to the growing distance between civilians and the military
(which has always existed, but was exacerbated after the Vietnam War, when
some within the military attributed the US failure to a lack of support from
civilian leadership).120 As Shay notes, “[a]cts of war generate a profound gulf
between the combatant and the community he left behind.”121 As such, it is
difficult for returning soldiers – especially those with PTSD or moral injury
for whom aversion and alienation are real possibilities – to find people willing
to even listen to what they have to say, let alone forgive them for it. A key
element in the redemptive framework for those suffering from selfjudgemental moral injury will therefore be the provision of an environment in
which interpersonal (and subsequently self-) forgiveness is possible.

3: Guilt, Shame, and the Ruin of Character

Although I think that the distinction between PTSD and moral injury is an
important one conceptually, both are worthy of exploration in a discussion of

Ibid.
Ole R. Hosti, ‘A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some
Evidence, 1976-96’, International Security, vol. 23, no. 3, 1998-1999, 5-42 at 6.
121 Shay, Odysseus in America, op cit., 152.
119
120

239

war’s ability to shatter the moral and psychological wellbeing – that is,
happiness – of an individual. In this section I focus on both conditions’ ability
to wreck a person’s wellbeing through fostering feelings of guilt and shame
(from which there is often no release). Some of this shame derives from the
warrior code discussed earlier. Other elements derive from misplaced senses
of moral responsibility, the (perceived) perpetration of wrongdoing, and –
significantly – incongruence between what a solider believes to be right and
virtuous vis-à-vis soldiering, and what he believes to be just vis-à-vis other
aspects of his life. Importantly, not all judgements that lead to PTSD are
mistaken ones: at times misattribution may occur, but at other times a soldier’s
feelings of guilt and/or shame may be entirely appropriate. However, there is
no necessary connection between a violation of deontological norms and the
experience of ‘aretaic’ trauma – that is, trauma that affects one’s character,
psychological, or moral wellbeing. We cannot explain all experiences of moral
trauma through a deontological framework.

First, it will be worth exploring the differences between guilt and shame.
Sherman, fittingly (given its prominence in the experience of soldiers) focuses
on shame.

What exactly is shame? One conventional place to begin is by distinguishing it
from guilt. Guilt is the bite of self-punishment we feel when we wrong another;
it often comes with a desire to make reparations [...] Real shame requires, in
addition, social discrediting – an affront to a person’s status or dignity.122
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Shame is the feeling associated with knowing that other people have judged
me to be a person that I do not believe myself to be, or wish for myself to be
known as. By contrast, guilt is an internal feeling of disharmony between one’s
self-perception and the act one has performed: “remorse or self-reproach
caused by feeling that one is responsible for a wrong or offence”.123

Gabriele Taylor argues that “guilt, unlike shame, is a legal concept […] to feel
guilty [is to] accept not only that [a person] has done something which is
forbidden, he must accept also that it is forbidden, and thereby accept the
authority of whoever or whatever forbids it.”124 By contrast, Taylor suggests
that shame (in the sense we are discussing it here) occurs “when [a person] is
judged by the group of which he is a member to have failed to comply with
some categoric command. He shares the point of view of the group, and so
[…] has failed in his own eyes.”125 In short, Taylor contends, shame requires
an audience whilst guilt requires an authority.126 In the case of military
personnel, audience and authority are blurred. One’s soldier peers are both
the enforcers and adherents of the warrior code. One is both a member of one’s
community and feels rightly subject to its moral judgement, and the soldier
himself witnesses the things he has done, and judges himself for them. This
latter sense, we will see, is especially important: the moral and psychological
trauma of war can often lead to soldiers playing the roles of judge, jury, and
executioner for themselves.
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However, guilt and shame themselves are not judgements, but the emotions
that accompany particular judgements. If a person judges that he has failed to
live up to (i) the moral necessities of a situation, or (ii) the expected
behavioural standards of his group, he will then feel guilt or shame
respectively (he may, in some cases, feel both). Both guilt and shame, however,
like all emotions, are bad indicators of morality. Oftentimes – as with seppuku
where men were shamed for refusing to commit suicide – one can feel guilty
or ashamed when no wrongdoing has actually been committed. This point
suggests that deontological explanations of the wrongfulness of a particular
action may (although useful in various situations) not be morally relevant in
all cases. Sometimes guilt and psychological trauma are not a response to
wrongdoing, but to some other factor. Furthermore, they assume that the
judge(s) (either the authority or audience) are the type of person(s) who can
infallibly dictate on matters of morality, and that the mind of the judge is
knowable to them. In reality, none of these factors are assuredly true. Even if
these were true and guilt and/or shame were appropriate emotional
responses, at some point the feelings must cease in order for the agent to have
any chance at rehabilitation.

3.1: Misplaced Guilt and Responsibility

Psychological and moral trauma as a consequence of misattribution is morally
tragic; we witness a diminution in flourishing of a person who has done
nothing wrong. Consider, for example, those Vietnam conscripts who served
honourably despite not having freely chosen to fight, only to return home to
find themselves stigmatised by the war itself. Here again, moral trauma and a
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diminution of wellbeing occurs not as a consequence of a moral transgression,
but in response to a perception that one’s character has been irrevocably
altered by the events one has participated in.

Bob Steck, one of Nancy Sherman’s interviewees, was opposed to the Vietnam
war when he was conscripted, but could ill afford to go to jail because his
father had recently died, leaving his mother alone. Steck is, Sherman remarks,
“a man of strong moral sensibilities; he is well read, knowledgeable and an
activist.” However, despite knowing there was little he could have done
differently, “he can’t psychologically or morally fully separate himself from
the war he fought.”127 Steck still sees himself as a participant in injustice, and
feels “a sense of taint.”128 This taint is not something he is responsible for, in
fact, Bob is aware that “the taint comes from outside in. [...] Yet it sticks.”129
Bob came home to crowds who jeered and called him “murderer” and “babykiller” despite his having done neither.130 He is an outspoken activist who has
regularly criticised the policies that led to Vietnam;131 and works with soldiers
still suffering from the psychological scars of that war,132 but even still, “[t]here
will be that felt lack of confidence about his moral position for agreeing to
fight [in an unjust war].”133 As Sherman surmises, “[h]is assessment of himself,
and how he views others assessing him, are wrapped up in moral luck and a
coerced choice.”134 Ultimately, Steck’s taint comes because, from his
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perspective, “cleansing and purification seem impossible.”135 I return to the
idea of purification later in this section.

A second kind of misattribution is perhaps more familiar to casual readers of
war literature: survivor guilt. Again, this experience is not unique to the
military, but it is typical of it. Survivor guilt arises when chance allots that a
soldier’s comrade(s) should die whilst he survives. Perhaps he was on leave
at the time, or had switched places temporarily with one of the dead. However
it occurs, the soldier is left with the sense that “it should have been me.” In
Les Misérables , the revolutionary-cum-romantic Marius literally begs for his
dead friends’ forgiveness “that I am here and you are gone.”136 Shay, who
observes similar emotions in Achilles’ response to Patroclus’ death, argues
that this kind of guilt is symptomatic of “the powerful bond that arises
between men in combat.”137 In some cases this bond – and grief – is so
powerful that soldiers feel driven to suicide after the death of a special
comrade.138

Part of this guilt, Shay suggests, is an “inner process of bringing the dead into
the present,”139 by continuing to feel pain in the absence of a lost comrade,
warriors maintain some connection to the loved one they have lost.
Interestingly, finding ways of reducing the intensity of “brother-in-arms” type
relationships may help stymie suicidal survivor guilt. The Roman philosopher
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Cicero wrote about therapeutic interventions for grieving, advocating a form
of Stoic distance from loved ones. It is helpful, he suggests, to reach a frame of
mind so that when trauma occurs, one sees the trauma as “nothing contrary
to expectation.”140 The Stoic Epictetus thus suggests that (in Sherman’s words)
“through daily prerehearsal, we are to remind ourselves of the mortality of
loved ones, kissing them each morning as if it might be the last time.”141 This
reminder may help to prevent the type of crippling grief that is seen in cases
of suicidal survivor guilt.

How can the type of character damage inflicted by such losses be healed? A
large part entails – as alluded to in the previous section – listening. Shay
describes this process as “personal narrative reconstruction,” the idea being
that misattribution can only be corrected if the mistaken facts are corrected.142
It is not sufficient for the soldier to be told that he has done nothing wrong; his
guilt is subjective and partly subconscious. What is required is a “fully realised
narrative that brings together the shattered knowledge of what happened, the
emotions that were aroused by the meanings of the events, and the bodily
sensations that the physical events created.”143 When this is allowed to occur,
“the survivor pieces back together the fragmentation of consciousness that
trauma has caused.”144 This narrative approach, Sherman observes, mirrors
aspects of the cognitive behavioural therapy used in psychological
interventions, whereby “the patient revisits […] relives and, most important,
reintegrates the traumatic experience into her life.”145
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Crucially, this process requires an audience capable of listening in the correct
manner. It requires the perfect combination of distance, belief, and
compassion. “Listeners must be strong enough to hear the story without
injury,” to listen without judging the speaker, and for the audience “to
experience some of the terror, grief, and rage that the victim did.”146 In short,
listeners must possess certain “therapeutic virtues” in order for narrative
rehabilitation to be successful. In speaking, the veteran’s isolation shatters: his
experiences are felt, validated and shared. Finally, the perceived guilt or
shame is shared, false cognitions are dismantled and the warrior can reconcile
his past, present, and future. This, perhaps, is a reason for providing the
families of soldiers with training in basic therapeutic virtues.

However, the audience must also hold the respect of the warrior. They be seen
as having sufficient insight, relevance and gravitas to justify the soldier
spilling his soul. Otherwise, to use Taylor’s terms, the audience will lack moral
authority. Shay emphasises the need of the listener to respect the veteran,147
but my argument suggests that the opposite is also true. Veterans are unlikely
to engage in conversation with someone they think has no way of
understanding or helping them, no matter how well-intentioned and
compassionate the listener is. Thus, there is also important cultural change to
be carried out in the military. A cultural shift that encourages soldiers to talk
is required. One that esteems the spouses, chaplains, and therapists of soldiers
as people who understand the warrior code – “honorary warriors” – who
value and know the code in a way that enables them to listen without being
injured by what is heard, or judging the soldier for what is said.

146
147

Shay, Achilles in Vietnam, op cit, 188-189.
Ibid., 189.

246

The story is slightly different for those who are genuinely responsible for
having committed an injustice. Although there is no doubt that narrative
rehabilitation will still play a role, soldiers who have genuinely done wrong
do not need to have their perception of the events corrected – they correctly
feel guilty and ashamed for having done the wrong thing. What these soldiers
require, more than anything else, is forgiveness for indiscretions they have
committed, or believe themselves to have committed. However, remember
that the phenomenology, at least of moral injury (which perpetrators are most
likely to suffer) is of the self as self-judge. Thus, any forgiveness that is granted
must be granted in a way that the warrior himself would accept. It must not,
therefore, be platitudinous.

Shay discusses the various “purification rituals” that have dotted warrior
cultures throughout history. In other times and cultures, when soldiers
returned from war, they underwent a process of moral purging that enabled
them to feel forgiven for any evil they may have done. For example, in the
medieval period any Christian who shed blood during war, just or not, had to
do penance afterward.148 Modern Western societies have no equivalent to
these practices, and this means soldiers – as we saw in Bob Steck’s case – can
spend years unsure as to whether or not they deserve to be living “ordinary”
lives, or whether they are in fact deserving of some punishment that was never
meted out. Installing a ritual, that enters into the warrior code as a significant
and revered process undertaken by soldiers would provide a mechanism
through which soldiers could forgive themselves for the things they have or
believe themselves to have done. This may be difficult to implement in a
society increasingly sceptical of religious practices – rituals among them – but
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the introduction of some form of authoritative, public, formalised, and
communal forgiveness and acceptance process seems likely to dismantle the
type of self-judgements that perpetuate moral injuries.

I noted above that the forgiveness must not be platitudinous. No good will be
done by automatically forgiving those who have acted unjustly; forgiveness
must feel deserved. Even soldiers who have not done wrong come home
feeling powerful guilt for which they need to be forgiven, and those who have
knowingly and intentionally violated their own codes of ethics will feel that
guilt all the more sharply. There is a temptation to forgive soldiers for
atrocities, explaining it as “duress” or the “stress of war.” However, this type
of generous forgiveness does little to allow soldiers to forgive themselves and
redeem themselves; they know themselves to have done wrong and to be
deserving of punishment. If they feel that this punishment is not meted out, it
is possible that any forgiveness will be seen as undeserved; indeed, it may well
be seen as patronising. Immanuel Kant, for example, believed that any
wrongdoing that was freely chosen had to be punished in order to respect the
autonomous decision of the wrongdoer.149 Likewise, soldiers will enforce their
own punishment – usually moral or psychological punishment in the form of
self-evaluation, in extreme cases self-harm or suicide – if they feel that they
have not been able to redeem themselves for the guilt that they feel. What is
required is a framework that abdicates soldiers of the burden of judging
themselves: submitting them to external judgement by the community.

Immanuel Kant, trans. Mary Gregor (ed.), The Metaphysics of Morals, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:355.
149
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This approach will help empower soldiers to forgive themselves for any
wrongs they have, or believe themselves to have, committed. Better still,
however, would be to prevent wrongs from being committed at all (an idea
that was explored in the first section). This is not only a matter of justice vis-àvis the rights of those who are innocent, but a pressing aretaic concern given
what we have learned about moral injury, guilt, shame, and their crushing
effects on wellbeing. Kant believed in a kind of “natural punishment […] in
which vice punishes itself,”150 and this idea appears to be at work in what Shay
describes so accurately as “the ruin of character.” Thus it is not only for the
sake of the victim that atrocities must be reduced, but also for the sake of the
perpetrator.

I have already discussed character traits and virtues that can help prevent
warriors from choosing to commit atrocities. In this section I focus on
preventing “betrayals of what’s right” that come from military commanders
and leaders. Although soldiers are obligated to disobey an illegal order, this
obligation rests on the epistemic possibility of recognising an order as unjust
at the time of their being given. At times – as occurs in a story Shay describes
– soldiers are ordered to carry out missions and only learn afterward who the
targets were. The soldier Shay describes conducted a night raid in which he
later learned he had massacred fishermen and children.151 The targets held no
strategic value, and the wrongdoing was ignored by the superiors who had
given the command. In fact, this particular soldier was given the highly
esteemed Combat Infantry Badge for killing children. Situations such as this
demonstrate the profound disconnect between those giving commands and
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those receiving them. In this case, a colonel told the troop that he would “take
care of it,” and not to worry. Such insensitivity to the fact that he had
commanded his men to kill innocent, vulnerable civilians demonstrates a view
of soldiers as mere instruments rather than complex human beings with
characters, virtues, and consciences of their own.

Those entrusted with the command of soldiers must be particularly cautious
that the commands they give are just ones, not only because it is evil to give
an unjust order, but because in doing so one can jeopardise the wellbeing of
one’s men. Commanders, therefore, must be aware of the psychological
seriousness of killing, particularly non-defensive killing, on the psyche of
individuals. Politicians, too, need to be aware of the differences in
psychological wellbeing between soldiers who believe themselves to be
fighting for a just cause, and soldiers who are unsure whether their war is just.
Of course, at times the fog of war is thick, and errors of judgement are made
with the best of intentions, but even in these cases, commanders must be
sensitive to the aretaic seriousness of a person feeling that they have “betrayed
what’s right,” and take full moral and legal responsibility for those
commands, as well as steps to engage with the moral and psychological
trauma that soldiers might subsequently experience.

By extension, soldiers need to be afforded more power to question commands,
disobey orders, and conscientiously object to wars they believe are unjust. This
extends beyond obviously unjust orders, but to circumstances in which a
soldier believes that what is at stake in obeying is his very soul. This question
is discussed at length in the next chapter, but for now it is important to note
250

that conscientious objection is not a value that enjoys pride of place in the
modern military ethos. As McMahan notes, “[s]uccess or failure, which can
make the difference between life and death for a great many people, may
depend on whether those lower in the chain immediately and unhesitatingly
obey the orders they receive from above.”152 Thus, obedience and trust are
vital in the military structure, and are enshrined as virtues in the warrior code.
I am unsure whether the argument from military efficacy is sufficient to
liberate low-ranking military personnel from the burden of conscientious
evaluation of each particular mission (in fact I suspect that it is not) but even
if it were, this would simply emphasise the need for commanders to ensure
that they had the best possible intelligence before proceeding, and that they
opt against acting in cases of ambiguous evidence.

Better still is a soldier who conceives “what it means to be a warrior” as
meaning he should never betray his beliefs about doing what is right: a soldier
who acknowledges his moral authority as judge not only after the commission
of a crime, but beforehand as well. French argues for a “military culture with
role models who remained true to their codes of honour even in the face of
nearly overwhelming challenges or temptations.”153 At the moment, there is
very little in modern military culture to support “remaining true” and
refusing orders unless they are prima facie illegal (and even then, I have some
doubt as to whether rejecting those orders would be seen as laudable).
Sometimes the illegality is not clear; sometimes the intelligence is shaky and
soldiers may have genuine doubts, in such cases, “[a] code that encompasses
all of what it is to be a particular kind of warrior may help the warrior who
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has internalized it determine the proper course of action in a situation the rule
writes could never have foreseen.”154

Change to military culture is necessary to expand the legal, moral, and
psychological ability of soldiers to refuse unjust orders, abstain from unjust
wars, or give voice to unjust practices. This last point is particularly pertinent
given ongoing testimonies of reprisals against military whistleblowers. 155 If
commanders can be made aware of how unjust commands affect their
soldiers, and the warrior culture is able to actively encourage dissent against
commands that betray a soldier’s own conception of what is right, then there
is a chance of reducing the amount of psychological trauma caused by
betrayals of right.

3.2: The Moral Gap Between War and Peace: a Critique of Role
Morality

Another chief catalyst in the ruin of character is what occurs when soldiers
return to home find that the people they have become are an ill fit with the
society they have defended. In the first section I argued that recognising the
integration of civic and military virtues may help to guard against serious
moral transgressions like the targeting of noncombatants. In this section I
argue that the same integration can help prevent the ruin of character, and

Ibid., 15.
Nick Schwellenbach, ‘Why Military Whistleblowers Fear Reprisal’, Time, 20/10/2012,
<http://nation.time.com/2011/10/20/why-military-whistleblowers-fear-reprisal/>.
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further, that failing to do so contributes to ruinous character. This section also
includes a critique of what I take to be a particularly culpable contribution to
the ruin of character, the approach to military ethics known as “role
morality.”156

Earlier I advocated a holistic approach to military ethics focussed on aretaic
notions of virtue, character and wellbeing. The good soldier, on this account,
will be a person who habitually chooses actions that promote the good in a
particular situation. For both Sherman and French, the virtuous soldier will be
one who fears doing evil more than he fears dying and will courageously
pursue the good even in the face of severe physical risk. The virtuous soldier
is one who understands that his deeds as a soldier form part of his identity
and need to be integrated with his life as a whole. Soldiering is a way of life
that can either assist in the achievement of human flourishing or be
detrimental to it, but it is not separate from the rest of my life; the way I soldier
will affect the way I act when I am at home. Thus, my identity as a soldier is a
key element of my flourishing, and therefore must make a positive
contribution to my wellbeing. John Courtney Murray spoke condemningly of
a “false antinomy between war and morality,”157 with his focus being a view
of war as a morally separate domain to the rest of our moral endeavours.

My discussion in this section will be focussed specifically on the psychological
consequences of teaching role morality, and how these might be deleterious to a person’s
psychological wellbeing. I take no position on whether or not role morality is a good, useful,
or valid framework for professional ethics, and indeed my observations are not affected by
the validity of role morality as a normative system.
157 John Courtney Murray S.J., 'Remarks on the Moral Problem of War', Theological Studies,
vol. 20, 1959, 40-61 at 54.
156
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I am not sure that one should talk today in these categories, “war and/or peace,”
leaving unexamined the question just what their validity is as moral and political
categories. The basic fallacy is to suppose that “war” and “peace” are two
discontinuous and incommensurable worlds of existence and universes of
discourse, each with its own autonomous set of rules, “peace” being the world
of “morality” and “war” being the world of “evil,” in such wise (sic) that there is
no evil as long as there is peace and no morality as soon as there is war.158

Although few just war theories would argue that the moral disconnect
between war and peace is as strong as Murray’s characterisation, there is still
a sense amongst a number of just war theorists that the deeds soldiers perform
are at best a “necessary evil.” However, a necessary evil is still an evil, and it
may not be possible to reconcile one’s identity as evil-doer with the endeavour
to live a morally excellent (happy) life. An aretaic approach to JWT which
takes an interest in the wellbeing of soldiers will dismiss arguments that my
conduct as a soldier will not affect my conduct as a father and vice versa as
misguided. Rather, military ethics must take an interest in the moral character
of the soldier as well as their actions, and do what it can to protect or enhance
that moral character, because doing otherwise may well be detrimental to the
overall quality of the soldier's moral life. It is on this basis that Nancy Sherman
takes issue with Jeff McMahan's view of unjust combatants as both morally
inferior status to just combatants, and morally responsible for the injustice of
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their cause:159 it “seems too harsh and to miss too much about the practice of
soldiering.”160

McMahan's “harshness” is mitigated by the fact that he suggests three
excusing conditions for unjust combatants: duress, which “include[s] threats
to an agent that exert varying degrees of pressure against his will to resist”;
epistemic limitations, where “[a] person's knowledge of relevant maters may
be limited or defective to varying degrees”; and diminished responsibility,
whether or not a particular person has the “capacity for rational moral
agency”.161 However, two further important ideas can be revealed by
enriching this account with aretaic notions.

First, that soldiers, regardless of the justice of the cause for which they fight,
can conduct themselves virtuously, honourably, and in conformance with
every normative requirement of highest warrior code. Such combatants surely
do nothing that detracts from their moral excellence in such fighting, unless it
be that they were culpably ignorant of the injustice of the cause. However,
even if ignorant, it does not necessarily follow that everything they do is evil;

In Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer suggests that soldiers fighting on either side of a war are
moral equals insofar as every soldier, regardless of cause, is afforded the right to kill his
enemies: “they can try to kill me, and I can try to kill them.” Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th
edition), (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 36. The moral equality of combatants (MEC)
famously rejected by Jeff McMahan in Killing in War, op cit. who compellingly argues that
there is no philosophically coherent reason for why just combatants might have forfeited
their right not to be killed. “It is hard to see how just combatants could become legitimate
targets simply by offering violent resistance to unjust attacks.” (16).
160 Nancy Sherman, The Untold War, op cit., 44.
161 McMahan, Killing in War, op cit., 116-117.
159
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if they fight with good intentions and violate no rights, it seems possible that
one’s status as an unjust combatant is not compatible with virtue.

The second, more telling insight would be in observing whether declaring that
unjust combatants are, all other things being equal, morally responsible for the
injustice of their cause might lead to significant doubts about the justification
of a soldier’s profession, or the particular war a soldier found himself in. If a
soldier learns after a war in which he fought nobly that the war was unjust, he
becomes a criminal in his own and in society’s eyes. How such a man is able
to live a flourishing life, when such a large part of his identity suddenly
becomes associated with immorality, is difficult to imagine. It does, however,
give cause for a more nuanced, sensitive approach to discussions of the
distinction between just and unjust combatants.

The aretaic, holistic approach I have been suggesting here can be contrasted
with an approach which sees the various roles of a person’s life as
unconnected, each with its own set of moral norms and values. This approach
is highly compatible with an insular, internally-developed warrior code. It
holds that what a person does at war has no bearing or relevance to their moral
conduct in other spheres of life. Thus, the virtues of a soldier will be different
to the virtues of a friend, which will be different to the virtues of a parent or
teacher. (As opposed to each of these being governed by the same virtues
applied in different ways).
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This view is typical of a growing school within applied ethics known as “role
morality,” which suggests that we wear multiple “moral hats” — one for work
and one for everywhere else.”162 Earlier I quoted Paul Robinson, who lists
prowess, courage, loyalty, and truthfulness as the four key virtues related to
military honour. It is interesting that there is no mention of prudence,
autonomy, conscience, or empathy amongst the important character traits of
the honourable soldier, meaning that the soldier’s role as a free-thinking,
autonomous agent (as he is in his life outside the military) is undermined.
Under such an approach, the virtuous soldier is paradoxically required to
separate himself from fundamental human characteristics. This is a growing
problem for military personnel today as the competing identities inhabited by
military personnel – broadly, their civilian and military identities – conflict
with one another in ways that inhibit the personal flourishing of individuals.
This problem is described by Paul Berghaus and Nathan Cartagena as
“fragmentation.”

As social creatures, human beings possess a number of identities [...] Many
people struggle to see themselves as a unified person, because they believe that
each identity requires them to be a distinctly different person. Throughout a
given day, they transition from being one person to another as they move to each
new social context.163

Kevin Gibson, ‘Contrasting Role Morality and Professional Morality: Implications for
Practice’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 1, 2003, 17-29 at 18.
163 Paul T. Bergaus & Nathan L. Cartagena, ‘Developing Good Soldiers: the Problem of
Fragmentation within the Army’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 12, iss. 4, 2013, 287-303 at 287.
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Whilst fragmentation is not a problem that is limited to military personnel,
they do seem especially vulnerable to it for at least two reasons. First, because
the difference between the military and civilian life is particularly sharp by
comparison to, for instance, the difference between a teacher’s professional
and private life. The difference between professional and private life is
particularly severe for military personnel, and for this reason, so too is their
transition between personal and professional lives.

Second, military personnel are especially vulnerable to fragmentation because
“it is often the case that they identify predominantly with their professional
moral self.”164 Thus, instead of seeing himself as, for example, both a parent
and a soldier, the soldiering identity may be seen to take priority over one’s
civilian identities. At worst, this threatens to rupture the individual from his
identity as a parent; at best, the two identities pull in different directions. If
wellbeing is, in some sense, the univocal end of human behaviour toward
which all activity is oriented, we see how fragmentation – which pulls a person
in different directions by dividing them into separate, and sometimes
contradictory identities – undermines the project of seeking the achievement
of a single ultimate end for one’s activities.

The virtuous soldier will therefore be one who understands that his deeds
help form his identity, and therefore he needs to integrate the military identity
with various others in a harmonious manner. Soldiering is a way of life that
can either assist in the achievement of human flourishing or be detrimental to
it, but it is not separate from the rest of life; the way I soldier will affect the
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way I act when I am at home. Thus, soldiers ought to understand their conduct
at war not only as reflecting their excellence as a soldier, but their moral
excellence as a human being.

Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, who argues that a Kantian approach to moral
education might be beneficial in the military, argues similarly that “[t]he goal
of moral education [...] is not merely to get the agent to follow rules. It is the
cultivation of moral agency, an agency that involves one’s becoming an
independent, right thinking and right acting person.”165 It is also worth noting
that any approach which prioritises codes of conduct in its approach to ethics
will interpret the virtues in such a way as favours the code; it will never be
virtuous to disobey. This type of approach, which in some ways is necessary
for the military to function at the same time undermines the capacity of the
soldier to act in “good faith” when faced with serious moral dilemmas. At the
same time, however, there is a concern that this approach asks too much of the
soldier and ignores the practical reality insofar as not everything that a person
does at war is (or can be) compatible with one’s home life.

Thus, there is an ongoing debate regarding which of these approaches should
be taught to soldiers during their military training. Should they be taught the
virtues that will make them good citizens, parents, friends and soldiers?166 Or

Susan Martinelli-Fernandez, ‘Educating Honourable Warriors’, Journal of Military Ethics,
vol. 5, iss. 1, 55-66 at 57.
166 Although I do not believe it undermines the argument, it is important to note that such an
approach may actually make military institutions less efficient. As Alexander Mosely notes:
“to raise the individual soldier up from an uncritical level to the philosophical realm [...] can
lead to a rejection, at any time, of the armed forces demands, commands, and even
contract.” C.f. Alexander Mosely, ‘The Ethical Warrior: A Classical Liberal Approach’ in
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should they be taught a more restricted approach which emphasises only
those virtues necessary to make effective soldiers who adhere to the laws of
war? Paul Robinson explores this debate in the introduction to the collected
volume Ethics Education in the Military.

[F]or some ethics is synonymous with ‘morality’. The aim of ethics education,
therefore, is seen as being what many refer to as ‘character development’, in other
words the creation of morally upright persons through the instillation of certain
key qualities or dispositions of character (commonly known as virtues). Others,
however, disagree, and consider ethics to be somewhat distinct from general
morality. Instead, ethics are more properly seen as being related to a given
profession and its requirements. The focus of ethics education therefore shifts
from character development to creating an understanding of the purpose and
methods of the profession and the values which underpin it.167

These two contrasting approaches suggest different approaches to military
ethics: the latter limits it to a set of clearly defined and codified rules, where
adherence to the rules counts as ethical conduct; whilst the former takes a
more holistic approach, apparently believing that moral conduct in the
military is synonymous with ‘what the virtuous soldier would do,’ where it is
assumed that a virtuous person will also be a virtuous soldier. Although both
these approaches are commonly seen in ethics education, it is clear that one is
waxing and the other waning, as Robinson notes, “the predominant principle
which most military ethics education programmes have adopted is that of

Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee & Don Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the Military, (Cornwall:
Ashgate, 2008), 184-185.
167 Paul Robinson, ‘Ethics Education in the Military: Introduction’, in Robinson, De Lee &
Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the Military, op cit., 1.
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virtue ethics.”168 However, in the same volume, Don Carrick is sceptical of the
practical viability of a virtue ethics approach to military ethics serving as an
appropriate normative guide for soldiers. “If the educators want to bring
virtue ethics, care ethics and so on in to the pedagogic equation, then they run
a serious risk of taking the soldier outside his role and into situations where
he does no longer have a reliable moral compass to guide him; he can find
himself having to deal with people ‘simply’ on the basis of common humanity,
fellow-feeling and a universal morality.”169

Carrick’s fear is that relying on universal, “everyday morality” to govern
warfare will generate a kind of ‘moral schizophrenia’ because soldiering
involves deeds that defy everyday morality, such as intentional killing.170 As
such, it is preferable to educate soldiers so that they see the practice of
soldiering as a separate moral realm from that of everyday life. As such,
Carrick advocates “ring-fencing soldiering within the notion of professional
role morality.”171

There are serious aretaic concerns regarding Carrick’s profession-centric
approach to virtue. As Berghaus and Cartagena note, focussing only “on the
development of character traits within the professional domain of soldiers’
lives […] fails to help soldiers develop in a holistic manner,” and may, in fact,
“further the problem of fragmentation.”172 The moral seriousness of
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soldiering, which involves committing “the ultimate wrong”173 – killing,
demands substantial psychological protection for soldiers who are asked to
kill.174 Carrick claims that to avoid this kind of slippage, one must insulate
what a soldier does from the rest of his moral life by referencing his
professional role; that is, embracing a kind of role morality whereby the
virtues are derived entirely from the deontological norms of the profession.
This claim sits in direct contrast to Sherman’s view that moral schizophrenia
is almost inescapable for the modern soldier in large part due to the huge gulf
between ‘peacetime’ and ‘wartime’ morality, as seen in the earlier discussion
of William Quinn.

Carrick’s suggestion is that if soldiers are only informed by “everyday
morality”, and have to “deal with people ‘simply’ on the basis of common
humanity, fellow-feeling and a universal morality,” they will be less able to
make decisions vital to the successful fulfilment of their role as soldiers.
Sherman, realising that what a person does actually affects the type of person
he is, highlights the reverse: if soldiers are encouraged to think of “soldiering”
as entirely separate from other walks of life, there will be inevitable “seepage”
where aspects of their soldiering are habituated, or haunt them in the form of
guilt in so small part because of the stark difference between the now-separate
moral realms of civilian and soldier life.

Carrick, ‘The Future of Ethics Education in the Military, op cit., 195.
By far the finest discussion of the psychological resistance that humans have toward
killing and the psychological steps that the military takes to overcome that is Lt. Col. Dave
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updated edition), (New York: Black Bay Books, 2009).
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It is worth asking on what basis Carrick justifies his claim that if soldiers were
to make decisions solely on the basis of a common morality that they would
be unable to perform their roles as soldiers well. The argument is as follows:

My concerns can [be] encapsulated in a simple imperative; one fundamental
objective of any ethics education programme must be to protect the soldier
against the sort of moral schizophrenia that can affect anyone who is brought up
on a diet of unqualified moral rules (do not lie, Do not break other people’s
things, Do not harm, Do not kill) but who is then told that he is entirely justified
in going out and doing the exact opposite, namely undertaking as much
breaking, harming and killing as possible.175

Besides taking issue with the straw-man claim that soldiers are told to break,
harm and kill “as much as possible,” we should question why it is the case
that developing two distinct sets of rules for two distinct contexts is the ideal
way to protect against moral schizophrenia, particularly when Sherman’s
empirical research suggests otherwise. Might it not be more fruitful to explain
to soldiers that, as the classical just war theorists believed, what is morally
important is not merely protecting the rights of the innocent, but acting
virtuously in war – with charity, courage, prudence, loyalty, etc. – and thus
fostering virtues that are equally welcome in home life and war time? This is
why Aquinas chose to situate his discussion of war within the virtues rather
than within discussions of justice,176 because he believed that ethical conduct

Carrick, op cit., 197.
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in war requires the same character traits as does ethical conduct in other walks
of life.

Martin Cook and Henrik Syse, argue that “[f]irstly and most importantly,
military ethics is a species of the genus ‘professional ethics’. That is to say, it
exists to be of service to professionals who are not themselves specialists in
ethics but who have to carry out the tasks entrusted to the profession as
honourably and correctly as possible.”177 However, Syse and Cook’s standard
of professional ethics is different from Carrick’s role morality model. “The test
is fairly simple here: is what’s going on [...] the sort of thing that might be
helpful in providing real-world guidance for policy-makers, military
commanders and leaders, or operational decision-making?”178 In fact, Cook
and Syse at no point suggest that military ethics is reducible to a set of laws,
that right conduct in warfare consists only in rule adherence or that soldiers’
morality is different from that of the everyday. What they note is simply that
military ethics is first and foremost about training ethical practitioners of
warfare; any academic endeavour that is not directed to this end “are more
marginal, ancillary, or perhaps essentially irrelevant.”179 In fact, they speak
somewhat disparagingly of military lawyers rehearsing the Laws of Armed
Conflict to fulfil their annual training requirements, suggesting that ethical
training requires much more than rote-learning the rules.180
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Ethical training requires, I suggest (and will argue in much greater depth in
the following chapter), the development of virtuous habits within those who
will find themselves a part of the theatre of war. Further, it requires that the
normative theory by which we evaluate actions conducted in war, JWT, hold
a special, central place for virtue so that soldiers, politicians, officers and
educators alike recognise that questions of virtue, character and moral
psychology are not peripheral issues to military ethics, but sit at the heart of
the field. Once this is recognised, it becomes clear that a holistic model of
ethical education is required. Accounts that are modelled on mere ruleadherence will be an ethical non-starter, as the entire system is entirely
dependent on the rules themselves being morally good ones that can be easily
applied across all situations and boundaries. If this is not the case – and given
the contingencies of war it is likely not to be – then defining morally good
conduct only in association with obeying particular rules or fulfilling
particular duties is setting soldiers up for moral failure. Thus, it seems that
equipping the soldier with skills or character traits that will allow him or her
to adapt morally to the demands of particular situations requires a more
comprehensive understanding of ethics than a strictly deontological
formulation is able to provide.

Even the further step of aiming to instil professional virtues is problematic for
the same reason: professional virtues, if they are divorced from a more holistic
account of the good life (such as that present in Aquinas’ writing), threaten to
require a professional to perform actions that he cannot reconcile with his
identity, conceived more broadly. As Berghaus & Cartagena note, “[b]y
limiting moral aspiration to a context-specific good, professionalism,
[professional

virtue

approaches]

actually
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further

the

problem

of

fragmentation.”181 The only model of education that really and seriously deals
with the psychological and moral trauma that war threatens to inflict on
soldiers is an education that aims to instil virtues and identity that is
concurrent between lives at home and at war.

3.3: Shame: Failing to Adhere to the Warrior Ethos

I have already alluded to the fact that an internally developed shame culture 182
such as the warrior culture might be a double-edged sword. In effect, shame
systems operate by threatening ostracism to members who fail to conform to
standards set by the group. The desire for social acceptance (honour) is a
powerful motivator for adherence. However, as I noted earlier, moral
philosophers who appeal to honour operate under the premise that the
community is more or less correct in its moral evaluations. Thus, it presumes
that the “social conscience” of the warrior culture is suitably well-developed
to shame things that are morally wrong, and honour things that are morally
right.

I have already explored this problem, but a similar problem is that some of
that which is honoured or shamed has less to do with showing moral
approbation/disapprobation, and more to do with expressing affective
judgements on a person’s character and identity. For example, Australians use

Berghaus & Cartagena, op cit., 293.
For an insightful discussion of what constitutes a shame culture, explored through a
discussion of Homeric Greece, see E.R. Dodds, ‘From Shame-Culture to Guilt-Culture’ in The
Greeks and the Irrational, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951).
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the pejorative “un-Australian” to refer to anything from ordering lowalcoholic beer, working on a Saturday instead of watching the cricket, refusing
to help a friend move house, to parking in a handicapped space without a
disability. Not all of these, obviously, are violations of any deep moral
principles or reflections of any grave vice. In fact, some (such as ordering lowalcoholic beer) may actually be demonstrations of virtue. The trapping of
culture is that it conflates moral judgements with ideas about identity: what it
means to be an Australian. The judgement regarding low-alcoholic beer is a
product of a gradual misattribution where something non-essential but
correlational to identity as something essential: real Australian men drink fullstrength beer.

A similar process can take place in the military when contingent, non-essential
traits (such as gender) are confused with essential traits (such as courage). The
historical fact that most warriors have been male has led to the development
of a warrior code that esteems machismo and bravado as aspects of the warrior
identity, or perhaps worse, sees only men as capable of achieving military
virtues like courage. This is particularly problematic when these sociallyinherited beliefs lead to character judgements based not only on non-essential
characteristics, but also on factual confusion. Indeed, Amelie Rorty expresses
this precise concern regarding overly-martial conceptions of the virtue of
courage generally. We have inherited, Rorty argues, a history of the
transformations of courage across various ages and different manifestations,
and have not fully separated the virtue itself from the contexts in which it is
often witnessed, described, or practised (such as war).183 Similarly, I argue that
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Amelie Rorty, ‘The Two Faces of Courage’, Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 236, 1986, 151-171 .
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we risk inheriting views on which deeds or people tend to demonstrate courage
rather than focussing on the virtue itself.

For instance, Clark C. Barrett explains how in combat situations, the amygdala
takes control of the brain and “complex motor skills diminish. Tunnel vision,
loss of depth perception, and restricted hearing follow. Loss of bowel and
bladder control is inevitable”.184 It is important that all soldiers be made aware
of what will happen in combat to avoid misattribution of cowardice or
incompetence when the symptoms arise.

Most soldiers are unaware of what will occur to them, physiologically, in combat.
The autonomic nervous system is in control, and unprepared soldiers have no
ability to change their reaction. In pop culture, there is a connection between
cowardice and losing bowel or bladder control; but of course, there is no such
real connection in combat.185

Thus, soldiers experiencing a perfectly natural response to combat can be
stigmatised by a mistaken attribution of cowardice. Colloquial expressions of
fear like “I shat myself,” or “I pissed my pants” actually reflect real
experiences in combat and ought not to be treated as reflective of a person’s
character, personal courage, or suitability as a soldier. Soldiers, Barrett argues,
“need to understand that everyone reacts differently to the stress of close

Clark C. Barrett, ‘Unarmed and Dangerous: The Holistic Preparation of Soldiers for
Combat’, Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry, vol. 13, no. 2, 2011, 95-114 at 100.
185 Ibid.
184
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combat,”186 or else they risk stigmatising natural reactions to events, resulting
in warriors who struggle to identify themselves as such – ‘I wet my pants in
battle, but only cowards do that; warriors are not cowardly, so I must not be
suited to being a warrior.’ Shame and stigma can fracture a warrior’s identity
as such, especially if that warrior is new to combat (and, given that “trained
soldiers […] cope better with physiological changes,”187 new warriors are more
likely to lose control of the autonomic system). ‘Warrior identity’ is a concept
that is difficult to pin down, and is subject to the particular values of the
majority over time. The use of shame and honour in warrior communities,
therefore, can be utilised to achieve great things, but can also be used to
monopolise identity in a way that is unproductive.

I do believe, however, that the warrior code can be a source of motivation for
moral conduct if that code limits itself to stipulating what is essential to being
a virtuous soldier. If what is honoured are acts of courage, charity, justice, and
so forth, then the warrior code can utilise the individual soldier’s desire for
honour for just ends. However, there is also reason for caution in identifying
precisely who should be held to this standard, and who should not. Are all
members of the military soldiers, or only front line personnel? This debate is
of growing relevance given the increasingly common use of non-traditional
military personnel, such as drone pilots, who experience no real risk in
carrying out their wars, and are thus distanced in several ways from the
realities of combat. This is a growing question for military ethics as interest
and pressure grows to reduce the physical risk of soldiers during war by
increasing the use of drones, developing cyber-weapons to allow war to be
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fought by cyber-warriors, and eventually making use of autonomous robots
to fight wars instead of physical soldiers.

Should such “non-risk soldiers” be considered soldiers governed by the
warrior code? To answer this question, I consider the case of drone pilots –
about which the most scholarly literature has been developed – in the hope
that many of my findings will be representative of all non-risk warfare Mark
Coeckelbergh opines that “there seems to be something cowardly and unfair
about remote killing.”188 Cowardice seems to be the central aretaic question
regarding non-risk, distance fighting and the morality of those professions.
Thus, we begin by asking whether, given that there is no risk involved, drone
pilots can be considered soldiers?

I believe not. Warriors undertake risk not only because of courage, but because
being an excellent warrior entails nonmoral virtues of excellence, which
means proving one’s excellence as a warrior requires testing one’s skills
against the enemy. As Christian Enemark notes, “war necessarily involves
some kind of contest.”189 Enemark suggests that the very legitimacy of killing
relies on the presence of a contest: “opposing combatants’ equal right to kill in
war is founded on the assumption of mutual risk.”190 That is, killing which is
no contest cannot avail itself to the justifications available to traditional
soldiers (nor, I would add, can it be an instantiation of martial excellence).

Mark Coeckelberg, ‘Drones, information technology, and distance: mapping the moral
epistemology of remote fighting’, Ethics and Information Technology, vol. 15, 2013, 87-98 at 92.
189 Christian Enemark, Armed Drones and the Ethics of War: Military virtue in a post-heroic age,
(London: Routledge, 2014), 77.
190 Ibid.
188
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However, the view that what gives enemy combatants’ the right to kill each
other is mutual risk is a different one to that which I defended in the last
chapter; namely, that what makes any action unjust, killing included, is the
intentional violation of rights. War is not a contractual relationship of equality,
it is the rightful defense of those who the virtues of justice and charity demand
be defended. Thus, the question is, does non-contested war intentionally
violate any rights?

G.E.M. Anscombe argued that “[t]he present-day conception of “aggression,”
like so many strongly influential conceptions, is a bad one. Why must it be
wrong to strike the first blow in a struggle? The only question is, who is in the
right.”191 If the ultimate question concerns the justice of war then it seems to
matter little whether or not the war is a contest or not. Wars on which one side
possesses overwhelming military superiority (what David Rodin calls
“unequal wars”)192 are not, a priori, problematic, so long as the more powerful
side are restrained by the principles of just war, and do no more than is
necessary. What is problematic about non-contested war is that it provides no
opportunity to practise the moral virtues, or the nonmoral excellences of the
soldier. (There are also contingent questions regarding drone warfare such as
whether it violates prohibitions on intentional killing, but these are a matter
for another work.)

Elizabeth Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, in G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, in
Richard A. Wasserstrom, War and Morality, (California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970),
43-44.
192 David Rodin, ‘The Ethics of Asymmetric War’, in Richard Sorabji & David Rodin (eds.),
The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 155.
191
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It is clear that drone pilots engage in risk-free killing, and for this reason
Enemark suggests that their profession “challenges traditional notions […] of
what it means to be a combatant or ‘warrior’ within the military profession.”193
Enemark describes drone pilots as “disembodied warriors,”194 with the focus
on disembodiment, not warrior status. Disembodiment entails an inability to
fear for one’s own personal safety; an inability to practise what Enemark
describes as “physical courage” (courage when one’s life is at risk).195 Thus,
disembodied warriors are never able to practise or prove their physical
excellences in life-or-death situations; in fact, given that their targets are vetted
in advance and their superior officers able to directly monitor their exact
conduct during missions, there is very little opportunity for drone pilots to
demonstrate any autonomy at all. They are, to return to Augustine’s fourth
century notion, “an instrument, a sword in [their] user's hand.”196 In this sense,
the idea that drone pilots are soldiers, who kill and risk being killed with a
sense of justice, charity, and courage vanishes: drone pilots are not acting as
soldiers; in fact, they are hardly acting as autonomous moral agents. Given
this, it is difficult to see how the drone pilot could achieve any moral
excellence, let alone the excellences of the soldier, for whom excellence

Enemark, Armed Drones and the Ethics of War, op cit., 77.
Ibid., 86.
195 Ibid., 80. I am unconvinced as to whether this is actually a different species of courage to
what Enemark calls “moral courage.” Physical courage is exercised against physical risk,
whilst moral courage, it seems, is practised where one’s physical security is not at stake, for
example, “having the courage to speak out against perceived injustice.” (80) However, all
physical courage is surely moral in that one accepts the risk of physical injury because of a
perceived injustice. What is perhaps different is that to practise physical courage one has to
overcome physical impulses (such as the autonomic system described earlier). However, I
do not think this constitutes a difference in species as Enemark suggests. Aquinas argues
that “it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws
the will from following the reason.” (ST, II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3). It seems not to matter what the
obstacle is, although, of course, the larger the obstacle, the more courage is required, which
means physical courage might be a more perfect instantiation of courage (thus Aquinas says
that fortitude is ultimately concerned with fear of death (II-II, Q. 123, Art. 4)), but this is a
question of differing degrees, not species.
196 Augustine trans. Henry Bettenson, City of God, (Victoria: Penguin Books, 2003), 1.21.
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involves both moral virtues and nonmoral skills practised in contested
environments.
The tragedy is that although they are treated as such, drone pilots are not
merely instruments in the hands of their superiors. They are people. As such,
the moral gravity of killing bears on their consciences, they feel acutely the
seriousness of what it is that they are doing, but without having the same
validation available to warriors. At the very least, regardless of the justice of
his mission or war, when a soldier kills an enemy, he can reconcile his action
through the framework of self-defence. This psychological assurance is not
available to the drone pilot. He is no warrior. He lives within the military
culture, but not within the warrior code. Although there is good reason to
expect drones owned and flown by the military to be used on the battlefield
during a live fight, those drones run by intelligence groups are more often
used for covert and isolated strikes in which drone pilots are also not able to
justify killing through defending fellow soldiers.

It is unsurprising, then, that despite undertaking no risk, drone pilots report
the same rates of PTSD (or perhaps, more accurately, moral injury, given PTSD
is a fear for one’s safety) as pilots of manned aircraft.197 Drone pilots not only
kill their targets, but they observe them for weeks beforehand, coming to
know their targets habits, families, and communities. That is, they are able to
see their targets as persons. As Coeckelbergh notes, “[p]ilots may recall images
of the people they killed […] of the person who first played with his children
and was then killed.”198 Drone pilots appear to consider themselves morally

C.f. Jean L. Otto & Bryant J. Webber, ‘Mental Health Diagnoses and Counseling Among
Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in the United States Air Force’, Medical Surveillance
Monthly Reports, vol. 20, no. 3, 2013, 3-8.
198 Coeckelberg, op cit., 96.
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responsible – at least in a sense – for those who they kill. Despite being an
instrument in the hands of superiors, it is the pilot who does the killing.

Here, there is a double-think about responsibility. Either drone pilots are
responsible, in which case they need to be afforded autonomy in the way in
which they carry out their professions, or they are not, in which case they are
not the ones who kill. If drone-based killing is to be justified, drone pilots need
to be made aware that the justifications for it are manifestly different to those
available to front-line soldiers. Just because drone pilots serve the military
does not make them soldiers, and does not avail them to the kind of
justifications for killing that soldiers possess. A new moral framework is
necessary to explain how (if at all) unmanned, risk-free killing can be
justifiable, lest more drone pilots become wracked with the guilt of unjustified
killings. Much of this guilt may stem from misidentifying drone pilots as
warriors. They are not. Better would be the emergence of a new honour code
available to “disembodied warriors” (such as drone pilots and “cyber
warriors”) which emphasises different moral virtues and nonmoral
excellences, and, in the case of drone pilots, explains how their killings can be
justified. If this cannot be done, the practice of armed drones should be
abandoned altogether.

Earlier I explored the way in which soldiers ought to be informed by, and see
themselves as part of, the variety of different honour worlds in which they
inhabit. The distance between the honour worlds of war and peace, for
example, seems extremely problematic for the wellbeing of soldiers, as well as
for their conduct in war. Drone pilots, however, are a species of warfighter
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who can be off at war in the morning, and home in time for dinner. They are
part of the military establishment with all its disciplines, regulations, history,
traditions and codes, but are at the same time something altogether different
to the frontline soldier. Enemark explores this dilemma, suggesting that the
mixture of the military and home worlds is confusing, paradoxical, “and
potentially damaging to the military profession of which they are supposedly
a part.199

It could also, I would add, be damaging to the pilots themselves. It is not
beyond imagining a drone pilot performing a strike that kills a major terrorist
leader, and hours later be mowing the lawn, washing the dishes or helping his
children with their maths homework. The traditional warrior code clearly
does not apply to these people. Enemark suggests describing them as
disembodied warriors, but in our more cynical moments, we might also call
them “bureaucratic warriors” for whom no real virtue is required. Regardless
of whether or not this is the case, drone pilots are suffering psychologically for
the killings they commit. Although he accepts no physical risk, the drone pilot
appears to be at even greater risk of fragmentation than does the conventional
soldier. Perhaps part of this is that drone pilots do not fit into either honour
world: peace or war. Because they never fully leave either world, they do not
encounter “re-entry” issues, so to speak, but still their military and home lives
are an ill fit. They are perfect candidates for the moral schizophrenia I explored
in the last section. Whether or not their practice is just, drone pilots’

Christian Enemark, ‘The end of courage? How drones are undermining military virtue’,
ABC Religion and Ethics, 24th April, 2013,
<http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/04/24/3744693.htm>.
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involvement in war makes them vulnerable to the kind of psychological
scarring that can shatter wellbeing.

4: Conclusion

This chapter focussed on the aretaic notion of wellbeing – flourishing – and
the ways in which war can be detrimental to that project. Importantly, it is not
possible to fully separate flourishing from virtue, as the flourishing life is, in
part, a life of virtue. I began by considering two different aretaic models of
military ethics, Nancy Sherman’s neo-Stoicism and Shannon E. French’s
warrior code, with regard to preventing the commission of atrocities. Whilst
both capture important elements of this project, an approach that seeks to
integrate the honour worlds of “everyday morality” and the military world of
honour promises to foster virtue and guard against moral transgression in a
more comprehensive manner than either of the above approaches. Offering
mechanisms for reducing the rate and likelihood of moral transgression is
vitally important because of the huge psychological damage caused by PTSD
and moral injury.

Moral injury and PTSD appear to be, at least phenomenologically, separate
conditions. The former is the experience of oneself as self-judge, whilst the
latter is an experience of victimhood and vulnerability. From an aretaic
perspective, I believe that moral injury can be more devastating, particularly
when it results from viewing oneself as perpetrator, because it involves a
changed perception of self as undeserving of happiness. As such, treatments
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and preventive methods are vital and, insofar as moral injury is a partly moral
problem, the intervention will be in part moral too. Borrowing from Jonathan
Shay, I argued that the “trauma narrative” is a vital way to help soldiers
reconcile their experiences with their non-warrior identities, but that such
narrative requires specific “therapeutic virtues” on the part of the audience of
such narrative. In the case of those who have perceived themselves to have
committed some wrong during their time at war, this must be complimented
by a kind of purification ritual. Importantly, both these processes must gain
the esteem of the warrior culture in order to have traction and ensure soldiers
actually participate in them genuinely. In the case of those who have
genuinely committed an atrocity, it is vital for the wellbeing of the warrior that
he be punished for his crime – even if the punishment is very minor otherwise, he will punish himself in ways that will be much more detrimental.

I took time to specifically refute the approach to military ethics known as role
morality. This approach undermines the integration of different honour
worlds that I sought in the first section. It suggests that what soldiers do in
one role is morally incompatible with other social roles soldiers inhabit. As
such, it threatens to undermine the kind of integration of one’s actions that
trauma narratives seek. Ironically, although role morality is framed as a way
of preventing “moral schizophrenia,” it seems a perfect candidate for
generating exactly that.

Finally, I returned to the notion of shame which is so central to honour systems
like the warrior code, arguing that it can be a double-edged sword. First,
because it is possible for warriors to be shamed for personality traits that are
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non-essential to the task of soldiering, or for misattributions that emerge over
time (such as overtly masculine traits, bravado, or control over one’s
autonomic system). Where shame is useful is in encouraging adherence to
strictly moral behaviours: the virtues. It is also important to identify exactly
who is part of the warrior culture and who is not, for in the case of drone pilots,
who I argue exist outside the moral community, it can be extremely harmful
for them to seek justification for their killings from the warrior code, given
that it does not apply to drone pilots because they fight in a risk-free manner.
Better would be the development of a new code of honour for “disembodied
warriors” to which those pilots could turn for a sense of honour and meaning
for their profession.

Bringing civilian values and roles to bear on the development and
enforcement of warrior codes is one way of ensuring that warriors are able to
maintain their commitments in the various honour worlds in which they
abide. This is especially pertinent in cases where the “warriors” – such as
drone pilots – are no longer fighting in a theatre of war, but might traverse the
honour worlds of warrior and family member in the same day. In these cases,
empathy – which Sherman prizes so highly - becomes one of many values that
traverses different honour worlds. Fathers and soldiers both need to be
empathetic, and one is honoured for being empathetic. However, one is also
honoured for issuing punishment where necessary, on one’s children or the
enemy; on obeying laws that bear on them, whether road traffic laws or laws
of armed conflict; for being slow to anger, but showing anger when
appropriate, and so on. This approach emphasises the moral virtues instead of
focussing on particular values which might be limited to a particular honour
world.
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Chapter Five

Virtue in Waging War

My thesis has advanced three claims. The first is the historical claim that,
although JWT originally considered both deontic and aretaic notions as within
its scope, it came to emphasise the deontological aspects above the aretaic as
it became increasingly concerned with the legal governance of war and
international relations. Secondly, that there is a logical connection between
deontological and aretaic values within moral philosophy via the concepts of
motive and intention, and that incorporating the aretaic allows for a more
robust account of wartime ethics. Thirdly, that re-introducing aretaic notions
to JWT allows the theory to encompass a broader range of different moral
issues, such as the growing distance between soldiers’ roles at home and at
war, PTSD, and moral injury.

The previous chapter in particular focussed on showing how, if just war
theorists were to take an interest in the aretaic (especially aretaic consequences
of deontological transgressions), problems of moral psychology and the
normative identity of the soldier could be more easily addressed from within
JWT. In what follows, I illustrate how interest in the moral virtues can be
brought to bear on more traditional questions of JWT such as when there may
be a resort to war, how soldiers ought to act, what strategies are morally
permissible, and so on. In this chapter I show why the presence of virtues
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within just war decision-makers yields desirable results for the military. First,
the virtues assist in adherence. The presence of virtues within individuals
makes it more likely that they will adhere to the responsibilities that their
professional duties impose – the minimum standards of their profession.
Secondly, the virtues offer the possibility of professional excellence. People of
virtue are more likely to characterise the ideal standards of excellence for their
professions, acting well not only when it is professionally necessary, but
whenever they determine it right to do so.

In making this argument, I also demonstrate the interplay between
deontological and aretaic norms within military ethics. It is my position that
deontological norms determine the minimum requirements of justice which
must be met in order for a particular action to be morally good. Thus, the
professional duties and responsibilities of military practitioners are
deontologically formulated. However, for individuals to act in accord with
those professional responsibilities may at times require particular dispositions
of character: virtues. This, we saw in the previous chapter, is especially true in
times when situational factors make adherence to moral principles difficult. 1
The virtues will therefore be necessary to compel individuals to actually
conform to the deontological standards they are bound to when it appears
most difficult to do so.

The importance of situational factors in aretaic ethics is discussed by Robert F. Card, who
notes how findings from social psychology reveal that character is not the sole determinant
in a person’s (un)ethical conduct. See: Robert F. Card, ‘Pure Aretaic Ethics and Character’,
The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 38, 2004, 473-484.
1
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However, the virtues go beyond assisting in adherence; they also encourage
individuals to do more than what their professional duties require of them. A
person who has characterised the virtues will not only act well when it is
necessary or required of him, he will act well because acting well is who he is.
The virtues, then, enable military practitioners to go ‘above and beyond the
call of duty,’ that is, to perform deeds that are supererogatory. So, although
all morally good professionals require the virtues, the degree to which they
possess them will determine how likely they are to do more than what their
professional duties stipulate.

In this chapter I consider the three central wartime professions: (i) the soldier
who fights the war; (ii) the military commander who oversees the manner in
which the war is fought; and (iii) the political leader who declares war and
determines the overall purposes for which the war is fought. In each section I
identify particular professional duties and demonstrate how particular virtues
are necessary in order for a person to conform to those duties. Where
appropriate, I go further, showing how a fuller characterisation of the virtue
could compel an individual toward morally excellent, supererogatory
behaviour.
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1: Soldiers

The word “professionalism” has become popular amongst discussions of the
ethical values and conduct of soldiers.2 Asa Kasher argues that
professionalism implies a commitment to five different components of a
profession: knowledge, skill, improvement, understanding, and ethics, 3 but it
is the fifth, ethics, which is most often the focus in discussions of
professionalism, as evidenced by the inclusion of “professionalism” as a chief
value of several military forces around the world.4 In this sense,
professionalism involves adherence to the “rules of proper behaviour of a
professional as such, according to the values of the professional ﬁeld.”5
Importantly, Kasher adds, “[a] correct understanding of the essence of the
profession is the basic content of professional ethics.”6 This means that
however a profession is defined will dramatically influence the manner in
which professional ethics are conceived.

Some examples include: Martin Cook, ‘The Normative Dimensions of Military
Professionalism’ in Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the US Military, (New York: State
University of New York Press, 2004), 55-78; Stephen Coleman, ‘Professional Ethics, Duties,
and Obligations’ in Military Ethics: An Introduction with Case Studies, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013), 32-58; Asa Kasher, ‘Teaching and Training Military Ethics: An Israeli
Approach’ in Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee and Don Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the
Military, (Cornwall: Ashgate, 2008), 133-145 and ‘Public Trust in a Military Force’, Journal of
Military Ethics, vol. 2, iss. 1, 2003, 20-45; Rebecca J. Johnson, ‘Maintaining Discipline in
Detainee Operations: Avoiding the Slippery Slope to Abuse’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol.
11, iss. 4, 2012, 360-362.
3 Asa Kasher, ‘Public Trust in a Military Force,’ op cit., 23-24.
4 Paul Robinson, ‘Introduction: Ethics Education in the Military’, Paul Robinson, Nigel De
Lee and Don Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the Military, (Cornwall: Ashgate, 2008), 7.
5 Asa Kasher, ‘Public Trust in a Military Force’, op cit., 24.
6 Ibid.
2
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However a profession is defined, a constitutive element of that profession will
inevitably be the duties and responsibilities that a professional commits to
when he joins the profession. Some are likely to see these duties as the defining
attributes of the profession, and the limits of their responsibilities as
professionals: “if the duties of soldiering are X, Y, and Z, then the definition
of a soldier is someone who does X, Y, and Z.” Another way of defining
professionalism would be to consider the purpose for which the profession
exists, and professional duties as necessary aspects of fulfilling that purpose.
This latter account, however, is likely to commit to professional duties only
insofar as they advance the ultimate purpose of the profession, and is
therefore more likely to advance the purpose of the profession even where
there exists no professional responsibility to do so. In this section, I argue that
this latter account of professionalism is the one that tends to characterise
excellent professionals, whilst professionals who see their duties as definitive
of their profession are likely to be competent, but unlikely to excel.

Serving either one’s professional duties or the purpose of one’s profession
requires the habituation of particular character traits in order to be able to do
what is morally required. In the case of soldiering, the virtues that are most
important in order to adhere to one’s duties, or to excel them, are (i) prudence
– the ability to choose well between the moral claims of competing paths of
action, and (ii) courage – the ability to do what is right despite the difficulties
that might present.
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1.1: Prudence

In a letter to his troops regarding the US military’s position against the use of
torture, former US General David Petraeus urged his soldiers to avoid the
illegal practice. Petraeus’ letter was written in part out of a perceived need to
“retain [the military’s] integrity,”7 and his tone suggests a concern about the
very character of the military, speaking of the “values and standards that
make us who we are.”8 However, his letter was also aimed at explaining to his
troops that torture is both illegal and ineffective. He encourages soldiers to
remember that new evidence indicates that humane methods of collecting
human intelligence have proved effective. There is, therefore, no need to
torture. Petraeus’ choice of words, categorising torture as illegal rather than,
for example, inhumane, immoral, or wrongful, is significant here. It indicates
a belief that soldiers are required to obey the laws set out before them: if
something is illegal, this should be sufficient for a soldier to restrain from
doing it. They do not need to be told why, it is sufficient that they are told.
Professional soldiers obey orders.

In his reflections on his experiences in World War II, American philosopher J.
Glenn Gray described the way in which fellow soldiers deferred to superior
orders and shirked responsibility for their actions as being “like escaping one’s
own shadow.”9 Unquestioning, unreflecting obedience of this nature was,

David H. Patreus letter dated 10th May, 2007, APO AE 09342-1400,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/petraeus_values_051007.pdf>.
8 Ibid.
9 J. Glenn Gray, The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1970) 181.
7
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Gray contends, a denial of the reality that every person is autonomous and
able to choose his own path of action. In light of this, there appears to be a
tension between the contention that soldiers have a duty to obey and the belief
that prudence – the virtue that helps people perfect their habits of moral
determination – is a desirable trait in soldiers, which I and other theorists have
contended.10 How can soldiers who are expected to defer their decisionmaking to others simultaneously act prudently in making decisions? This
discussion will show that it is only the prudent soldier who is able to be
obedient in the manner that his professional duty requires because it is
prudence that enables a soldier to determine when and whether he should defer
his responsibility for moral decision-making to another.

1.1.1: The Prudent Soldier and the Cause for War

In one of the early exhortations on the duty of soldiers to obey orders, di
Vitoria argued that “if the war seems patently unjust to the subject, he must
not fight, even if he is ordered to do so by the prince.”11 However, Vitoria is
quick to note, “lesser subjects who are not invited to be heard in the councils
of the prince nor in public council are not required to examine the causes of
war, but may lawfully go to war trusting the judgement of their superiors.”12
In a modern context, this argument can be taken to imply that if a soldier,

C.f. Gregory Reichberg, ‘Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence’, Journal of Military Ethics,
vol. 9, iss. 3, 2010, 262-275; Henry Hude, ‘Reshaping the Ethical Training of Future French
Commissioned Officers’ in Robinson, de Lee & Carrick, Ethics Education in the Military, op.
cit., 118.
11 Francisco di Vitoria, On the Law of War in Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (eds.),
Vitoria: Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), Q. 2, Sec. 22.
12 Ibid., Q. 2, Sec. 25.
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through some unique information or conscientious judgement genuinely
believes a cause to be unjust, he may not permissibly fight in the war.
However, he is not obligated to undertake such conscientious reflection unless
prompted by his conscience, special information he possesses, or something
else. This is to say that it is not a basic duty of soldiers to reflect on the justice
of their cause. As Bates, an ordinary soldier in Shakespeare’s Henry V notes,
“we know enough if we know we are the King’s subjects. If his cause be
wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.”13

In response, McMahan argues that soldiers could only have a duty to “defer
to the epistemic authority of the government,”14 saying that “there must be
good reason for them to believe that the government, or the relevant
governmental institutions, are actually fulfilling the task of scrupulously
evaluating potential wars as just or unjust.”15 If such reasons were available,
McMahan contends, a “division of moral labour” which liberated soldiers
from moral evaluation of cause would be justifiable.16 This is, however, not the
case – at least in the United States – according to McMahan: “[t]here are no
institutional or procedural mechanisms that ensure that moral considerations
are even taken into account, much less taken seriously, in decisions concerning
resort to war.”17 The reality of modern day political institutions lends no faith,
McMahan contends, to soldiers who would seek to outsource some of their
moral and cognitive burdens to others. Were the government suitably welldisposed, “it would be rational and perhaps morally required for soldiers to
William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 4, Scene 1, 129-132 in John Jowett, William
Montgomery, Gary Taylor and Stanley Wells (eds.), The Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete
Works (2nd ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
14 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009), 66.
15 Ibid., 67.
16 Ibid., 68-70.
17 Ibid., 69.
13
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subordinate their own moral judgement to that of the government […] But
there are no countries of this sort now.”18

Here we are faced with two competing accounts of whether the prudent
soldier will defer his moral decision-making to the political leadership and
simply obey his leaders’ determination regarding the war. However, I believe
the two accounts (which I take as representative of a more general distinction
in the academic literature) are less disparate than is contended. Vitoria, for
instance, stipulated that “there may nevertheless be arguments and proofs of
the injustice of war so powerful, that even citizens and subjects of the lower
class may not use ignorance as an excuse.”19 One argument that might be
sufficiently powerful would be evidence that the government has no interest
in seriously considering the justice of the wars they fight. David Estlund
explores this question in relation to Nazi Germany; specifically, in response to
Michael Walzer’s exoneration of Ernst Rommel on the basis that he did not
violate in bello principles:20

In Nazi Germany I would hold at least some soldiers responsible for their
abdication of a responsibility to ask whether justice is being duly looked after.
They knew, or should have known, that Hitler’s aggression was without
justiﬁcation. Insofar as they had an acceptable alternative they should have
refused to ﬁght and done what they could to obstruct the German effort. Soldiers
lower down in the chain of command also have a responsibility to ask themselves
whether justice is being looked after, but it will sometimes be much harder for

Ibid., 70.
Francisco di Vitoria, On the Law of War, op cit., Q. 2, Sec. 26.
20 C.f. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (4th edition), (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 3741.
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them to make this determination. Moreover, they are more likely than generals
to be without an acceptable alternative to obeying. How much blame is
reasonable in their case is, for these reasons, often less clear. This does not mean
that they are not to blame; I believe that they often are when they know or should
know that the war is without justiﬁcation, fought on a pretext, or based entirely
on lies.21

What is important to note here is that the point of conjecture is not, in fact,
whether or not soldiers can justifiably fight in any war, regardless of how
evident the (in)justice of the cause, but whether as a matter of empirical fact
current soldiers would be prudent to trust in politicians to be making moral
decisions about the wars they are fighting in. There is consensus that soldiers
ought not to fight in wars that they know to be unjust, and that they ought only
to trust governments that have demonstrated a commitment to justice. What
is contested is whether or not today’s governments tend to fulfil their
obligations to deliberate the justice of their causes. However, given that the
soldier is, in many senses a representative of the government and its people,
it does not seem reasonable for soldiers to be duty-bound to doubt their
government’s commitment to justice. Thus, we can also assume that soldiers’
professional duties of obedience include requiring them to give governments
a “presumption of good moral character” that must be disproved before a
soldier becomes professionally bound to question commands to go to war.

Note, however, that the professional duties to (i) refuse patently unjust orders
and (ii) defer to the moral authority of the government except in cases where

David Estlund, ‘On Following Orders in an Unjust War’, Journal of Political Philosophy, vol.
15, iss. 2, 2007, 213-234 at 226.
21
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the government has eroded its own moral authority each require that soldiers
possess a level of moral awareness and evaluative prowess. If soldiers are
unable to analyse the actions of their government – in particular, unpopular
or widely criticised actions – for themselves to determine whether this
government is one worth obeying, they cannot know what to do with the next
order they receive. Thus, to fulfil their professional duties, soldiers must be
able to prudently evaluate the state of affairs to determine whether to trust a
government or not.

In the case of obedience, I do not believe it makes sense to describe a
supererogatory level of prudence for the following reason. If, as I have
contended, excellent professionals are in part characterised by a commitment
to the purposes of their profession, then excellent soldiers will be committed to
the efficient running of the military. As di Vitoria noted, it would be
“inexpedient”22 for every soldier to make decisions for himself regarding
which orders to obey, and which not to. The military chain of command is
meant, in principle, to allow the most qualified people to make decisions with
regard to operations. For subordinates to question those orders is not merely
a challenge to the order itself, but to the expertise of the person giving the
order. More importantly, however, it threatens to undermine the efficient
functioning of the military.

Obedience in the military is of instrumental value. It serves to expedite the
process of mobilising soldiers and waging war, and it is morally important

22

Francisco di Vitoria, On the Law of War, op cit., Q. 2, Sec. 25.
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that the military be efficient because its task, the defence of the state, the
innocent, and the common good, is morally serious. As McMahan notes:

Military institutions have to be able to react quickly and efficiently in moments
of crisis. Because of this, they are organized hierarchically with a rigid chain of
command, Success or failure, which can make the difference between life and
death for a great many people, may depend on whether those lower in the chain
immediately and unhesitatingly obey the orders they receive from above.23

Thus, morally excellent soldiers are unlikely to embark on any more
evaluation than professionally competent soldiers. As Ward Thomas notes,
soldiers are “quite justifiably, likely to place more weight upon those
principles and values that go to the essence of their vocation, including
deference to political authorities and the virtue of obeying those authorities.”24
What is required, as a matter of professional duty, is that soldiers be prudent
and self-aware in their delegation of moral decision-making to their political
leaders. The deference to the judgement of others must be an exercise in
reflection, not in (to borrow from Gray) escaping one’s own shadow. For this
reason, it is acceptable that occasionally soldiers are obedient in cases where
the cause was unjust. Because their commitment to other goods, such as the
efficient functioning of the military, coupled with the lack of compelling
reasons not to trust the government, their misplaced trust is still morally
justifiable and consistent with prudence. As Estlund argues:

Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, op cit., 71.
Ward Thomas, ‘Unjust War and the Catholic Soldier’, Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 35, no.
3, 2007, 509- 525 at 518.
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If an order to go to war or an order to fight in a certain way is not even close to
what would be just if the facts were as the authority states them to be, or if the
stated view of the justifying facts is not even close to a reasonable conclusion
based on the appropriate materials, the soldier is not obligated (and probably not
permitted) to carry out the order.25

In this section I established that the professional duty of soldiers does not
require them to be blindly obedient to the political leadership. Rather, it
requires that they be obedient insofar as that obedience serves the goals of the
military profession, which include only fighting in just wars. Thus, as a matter
of professional duty, soldiers require the virtue of prudence in order to avoid
being involved in patently unjust wars. However, this is not the end of
prudence’s value to soldiers. Even in just wars, soldiers require prudence in
order to evaluate the commands issued to them by their military commanders,
and it is to this question that I now turn.

1.1.2: The Prudent Soldier and the Conduct of War

As was also the case in ad bellum evaluations, although soldiers have a duty to
obey reasonable commands, they also have a duty not to afford trust where it
has been proved to be unwarranted. Similarly, it would be a violation of a
soldier’s professional duty were he to continue to unquestioningly obey a
commander who had repeatedly issued orders to fire on noncombatants, for
instance. In the case of the cause for war I argued that even if, on occasion, a

25

David Estlund, op. cit., 230. Emphasis added.

291

soldier’s obedience meant that he fought in an unjust war, this would not be
inconsistent with either prudence or his professional duties. However, it
remains to be seen if the same can be said for obedience to in bello commands.
If a soldier obeys an order from his commander which, as it turns out, results
in his killing noncombatants, is he similarly free from moral responsibility?

Of course, like in ad bellum cases, soldiers are duty-bound to refuse any
obviously immoral order. If a soldier knows an order to be a violation of
deontological norms, duties of professionalism stipulate that he ought to
refuse that order. However, this has not always been the case. Throughout
history there have been instances in which unwavering and unquestioning
obedience was seen as a professional duty of soldiers, in particular during the
Elizabethan era26 and amongst the Southern States of America during the Civil
War. Paul Robinson cites a letter written by Confederate soldier John Hooper,
who states that “the good soldier never stops to inquire whether [an] order is
right or wrong.”27 However, from what was established with regard to ad
bellum, it seems that soldiers must inquire at the very least into the rightfulness
of seemingly illegal or immoral commands, especially if they are given by a
commander of ill repute.

However, there are noteworthy differences between a soldier’s ability to
refuse to go to war and a soldier’s ability to refuse an order within war. On
the one hand, it appears clear that in bello commands will require a much more

Paul Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq, (New
York: Routledge, 2006), 87-88.
27 Southern Historical Collection, John Hooper Letters, Letter dated 28 th May 1864 in Paul
Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq, 115.
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immediate response, and relevant information may be much less readily
available than in ad bellum matters regarding cause, indicating that soldiers
ought to be more trusting. On the other hand, because soldiers are on the
ground, they are able to witness first-hand the realities of what they are being
ordered to do, and evaluate the evidence in the moment. For instance, in a premission briefing a soldier might be told that a particular sector contains only
insurgents who are legitimate targets, but if he gets to the sector and sees
groups of children, he has cause to question the order. As Walzer notes,
“[s]oldiers can never be transformed into mere instruments of war […]
Trained to obey “without hesitation,” they remain nevertheless capable of
hesitating.”28 Thus, it appears that soldiers may be both better and worse
equipped to refuse an order in bello than they are ad bellum. The question for
us to explore is what the professional duties of the soldier are in these cases,
and whether prudence is necessary to assist in adhering to those duties.

It is easier to answer the second question first. One argument for the necessity
of prudence is that illegal or immoral orders in war may not be phrased in a
way that makes their illegality/immorality readily apparent. Mark Osiel
describes the use of ambiguous orders as a source of either “atrocity by
bureaucracy,” “atrocity by connivance,” or some combination of the two.29 He
notes that “a key problem with requiring that an order be manifestly criminal
on its face, in order to hold subordinates liable for obeying it, is that this
approach easily permits the superior officer who desires atrocity to formulate
his orders in ways that ensure that soldiers obeying them are excused from

Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 311.
Mark Osiel, ‘Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War’, California
Law Review, vol. 86, no. 5, 1998, 939-941 + 943-1129 at 1099.
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criminal liability.”30 Because commanders are to be afforded, like political
leaders, a presumption of morality, commanders who intend to command
illegal or immoral action need only word their command in language that is
sufficiently vague as to avoid being an explicitly wrongful order. If soldiers
lack the prudence to press their commander for more specific details on vague
commands, they risk having their obedience abused.

Some may argue that prudence is not necessary here. If a commander chooses
to use vague language in issuing commands, that is his business – even if his
order is immoral, it is he who is acting wrongly, not the soldiers who obey him.
To paraphrase Walzer, when soldiers obey just commanders their actions are
not crimes, when they obey unjust commands, their actions are not their
crimes.31 I have some sympathy for this view, however I believe its
applications are limited. Oftentimes an initially ambiguous order will later be
revealed to be unquestionably immoral. At that point, soldiers must refrain
from completing the order or they will rightly be held complicit in the crime.
As Walzer noted above, soldiers remain capable of hesitating until the very
last moment.

Consider the infamous My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. Walzer, in
his analysis of the events, notes that Captain Medina, the company
commander had ordered his troops to kill any enemies in the area, giving the
following definition of enemy: “anybody that was running from us, hiding

Ibid., 1100.
Walzer uses similar wording to describe the moral equality of combatants, c.f. Walzer, Just
and Unjust Wars, op cit., 39.
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from us, or appeared to us to be an enemy.”32 The ambiguity in a definition
like this, which ignores the extreme likelihood that noncombatants would flee
from an imminent fire zone, appears to have been complicit in the slaughter
of noncombatants that followed. Soldiers who saw themselves as duty-bound
to obey exercised no prudence in questioning the morality or legality of the
order, perhaps believing their moral responsibility to have been absorbed by
their commanding officer.

In his defence testimony following the My Lai Masscare, Lt. William Calley –
who testified to having killed noncombatants that day – was asked what he
understood his responsibilities to be when he had doubts about an order. His
response was that [i]f I had - questioned an order, I was supposed to carry the
order out and then come back and make my complaint later.”33 Calley
explicitly notes that he “was never told that [he] had the choice”34 to refuse an
order. To say that prudence – the virtue that governs and assists us in making
choices – was not at work here is an understatement. Not only the refusal to
make a choice, but the belief that the capacity to choose was denied,
demonstrates the extent to which obedience can undermine soldiers’ ability to
question or refuse illegal orders. Calley testified as follows:

I was ordered to go in there and destroy the enemy. That was my job on that day.
That was the mission I was given. I did not sit down and think in terms of men,

Ibid., 310.
UKMC Law School, ‘Defense Testimony of Lt. William Calley’, 1970,
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women, and children. They were all classified the same, and that was the
classification that we dealt with.35

Calley’s refusal to discriminate or hesitate at the prospect of killing
noncombatants is the antithesis of what one would expect of the prudent
soldier. Unlike Tennyson’s heroic cavalryman in ‘The Charge of the Light
Bridgade,’ whose duty was “not to reason why […] but to do and die,”36
professional soldiers ought to reason why, especially in cases where their
commands seem contrary to the professional duties and purposes of
soldiering.

The professional duty of the soldier with regard to obeying his commander’s
orders during a war is in most ways analogous to his duties with regard to ad
bellum commands. He owes his commander the presumption of morality
unless the order reveals itself to be immoral or unconscionable. A danger for
soldiers is that the presumption of morality could be abused by commanders,
allowing them to issue orders that are sufficiently vague so as to avoid being
clearly wrongful. Prudence may assist soldiers in recognising ambiguous
commands

and

seeking

further

clarification

to

avoid

potentially

compromising situations. In in bello cases, the revelation of immorality may
occur very late in the piece, even during the operation itself. For this reason,
prudence is an essential virtue because it helps to determine the limits on
obedience, and thus helps guard against atrocities of the nature seen at My
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Lai. Of course, refusing orders in situations like this also requires courage, to
which we now turn.

1.2: Courage, Risk, and Sacrifice

Courage is the virtue most frequently associated with soldiers. It is regularly
listed as a core value of military associations – Paul Robinson notes its
inclusion in the US Army, British Army, and Canadian Army, 37 and it is also
included amongst both the Australian and New Zealand Army Core Values.38
Further, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas all believed that military combat was
the arena in which courage was most readily applied.39 Why do soldiers need
to be courageous? The simply answer is because soldiering is a physically,
psychologically, and morally difficult endeavour in which a person is asked
to risk his life, his mental wellbeing, and his soul. Soldiers are frequently asked
to do that which is difficult, and courage is the virtue that assists in doing what
is right despite the difficulties involved.40 In a recent report from the
Australian Defence Force, military personnel are described as “Servants of the
State,” who are required “to be prepared to risk injury or death in pursuit of

Paul Robinson, Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq, op cit.,
166-167
38 For the Australian Army, see: Australian Army, ‘Army Traditions’,
<http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/army/about-the-army/army-traditions/>; For New Zealand,
courage is featured on the title header of the regular newsletter ‘Army News’, iss. 428, 2012,
<http://www.army.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/army-news/armynews428.pdf>.
39 Plato trans. Rosamond Kent Sprague, Laches, in John M. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete
Works, (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III,
1115a25-34; Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 123, Art. 5.
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State-directed missions.”41 Thus, every professional soldier who is ready and
willing to undertake missions that not only his life but his moral and
psychological wellbeing must, as a matter of necessity, possess a certain
degree of courage in order to fulfil his professional duty.

However, not all tales of courage, risk, and sacrifice by soldiers are performed
in the pursuit of State-directed missions: sometimes a soldier will dive on a
grenade to save his troop or volunteer to be the first man over the top or serve
as a decoy to attract enemy fire. These appear to be extraordinary cases of
courage, which go above and beyond a soldier’s professional duties.

Consider, for instance, Bombadier Robert Key: a miner and British solider in
WWII who was recorded as having been killed “showing off” with a hand
grenade. Recent reports have discovered that, in fact, Key died after noticing
a group of children crowded around a live grenade in a field. He rushed into
the group, snatched the grenade from one child, smothered it in his jacket and
ran as far away as he could.42 Key, who at the time was patrolling the village
in which he was stationed, could not have been blamed if he had stood back
and, regretfully, done nothing – his action clearly went beyond the mission
directives of an ordinary patrol. Thus, it appears that alongside the ethical

Maj. Gen. C.W. Orme, ‘Beyond Compliance: Professionalism, Trust, and Capability in the
Australian Profession of Arms’, Report prepared for the Australian Defence Force, 2011, 63,
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duty to be courageous is a level of sacrifice that goes beyond professional duty
and is genuinely supererogatory.43

How we distinguish between these two different levels of courage is an
important question for the purpose of demarcating a soldier’s professional
duty from what is a matter of professional excellence. In this section I explore
the level of risk a soldier is duty-bound to accept, and how to distinguish that
risk from the type of supererogatory courage displayed by Bombadier Key. In
short, I argue that soldiers are duty-bound to accept the level of risk necessary
for them to complete State-directed missions. Any risk that is undertaken not
for those purposes is a matter of either personal virtue or professional
excellence. However, whichever level of risk and sacrifice a soldiers strives
for, it appears clear that courage will be necessary to assist him in complying
with standards of either professional duty or professional excellence.

Consider the following hypothetical case study:

A group of insurgents are holed-up in an apartment block filled with civilians
and a platoon has been ordered to neutralise them. The building is over ten
stories high, filled with individual apartments, each of which would need to be
searched and cleared. The amount of corners, blind spots, and ambush points
make the possibility of casualties amongst the squad a distinct possibility. The
sergeant contemplates calling in a drone strike on the building to avoid the
possibility of losing men for whom he is responsible. However, his NCO reminds

For a discussion of the integration of courage and martyrdom in Aquinas, see: Gregory
Reichberg, ‘Aquinas on Battlefield Courage’, The Thomist, vol. 74, 2010, 337-368.
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him that the apartment is also inhabited by large numbers of civilians. The
soldiers themselves as torn. Some consider it a matter of professional honour and
duty to breach the building and clear it themselves, whilst others see no point
taking such an unnecessary risk.

Are the soldiers duty-bound to physically enter the building? If the duty of
soldiers to undertake personal risk is limited to when they are in pursuit of
State-directed missions, then it appears as though they are. Presuming that
missions do not order or sanction immoral or illegal conduct (and if they do,
they ought to be refused), every mission includes the responsibility to respect
and uphold the deontological norms of discrimination and proportionality. To
call a drone strike on the apartment would be a clear violation of the principle
of discrimination, as can be seen by applying DDE to the case. In order to kill
the insurgents by way of drone strike, one must kill all the inhabitants of the
building – including the innocent – in the same action. In such a case, the
deaths of civilians are no more a side-effect than the deaths of the insurgents.
As G.E.M. Anscombe wrote, “[i]t is nonsense to pretend that you do not intend
to do what is the means you take to your chosen end.”44

Were it to occur that in storming the building with soldiers, a grenade tossed
into a room happened to trigger a structural collapse due to poor building or
prior damage, killing all those inside, this action clearly lies outside the
soldiers’ intentions in a way that bombing the building does not. In bombing,
the means of destroying the soldiers is by destroying everyone. The brute fact

G.E.M. Anscombe, ‘War and Murder’, in Richard A. Wasserstrom, War and Morality,
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is this: in bombing the building one’s act is the targeted killing of enemy
combatants for the means chosen are not discriminate enough to target the
insurgents specifically.

A similar suggestion is made by Thomas Nagel: perhaps the bomber could
argue that what was intended was only that the building in which the bombers
were hiding was destroyed, and any people killed were unintended sideeffects.45 However, if one genuinely wishes to mount that argument, then one
has to somehow justify accepting the deaths of human beings for the mere
purpose of destroying a building, which is an obvious failure of the
proportionality condition of jus in bello. The reality is that an accurate
description of the bombing would be targeting the building and all its
inhabitants, and therefore accepting the killing of noncombatants as a means
to killing the soldiers. Therefore, it seems clear in such cases that the soldier is
morally required not to bomb the building. Self-sacrifice for the sake of
protecting the lives on noncombatants in the form of riskily storming the
building is morally necessary.

Because soldiers – at least in Western nations – volunteer to join the military,
they consent to a host of professional duties: the duty to obey the civilian
leadership of the military in deployments, the obligation to obey commanding
officers (excluding, as discussed earlier, cases where the orders are patently
unjust or untrustworthy), and the duties to uphold the principles of JWT,
including to avoid intentionally harming noncombatants. The professional

Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’ in Thomas Nagel (ed.), Mortal Questions, (Cambridge:
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duty of soldiers is to accept the risks to life, mind, and soul that are necessary
in order to complete a stipulated mission. These include risks necessary in
order to make the mission morally consistent with the other professional
duties of soldiers, for instance, the principles of discrimination and
proportionality. Thus, as a matter of professional duty, the soldiers must
storm the building.

A similar view is proposed by Michael Walzer, who argues that “when it is
our action that puts innocent people at risk, even if the action is justified, we
are bound to do what we can to reduce those risks, even if this involves risks
to our own soldiers.”46 However, Walzer’s requirement actually requires more
than the model of professional duty above. As a matter of duty, soldiers must
avoid intentionally killing noncombatants, or disproportionately causing the
deaths of non-combatants as side-effects in the pursuit of their missions, and
must accept personal risk where necessary to fulfil these goals. However,
tweaking the above case study slightly will demonstrate how Walzer’s
proposal requires a greater level of risk commitment than professional duty
requires:

Imagine if the apartment block was uninhabited as the town had been evacuated
some weeks ago. Thus, when the sergeant contemplated calling in a drone strike,
he did not have to factor in noncombatant lives. It would, therefore, seem
imprudent for him to order his men to storm the building given the risks.
However, before calling the strike, the sergeant’s NCO observes what he believes
to be two children peering out at them from one of the windows. It would not be
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the first time the platoon had found children living in an evacuated area and so
the NCO tells his sergeant what he saw. The sergeant is now faced with the
choice between risking the lives of his men, or potentially causing the deaths of
two children by ordering the strike. Although a few soldiers express their
willingness to clear the building themselves, the platoon are largely in favour of
a strike.

In this case, DDE will not prohibit the bombing of the building. First, the action
is proportionate: the deaths of a group of insurgents weighed against the lives
of two children. Second, the NCO cannot be certain about the presence of the
children, nor whether they would have stayed in the building or not. Thus, it
would be justifiable to order the drone strike, hoping that the two children
were not caught in the explosion, but accepting the likelihood that they will
be. However, Walzer’s principle would prohibit such a bombing and require
that the soldiers enter the building themselves to prevent the possible deaths
of the two children, even if the anticipated deaths of soldiers would be higher
than that.

Walzer’s requirement demands risks that go beyond those of the professional
duties of soldiers, and soldiers therefore ought not to be duty-bound to accept
risks in cases like this. Those soldiers who did express willingness to accept
that level of risk demonstrate the same kind of supererogatory courage as
Bombadier Key in the case discussed earlier. The reasons that this level of
courage is not professionally required is because it is not mission critical:
neither the success of the state-directed mission, nor the upholding of other
duties to which soldiers are professionally committed hinges on the physical
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storming of the building. Thus, any risk undertaken in this regard is not
deontologically demanded.

However, that does not mean that accepting this kind of risk is necessarily
reckless or foolhardy. Rather, Walzer’s principle can be seen as an accurate
representation of the type of courage and sacrifice that embodies professional
excellence in soldiering. The description of professional excellence I offered at
the beginning of this chapter spoke of individuals who would be willing to
advance the purposes of their profession even when there exists no duty to do
so. If one of the purposes of soldiering is the protection of the innocent, then
one can see how a willingness to risk one’s life to spare two children is a
continuation of those purposes. In cases of supererogatory courage such as
this, soldiers’ decisions are informed without recourse to any kind of selfinterest. They are not only ready to die when necessary to complete the
mission, but they are ready to die when necessary to advance the overall moral
purposes of their profession. Sacrifice such as this represents the instantiation
of the highest levels of courage in an individual, and although it is not morally
necessary, it is morally excellent and laudable.

Some may ask whether soldiers in fact require courage in order to accept risks
and sacrifices of the type I have described here. Is it not possible for a soldier
to think carefully about his actions, determine what level of risk is missionnecessary, and accept that risk in completing his mission without ever needing
to possess the virtue of courage – that is, the habitual disposition against
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letting obstacles overcome doing what is believed to be right? That is, why do
we need courageous soldiers rather than risk-accepting soldiers?47

I believe there are three responses to this challenge. First, today’s militaries are
increasingly expecting their soldiers not only to be competent in the
performance of their duties, but to be excellent; the Australian Defence Force,
for instance, lists its foundational value as “Professionalism – striving for
excellence in everything we do.”48 Military personnel who are only willing or
equipped to reach the minimum standards of professionalism are beginning
to be expected to strive further, and that means extending beyond the basic
duties that they are able to identify through rational inquiry and training.
What is required is an attitude which strives toward embodying the values
and purposes of the military; that is, to embody the virtues.

Secondly, if a soldier was to regularly determine how best to act in order to
fulfil his professional duty of risk acceptance and act on those determinations,
he would eventually come to characterise the virtue anyway – at least to the
extent necessary for compliance with duty. Aristotle argued that the way in
which a person came to develop a virtue was to practise it repeatedly, exactly
in the way described above.49 So, even if the virtues are not necessary, they are
inevitable in the conscientious soldier.

Indeed, a similar objection could be made regarding any of the virtues: i.e. why do we
need prudently obedient soldiers rather than soldiers who are committed (from duty, fear or
punishment, or some other motivating factor) to the deontological norms of war, and will
refuse to ever violate them. Why do they need to characterise the virtue of prudence in order
to be obedient in the appropriate manner? I take my response here to be applicable to this
objection as formulated against any virtue or profession.
48 Maj. Gen. C.W. Orme, ‘Beyond Compliance’, op cit., 61.
49 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a26-1103b2.
47
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Thirdly, the virtues are indeed necessary for military practitioners, and the
reason for this is because, as has been mentioned several times in this chapter,
war is an environment in which decisions must be made quickly and under
great pressure. Furthermore, it is a domain in which the right thing to do is
not always obvious. Thus, soldiers ought not to trust only in their skills of
inquiry and determination, but strive to be able to do what is right as a matter
of habit. Not only is it more likely that the virtuous person will make the right
decision under pressure in a difficult situation, but his ability to make the
decision quickly might be the difference between life or death for himself, his
comrades, or innocent civilians.

1.3: Prudence and Courage Combined

Although professionally excellent soldiers will be prepared to sacrifice
themselves in situations where duty does not require them to, this does not
mean that in every situation where the death of a soldier might serve the
general purposes of the army, that excellent soldiers will readily allow
themselves to die. If every excellent soldier was as readily sacrificial as I have
described above, we would quickly run out of excellent soldiers. However,
professional excellence also requires soldiers to be prudent; that is to balance
their disposition toward courageous self-sacrifice against the variety of other
competing goods and paths of action.

For instance, on October 3, 2009, the men of Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st
Cavalry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division of the US
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Army in Afghanistan were stationed at Combat Outpost Keating when they
were set upon by a Taliban force that heavily outnumbered them. Although
they successfully repelled the much larger force, the attack resulted in 8
casualties and over 25 wounded. One of the dead was Spc. Stephan Mace, who
had been injured early in the battle. Eventually, Mace was saved by Spc. Ty
Carter, whose heroics earned him the Medal of Honour, but by then Mace’s
injuries had gone untreated for too long and he died soon after. According to
reports:

Carter watched in horror and anger and shame as Mace tried to crawl toward
the Humvee, begging for help, but at first enemy fire was far too intense to
attempt a rescue. At grave risk to himself, Carter did eventually get Mace to
safety […] but Mace's injuries were too severe.50

There are several points worth discussing in this case, including Carter’s
recovery from PTSD (and possibly undiagnosed moral injury) as a
consequence of not being able to save Mace, and blaming himself for it. 51
However, what is worth noting in this case is that Carter’s belief that he “had
failed [his] troop and [his] family because [he] couldn't save him [Mace]”52
appears to have emanated in part from his inability to respond as immediately
to Mace’s need as he would have like due to enemy fire. Now, it is true that
Carter could still have run to Mace’s aid despite the heavy fire, and that such
an action would have represented the type of sacrifice I discussed above, but

Elizabeth M. Collins, ‘In aftermath of Keating: MOH nominee Carter gets help for PTSD’,
Soldiers Live, August 21, 2013,
<http://www.army.mil/article/109617/In_aftermath_of_Keating__MOH_nominee_Carter_get
s_help_for_PTSD/>.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
50
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it would have been incredibly foolish nonetheless. The likelihood of such
action actually being able to save Mace is incredibly low; more likely is that
Carter himself would have been injured or killed in the process, thus not only
failing to assist Mace, but also meaning he could be of no help to his other
comrades under fire. Although a possible factor in his PTSD, Carter’s
hesitation in this case is demonstration of the governing role of prudence over
one’s courageous dispositions. Excellent soldiers will always be ready to die
to advance the purposes of the military, but will always check those
dispositions against the other duties, values, and commitments that the
military is sworn to.

2: Military Commanders

Professionally excellent soldiers, even if ready to die in commitment to the
purposes and values of the Army, are unlikely to do so where that sacrifice
appears wasteful, or when it will undermine the success of the mission.
Excellent soldiers still adhere to their duties, one of which is ensuring the
success of State-directed missions. Thus, they are required to balance their
dispositions toward supererogatory deeds against their duty to ensure that
missions are completed efficiently. However, as concerned as individual
soldiers might be with the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations,
the primary concern for these rests with the military commander.

Common views of military commanders associate them most strongly with
military strategy, defined by Carl von Clausewitz as “the employment of battle
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to gain the end of the war.”53 Clausewitz argues that “[a] prince or general
who knows exactly how to organise his war according to his object and means
[…] gives by that the greatest proof of his genius.”54 Here Clausewitz appears
to suggest that the primary concern of the military commander is strategy:
professional excellence for the military commander entails strategic
excellence.

This speaks to what professional excellence entails, but what are the
professional duties of commanders? I argue that they are twofold: first,
commanders are bound by the same deontological limitations on in bello
conduct as are individual soldiers, and may not devise strategies that violate
those principles. Secondly, commanders have a professional duty toward, as
Clausewitz identifies, the end of the war. In this context, end refers to telos: the
purpose, or goal of the war. Commanders are duty-bound to organise their
strategy according to the purposes for the war as determined by the political
leadership. Once these goals are determined, the military commander is
bound to strive to bring them to fruition through military strategy. However,
commanders cannot see the goals of war as their only function, they too are
bound by moral restrictions. This means that a tension can emerge between
the duties of the military commander: on the one hand, aiming to bring about
the political goals of war efficiently and effectively, and on the other, accepting
moral limitations on what strategies can be used in bringing about those goals.
This tension is one that Michael Gross describes as being “at the root of our
conflicting intuitions about the conduct of war” – namely, “[t]he tension

Carl von Clausewitz trans. J.J. Graham, On War, (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth, 1997), Book
III, Ch. I.
54 Collins, ‘In aftermath of Keating’, op cit.
53
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between the means required to get the job done […] and the human urge to
limit the carnage.”55

In this section I argue that the virtue that bears most strongly on the military
commanders ability to fulfil his duties is prudence. Here I recall Aquinas’
claim that “[t]he execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the
direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs
to prudence.’56 Prudence, being the virtue that enables good choices between
different possibilities, appears best suited to balancing the deontological
requirements of justice and the duty to be efficient in the pursuit of politically
stipulated ends. I describe to what extent military commanders are bound, as
matters of professional duty, to the conditions of jus in bello, conducting
strategy in a way that is both effective and efficient, and to the ad bellum goals
of the war as set by political leaders. The virtue that best allows military
commanders to fulfil and balance these duties is prudence.

It is also worth focussing specifically on the fact that the ends that military
commanders pursue are politically stipulated, as military commanders are not
only the issuers of commands, they also receive their orders in turn from
superiors, and ultimately from the political leaders who declare wars in the
first place. Here, another tension emerges between the military commander’s
authority and expertise with regard to strategy and the right of political
leaders to determine (in part) the course of the war he is required to command.
Thus, military commanders must navigate their professional duty to run their

Michael Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an
Age of Asymmetric Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 21.
56 Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4. Emphasis added.
55
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war as best as they can without intervention whilst simultaneously receiving
instruction on the general direction and objectives of the war. This requires
both that military commanders be humble enough to receive instruction on
matters of the direction of a war, and be courageous enough to refuse
commands when political leaders issue directions with regard to the strategy
and not the objectives of the war.

2.1: Prudence and the Tension between Strategy and Morality

The primary roles of the military commander are twofold. First, it is the
responsibility of the military commander to win the war. Secondly, the
commander must ensure that the war is won well; that is, without violating
deontological norms in order to attain victory. However, in light of a number
of drawn-out conflicts across the world many are beginning to question
whether winning well is possible in cases where one’s enemy refuses to abide
by deontological restrictions on conduct. As Steven P. Lee argues:

[I]f one side seeks military advantage by attacking civilians or using them as
shields, should the other side be allowed to relax the protection it allows for
enemy civilians? If one side abandons the principles, it may seem only fair that
the other side may do so as well. Otherwise the other side would be fighting with
“one hand tied behind its back.”57

Steven P. Lee, Ethics and War: an Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012), 158.
57
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Military commanders who understand strategy will recognise that their
professional duty to uphold the laws of war can represent a strategic weakness
that may be exploited by one’s enemies. For instance, the use of “human
shields” – keeping civilians in close proximity as a means of preventing an
enemy from returning fire or initiating attack – exploits an army’s
commitment to the principle of discrimination to obtain strategic advantage.
If used successfully, as in Gaza 2006 when an Israeli air strike on a rocket cell
hidden amongst civilian homes was called off when Palestinian civilians
refused to evacuate, how is a commander to respond? After the raid was
cancelled Palestinian spokesman, Abu Mujahed, proclaimed that ``From now
on we will form human chains around every house that is threatened with
demolition.’’58 In light of this, one Israeli officer explained simply that “[i]f we
can’t get to the target by air due to the human shields, we will reach it by
ground and the Palestinians will pay a heavy price.”59 Need the commanders
of the Israeli military need have exposed their soldiers to such risk? Might they
have been justified in continuing the air strikes anyway? Why, some may ask,
should the enemy’s unjust conduct force a military to fight with one arm tied
behind its back? In short, when faced with a choice between doing what is
right and doing what will bring about victory, how ought a commander to
choose?

Joseph L. Allen describes several characteristics that the military ethicist and
strategist have in common; that is, where the strategic and moral duties of the
military commander coincide. So, although there are times when strategy and

Abraham Rabinovich, ‘Human shields stump Israel’, The Australian, Nov. 21, 2006
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/human-shields-stump-israel/story-e6frg6so1111112557676>.
59 Ibid.
58
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morality generate tension, Allen’s list (below) demonstrates how the
professional duties of morality and strategy do also seek similar ends.

1. Both military strategist and moralist must recommend limited military action
that contributes to some creaturely wellbeing;
2. Both strategist and moralist will be guided by the principle of the economy of
force. That principle prescribes that the available forces shall be used in the
most effective way possible;
3. Both good strategy and a creature-respecting morality will seek to avoid
destruction beyond need.60

Thus, Allen notes that although strategy “may require destruction and
certainly tempts one to perform the immoral,” it “does not require immoral
acts.” Thus, “[m]oral inadequacies in strategy are matters for which the
human actors are responsible.”61 Put another way, if strategy appears to
require the violation of professional duties toward morality, it is a failure of
the strategist to (i) have sufficiently prowess in strategy to devise another
possibility; or (ii) to avoid, by strategy, situations in which violations of
morality will be strategically necessary.

The image of the military commander as duty-bound to both morality and
strategy appears further complicated when one considers the moral
importance of victory. If the commander has – or at least believes himself to

Joseph L. Allen, ‘The Relationship of Strategy and Morality’, Ethics, vol. 73, no. 3, 1963,
167-178 at 174.
61 Ibid., 176.
60
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have – just cause, winning becomes a morally significant enterprise. This was
the position of utilitarian philosopher Henry Sidgewick who, in Walzer’s
words believed that “it would be difficult to condemn soldiers for anything
they did in the course of a battle or a war that they honestly believed, and had
good reason to believe, was necessary, or important, or simply useful in
determining the outcome.”62 Sidgewick’s contention was that although if
faced with the choice between winning and winning well, all commanders
should choose to win well, when the choice is between winning badly or
losing, it becomes much less clear that deontological norms should limit what
is strategically permissible.

Military commanders faced with decisions like this will rightly ask which of
their duties – to victory, or to morality – trumps in cases of apparent tension.
Sidgewick’s utilitarian reasoning will appear compelling to the commander.
The value of victory, weighed against the costs of violating particular
deontological norms in war, is still likely to be the more beneficial to the
common good. However, the flaw in this reasoning is that it assumes that
victory, with all its moral benefits, will actually come about. Even in the most
asymmetrical conflict victory cannot ever be guaranteed. Thus, when
considering the adoption of a particular strategy – especially one that violates
in bello principles – one must consider how much worse the situation would be
if such tactics were adopted and one were still to lose. Even if it were better to
win badly than lose well, it is better to lose well than to lose badly, and
winning badly can rarely be assured. For this reason, the adoption of immoral
strategies for utilitarian reasons is always a gamble which will only pay off
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Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, op cit., 129.
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(even on its own terms) if the strategy is ultimately successful in winning the
war.

Acknowledging the existence of uncertainties, with victory being one of them,
is a habit of great benefit to the military commander. A further uncertainty is
with regard to whether the cause for which a commander is fighting is indeed
a just one. Commanders, like soldiers, are entitled to obey trustingly the
commands of just governments unless they appear patently unjust. However,
they must always be aware that some crucial information regarding the war’s
justice may be unknown to them; indeed, it may be unknown to their political
leaders. Thus, the military commander must also be aware that fallibility
means the justice of the cause is also – to some extent – uncertain. Thus, there
are several levels of uncertainty that must be applied to Sidgewick’s utilitarian
calculation regarding the justification of immoral strategies to achieve victory
in war which make it far less obvious that morality can be foregone in the
interests of achieving overall victory.

Given this, should we not simply admit the commander’s moral duties trump
his duties to achieving victory and leave it at that? Why do commanders need
to be virtuous in order to adhere to this requirement, now that we have
revealed which duty takes priority? After all, it does not require a particularly
prudent person to have him obey a rule once the reasonableness of that rule
has been explained to him and he has understood it. The first answer is to say
that it although it is true that the person need not be particularly prudent he
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does need to be, in the words of David Kaspar, “minimally prudent.”63 Thus,
the military commander does require at least partial disposition toward
evaluation of options, consideration of consequences, and the ability to
determine between options well.

Furthermore, as ordinary experiences reveal, the existence of a rule, even one
that is understood, does not necessarily preclude the violation of that rule:
“sometimes we end up resorting to lying or breaking a promise to get out of a
trap we laid for ourselves. So being minimally prudent isn’t enough for us to
be fully moral.”64 This is likely to be particularly true in situations where the
reason for breaking the rule is because of another duty that one is committed
to, such as victory. Thus, military commanders in particular require particular
acumen in evaluating the respective moral strength of different paths of action
in order to determine between them rightly and avoid being overly drawn
toward the perceived good of victory.65 This is where prudence comes to the
fore. As Aquinas argued, quoting St. Isodore of Sevilla, the prudent person is
able to see “as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event
of uncertainties.”66

David Kaspar, ‘Can Morality Do Without Prudence?’, Philosophia, vol. 39, 2011, 311-326 at
315.
64 Ibid.
65 Another reason why prudence is a necessary virtue for military commanders is if there are
in fact times when it becomes necessary to violate deontological principles in the pursuit of
some greater good. I note again, as I did in the discussion of supreme emergencies in
chapter three, that I do not believe this is the case. However, as this is still a contested point
in the literature, it is of benefit to show how the virtues could be brought to bear on the
matter of supreme emergencies.
66 Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1.
63
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Prudence is also of central importance for professionally excellent military
commanders who, in Clausewitzian language, demonstrate their “genius”
through strategy. Aquinas is again informative. In Question 50 of the typology
of virtue in Summa Theologica II-II, Aquinas designates a special mode of
prudence: “military prudence.”67 Aquinas argued that “he who reasons well
for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent,
not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare.”68 Recall that
prudence is directed toward the rational consideration of practical matters
regarding how one should act; in this sense, prudence is a purely intellectual
virtue.

As a moral virtue, prudence includes in those practical considerations the
various moral factors at stake, including the ability to foresee likely
consequences. Prudence, therefore, requires one to know the good and include
it as a factor in one’s decision-making. It is this latter concern that gives
prudence its specifically moral designation. Reichberg makes the same point
in explaining why Aquinas sees military strategy as a matter of prudence, and
not an art. “Art, Thomas defines as ‘right reason about things to be made’ and
prudence as ‘right reason about things to be done’ […] it is choice – the inner
act by which the will selects among alternative goods – that prudence is
especially meant to guide.”69 The choice between moral goods as opposed to
transitive goods (such as which materials one might use to make a sculpture)
is what distinguishes military prudence from art.

Reichberg, ‘Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence’, op cit., 264.
Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 47, Art. 2.
69 Reichberg, ‘Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence’, op cit., 266.
67
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[H]ad [Aquinas] categorized [military] leadership under the heading of art,
morality would have applied to it in an extrinsic manner only. A general who
ordered the commission of atrocities, or who waged war for a manifestly evil
purpose, could still be deemed a habile commander if he successfully led his
troops to victory, even though, on moral grounds, he must be deemed a bad man.
But to assert that military command is indeed an instance of prudence is for
Aquinas equivalent to saying that morality is intrinsic to this practice, such that
any willful misconduct – by direct intention or negligence – on the part of the
general would evince a faulty command. In such a case not only is he to be rightly
condemned qua man, but more to the point, his competence qua commander
would be called into question.70

Aquinas concedes that military strategy is an art and – as Clausewitz
described it above, a “genius.”71 However, being a strategic genius is not
sufficient to fulfil ones professional duties as a commander; one must also be
committed to upholding the moral commitments of the military profession. In
both regards, the virtue of prudence will serve to further the successful
adherence of military commanders to their professional duties and to the
achievement of strategic excellence.

Ibid., 267-268.
Aquinas, ST, II-II, Q. 50, Art. 4. “Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it
has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but in
so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence.”
70
71
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2.2: Courage, Humility, and the Tension between Political Leaders
and Commanders

As has been noted throughout this discussion, military commanders are dutybound to the ends of the war as determined by the political leadership.
However, they are also experts and leaders in their own right, and thus tension
may emerge between pursuing their own professional opinions on what
ought to be done and the political commands that they receive and are
expected to obey. The project of waging a war must – at the macro level – be
one of collaboration between political leaders who determine the objectives of
the war, and commanders who determine the best way of achieving those
goals.

The reasons for this are twofold. First, because the political leader is the one
who will be held answerable for the objectives of the war, and the military
commander for the strategies adopted; secondly, because (ideally) each
profession is chiefly responsible for the matter about which they possess the
relevant experience and expertise.

However, at times conflict is likely to emerge between high-level commanders
and political leaders regarding decisions that bear on the military and political
significance of particular decisions. Mlitary commanders, like ordinary
soldiers, have a moral duty to refuse an obviously illegal or immoral order
(because the moral duty to obey one’s conscience is prior to any professional
obligation one has to obey commands). However, in many cases a commander
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may disagree with an order on the basis of its efficacy, likelihood of success,
or some other professional consideration not serious enough to justify
refusing the order. In these cases, how is the military commander to respond,
and what virtues are required in order for him to do so?

In the first case, let us consider what a commander ought to do when he
disagrees with the commands of the political leadership regarding political
decisions that have substantial strategic implications for achieving the goals
of war. On June 1, 2011, General David Petraeus met with President Barack
Obama and a host of other senior members of government (including the Vice
President, Defence and State Secretaries) to discuss withdrawal plans for
Afghanistan. It was agreed that 10,000 troops would be withdrawn by the end
of 2011, but discussion continued over how long the remaining 23,000
personnel should remain. According to reports:

Petraeus had recommended that they stay in Afghanistan through November
2012, which marked the end of the annual fighting season [whilst] Obama began
the discussion by explaining that he wanted the 23,000 forces out of Afghanistan
by July 2012, five months sooner than Petraeus had recommended.72

Ongoing discussion saw opposition to the hastiness of Obama’s proposed
withdrawal, the President “voiced a willingness to consider splitting the
difference and leaving the troops in Afghanistan through the end of the
Paula Broadwell, Vernon Loeb, ‘Gen. David Petraeus: “The troops can’t quit”’, Washington
Post, January 24, 2012, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/gen-david-petraeusthe-troops-cant-quit/2012/01/19/gIQALYlmKQ_story.html?hpid=z4>.
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summer, but he was against waiting until the end of 2012.”73 Many, including
Defence Secretary Robert Gates, State Secretary Hillary Clinton and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, were willing to accept an end
of summer withdrawal. General Petraeus, however, was not so easily
persuaded.

Petraeus again made it clear that he remained in favor of keeping the troops in
Afghanistan until the end of the year in order to achieve the President’s
objectives. The mission in Afghanistan, he said, was not transition to Afghan
forces; it was achieving conditions that allowed for successful transition. Obama
asked whether those three extra months would make that much difference;
Petraeus said he thought they would.74

Here it is important to emphasise the courage required in expressing a
minority opinion against the person one is sworn to serve and then, in the face
of disagreement, to maintain that position. This is what the professional
military commander is required to do, advise his leaders in good faith what
consequences their decisions will have on his ability to win the war. Therefore,
it seems that military commanders require courage if they are to successfully
fulfil their advisory duties to the political leadership. They must be willing to
tell political leaders when a decision goes against the objectives of winning the
war, and not fold to pressure if and when the advice given is contrary to what
political leaders want to hear.

73
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However, there is not always a direct correlation between the giving of sound
advice and the heeding of that advice, a fact Petraeus was especially sensitive
to; his doctoral dissertation was in the area of civil-military relations during
and post-Vietnam, and included a discussion of how political goals were
preferred to sound military strategy during Vietnam. 75 As well as his doctoral
research, Petraeus witnessed this fact first hand when, “the president made
his decision: 10,000 forces would leave Afghanistan by the end of the year, and
the remaining 23,000 surge troops would be out by the end of summer 2012.”76
This decision, made on the basis of several factors including a desire “to signal
to the American, Afghan and international communities that the coming year
would be one of transition”77 was, in Petraeus’ opinion, contrary to the
objectives of the war and his ability to bring those objectives about fruitfully.
Having spoken his mind and given his advice, what is a commander to do if
political leaders hamstring his ability to do his job?

It seems that the military commander now has three options: dissent,
obedience, or resignation. Is he, however, morally obligated to any one of
those paths? Dissent can come in several forms. The first is outright
disobedience. When a military commander receives an order from political
leaders, there may be occasions when it is within his power to simply refuse
the order. However, such an action amounts to insubordination, and is likely
to see the commander not only relieved of command, but also court
martialled. More likely is dissent through the media and public statements.
Indeed, this was the path chosen by General Douglas MacArthur when he

David H. Petraeus, ‘The American military and the lessons of Vietnam: A study of military
influence and the use of force in the post-Vietnam era’, doctoral thesis submitted to
Princeton University, 1987, 122-127.
76 Paula Broadwell, Vernon Loeb, op cit.
77 Ibid.
75
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described President Harry Truman’s involvement in the Korean War as “an
enormous handicap, unprecedented in military history.”78 This was the first of
several publicly dissentious statements by MacArthur, which included a letter
to Congress critical of the President’s policies, and the scuppering of a possible
ceasefire agreement with China, which led ultimately to his dismissal by the
President.

MacArthur was rightly dismissed for having failed to uphold his professional
duties. He failed to accept that his responsibilities were limited to strategy and
not to policy decisions regarding whether a war should be continued, whether
a new war should be allowed to break out (in this case, with China), or
whether the military should be permitted to breach the sovereignty of another
state. The failure to recognise the limitations of one’s own authority, influence,
and power is a failure to exercise the virtue of humility. Humility, G. Alex
Sinha explains, “relates […] to keeping one’s ego in check.”79 The virtue, he
notes “is premised on the idea that ego is objectionable to the extent that it
leads us to forget or ignore other duties.”80 In the case of MacArthur, his own
expertise and experience appears to have made him incapable of recognising
his duty of obedience and his limited responsibility for strategy. Further,
MacArthur’s actions and public statements expressed no belief that his
opinion might be wrong, or that the President and the Joint Chief’s viewpoints
may have also had some merit.

Michael D. Pearlman, Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honour and
Renown, (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008), 170.
79 G. Alex Sinha, ‘Modernizing the Virtue of Humility’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol.
90, no. 2, 2012, 259-274 at 260.
80 Ibid.
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MacArthur’s failure to be humble caused him to forget duties that are
expressly his as a military commander; namely, to further the politically
determined objectives of the war by way of strategy. By publicly expressing
doubt for the policies and strategies adopted by his political leaders,
MacArthur’s criticisms shot his own objectives in the foot. Not only does
morale suffer as soldiers find themselves confused regarding whose
commands they ought to follow or whether the major decision-makers have
any clear plan for the war, but publicly-aired disputes such as these give hope
and resolve to one’s enemies, who see disunity and a lack of unified
commitment to shared goals as signs of weakness. Thus, in two ways these
actions threatened to undermine MacArthur’s own strategic goals.

A better decision for MacArthur would have been to privately express his
concerns for the chosen policies insofar as they bore on his military strategies
(as he did), and if they were not heeded and the policies pursued were so
grossly contrary to his desired strategy to have offered his resignation. This
would have allowed MacArthur to demonstrate clearly his refusal to be
involved with or support strategies with which he so strongly disagreed
without violating any of his other professional duties. In fact, if pride
prohibited MacArthur from accepting any opinion on policy or strategy that
was not his own, then he ought to have retired.

However, not all matters of disagreement need end in resignation. As J.
Patrick Dobel notes, the purpose of resigning from a position is to maintain
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one’s integrity.81 Thus, only commands that would, if obeyed, compromise
one’s integrity need be cause for resignation. It seems that there would be a
number of policy or political decisions whose strategic implications would not
be severe enough to warrant resignation on the basis of the compromised
integrity of the military commander.

Indeed, Petraeus, after hearing Obama’s decision “assured the president that
he would faithfully support and execute his decision, but he noted that he
would have to say, if asked at his [CIA Director] conﬁrmation hearing in two
days, that the timeline was more aggressive than he had recommended.”82
Instead of resigning, Petraeus demonstrated his belief that “military leaders
should provide advice that is informed by important nonmilitary and military
factors beyond their strict purview, but is driven by the situation on the
ground and military considerations”83 by offering his full support to the
President’s plan, instructing his subordinates to do the same, and at his CIA
confirmation hearing openly rebufing suggestions that his disagreement with
the President should prompt his resignation.84 In doing so, Petraeus
demonstrated sufficient humility to recognise the extent of his expertise,
responsibilities, and authority as a moral and military decision-maker. These
virtues, in complement to his courage in expressing an unpopular opinion,
make Petraeus’ conduct in this instance an excellent demonstration in how the
virtues are necessary for military commanders to successfully negotiate their
relationship with political leaders, as MacArthur was so famously unable to
do.

J. Patrick Dobel, ‘The Ethics of Resigning’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol.
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Having discussed both General Petraeus and the matter of resignation, it
would be inattentive of me not to speak briefly about that General’s public
disgrace and subsequent downfall. In November 2012, General Petraeus
resigned as Director of the CIA after it was revealed that he had been involved
in an ongoing extramarital affair with his biographer, Paula Broadwell.
Petraeus admitted to having exercised “extremely poor judgment” that was
“unacceptable, both as a husband and as [a] leader.”85 Petraeus rightly
identified his moral failing as being one not only of spousal loyalty, but of
judgement – that is, prudence. However, Petraeus’ apparent desire to continue
his marriage and his admission that he “screwed up royally”86 suggests that
another moral failing was his inability to uphold his own moral beliefs when
it was undesirable or difficult to do so, a vice that is an absolute anathema to
professional soldiering or military command. Although it may be true that
Petraeus’ failing was out of character and that he is – and most reports suggest
this is the case – an honourable and virtuous man, Petraeus’ resignation sends
a clear message to the military regarding the moral importance of selfdiscipline and prudent moral judgement in all areas of one’s life.

Furthermore, the decision to resign in the light of a private moral failing
demonstrates again, in a different but no less important way, the intimate
connection between the personal and professional identities of military
personnel discussed in the previous chapter. If, as Dobel notes, the purpose of
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resignation is to maintain one’s integrity, then it is reasonable to assume that
Petraeus’ recognition of his own failings as a husband and as a man of virtue
and the public besmirching of his reputation that accompanied it necessitated
his resignation. This was the only possible means of preserving both his own
personal integrity and the integrity of the organisations he served throughout
his career.

3: Political Leaders

All wars are begun by political leaders. As Brian Orend notes, war is a conflict
only possible between political communities: “fisticuffs between individual
persons do not count as war, nor does a gang fight, nor does a feud on the
order of the Hatfields versus the McCoys.”87 There are a number of reasons
why this is the case, but one must be that individuals, gang leaders, or family
patriarchs (or matriarchs) lack the authority to exercise legitimate force. Each
of Orend’s three examples are governed by a higher authority (i.e. the legal
system of the state) to whom they can take recourse to resolve disputes, and
to whom they are answerable for wrongdoing.

Political leaders, by contrast, are the highest authority in their land, and as
such, cannot take recourse to a higher authority. Thus, under severe
circumstances (such as in response to aggression), they are entitled to declare
to war in defence of the common good. In Aquinas’ words, the authority
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“belongs to him alone who has charge of the community's welfare.”88
However, although being in charge of a community’s welfare is sufficient to
be considered a political authority, but it is not sufficient to constitute a
legitimate political authority. This further step requires not only that leaders
have charge of the community’s welfare, but also that they govern with the
intention of upholding and advancing that common good. Legitimate political
authorities should only declare war for the common good, a judgement which
should ideally be made by leaders possessing moral virtues who will have
greater sensitivity for, and awareness of, the common good.

The obligation to go to war in the interests of the common good is complex
given the common assertion that “statesmen think and act in terms of
[national] interest,”89 and are right to do so. In what follows, I first explore the
moral responsibilities, necessary skills and virtues of a political leader who
believes his primary obligation to be the defence and advancement of national
interest, before contrasting this with the attitudes of a political leader who
embodies the virtues of justice, charity, and prudence. As Reichberg notes, “it
must be recognized that a fuller […] approach to just war would require […]
teaching on the political virtues to decision-making about resort to war.”90
Such a project is undertaken here.
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3.1: Justice & Political Leadership

In one sense it should not be surprising that one of the chief duties and virtues
with which political leaders and just war theorists ought to be concerned is
justice. However, exactly what this means requires some exploration as justice
has several meanings in different contexts. In one sense, justice is chiefly a
state of affairs where all individuals and nations enjoy a moral parity in which
all persons enjoy all the goods, freedoms, and privileges to which they have
some normative claim.91 By this account, the moral requirements of justice are
duties to bring about that state of affairs. In another sense, justice is a reason
for acting: one is motivated by a desire to do “just” deeds. By contrast, an
aretaic approach sees justice chiefly as a virtue. Justice is, according to Aquinas
(and Aristotle before him) the “habit whereby a man renders to each one his
due by a constant and perpetual will.”92

In one respect, there is no real difference between these different senses. All
are important aspects of justice, and absent of any, justice would be
unintelligible. However, focussing on justice as a habit may help political
leaders to view justice not only as a professional duty, but also as a reflection
of character. One way of explaining this difference is to return to the
distinction between internal and external motivations explored in the
previous chapter. Making justice a virtue means that the practise of justice is
a reflection of one’s own character, and thus acting with justice is – literally –
a force of habit. Under this approach one is much more assured of political
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leader’s adherence to professional duties than if those duties were seen as
externally imposed, and at times in competition with other duties. Nicholas
Rengger notes that human societies are often “torn between conflicting
demands, moral and practical.”93 It is possible – indeed likely, then – that the
moral duties of respecting, upholding, and perhaps defending the rights of
other states will be impractical or contrary to national self-interest. In such
situations, only political leaders with internally compelling reasons for acting
morally well – that is, who have cultivated justice as a habit – are likely to do
so.

The reason this is important is because political leaders do have a commitment
to advancing national interests: Stephanie Newbold argues that one of the
defining functions of the statesman is “ensuring the preservation of the […]
state.”94 Newbold argues that it is possible for statesmen to do the right thing
even if that means violating their own personal principles so long as it is for
“for the good of the state, its institutions, and its citizenry.”95 However,
Newbold’s argument is with regard to a case in which a President chose to
violate domestic law for the sake of his own people: thus, he sacrificed his own
morality for the national interest. That is one thing. It is another altogether to
argue that political leaders should act unjustly, or permit injustice, in the
international arena with regard to war, as this implies that the political leader
is willing to let the citizens of other nations suffer injustice to advance the
interests of his own nation. The duty to advance self-interest, if held as the sole
duty of the political leader, appears to require causing or allowing innocent
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people to suffer on the mere accident that they were born or live in a different
country. However, responsible statesmen in the international arena have
professional duties beyond self-interest. They are duty-bound to the
principles stipulated by jus ad bellum: notably that war may only be pursued
in response to a sufficiently grave injustice, and that correcting this injustice
must be the motivating factor for the political leader.

The duty to be motivated by justice is expounded in the right intention
condition of jus ad bellum which is of continued relevance in contemporary just
war theories, although many afford the criterion a less central role. Right
intention emphasises the importance not only of a just state of affairs being
reached, but of political leaders actually being motivated by justice.
Commitment to the professional duty to only fight just wars is crucial because,
as theorists such as Orend96 and Darrell Cole argue, leaders who act with
unjust intentions tend to betray those intentions through the commission of
war crimes: “right intention is determined by observing a belligerent’s acts
during and after a conflict.”97 Notably, what Orend and Cole require is not
merely that a political leader act in compliance with his professional duties,
but that he is personally motivated by that which his duty aims to serve:
justice. This, I argue, is what it means to have a right intention.

C.f. Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 47-48: “Intentions can be, and ought to be, discerned
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Most just war theorists understand a right intention to be an intention which
corresponds to an objectively just cause. Orend notes that “it is not enough to
have an objectively just cause in going to war […] you must also have the
proper subjective intention, or state of mind, for your act to be moral.”98
However, if we are to describe right intention in a way that is helpful to
political leaders faced with having to make just war decisions, we will need to
add some more content to this description.

James Turner Johnson notes that right intention “has both negative and
positive meanings. Negatively, it means the avoidance of bad intentions or
motivations. […] Positively, it means the intention of serving the goods of proper
political life.”99 If we are to fully understand right intention in a way that
informs the function of justice as a virtue of moral decision-making, we must
therefore understand what it means to “serve the goods of proper political
life:” that is, we must understand what a just cause is, a question I come to in
the later discussion of charity.

To answer this question I must say more about justice and right intention,
particularly with regard to political leaders. Importantly, the demand of
justice to render what is due to whom it is due is not limited to tangible or
physical goods. Rather, as Johnson notes, it extends to all the goods of proper
political life. Primary amongst these goods, especially in a liberal democracy,
is truth. Justice therefore demands that political leaders be honest and
transparent in their military decision-making. Just leaders will conduct their
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business honestly, recognising the importance of allowing the citizenry to
hold leaders accountable for their decisions. Importantly, in military matters
it would be imprudent to be overly transparent: to publish military plans in the
newspaper prior to invasion would be irresponsible, and goes beyond what
justice requires, because citizens do not need to know or evaluate the intricacies
of a particular military strategy. By contrast, citizens need to know and
evaluate broader ad bellum concerns in order to properly hold the political
leadership to account for the wars they involve the nation in, as well as some
in bello matters, such as whether the military will be using unmanned drones,
torture of detainees, or widely destructive weaponry.

Justice appears to present a challenge to the important concept of ‘state
secrecy.’ Imagine a government, A, discovers that an unstable, 'rogue' nation,
B, has succeeded in weaponising the smallpox virus and intends to deploy the
weapon. A has the power and means to go to war and potentially prevent this
from happening, but the dissemination of evidence would jeopardize the
safety of intelligence officers still in the field, allow B the time to successfully
hide or destroy weapons caches and evidence, or expedite the use of the
weapon. How should the political leadership of A act in relation to the
revelation of information to their people? Should they release the information
in the interests of truthfulness, or protect the national interest by keeping the
evidence classified?

In fact, a very similar scenario occurred in 2003 when US President George W.
Bush revealed evidence of an allegedly illegal biological weapons program in
Iraq. The conditions that allowed him to feel justified in releasing that
333

information are unclear, but a significant part of it may have been that the
evidence was gathered by satellite, not by personnel on the ground.
Furthermore, unlike the scenario described above, the evidence presented
pointed to the development of a weapons program, but showed no intention
of any weapons actually being deployed. Thus, there appeared to be no
pressingly compelling reasons to withhold the evidence.

Although the risks for Bush in 2003 were low, a question presents itself here:
should political leaders be professionally required to reveal any and all
evidence prior to engaging in war in the interests of transparency, even when
the costs are dramatically higher? This may be the path chosen by some wellintentioned but imprudent political leaders, but justice allows for other
courses of action whilst still complying with duty. Noting that the reason that
citizens are entitled to assess evidence is to hold leaders accountable for their
decisions (rather than, say, making the decision themselves by voting, as Kant
required).100

Thus, citizens are entitled to the evidence, but they are not entitled to the
evidence at any particular time. The just and prudent political leader would
reveal the evidence to the public at a time when that revelation would not be
advantageous to the enemy; as Lucas Swaine notes, “leaders need to be
mindful of moral requirements to provide justification to those affected
significantly by government policy.”101 A political leader only violates his
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professional duties if he denies information in a way that will significantly
affect those who are entitled to the information (thus, if he withheld that
information until after an election, he would be guilty of an injustice).
Understanding this enables us to say that, in the case of weaponised smallpox
above, A would be justified in taking military action against B without
needing to disclose the specific reasons prior to engagement. However, A’s
government would be required to, at a later date, disclose their reasons for the
war and the evidence which justified the military action. The citizens of A are
entitled to take this information under consideration when they next vote, but
this entitlement does not require the disclosure of information prior to the use
of force.

Note that the process of decision-making required to adhere to duty entails
that judgements be made with regard to the particulars of the situation.
Specifically, it requires (i) close knowledge of the facts regarding rightsviolations and the cause of the war in question, and (ii) requires a judgement
to be made on the whether the proportionality condition – which stipulates
that wars are only just if the war will be of benefit to the common good (not
merely the good of particular states102 – will be met. Thus, as James H. Toner
notes, “the just decision flows from wisdom or prudence.”103
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3.2: Prudent Political Leaders

As the virtue that guides and perfects moral decision-making, prudence is a
virtue all political leaders should possess. This is particularly true with regard
to war, where uncertainty is rife. Of course, it does not fall only to political
leaders to be prudent: we expect soldiers, commanders, citizens, and indeed
every person to be prudent to some degree. However, prudence is especially
important to political leaders because “ruling and governing belong properly
to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in
so far as he has a share in ruling and governing.”104 Indeed, Aristotle’s
discussion of prudence frequently deviates to the political, with “Pericles and
men like him” being the personification of the virtue of practical wisdom.105

Prudence, or practical reason, is the application of reason to the moral
demands of a particular situation in light of the available facts, and is
especially important in those areas of moral decision-making that involve
calculation or prediction. In short, prudence is simply the exercise of
reasoning well about what one should do in a particular situation. Aquinas
argued that it consists in three separate acts:

The first is “to take counsel,” which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of
inquiry, as stated above. The second act is “to judge of what one has discovered,”
and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is
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directed to action, goes further, and its third act is “to command,”
which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged.106

The prudent person, when forced to make a decision regarding how best to
act in a particular situation, begins by taking counsel. He does not,
importantly, make the decision without consulting others. This is especially
true of political leaders whose decisions affect a vast number of people. Vitoria
argued that leaders only declare war “according to the judgement of a wise
man.”107 The judgement of a wise man, for Vitoria, is one made in counsel with
those presenting both supporting and dissenting opinions. It is a duty of
political leaders to seek out advice regarding war from a number of trusted
and well-informed advisors. Importantly, the political leader must have
counsel on all relevant factors to making his decision: thus, he should
surround himself with lawyers, military strategists and experts, ethicists,
diplomats, any whose voice might lend helpful insight as to the best cause of
action.

For example, two jus ad bellum conditions that pertain strongly to prudence
are proportionality and probability of success (to a lesser extent, prudence also
plays an important role in last resort judgements). In determining whether the
proportionality condition were met, one would need help predicting the
extent and likelihood of various harms likely to be generated by the war. These
will include noncombatant deaths and physical damage to infrastructure, but
may also extend to political fallout that undermines the common good,
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whether any dangerous precedent will be set in international law by the
action, the likelihood of military action to generate further hostility toward my
nation, and a number of other variables. Only those with sufficient experience
in the relevant fields will a leader be able to identify the possible consequences
of war and predict both their likelihood and quantify the harms. The prudent
political leader, therefore, would gather as many experts as possible to help
inform his decision.

A demonstration of the harms resulting from a political leader’s failure to take
due counsel from experts can be seen in the tumultuous civil-military relations
of the Johnson White House during the Vietnam War. In his biography of
General Harold K. Johnson, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the
Vietnam War, Lewis Sorely documents the minimal influence of military
advice on President Lyndon Johnson, suggesting that “there were at most
thirteen occasions when General Johnson had an opportunity to talk about the
war with his Commander-in-Chief.”108

The greatest point of contention during this period regarded differing
approaches to the method of winning the Vietnam War. Despite military
advice that the best chance of victory in Vietnam would be to invest heavily
in the war, including calling up Reserves to strike quickly and decidedly,
President Johnson continually favoured budgetary levels that were, in the
opinion of General Johnson, inadequate.109 However, rather than consulting
closely the advice of his generals, President Johnson and Defence Secretary
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Robert McNamara “confronted their military counterparts with an admixture
of arrogance and disdain.”110 Being ill-equipped or informed of military
concerns on their own, this hubristic ignorance of advice by Johnson and
McNamara demonstrate an abject failure to exercise prudent and responsible
decision-making as a Commander-in-Chief.

The second act of prudence involves judging what one has discovered. One
cannot seek counsel forever. As James H. Toner notes, ““paralysis by analysis”
is not an option.”111 At this point the leader must judge an appropriate course
of action from the various different facts and predictions that have been
presented by his expert counsel. Here, as was discussed in the previous section
in the case study on Petraeus’ and Obama’s disagreement on the Afghanistan
withdrawal, the political leader must make decisions regarding how to
balance the moral value of his cause against other morally compelling factors
(including national interest, the common good, and so on). Ultimately, this
judgement must be made by the political leader, who alone has legitimate
authority in such matters. Here, ultimately, the political leader must make a
decision from his conscience112 about what is the right moral course of action.
For this reason too, it is not sufficient (although it is necessary) that the
political leader be prudent. He must also be just, possessing a well-formed
conscience. For instance, if a political leader must conscionably judge whether
his war is proportionate, he must have a keen sense of the likelihood of harm
to noncombatants, and the moral seriousness of those harms. Justice is also
Ibid., 221.
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brought to bear in recognising absolutely inviolable duties that will never be
violated, no matter how effective they might seem.

The interplay between inviolable duties and prudential reasoning can be
complex and problematic, as was seen in 2013 when compelling evidence
emerged that the Syrian government, led by Bashar Al-Assad, had employed
the use of chemical weapons against its own people during a bloody (and
ongoing) civil war. In response, Barack Obama declared his intention to
undertake a strategic military strike using long-range ballistic missiles, aiming
“to deter Assad from using chemical weapons, to degrade his regime’s ability
to use them, and to make clear to the world that we will not tolerate their
use.”113

For Obama, responding to the use of chemical weapons represented an
inviolable duty. Thus, responding immediately and severely appeared
morally (as well as strategically, due to Obama’s ongoing dispute regarding
the Iranian nuclear program) necessary. However, the proposal was poorly
received amongst large sections of the international community for a variety
of reasons; not least that it was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council and
would therefore violate international law.114
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However, the strike never occurred. Russian and Syrian representatives met
for diplomatic talks in Geneva, and Syria agreed to surrender their chemical
weapons cache to international control to be immediately dismantled.115 This
allowed a military strike, with the related potential for escalation and civilian
casualties to be avoided, with “sanctions short of the use of force” to be meted
out according to evidence discovered by the UN Security Council.116

Just war theorists would be right to determine from the evidence above that
any military attack on Syria that occurred after an inspections deal had been
reached but before it had been implemented would have been imprudent, and
likely have failed the jus ad bellum condition of last resort. However, what has
been less commonly noted is the fact that last resort (and similarly,
proportionality) are conditions that require decision-makers to possess
particular skills and traits to be adhered to adequately because of the
sensitivity of these conditions to particular circumstances. Even Brian Orend,
who expresses scepticism toward more literal interpretations of last resort,
concedes that “[t]he key question this criterion demands to always be asked,
and then answered in the affirmative, is this: is the proposed use of force
reasonable, given the situation and the nature of the aggression.”117 In one way,
this merely pushes the central question back a step: what is reasonable will be
determined by whether and if there are less harmful means of resolving the
conflict, but in another way, Orend’s imploration demonstrates the
importance of situational considerations in one’s reasoning.
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Prudential reckoning of the particularities of a situation may even lead
decision-makers to challenge commonly-assumed deontological limitations of
justice. For instance, Nicholas Fotion argues that the account of just cause
presented by the theory of aggression can be overly-restrictive in that it tends
to entail a singular-reason approach to justifying war:118 as Walzer notes,
aggression “is the only crime that states can commit against other states:
everything else is […] a misdemeanour.”119 This, for Fotion, is a shortcoming
of just cause. He notes that “several small reasons [misdemeanours, in
Walzer’s language] can, in theory, rise to the level of a single overriding
reason. The whole might not be greater than the sum of the parts, but the parts
may add up to a single overriding reason.”120 As such, Fotion advocates a
“multiple reasons approach” to just cause, in which political leaders make
judgements about the justice of a cause being informed by a multitude of
different reasons for and against waging war, rather than one single reason.121

This approach seems consistent with the Thomistic argument that wars are
fought for the common good.122 The manner in which the common good is
harmed (e.g. aggression) will therefore matter less than the severity of the
harm inflicted on the common good. If political leaders were to take such an
approach, the need for practical reasoning skills in political leaders would be
even greater as just cause would no longer be a matter of simply determining
whether or not political sovereignty or territorial integrity have been violated,
but also working out whether a series of minor offences amount to a serious
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harm to the common good. However, this entails political leaders being
concerned with the common good, rather than simply concerning themselves
with the goods of their particular state. Such concern is the domain of the
virtue of charity to which I now turn.

3.3: Charitable Political Leaders

All political leaders need to possess the virtues of prudence and justice as each
is necessary to fulfil the jus ad bellum conditions of JWT. However, the
perfection of the virtues of the political leaders lies in the virtue of charity.
Unlike justice and prudence, the political leader’s charity is supererogatory:
morally laudable and excellent, but not necessary for a just action. Thus,
discussion of charity is warranted not to understand the professional duties of
political leaders, but what it means to excel in the profession.

Perhaps the most obvious instantiation of charity is in the Augustinian claim
that war can be a morally acceptable way of loving one’s enemies. Augustine
exhorted those involved in war to be peacemakers “even in war so that by
conquering [enemies] you bring the benefit of peace even to those you
defeat.”123 For Augustine, wars were declared in part as an exercise of fraternal
correction for the moral indiscretions of another. Were it impossible,
Augustine claimed, to stop an enemy from sinning through non-violent
means, it would be better to stop him with the use of force, even lethally, than

E. M. Atkins and R. J. Dodaro (eds.), Augustine: Political Writings, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 217.
123

343

to allow him to keep sinning, because by sinning the enemy sacrifices his very
soul. On this account, war becomes perhaps the grandest manifestation of
‘tough love.’ In Aquinas, this approach changes so that war is always aimed
at bringing about peace, understood both as a state of concord between
communities, and a state of harmony in the souls of individuals. In a world
where the international community is pluralistic, it is this latter sense of
charity which political leaders must be equipped with.

Charity, in this latter sense, is a commitment to the advancement of the
common good; the flourishing of all people and communities. As Daniel M.
Bell notes, “this common good […] is concerned with the welfare of all, such
that all may prosper in harmony with their neighbours.”124 For Bell, it is also
concerned ultimately with love of God and a “theological vision of political
life.”125 Bell combines the conceptions of Augustine and Aquinas, seeing war
as concerned with the common good, but at the same time forbidding selfdefensive wars in the Augustinian spirit, 126 leaving the victim of violence “in
the hands of God’s providential care.”127 A different view is presented by
Lucas Swaine, who argues that:

[P]olitical leaders have responsibilities that ordinary citizens do not […] political
leaders [do not] have a prerogative to yield rights of self-defence for their

Bell, op cit., 134.
Ibid., 134.
126 C.f. chapter two, 31.
127 Bell, op cit., 134-135.
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respective polities, whereas it appears that ordinary citizens may permissibly
decide to be killed rather than to kill.128

Swaine’s argument coincides more neatly with the duties of the modern-day
democratically-elected political leader than Bell’s. Swaine understands the
leader’s duties as being directed primarily to his citizens whilst Bell sees them
primarily directed to God. For Bell, all just wars must be motivated by the
Christian prerogative to serve one’s neighbours, including “by defending
them against unjust aggression.”129 Thus, it is charity that determines whether
a cause is just or not. Here it will be worth returning to the question asked
earlier: what should virtuous political leaders understand just cause and the
“goods proper to political life” to be?

As we have already noted, deontological just war theories have, since Walzer,
identified the goods proper to political life as the two state rights of political
sovereignty and territorial integrity. These have led to the formulation of
several duties in order to protect these two rights. The collection of these
duties is commonly known as the “theory of aggression” first presented in Just
and Unjust Wars.130

This theory understands aggression as the only just cause for war. There are,
as Orend notes, two kinds of just cause with relation to aggression – “self-

Swaine, op cit., 325.
Bell, op cit., 135.
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defence” and “other-defence.”131 They share between them a common interest
in defending the rights of states when they are wrongly violated. Perhaps one
limitation of the theory of aggression which an aretaic approach, informed by
charity, might enhance is the view that just cause grants states a license to go
to war. Just cause has not traditionally been formulated as a duty to go to war,
but as a liberty: states are entitled to go to war when the condition of just cause
has been fulfilled, but are not obliged to. Thus, unless political leaders are
motivated by charity, they appear likely to go to war only when it serves their
interests. Bell describes the modern conception of just cause:

The justice in modern just war is a matter of refereeing the interaction of nations
as each pursues its own interests and values. As the account of just cause [makes]
clear, a nation has just cause for what when its right to territorial integrity and
political sovereignty, its values, or its interests are attacked. Justice is first and
foremost about securing a nation’s individual good.132

Bell’s critique overreaches somewhat. In fact, there is a growing move in
international law and relations toward a doctrine of “Responsibility to
Protect,” (R2P) which states that:

Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war,
insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state is unwilling or unable to halt
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or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
responsibility to protect.133

Thus, it might be said that the state of just cause in modern JWT is somewhere
in between a self-interested approach and what Bell sees as a “justice for all”
approach.134 However, R2P is controversial in the literature precisely because it
is formulated as a moral duty of states.135 Political leaders, it is argued, are
morally required to defend the victims of aggression where it is possible and
necessary. This may be true, but because the international sphere has, until
this point, largely been governed by the language of rights which, Bain notes,
“preﬁgure a permissive mode of action, mediated by contingent motives and
interests, which does not always make contact with victims who are in need
of rescue.”136 Because of this, the introduction of duties to intervene, as opposed
to an account when intervention is justified, will take some time.

Perhaps eventually such duties will be popularly acknowledged and be
enforced, but until then, interventions are likely to continue to take place in a
voluntaristic manner. So, although Bell is perhaps overzealous in his
description of the state of modern international relations, it is true in situations
where (i) there is no risk to their own political sovereignty or territorial

Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun (Co-Chairs), The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, International
Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001, XI,
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/57/303>.
134 Bell, op cit., 133.
135 For a thoughtful discussion of the interplay between R2P and obligation, see: William
Bain, ‘Responsibility and Obligation in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, Review of International
Studies, vol. 36, Supplement S1, 25-46.
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integrity, and (ii) there are no national interests at stake, political leaders will
feel less compelled to defend just causes. Bell’s solution to the “interested
approach” (which he describes as consistent with a model of just war as a
“public policy checklist”137) is to remodel JWT on Christian moral virtues such
as charity and justice.138 Such an approach “is more amenable to the possibility
of humanitarian intervention.”139 The political leader, if he has genuinely
cultivated the virtues of justice and (more importantly) charity, will not be the
type of person who stands indifferent to injustices simply because his interests
are not served by intervening. He will, in short, not require any duty to tell
him to help the innocent. As Swaine explains:

[M]oral character […] can move people to action, and this is another way in
which it proves relevant to a normative treatment of democratic leadership.
Strength of character [here understood as possessing the virtue of charity] can
induce individuals to press forward with difficult efforts even when beleaguered
or frustrated.140

Bell, op cit., 74. The checklist, for Bell, is “an instrument of public policy, a checklist of
criteria that aspires to guide politicians, rulers, and military leadership in times of war.”
138 Ibid., 73-74. In many ways, this approach is consistent with mine, but I believe Bell goes
too far in theologising his argument (for instance, suggesting that just as self-defence does
not justify intentional killing, state self-defence cannot constitute just cause for war (134-135)
– an approach in which Bell seems to overlook the legitimate use of force which is not
intentionally lethal, but which is willing to be lethal if necessary, just as occurs in individual
self-defence under DDE. Elsewhere Bell defends punishment as a just cause for war (136), an
approach which is deeply unsettling and at odds with much of what I have argued here:
most significantly because it is indiscriminate in its punishment of wrongdoers and
noncombatants alike.
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These beleaguerers and frustrations can and are likely to include a lack of
politically compelling reasons to assist those in need when doing so carries
great national expense and little benefit. The virtue of charity (alongside other
moral virtues Swaine includes in his description of good moral character)
compels leaders to find motivations outside of political interests. An aretaic
approach to just cause, therefore, is less likely to take a license-based
approach. All things being equal, if injustice is being done, and it is within the
power of the charitable individual to correct that injustice, the charitable
individual will act. Further, his actions will be motivated by a desire to correct
the injustice itself.

Alex J. Bellamy has argued that “[a] state may launch a humanitarian
intervention for self-interested reasons (motives) but its intention may still be
humanitarian […] The Just War tradition requires that those embarking on
humanitarian intervention have a primarily humanitarian intent.”141 However,
if humanitarian intervention is to be genuinely motivated by charity, political
leaders will not possess, as Bellamy and Orend allow, “mixed motives,” in
which just motivations are present alongside self-interested ones.142 Rather,
charitable political leaders will rationalise the decision to act in defence of
others by asking (i) is there injustice occurring here? and (ii) am I in a position
to correct that injustice without causing greater injustice? They would, in
Johnson’s words, “serve the goods of proper political life” wherever it were
possible for them to do so.

Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 211.
C.f. Ibid., 211; Orend, The Morality of War, op cit., 46-47. Note that Bellamy requires the
moral intention of the political to be primary amongst the variety of different intentions and
motives available.
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Serving the goods proper to political life requires a nuanced understanding of
that political life, including the relevant facts, historical trends, and
personalities involved. Thus, political leaders who aim to serve the goods of
political life are required to possess a keen awareness of the current and past
circumstances of international relations. Prudence, as we have seen, is the
ability to apply one’s reason to determine the correct course of action against
a variety of alternatives, including, as Aquinas notes, the ability “to
obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past.”143 This
is to say that prudence will serve political leaders in determining the best path
of action using not only evidence from current events, but from past
circumstances as well.

Political prudence concerns a political leader’s awareness of the historical,
political, and cultural facts that are relevant to a particular situation, and his
ability to apply those facts to the situation in a reasonable manner. The
reasonableness of this application includes, for the prudential reasoning to be
virtuous in character, concern for justice and charity. Not only must this be
applied to matters of just cause, but also the means by which the war is fought
and how closely they align to the goals of war as stipulated by ad bellum
reasoning. In this regard, both political leaders and military commanders are
required to possess charitable prudence; however, I include it in the discussion
of political leadership because the political leader usually possesses sufficient
authority to influence the means by which commanders fight their wars.
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Carl von Clausewitz argued that “the aim [of] the whole military action […]
must be in accordance with the object of the war.”144 Indeed, he goes so far as
to say that “[a] prince or general who knows exactly how to organise his war
according to his object and means […] gives by that the greatest proof of his
genius.”145 The central importance of unifying the means by which a war is
fought with the goals of that war requires a unification of moral and strategic
values by political leaders. After all, it makes no sense to, as one Vietnam
veteran put it, “rationalize destroying villages in order to save them.”146

Unifying goals and means in wartime requires two things of political leaders:
(i) awareness of practical and logistical matters to an extent sufficient to make
well-informed decisions as to the efficacy of a particular decision with regard
to the specific goals of the war (i.e. rout the enemies northern flank, or capture
a prominent terrorist leader); and relatedly (and more importantly), (ii) the
ability to connect practical matters with the ad bellum moral justifications for
war (i.e. does this advance the cause of peace in a morally good way?). In this
sense, a political leader must be sufficiently proficient in the ways of war as to
be able to connect short-term battle tactics to broader military goals that are in
the national interest, but are also moral concerns of the just and charitable
political leader.

The importance of unifying goals and means can be demonstrated by
returning to President Obama’s intention to conduct a long-range missile

von Clausewitz, On War, op cit., Book III, Ch. I.
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attack on the Assad regime in response to evidence of the use of chemical
weapons. In questioning whether the decision was prudent (and leaving aside
the variety of other important questions provoked by this strategy),147 we must
ask whether the strategy would be effective in serving the particular goals it
set out to achieve. In this case, the goals were (in no particular order)
punishment, deterrence, and incapacitating Syrian chemical weapons
capabilities. In terms of these specific goals, it appears as if a limited, ranged,
missile strike might possibly have served the specific goals designated by the
strategy in question.

However, problems arise in a second respect: do the proposed military
strategies of a particular action align with the broader purposes of the war
stipulated by jus ad bellum, to which a political leader is committed? The aim
of the strike was, at best, to protect the innocent by punishing, incapacitating,
and deterring the Assad regime. Given the vulnerability of civilians and the
limited likelihood of their being protected by such a strike, this policy draws
analogy to the Vietnam War’s rationalization of “destroying villages in order
to save them.” It is unclear that such an approach coincides with charity’s
dictum that all wars ultimately aim at bringing about a just peace and benefit
the common good. In one sense, this could rightly be seen as a moral failure by
the political leadership, however, in another important sense it represents a
failure to appreciate military strategy and history. For instance, learning from
the NATO intervention in Bosnia, when distance strikes only led to a speedup in the killings occurring on the ground. Thus, appreciation of political and

Elsewhere I have spent more time focussing on some of the moral shortcomings of
Obama’s proposed response. See: Matthew Beard, ‘War as Punishment: President Obama’s
Syrian Solution’, ABC Religion and Ethics, 2nd September 2013,
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historical factors at play in a situation can be an important virtue for political
leaders to possess. Although it does not – in itself – demonstrate anything
profound about the moral character of the person in question, its absence can
carry serious moral implications.

4: Conclusion

This chapter offers a new way of understanding the individuals obligated to
make moral decisions with regard to JWT. I argue that soldiering, military
command, and political leadership all require the virtues for adherence to
political duty and to achieve professional excellence. The interplay between
deontological duties and moral virtues was explored in two different ways.
First, as ‘compliance multipliers’ that assist individuals in recognising and
acting in consistency with their professional duties. Secondly, virtues are tools
for professional excellence. They aid individuals in achieving more than the
minimum standard of acceptable behaviour, but drive them toward the
supererogatory.

Soldiers are required to risk their own lives in defence of what is good. For
this reason, they are especially called to the virtue of courage, by which they
are prepared to be subject to unjust aggression in order to defend and uphold
the common good. Courage of this form is the duty of soldiers, but soldiers
who seek to achieve excellence in their vocation may also strive for a higher
level of courage, one Aquinas understood as martyrdom. Such figures can
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serve as role models and examples to inspire courage and virtue in other
soldiers.

Insofar as every moral agent is autonomous, they are expected to determine
for themselves how best to act in particular situations; that is, to practise
prudence. However, soldiers have a moral duty to obey orders, making it
unclear how prudence can be practised in the military. The prudent soldier,
however, ought to question those orders which jar with his conscience, or
which have been issued by commanders who have not demonstrated a prior
commitment to justice. However, absent of these conditions, prudent and just
soldiers will obey orders without needing to undergo deep reflection as swift
obedience serves the efficacy of the military, which serves a morally important
role.
Commanders too, require moral virtues, not least because such virtues will
empower their soldiers to be more readily obedient. Most importantly,
commanders require prudence of a specific kind: military prudence. As a
moral virtue, prudence requires commanders to consider not only what will
be most effective with regard to achieving victory, but what will best uphold
the moral commitments of JWT. Effectiveness cannot be allowed to outweigh
the requirements of morality.

Although military commanders’ primary concerns are for strategy and the
proficient use of military resources to bring about the ends of war, the virtuous
commander must also recognise that victory alone is not sufficient: it is
necessary to win well. Thus, the virtuous commander will place moral
considerations alongside strategic ones and take an approach that conforms to
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each of these domains. Joseph Allen notes that “no inherent conflict exists
between the theory of strategy and a morality of respect for beings that seeks
the best action possible under the circumstances.”148 Given the lack of conflict,
a middle ground approach is both possible and preferable to pursuing
strategy over morality, as the merely proficient commander may be tempted
to.

Finally, political leaders require moral virtues relating to making decisions
that conform to jus ad bellum principles. Specifically, political leaders serve the
goods particular to political life, which include states’ rights of territorial
integrity and political sovereignty, but are not limited to them. Most
importantly, political leaders must serve the common good. This requirement,
which dates back at least as far as Aquinas, sits in contrast to modern
conceptions of JWT, which see just cause as a license to go to war, and thus in
reality see war practised only on those occasions when they serve the national
interest.

The charitable and just political leader, by contrast, will feel obligated to go to
war wherever it advances the common good – meaning that virtuous political
leaders will be more likely to engage in exercises of humanitarian intervention
than will those committed only to deontological conceptions of just war
theory. However, the virtuous political leader will approach every decision
with prudence, seeking consultation from experts in various fields before
reaching a final decision. Prudent decision-makers also require nonmoral
skills in order to practise their vocation with excellence: specifically, they must
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be experienced in the relationships between states by way of diplomacy.
Further, they must possess the ability to understand military matters enough
to determine the efficacy of proposed operations, and to understand whether
a proposed strategy will advance the ad bellum causes under which war was
commenced in the first place.

In this chapter I paint a (necessarily limited) picture of how the military
professions manifest when practitioners concern themselves with more than
mere proficiency, and rather strive to practise their professions with virtue. I
limit my discussion to a few central virtues, but others will also be important
for virtuous conduct. Part of the importance of incorporating aretaic concerns
into JWT is to allow the theory to become more sensitive to situational
concerns, and as the situations in war and politics vary, so too will the manner
in which the relevant virtues manifest. Thus, we must develop professionals
who treat the aretaic project of living a virtuous life seriously.
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Chapter Six

Conclusion

This thesis argues that just war theorists would do good service both to JWT
and to military practitioners by using aretaic moral reasoning to complement
the deontological elements of military ethics. Each chapter has made this
argument in a different way, but all have been unified in emphasising the
complementarity of aretaic and deontological ethics. In this final chapter, I
return to the discussions of each of the preceding chapters, summarising the
basic arguments and highlighting areas of key thought in this thesis.
Following this summary of what has been argued throughout, I briefly
suggest some of the practical applications of what has been argued, as well as
avenues for future academic research. Some of this has already been
addressed, but I return to these matters again to identify critical questions that
this thesis may assist in addressing.

1: Summary of Arguments and Key Thoughts

This thesis consists of four main chapters. Chapter one is introductory, and
explored the central concepts of the thesis: aretaic ethics, deontological ethics,
and JWT. Chapters two to five built an argument as to why JWTs current
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emphasis on deontology is problematic and warrants revisiting. Chapter two
chronicles how JWT came to emphasise deontology so heavily; chapter three
explains how the concept of intention serves to bridge the gap between
deontological and aretaic ethics, and explained some ways in which aretaic
thinking about pertinent questions of military ethics can enrich the answers
provided by deontological theories; chapter four explores how aretaic
thinking provides new insights into the ethical aspects of PTSD, moral injury,
and military identity; and finally, chapter five reveals the ways in which
particular virtues are necessary for political leaders, military commanders, and
soldiers to readily identify what morality demands in particular situations.
Each of these arguments will be explored in more detail below.

In this section I also make special mention of the key thoughts of this thesis
that mark original contributions to the military ethics literature. The chief
original contribution of this thesis is demonstrating the complementarity of
deontological and aretaic ethics within JWT. I argue – particularly in the
exploration of Walzer, Rodin, and McMahan’s ideas in chapter three – that
most just war theorists do not consider aretaic ethics to warrant significant
consideration in discussions of the morality of war. There are, by contrast,
some theorists who do consider aretaic questions to be worthy of
consideration for educational reasons,1 because they enhance performance,2 or
protect soldiers from moral harm.3 Each of these positions makes a substantial

C.f. Paul Robinson, Nigel De Lee & Don Carrick (eds.), Ethics Education in the Military,
(Cornwall: Ashgate, 2008).
2 C.f. Peter Olsthoorn, ‘Courage in the Military: Physical and Moral’, Journal of Military
Ethics, vol. 6, iss. 4, 2007, 270-279; J. Carl Ficarrotta, ‘Are Military Professionals Bound by a
Higher Moral Standard?’, Armed Forces & Society, vol. 24, no. 59, 1997, 59-75.
3 C.f. Shannon E. French, The Code of the Warrior, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003);
Nancy Sherman, The Untold War: Inside the Hearts and Minds of Our Soldiers, (New York:
W.W. Norton, 2010).
1

358

contribution to the debate on aretaic ethics and the military, but none
demonstrate the ways in which virtue can be conceptually integrated into
existing JWT. That is, none of them mount substantial aretaic arguments
whilst simultaneously engaging with the deontological strands of military
ethics. My thesis addresses this absence in the literature by showing how the
two different approaches can enrich each other; in particular, how aretaic
ethics can enhance deontological formulations of JWT.

In mounting this argument, a number of lesser, yet original, contributions to
the literature are made. All of these contribute to the overall argument of the
thesis, but each also contributes to other aspects of the military ethics
literature. Insights from these chapters can be brought to bears on debates that
are ongoing within the literature. These original contributions occur in
chapters three, four, and five.

1.1: Historical Shifts in JWT

Chapter two explores how JWT emerged in the Western tradition beginning
with St. Augustine. The just war, for Augustine, must be one that accords with
the divine moral law. For Augustine, the injustices of war did not chiefly
include the wide array of physical damages – loss of life, destruction of
property, or loss of political autonomy – rather, war’s injustice was the
corruption of human souls. War threatens to turn human hearts to hatred, love
of violence, anger, and vengeance, and the sin of war is when people act with
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intentions formed from those emotions. Only service of God’s will would
count as an intention from which one could justifiably go to war.

Developing Augustine’s views, Thomas Aquinas situated his discussion of
war within the context of his work on the supernatural virtue of charity. Thus,
Aquinas expressed his view that just wars must be in the service of the common
good, not only the good of the nation or leader who declares them. All wars,
Aquinas stipulated, must ultimately aim at a specific type of peace: concord
between all persons. Aquinas also explored the virtues that best characterise
the practices of military command and soldiering. It is noteworthy that
Aquinas kept these discussions separate from his exploration of jus ad bellum.
This seems to reflect a similar belief to that present in Augustine; namely, that
the objective justice of cause is a separate matter to whether individual people
have acted virtuously in waging war.

Aquinas suggested that the moral virtues of prudence and fortitude bear most
immediately on military affairs. Prudence refers to the special virtue of the
cognitive faculty which allows man to decide between various paths of action,
whilst fortitude (more commonly called courage) is the virtue which allows
man to pursue what he knows to be good despite the difficulties involved.
Prudence pertains to military command, whilst fortitude regards the carrying
out of orders: “[t]he execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the
direction, especially insofar as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs
to prudence.”4 By aligning different military practices with particular moral
virtues, and – crucially – remembering that Aquinas saw the virtues as
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character traits that direct an individual toward happiness, 5 Aquinas
demonstrated how the act of soldiering can be a constitutive element of the
good life as well as being a morally just practice. Thus, Aquinas’ model of war
does service to both deontological and aretaic aspects of JWT.

Later, Francisco di Vitoria sought to formulate a positive law of war. In doing
so, he argued that war is a separate moral domain, independent of everyday
morality in which political leaders with just causes could do “everything
necessary for security and peace.”6 By determining moral justifications solely
with reference to the justice of one’s cause, Vitoria advanced a kind of
consequentialism that is at odds with his other moral writings, which are
grounded in natural law. This seems to indicate that Vitoria saw war as an
entirely separate moral domain from everyday life, with its own unique set of
rights and duties. Thus, new and specifically tailored laws are required to
govern this separate moral domain. In this way, Vitoria’s project deviated
from those of his predecessors, who had attempted to apply existing laws of
morality to war, rather than develop an entirely new moral system.

Vitoria’s successor, Hugo Grotius, preferred deontological to aretaic ethics,
arguing that virtue is supererogatory. Following Vitoria’s view that war is a
morally separate domain, Grotius described soldiers as being governed only
by the rights and duties of war. However, he also believed that the soldier who
continues to adhere to ‘everyday morality’ were morally superior to soldiers

Ibid., I-II, Q. 1, Art. 8; I-II, Q. 4, Art. 7.
Francisco di Vitoria, On the Law of War in Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence (eds.),
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who only obeys the laws of war. Here, Grotius acknowledged the influence of
aretaic morality: although we may only punish soldiers who violate
deontologically-prohibited norms, we should hope that soldiers be
“honourable.”7 In some ways this acknowledgement continued the legacy of
Augustine and Aquinas by making a place for aretaic ethics in JWT. However,
construing the virtues as unnecessary for moral conduct dramatically
undermined the authority of aretaic ethics in moral evaluations of war.

The undermining of aretaic ethics in modernity continued with the
publication of Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars in 1977. Walzer’s work focusses
explicitly on understanding the morality of war through the lens of human
rights and their violations. Although there are multiple reasons for this, a
central one is Walzer’s belief that universal morality must necessarily be
“thin” and comprise only of the most basic moral norms. Thus, Walzer’s just
war theory is similarly “thin,” focussing on what basic principles of conflict
all nations agree to in their conduct of war.

However, perhaps alone of the just war theorists discussed in this section,
Walzer is acutely aware of and concerned about the practical realities of war.
Grounded in countless historical examples, Just and Unjust Wars (and, indeed,
all of Walzer’s work since that book) attempts to reconcile military ethics with
the practical necessities and realities of military practice.

Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, in Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse & Endre
Begby, The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings, (Victoria: Blackwell Publishing,
2006), Bk. III, IV.II.
7

362

This led, for instance, to (i) Walzer’s justifying the commission of war crimes
and moral atrocities in times of grave necessity; (ii) his belief that all soldiers,
regardless of the justice of their cause, share mutual rights to kill each other;
and, perhaps most tellingly for this thesis, (iii) that the cultivation of the
virtues in soldiers or political leaders is supererogatory or heroic, and goes
beyond the basic requirements of morality. It is this last view that perhaps
most typifies contemporary JWT: focussed only on rights as the minimum
standard of moral excellence and the moral necessity to which all actions must
reach in order to avoid being prima facie wrongs. And it is to this account that
my discussion turns to in chapter three.

1.2: Intention: Connecting Rights and Virtues

Chapter three begins with a philosophical exploration of the concept of rights
as used by several of today’s prominent just war theorists. I argue that the
theories of Walzer, Rodin, and McMahan – although different in a variety of
ways – share a basic understanding of rights. For these theorists, their use of
the term rights refers to (i) basic rights; (ii) liberty-rights to defend those basic
rights; and (iii) obligations not to violate the rights of others. Focussing on the
case of the alleged right of soldiers to kill their enemies during war, I find that
this approach, focussing on the moral status of both the perpetrator and the
victim, fails to give adequate focus to the concept of intention as it bears on
the morality of killing in war.
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I therefore contrast the status-based approach to rights and intentional killing
with that provided by DDE. This approach, today popular in discussions of
collateral damage, can also be used to show how an absolute prohibition on
intentionally killing might be consistent with forcefully taking another
person’s life. I presented the absolutist interpretation of DDE as both
practicable in military settings and as being preferable in its consistency with
common morality. Further, by introducing an absolute ban on intentional
killing under all circumstances, the absolutist interpretation DDE can be said
to defend the absolute value of persons in a way that a non-absolutist account
of human rights does not. In making this argument, I reveal the ability of
intentions and motives to bridge the deontological and aretaic aspects of
military ethics.

After exploring how modern just war theories tend to conceptualise rights, I
identify three reasons why the framework provided by rights might appear as
a desirable one for just war theorists. The first reason is one that I have already
identified: the defence of the immense value of each individual human life.
This emphasis provides a response to pure utilitarian modes of thinking in
which moral value is determined with reference to the overall benefit to all
persons, but where each individual is of comparably little moral value. Rights
language is also a powerful disincentive against wrongdoing because it
provides a framework through which legislation can be developed to prohibit
and punish wrongdoing. Thus, for just war theorists, rights discourse appeals
because it can assist in – as di Vitoria and Grotius sought – the development
of morally binding and enforceable laws of armed conflict. The usefulness of
binding laws is contingent on their being applicable to all people who are
engaged in wars. In this way, rights theory is also a useful framework for
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military ethics as it claims to be universally applicable. By appealing to values
that are universally-applicable to and ostensibly held by all members of the
global community, rights discourse further empowers military ethics to be
able to govern the conduct of all soldiers from all parts of the world for all
times.

In the final section of chapter three, I explore two different problems – torture,
and lesser evil scenarios – and the ways in which deontological just war
theories explain and respond to those problems. I emphasise the way in which
each of these problems could be greater illuminated by supplementing the
deontological reply with insights from aretaic ethics.

I explore various conceptions of torture, advocating that of Patrick Lee, whose
definition of torture derives from what the act aims to achieve, rather than
which methods are used. Torture, under this definition, consists in “acts of
mutilation or acts that attempt to reduce the detainee to a subhuman, disintegrated state, for the ulterior purpose either of interrogation, deterrence,
revenge, punishment, or sadistic pleasure.”8 It is noteworthy that the best
definition of torture is one that is related to the intentions and motivations of
the torturer – thus allowing for the interplay between aretaic and
deontological norms. I suggest that insights from aretaic ethics might be
helpful in adding further moral depth to discussions of torture. Torturers are
asked to perform acts that degrade, mock, traumatise or objectify other human
beings. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether institutions that employ

Patrick Lee, ‘Interrogational Torture’, The American Journal of Jurisprudence, vol. 51, 2006,
131-148 at 132.
8
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torture are facilitating those operatives becoming the kind of people who do
not make good citizens. That is, whether the deeds torturers perform come to
form character vices such as insensitivity to the suffering of others,
manipulative attitudes toward relationships, or reluctance to believe what one
is told at face value. Further, it is worth understanding whether, even if
torturers are able to retain virtue during torture, what harm is done to their
ability to flourish as human beings. I concluded by arguing that the moral
costs of torture on the torturer himself are too severe to ever morally justify the
practice.

The case of lesser evil scenarios, which are only revealed as a real dilemma if
one takes a threshold deontological approach to rights, is explored with
regard to aretaic elements. I argued that supreme emergency and lesser eviltype arguments tend to demonstrate a failure to render the morality of war as
subject to the common good. It is only for instance, by preferring the good of
my nation over the good of other nations that I can justify invading a neutral
country in my own defence (as explored in Jeff McMahan’s case). However, I
show how even if one were to consider lesser evil problems to be morally
difficult cases, their sensitivity to a huge range of situational variables and the
lack of a deontological principle to guide actions in these cases suggest that
the only person who we could reasonably trust to resolve a lesser evil problem
well would be a person of virtue.

The case of Walzer’s supreme emergencies is also considered from an aretaic
perspective, from which it was revealed that insofar as the virtues are
concerned not only with how one relates to other people, but also how one
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relates to oneself, they will never justify violations of morality, regardless of
the consequences. Aretaic ethics can also provide a framework to substitute
the ‘damned martyrdom’ of supreme emergencies – whereby political leaders
sacrifice their souls in defence of their communities – with a more literal kind
of martyrdom, where leaders sacrifice themselves and their communities in
defence of what is right. Although this appears dramatic and perhaps
unlikely, it is worth noting that it is a response to a scenario (supreme
emergency) which is itself dramatic and unlikely. As such, it should be
unsurprising that in the entirety of human history, no such instance of
communal martyrdom has ever taken place. However, it is important that
political leaders be of a character that is prepared to sacrifice the community
rather than betray deontological norms because, as was discussed in chapter
four, the psychological fallout from betrayals of moral norms can be
catastrophic.

1.3: War Crimes & Psychological Scarring

In the first section of chapter four, I turn my attention to aspects of military
ethics in which an aretaic approach offers not only new insights, but new
questions. Aretaic ethics, I argued, provides unique and important insights
into the moral-psychological effects of warfare, specifically, of unjust conduct
and moral transgression. I explore two different frameworks that aim to
reduce instances of moral transgression by soldiers – those of Nancy Sherman
and Shannon French – before offering my own account. Sherman argues that
the inculcation of empathy within soldiers; empathy for the plight and
humanity of noncombatants, enemy soldiers, and colleagues, is the best way
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for soldiers to guard themselves against committing atrocities. French, on the
other hand, argues that appealing to a warrior code of honour provides
soldiers with an internalised set of beliefs about the type of things that soldiers
should and should not do.

In response, I argue that Sherman’s approach, whilst effective in preventing
the killing of noncombatants, does little to restrain soldiers’ passions when the
target of those passions is culpable for some wrongdoing (i.e. killing a member
of the troop). Whilst French’s approach, on the other hand, relies on a soldier
seeing himself primarily as a warrior (and thus being governed by the warrior
code). The difficulty here is that the soldier’s conduct is governed by what the
rest of his peers (fellow warriors) see as laudable or blameworthy. Both
approaches are therefore – I suggested – of limited usefulness. In overlooking
the significance of the fact that most warriors hold moral commitments in a
variety of different moral domains, most pertinently in this case, at war and at
home, French and Sherman both miss a crucial piece in the psychological
puzzle of the soldier. I argue that what it means to be a soldier must be
consistent with what it means to be a father, brother, mother, sister, and so on,
for honour to be given the best opportunity to prevent atrocities.

A better approach, I believe, is revealed by Shakespeare in Coriolanus when
the protagonist, Caius Marcius, is persuaded against destroying Rome by the
exhortations of his mother. Coriolanus is swayed by the prospect of shame not
by fellow soldiers, but by society generally. Coriolanus’ eyes are brought to
“sweat compassion” out of love for his mother, and his memories of home. In
a similar vein, the wrath of Achilles abated in response to memories of his
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father. Drawing on these, I argue for a military culture that encouraged holistic
moral identities and virtues rather than the cultivation of warrior-specific
virtues and identities. If soldiers are able to identify simultaneously as good
soldiers, fathers, mothers, sons, sisters, and citizens, they are less likely to
engage in behaviour that deviates sharply from basic, everyday moral norms
and virtues. This approach is also appealing in that it can be applied more
easily to the growing number of military operators who do not fit the warrior
archetype, such as drone operators. Thus, soldiers will do well to remember
their moral commitments on the “home front,” as well as the expectations of
fellow soldiers.

This novel approach is consistent with emerging literature on the
“fragmentation problem” in soldiers, which identifies the psychological
trauma suffered by veterans because of the severe disconnect between their
military and civilian lives, and makes an original contribution to that literature
by showing consistency between literary cases and contemporary examples.9
Further, I connect the question of warrior identity to the changing roles of
military personnel. New “warriors” – including drone pilots and cyber
warriors – no longer engage in physical combat, but still go to war and then
return home at the end of the day. In these cases, problems of fragmentation
will only be exacerbated by the immediacy and regularity of the civilianmilitary transitions. Thus, more than ever, Western militaries face a pressing
need to re-shape soldier identity.

See Paul T. Berghaus & Nathan L. Cartagena, ‘Developing Good Soldiers: the Problem of
Fragmentation within the Army’, Journal of Military Ethics, vol. 12, iss. 4, 2013, 287-303.
9
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In the second section of the chapter, I focus specifically on the experiences of
PTSD and moral injury as they occur in soldiers. I distinguish the two through
a phenomenological framework that revealed moral injury as an experience of
oneself as self-judge, and PTSD as an experience of ongoing victimhood and
vulnerability. Although both have severe consequences for the veterans who
suffer them, I contend that it is moral injury which was the more severe
because it involves erroneous judgements about the self and the world that
are less easily challenged or corrected. However, I suggest that certain moral
interventions, including trauma narratives and purification rituals might lead
a veteran to the self-forgiveness that is critical to successful recovery from a
damaged thumos. This conceptual exposition helps to add further depth to our
understanding of moral injury, a condition about which Litz et. al. note,
“existing evidence-based strategies fail to provide sufficient guidance”10 to
clinicians attempting to treat it. Thus, further information regarding moral
injury is necessary in order for victims to receive the care they require to heal.
Furthermore, adopting a phenomenology that understands what the
experience of moral injury (or PTSD for that matter) is like provides useful
insights to the kind of narrative therapies that prominent theorists in the
literature have advocated.11

My earlier argument regarding the inclusion of soldiers’ civilian identities in
their warrior identities is relevant again here. The segregation of these two
different identities is morally problematic and is likely a contributor to moral
injury. For this reason, I reject the approach to military ethics known as “role
morality,” whereby one sees morality as being defined by the role in which

Ibid.,, op cit., 696
Ibid., 702-703; Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Ruin of Character,
(New York: Scribner, 1994, 188-189.
10
11
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one serves. Defenders of role morality argue that this approach is far simpler
for soldiers to apply, and makes it much easier for soldiers to understand why,
for example, killing is justified in war. However, as the earlier sections of the
chapter reveal, seeing oneself as governed by different rules in different
contexts generates as many, if not more, moral problems than does applying
the same set of moral rules in radically different circumstances. The most
immediate and obvious of these problems is the one described as
“fragmentation,” whereby soldiers are unable to see their military identities
as being morally consistent or copasetic with their other moral identities. For
this reason, I advocate a military culture based in cultivating the moral virtues,
which traverse different traditions and cultures whilst also serving to guide
conduct appropriately.

Finally, I focus on the experience of shame, which, although pivotal to the
warrior code of honour, also appears to be a powerful factor in moral injury.
Shame can be problematic when it is used to try to homogenise members of a
group, so that members are shamed for possessing characteristics that do not
hold moral significance (such as one’s sex). Shame is, however, helpful in
eliciting virtuous conduct from individuals who fear besmirching their
honour in front of their peers. The notion of peers emerges as pivotal when
one considers new categories of soldiers, such as drone pilots, as well as for
soldiers who do not immediately fit cultural archetypes of the warrior, such
as women, homosexuals, or those who experience nervous reactions to
combat. Unless a new warrior code emerges for these new warriors, they too
risk being shamed unnecessarily for failing to possess characteristics that are
entirely irrelevant to their professional responsibilities.
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1.4: Just War Decision-Makers and Moral Character

In the penultimate chapter of the thesis, I apply my arguments regarding the
complementarity of aretaic and deontological ethics as well as the value of
incorporating aretaic viewpoints into JWT to the people who are chiefly
responsible for making decisions in war. The reason for this inquiry serves
two purposes. First, it demonstrates how virtues and rights can co-operate to
assist the military and civilian personnel who actually need to make decisions
about the morality of war. Secondly it shows that a collaboration of
deontological and aretaic ethics is not merely an effective evaluative moral
framework to be applied retrospectively by academics, lawyers, or historians,
it is also a useful approach to ethical thinking for those who are actually
obligated to make these decisions. However, having said this, the framework
I suggest does also serve as a comprehensive descriptive account of moral
actions in war, allowing observers to distinguish between just actions, the
virtues that make them possible, supererogatory actions, and the virtues that
enable these. This chapter demonstrates both the descriptive and practical
value of a combined deontological/aretaic framework, focussing specifically
on the three major decision-making groups and the virtues necessary to
ensure ethical conduct in those roles: soldiers, military commanders, and
political leaders.

The central virtues assisting in the ethical conduct of soldiers’ duties are
prudence and courage. In each case (and these are only exemplar cases – there
are other virtues which apply to soldiers and for which a similar distinction
exists), the operation of the virtues can be seen as operating on two different
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levels. First, on the level of ensuring a soldier, commander, or political leader
adheres to his basic and minimal deontological duties; and secondly on the
supererogatory level of perfecting the virtue of individual actors such that
their conduct becomes a model instantiation of the moral excellence of their
profession. Thus, the soldier who is willing to risk his life in the performance
of his ordinary and stipulated duties (for instance, the carrying out of an
ordinary mission) is indeed courageous, but the soldier who is willing to
sacrifice his life in conditions where his professional responsibilities do not
demand it demonstrates a greater level of courage. The former type of courage
I describe as readiness-to-die, and the latter as martyrdom. For example, if any
soldier who went ‘over the top’ during the trench warfare of WWI was
courageous, he was at least equally so with all others who went over.
However, if a soldier volunteered to go over in the first wave, knowing that
casualty rates would be highest, he could perhaps be described as more
courageous – particularly if he had volunteered. Going over the top was a
necessary duty of the soldiers, and courage was necessary to fulfil that duty,
but volunteering to be in the first wave is not necessary, and to do so requires
more courage given the elevated likelihood of death. This latter case is an
instance of martyrdom, whereas simply obeying one’s command to go over
the top is an example of readiness-to-die.

Some may contend, however, that any decision to go over the top is not
courageous but foolish: the likelihood of success is so low, and the casualty
rates are so high. If this were true, would it follow that soldiers should have
refused to engage in trench warfare at all? Deciding which orders to obey and
when is an operation of prudence, the virtue of practical reason which allows a
person to choose what ought to be done in a particular situation. In military
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scenarios, prudence is particularly important as soldiers not only have to
consider the strategic validity of an order and its morality, but must balance
those against their duty to obey commands and contribute to the efficient
functioning of the military. Prudence bears on soldiers in determining
whether they ought to fight in a particular war at all, as well as determining
whether a particular order ought to be obeyed. The soldier who is prudent
will, I argue, presume that any order is a just one except in those cases where
the commander (or political leader in the case of commanding a soldier to go
to war) has previously evidenced unethical behaviour. In those cases, soldiers
are duty-bound to evaluate each command received because they are unable
to justify trusting commands from that source. Prudence will assist soldiers in
determining when trust should be awarded and when it has been eroded and
will prevent them from shirking all personal moral responsibility for acts they
are commanded to do.

Given that the prudent soldier’s obedience is predicated on the extent to which
he can trust his commander, the moral virtues of the military commander are
directly relevant to efficient military functioning. The primary virtue with
which military commanders must be concerned is prudence. However, unlike
soldiers, whose prudential considerations are generally limited to their own
behaviour, military commanders must be prudent on a macro scale: balancing
the stipulated objectives of a mission to the objectives of the war, comparing
them to anticipated costs of operations, and – crucially – to the moral
requirements that prohibit certain types of behaviour. Any effective
commander is required to be prudent insofar as prudence is the skill that
allows balancing between options.
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However, the commander whose only interest is military effectiveness risks
jettisoning morality when it threatens to undermine mission effectiveness. The
virtuous commander, therefore, will be prudent in a way that not only allows
him to evaluate alternatives to determine the most effective way of
proceeding, but in a way that allows him to prioritise the various demands
according to their moral significance. Thus, the proper practice e of prudence
will not prefer strategy to morality, but recognise that the moral limitations on
war may at times make victory more difficult. However, it is only by adhering
to the moral parameters of war that victory becomes worthwhile.

The political leader is often posited as being duty-bound to defend the
interests of the nation. Although in some senses this is true, good political
leaders ought not to prefer their own nation’s interests to the interests of the
whole community. The virtuous political leader, therefore, will be concerned
not only with the nation’s good, but with the global common good. Defending
and upholding the common good requires political leaders to possess at least
three moral virtues: justice, prudence, and charity. Justice serves to assist
political leaders in adhering to the right intention criterion of jus ad bellum.
First, it encourages political leaders not to abuse their powers but only to go
to war when it is right for them to do so. However, having right intention is
one thing, but political leaders (at least democratically elected ones) are
representatives of the communities to whom they are subject, and therefore
ought to demonstrate their right intention to their people. Thus, just political
leaders will also be as transparent as is possible in demonstrating what their
reasons for going to war are, in order to generate trust from the population,
and to guarantee accountability and reasonable debate about the justice of the
cause.
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However, political leaders must exercise prudent discretion in determining
when, and to what extent, they must disclose information to their people. The
virtuous political leader must be experienced and capable in making practical
decisions about how to manage his own affairs and those of the nation. With
regard to engaging in war, prudence entails three steps: (i) taking counsel with
experts to ensure an informed decision is made; (ii) determining between the
various opinions, evidence, and moral requirements; and (iii) mobilising the
decision in the most efficient and just manner. Thus, prudential reasoning
flows through all of the jus ad bellum criteria, and helps to ensure that each of
the requirements is weighed and the costs are seriously considered before a
decision is made.

Finally, the virtue of charity assists political leaders in two ways. First, it
assists leaders in avoiding the temptation only to serve their own nation’s
interests and focus on the common good. Charitable leaders are less likely to
engage in nationalistic wars, instead seeing war only as a means of restoring
justice. Further, charity allows leaders not only to fulfil their negative duties
against violating the rights of other states, but to fulfil positive duties to
protect other nations against aggression in cases where intervention does not
necessarily serve national interests. The virtue of charity serves to motivate
leaders to at least consider assisting other nations who are the victims of unjust
aggression even when it might be costly for the intervening nation. Of course,
the decision to intervene, like all other decisions, must be governed by
prudence lest a political leader overcommit to too many noble causes at the
cost of vital national resources.
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On this final point, the virtue of charity to debates around intervention and
the so-called “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), this thesis offers a new
contribution to the literature. By suggesting that R2P be appraised through the
lens of aretaic ethics and the personal virtue of political leaders, I challenge
the popular conceptualisation of the ethics of intervention in legal and
deontological terms. In fact, emphasising the virtue of charity means
challenges the entire framework in which R2P exists by arguing that the
protection of the innocent is not chiefly a matter of responsibility, but of virtue.
Under a charitable framework, the relevant question in R2P is not whether (i)
the victim state has a right to be defended, and (ii) other states have a duty to
positively uphold that right. Charitable political leaders will not be concerned
with whether morality demands them to lend assistance; rather, they will lend
assistance when that assistance prudently and charitably serves the common
good. Nations may not have the right to demand intervention on their behalf,
but even if that were true, it would not forbid political leaders from
intervening; it would simply make such intervention supererogatory. Thus,
the complementarity of aretaic and deontological ethics can once again be
brought to bear on an ongoing debate in the literature.

2: Further Research

Each of the points of originality highlighted above would serve as a fruitful
area of further inquiry in its own right, but my ability to explore these
questions in full has been restricted by the demands of writing a thesis. In this
section I suggest two pressing questions that arise directly as a result of what
has been established here.
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The first question would have, in a longer work, been explored in a chapter
immediately following chapter five. That is, having established that the
virtues are a necessary component in ensuring morally upstanding conduct in
war, the subsequent question is how educational and military institutions
could develop those virtues in military personnel. Having established that the
virtues are important for moral conduct and why they are important – what
remains is to explore how to implement the changes I have recommended.
Although there is a growing literature on training soldiers in the virtues, 12
most of this work fails to take the holistic approach to moral development
called for in chapter four. Instead, many virtue training programs are focussed
on the development of professional virtues. Thus, these education systems
risk being complicit in the development of fragmentation and psychological
scarring. More work needs to be done exploring how to make military training
in the virtues consistent with a universal morality rather than a professioncentric system. What consequences this may have for military training, how
to implement this most effectively, and where such an education should be
housed are all important questions to be answered by further research.

The second question that appears to emerge from this research is more directly
connected to the psychological experience of political leaders, commanders,
and soldiers. If, as insights from aretaic ethics have revealed, the moral and
psychological wellbeing of individuals can be dramatically affected by what
they choose to do in war and the way they think about their actions, there

C.f. Berghaus & Cartagena, op cit.; Peter Olsthoorn, Military Ethics and Virtues: An
Interdisciplinary Approach for the 21st Century, (London: Routledge, 2011); Dean-Peter Baker,
‘Making Good Better: A Proposal for Teaching Ethics at the Service Academies’, Journal of
Military Ethics, vol. 11, iss. 3, 2012, 208-222.
12
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appear to be good reasons for further research into the correlation between the
moral frameworks military personnel utilise when thinking about ethics, and
the psychological toll of what they are required to do. If, as some evidence
indicates, there is a correlation between PTSD symptoms, intentional killing,
and the killer’s beliefs about whether his victim deserved to die,13 then it follows
that a soldier’s beliefs about the morality of intentional killing will bear on his
experience of PTSD. It is worth investigating whether this is true in practice,
and if so, which framework for explaining intentional killing is most effective
in guarding against moral and psychological trauma. Of course, the effective
approaches must then be examined vis-à-vis the objective morality of that
approach (for instance, racist propaganda may protect against psychological
trauma, but that alone will not justify it), but the insights provided by this kind
of empirical research will provide vital insights into how best to train and
inoculate soldiers especially, but also political leaders and military
commanders, from the darker sides of their vocation.

3: Final Reflections

This thesis argues, generally speaking, that the incorporation of aretaic ethics
within JWT will be of benefit to two separate groups: military ethicists whose
work relies on JWT to explain the morality of war, and military practitioners
who are required to fight the wars that ethicists study. Aretaic ethics, I argue,
will be of benefit to those two different fields in different ways. To the military

Nicola S. Gray, Nicole G. Carman, Paul Rogers et. al., ‘Post-traumatic stress disorder
caused in mentally disordered offenders by the committing of serious sexual or violent
crimes’, Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, vol. 14, iss. 1, 2003, 27-43 at 40.
13
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ethicist aretaic ethics offers a new framework through which to address
controversial issues within military ethics, as well as availing theorists to new
questions which have previously not been considered within the purview of
JWT. To the military practitioner, aretaic ethics offers three things. First, a new
way of understanding the professions responsible for just war decisions.
Second, supporting mechanisms to enhance ethical compliance with
deontological norms. Finally, third, a coherent way of appreciating both the
rule-compliant

and

supererogatory

aspects

of

professionalism,

and

distinguishing them from one another. Whilst these arguments are made
throughout the thesis, their originality and benefit to academics and
practitioners alike warrants reiterating them succinctly here.

3.1: Academic Benefits

A large part of my argument in this thesis is to emphasise the conceptual
complementarity and connection between deontological and aretaic aspects of
military ethics, and thus the applicability of aretaic ethics to hotly-contested
questions in the military ethics literature (such as, at various points in the
thesis, torture, sacrifice, intervention, and supreme emergency). Although my
primary motivation for this is to ensure that any recommendations for just war
decision-makers were founded in logically coherent philosophical analysis, an
additional benefit of this path of argument has been to demonstrate to
academic military ethicists the availability of aretaic ethics as an alternative
and, for the most part, novel framework for considering traditional and topical
ethical issues in the military.
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As I argue in chapter two, contemporary JWT is dominated by deontological,
rights-based reasoning and is closely connected to discussions of the
international law of war. Just war theorists adopting this framework usually
understand moral questions about war as being concerned with either
conflicting rights or rights violations. Almost invariably, moral debates under
deontological formulations of JWT can be reduced to debates between
absolute and threshold deontology – i.e. “rights may never be intentionally
violated” versus “rights may occasionally be intentionally violated if the
stakes are high enough.” Examples of this type of thinking that I explore in
this thesis include debates regarding torture and supreme emergencies. The
question for most contemporary just war theorists is not whether torture
violates the basic rights of persons, but if and when those rights violations are
morally justifiable through reference to some greater good that is brought
about or greater evil that is avoided through the commission of acts of torture.

Those questions which are not reducible to a debate between threshold and
absolute deontology are usually reducible to a debate between obligation and
privilege. In these cases, proponents argue that a particular individual or
group possesses certain basic rights that form obligations not to violate them:
for instance, a person’s right not to be unjustly attacked forms an obligation
not to attack that person. However, whether rights entail positive duties on
others alongside the negative duties described above is unclear. Does a
person’s right not to be unjustly attacked constitute an obligation for all people
to protect the unjust from attack? Debates of this nature lie at the heart of
another group of contemporary debates in military ethics: humanitarian
intervention, risk minimisation in warfare, and Responsibility to Protect.
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The inclusion of aretaic ethics within the discussion provides new factors to
consider in addressing topical issues like intervention and torture. The
incorporation of aretaic concerns into military ethics debates does not only
provide fresh perspectives through which to explore ethical questions, but
overcomes the risk of reducing complex moral questions to basic
philosophical disputes regarding the categorisation of particular actions as,
for instance, ‘rights-violating’ or ‘rights-respecting.’ Instead, aretaic ethics
encourages consideration of factors that are grounded in the character,
dispositions, and motivations of the agent, as well as what the moral
consequences of performing particular deeds are on the agent. By
supplementing deontological readings with aretaic thinking, just war theorists
are able to describe more accurately and completely the nature of moral and
immoral conduct in war, which is the chief subject of inquiry.

As well as providing fresh methods for describing the morality of war, aretaic
ethics provides new means of evaluating the morality of particular military
decisions. For instance, we might ask whether, even if there could ever be such
a thing as a supreme emergency, would the saving of a community be worth
the moral devastation on the character of the political leader who sanctioned
such severe moral transgressions? Or, for military personnel, even if a person
can be proved to have forfeited his right not to be tortured, what would the
consequences of making oneself a torturer be? Could the vice necessary to
commit allegedly morally justifiable deeds render them immoral?

Aretaic frameworks challenges the traditional methods of determining
whether an act is morally justifiable, and in so doing, re-centres JWT on the
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people who are responsible for making military decisions, not the actions
those people decide to undertake. In focussing on the people responsible for
moral conduct, aretaic ethics also provides ethicists with a means by which to
bridge moral and psychological questions. As military institutions begin to
show increasing concern for the psychological effects of war on soldiers,
philosophers need to recognise the important role they are able to play in
explaining and understanding the psychological injuries that soldiers have
been reporting. Aretaic ethics provides a lens through which to subject
apparently psychological data to ethical analysis. Thus, a combined approach
to military ethics that incorporates both deontological and aretaic ethics is able
to (i) include psychological concerns, findings, and data within its analysis on
war and therefore expand its explanative power; and (ii) make military ethics
more relevant and applicable to clinical psychological treatments for soldiers
and veterans. The possibilities for inter-disciplinary solutions to some of the
pressing problems of the contemporary military is one particularly promising
outcome of the synthesis of different aspects of morality in JWT.

These two benefits – new frameworks to evaluate old questions and the
availability of entirely new topics of analysis – are the benefits of incorporating
aretaic ethics into JWT. However, before I move on I must address one
possible criticism to what I have argued thus far: namely, why do these new
frameworks and questions need to be considered within JWT? There are
military ethicists who are not just war theorists and who are not deontologists;
why not simply leave them to explore the aretaic aspects of military ethics
rather than forcing JWT to make room for it?
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There are several answers to this question. The first is to say that although
there are military ethicists who do not describe themselves as just war
theorists, they are few and far between. JWT is overwhelmingly the
predominant framework for evaluating the ethical conditions under which
war can be justified. As such, the adoption of aretaic ethics by just war
theorists demonstrates the seriousness of aretaic matters to military ethics. It
is not my desire to see aretaic considerations as a niche sub-discipline of
military ethics; rather, aretaic matters should permeate every aspect of ethical
reasoning in the military. The second response is that, as I argue throughout
this thesis, a satisfactory theory of the morality of war must incorporate both
deontological and aretaic concerns. JWT is, and is likely to remain, the
dominant representation of deontological thinking (in both its moral and legal
forms) within war, and as such, is the theory within which the best
deontological thinking and theorists reside. For this reason, the incorporation
of aretaic ethics into JWT represents the best chance of developing a
comprehensive morality of war that addresses both aretaic and deontological
concerns.

3.2: Benefits to Decision-Makers

The incorporation of aretaic ethics into JWT is also of great benefit to those
individuals for whom military ethics discussions are not merely academic
questions, but real decisions they will have to make. In the case of
professionals who have to make just war decisions, the incorporation of
aretaic ethics specifically into JWT (as opposed to as an independent theory or
field of study) is somewhat less important than it is for academics. However,
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it is still important for two reasons. First, because the inclusion of aretaic ethics
into JWT ensures that aretaic questions will interact with deontological ones –
both of which are centrally important for military practitioner. And secondly,
if JWT was to adopt aretaic ethics as part of its purview, it would effectively
ensure that all those trained in ethics by Western militaries would enjoy
familiarity with aretaic thinking as JWT enjoys a central place in the ethical
training of military personnel. It is important that aretaic ethics be part of the
ethical training of military personnel because of the benefits I outline in this
section.

Perhaps the most beneficial outcome of this thesis for just war decision-makers
is

the

development

of

a

coherent,

ethically-sensitive

account

of

professionalism. Although soldiers, commanders, and (to a lesser extent,
perhaps ironically) political leaders are expected to conduct themselves with
professionalism, the term is used so interchangeably and varyingly that the
precise meaning of the concept risks being lost. What does it mean, ethically
speaking, to be a professional? Adopting the findings of this thesis explains to
military professionals that being a professional entails several commitments
on behalf of the individual, including:

- Commitments to acting in particular ways (fulfilling one’s duties)
whilst functioning as a professional;
- Accepting the values of the profession as one’s own values, seeking to
instantiate, characterise, and uphold those values wherever possible;
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- Submitting oneself to having one’s conduct, proficiency, and
professionalism evaluated according to adherence to these duties and
values;
- Personalising externally-determined standards of excellence for the
profession and striving to achieve them wherever possible;
- Commitments to particular ways of being – that is, accepting a
particular role as being in some way constitutive of one’s identity.

Understanding professionalism in this way allows those who commit to the
professions of political leadership, military command, or soldiering to fully
understand what it is they are subjecting themselves to. For instance, if a
soldier refused a particularly risky mission on the basis that “for me, this is
just a job, and I’m not dying for my job,” it could be pointed out to him that
soldiering is not, in fact, a job, but a profession, and that he knew this from the
start and chose to join the profession anyway. More clearly explaining what it
means to be a professional and how professional duties and virtues interact is
one area where this thesis offers a great deal to military practitioners.

Developing the idea of professionalism, this thesis – specifically, the aretaic
elements of this thesis – offers just war practitioners a comprehensive account
of the complex and influential role that one’s identity and beliefs about one’s
identity can have on the moral and psychological wellbeing of an individual.
Recognising the moral significance of psychological factors in military
practitioners includes recognising how beliefs about one’s profession can
affect the way in which individuals see themselves. If they see their profession
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as being consistent with other values and identities they hold to be morally
good or valuable, then it is easy for them to see their profession as equally
valuable. However, if the duties and values of their profession require them
to act in ways that seem at odds with their lives outside of the profession,
individuals are likely to struggle to reconcile these different aspects of their
lives, leading to possible psychological fragmentations that threaten moral
and psychological wellbeing. For military practitioners, the provision of a
comprehensive explanation of the moral and psychological power of identity
and beliefs about identity gives impetus to consider seriously whether
institutional, cultural, and privately held beliefs about what professional
identity means are consistent with the ethical values of society in general. That
is, are just war decision-makers’ beliefs about what it means to be a good
soldier, political leader, or military commander consistent with their views of
what it means to be a good human being? If not, the findings of this thesis
indicate that we should expect disharmonious beliefs about different identities
to manifest in moral and psychological trauma.

As well as providing means of anticipating, predicting, and preventing moral
and psychological trauma, this thesis may provide just war decision-makers
with something all military personnel desire: a sympathetic citizenry. In
giving voice to the psychological and moral trauma that military professionals
undertake in order to perform their roles – roles that are ultimately designed
to protect citizens and defend the common good that citizens benefit from
most – this thesis and publications proceeding from it may provide citizens
with deeper insight and understanding into trauma than is currently
available. In so doing, this thesis might provide some insight into the enormity
of moral labour and virtuous character that is required to conduct oneself well
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in matters of war and morality and, in so doing, develop some sympathy for
the difficulty involved. This benefit is one that is particularly indebted to the
introduction of aretaic thinking into the thesis. Aretaic ethics concerns itself
primarily with the agent, it is able to understand the multitude of different
factors that can affect, undermine, or support a person’s ability to do the right
thing. Because of this, aretaic ethics is able to describe unethical behaviour in
a way that does not excuse it, but does identify the various possible reasons
for the behaviour. In so doing, this thesis may provide military practitioners
with a sense that although their actions will be judged, they will be judged
with sensitivity and empathy to the immense moral and psychological
difficulty of the environment just war decision-makers face, and the
complexity of the decisions they have to make.

Further, as Western militaries continue to insist that their personnel not only
comply with professional duty but strive for professional excellence, the
distinction between professional duties and professional excellence will
become increasingly relevant. Aretaic ethics, as I interpret it in this thesis,
offers not only a description of what professional excellence might consist in
for soldiers, military commanders, and political leaders, but a guide to
understanding professional excellence from a moral standpoint. I describe
excellence in military professions as consisting in in the performance of
supererogatory deeds which further the basic moral purposes of military or
political institutions. Although they are often described as going “above and
beyond the call of duty,” it might be more accurate to describe acts of
professional excellence as acts done (i) by a professional, (ii) for the
advancement of the moral purposes of the profession, (iii) when no duty could
compel him to do so.
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Finally, this thesis – in particular its aretaic focus – justifies Western militaries’
interest in the virtues as means of ensuring moral conduct. This thesis shows
how moral duties will typically fail to provide individuals with sufficient
motivation to comply if the individual is completely lacking in certain virtues.
It is therefore necessary both to teach moral duties and inculcate the virtues
into those on whom those duties bear. If educators do not take the time to
develop the virtues of professionals during their training, they risk higher
rates of moral transgression because individuals will feel no personal
motivation to do what is right when it becomes difficult, inexpedient, or selfdamaging to do so.

Thinking seriously about the moral dimensions of military practice means
accepting that there are serious moral questions beyond those that describe
actions as right or wrong. The moral life is, we know, far further reaching than
a right/wrong dichotomy could possibly encapsulate. Absolute moral
principles matter; so too does deontology. However, it is not all that there is.
Ethics is, or at least can be, a science dedicated to the perfection of humans in
their fullest nature. That involves a full recognition of humanity as mental,
moral, communal, and spiritual – in a word, bigger – than deontological ethics
alone is able to describe. If we are willing and ready to see soldiers,
commanders, and political leaders as human beings first and professionals
second, then we must first see the morality of war as being primarily
concerned with humanity proper. The breadth, richness, and complexity with
which we conceive military ethics is the breadth, richness, and complexity
with which we understand humanity itself.
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